

RENDER UNTO KAISER

A TRANSKEI DOSSIER



BARRY STREEK AND RICHARD WICKSTEED

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Far from proving the viability of segregation, Transkei is destroying it — and, almost unknown to the South African government and the National Party with the exception perhaps of a few planners, that experiment in separate development is turning into a monster. It is a bizarre story, and many of its chapters are known best by the long-suffering people of the territory and their relatives in South Africa's urban areas. In blissful ignorance, white political parties and the government talk about constellations, federations, and confederations as though the Transkei experiment is a success; it is held out as a carrot to other homeland leaders; yet it remains a dumping ground for redundant people some official has classified as 'Transkeian'. For the Brothers Matanzima, Transkei has provided status, power and wealth; for the chiefs, a measure of the same rewards; but for the mass of the people, 'independence' has meant nothing except more poverty, more oppression and fewer citizenship rights. It is indeed a case of 'Render Unto Kaiser' — and in Transkei there are very few aspects of life which do not fall under the sway of his ubiquitous authority.



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Render unto Kaiser: A Transkei dossier

VERYGOOD



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**BARRY STREEK AND
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**RAVAN PRESS
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We have come to a closer understanding — through writing this book — of the day-to-day hardships and struggles of the great mass of people to whom the bantustan system represents nothing less than the root cause of their poverty and exploitation. It is to these people, especially those living in Transkei, that this book is dedicated.

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INTRODUCTION

One of us was talking recently to a senior journalist on an Afrikaans, very pro-Nationalist newspaper when the conversation turned to Transkei and its political leaders, President Kaiser Matanzima and his brother, Prime Minister George Matanzima. His reaction was immediate and instinctive: 'Them? Those two brothers are the Papa Docs of Southern Africa.' The more one examines the events following October 1976 in that beautiful, over-populated region of Southern Africa, the more it becomes apparent that his was not an unfair description of the Brothers Matanzima, and the system of government they head.

Five years ago, Transkei became the first Bantustan to gain its 'independence' under the Verwoerd-inspired policy of apartheid or separate development. No other 'homeland' was better placed to justify the case for partition — if it could be justified. Transkei had a tradition of tribal rule, it was geographically (well, almost) consolidated and it appeared as if its leadership had the overwhelming backing of the people. Willingly or unwillingly South African taxpayers have pumped millions each year into the territory. It is turning into a disastrous investment.

Far from proving the viability of segregation, Transkei is destroying it — and, almost unknown to the South African government and the National Party with the exception perhaps of a few planners, that experiment in separate development is turning into a monster. It is a bizarre story, and many of its chapters are known best by the long-suffering people of the territory and their relatives in South Africa's urban areas. In blissful ignorance, white political parties and the government talk

about constellations, federations, and confederations as though the Transkei experiment is a success; it is held out as a carrot to other homeland leaders; yet it remains a dumping ground for redundant people some official has classified as 'Transkeian'.

After some acquaintance with what is really happening in Transkei, we felt it necessary — indeed urgent — to bring the facts of life in that region to the attention of as many people as possible. It has not been necessary for us to develop complicated academic theories, or to delve into the fond beliefs of those politicians who have preached separation for so long. The facts in Transkei speak for themselves. They tell concerned South Africans and others what separation has meant to some three million people who were deprived of their South African citizenship and made 'independent' without any meaningful choice.

Because there is so much ignorance and so little analysis of what is happening in Transkei, we felt this book had to be written now. Fuller and more detailed studies of events in that territory will, we hope, be produced. Today, the public needs to know why the attempt at separation is failing; why the South African government — aided perhaps by big business — will try and save it; and how the South African taxpayer's money is being used to fund and perpetuate an illusion.

For the Brothers Matanzima, Transkei has provided status, power and wealth; for the chiefs, a measure of the same rewards; it has led to the creation of a tight security network; but for the mass of the people, 'independence' has meant nothing except more poverty, more oppression and fewer citizenship rights. It is indeed a case of 'Render Unto Kaiser' — and in Transkei there are very few aspects of life which do not fall under the sway of his ubiquitous authority. In this study, we have documented these developments and shown how it was possible for them to occur, how money has been wasted and how the system of government has been constituted. We have shown how the need for money continues to drive thousands of Transkeians onto the South African labour market — and why big business, as well as the South African government, likes to keep it that way.

In spite of Total Strategy the grand Nationalist dream is slowly turning to a nightmare in Transkei. We think we have shown how and why this has occurred. And we hope that we have given those outside Transkei due warning of what the system is doing to those inside that 'land of a dying illusion'.

Chapter One

THE COUNTRY

THEY COULDN'T REFUSE

Engineered Consent in Transkei

In view of the considerable volume of evidence that black South Africans reject the concept of separate homelands, particularly independent homelands, the apparent support both for independence and for the governing party in Transkei is surprising. The explanation, however, is far from surprising: there never has been a free and fair test of Transkeian opinion.

Through the use of dubious electoral techniques, the connivance of South African government officials who simply had to make separate development work or lose their jobs, the considerable powers given to government-paid chiefs, the extensive use of wide-ranging security laws and other measures, 'support' for Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima's Transkei Independence Party was ensured.

It has certainly appeared as if Paramount Chief Matanzima had popular support — and this enabled Pretoria to grant Transkei 'independence' on October 26, 1976, in fulfilment of its policy of separation. But, in the light of what evidence there is from outside Transkei about black opinion on independent homelands, this appearance of support within the territory is simply too good to be true.

If the techniques employed to manipulate popular opinion were successful before October 1976, they have been applied with such relish since then that in 1980 the four members of the executive of the official opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party, could be detained for 46 days along with eight members of its Youth League. They were released after the Attorney-General declined to prosecute them on the basis of the police dossier.¹ In July the

opposition's executive was refused permission to meet in terms of the emergency proclamations.²

Clearly consent for the government in Transkei has been engineered. It is important to analyse how this has been done.

OPPOSITION TO THE HOMELANDS

The published surveys of black opinion in South Africa have shown a clear-cut rejection of the government's policy of separate and eventually independent homelands for African people. Professor Lawrence Schlemmer summed this up in his analysis of the results of the attitude survey conducted for the Quail Commission:³ 'Apart from some staunch supporters of the National Party government, few observers of the political scene would assume that any significant support for the policy of separate development exists among black people who live permanently outside of the homeland territories.'

He did, however, say that he had found in 1972 that a substantial proportion of Zulu-speakers living permanently in the Durban area identified strongly with rural or 'homeland' areas — but analysis 'revealed that often the reaction against the urban area was based not so much on political conviction as on the experience of the social costs of living in poor circumstances in a white-dominated environment.'⁴ He said similar patterns had been found by Mayer among Xhosa respondents.⁵

A later study found that the pattern of responses by migrants was associated with the extent to which they had investments, such as cattle and land, in the rural areas⁶ although a survey conducted by a market research firm, Markinor, established that 'a clear majority of Africans within the homelands approved of the homeland policy, on the grounds of some form of black separatism, the privilege of owning land and houses, the opportunity to raise cattle and farm and the desire to preserve traditions.' Schlemmer points out, however, that in the Markinor study 'no attempt appears to have been made to establish whether or not the reaction of respondents was due largely to intrinsic appreciation of the benefits of the policy or to a reaction against discrimination in the urban areas.'⁷

Most of the limited political research has revealed a preference for a unified South Africa and a universal franchise, certainly

among urban Africans. The Arnold Bergstrasser Institute study, moreover, established among urban African leadership a clear majority rejection of the homeland policy.⁸

Edelstein found among black youth in Soweto that 88,5 per cent believed 'black South Africans (should) form one nation irrespective of tribal origin,' 70 percent wanted multi-racial government and only 13 percent wanted 'tribal' government, while 68,7 percent opted for a 'Western' way of life.⁹

Mayer said one of the most clear-cut findings of his research among black people in Johannesburg was that 'exclusive tribal patriotism seems almost to have died in Soweto,' and that 'ideologically, it is race and class oppositions that are claimed to matter, while ethnic oppositions are denied or simply shrugged off.' He also found that 'the homelands have very little to offer the urban dwellers' and that in East London and Mdantsane (which is technically in the Ciskei) 'people expressed their dread of being sent back to homelands — as they put it — "to starve".'¹⁰

A more recent survey found that none of 19 discussion groups drawn from black urban people identified with the homelands. It was reported that black views were consistent — irrespective of age, sex or geographic location.¹¹

Little satisfactory research has been conducted in the rural areas and even less in places where the views of blacks can be 'freely' expressed without fear of victimisation — but Schlemmer's research for the Quail Commission can only raise doubts about election results in Transkei, particularly in view of the feelings specifically expressed about the independence of the territory.

His sample was 700 Xhosa-speaking people who were not Transkeian or formally associated with Transkei — the Quail Commission investigated the possible independence of the Ciskei — and it was spread over urban and rural areas both in the Ciskei and in the major cities of the Cape and Transvaal. He also compared these responses with those of Pedi- and Zulu-speaking people in Soweto.

He found that 91 percent found the current situation in the Ciskei to be 'meaningless' to them and only one-fifth of those living in the urban areas of the homeland had any positive feelings about the policy. Only 36 percent reacted positively to the possibility of the Ciskei gaining independence, a figure which declined to 19 percent in the Western Cape and Transvaal. 'The most favourable responses came from older people, Ciskei urban

dwellers, people of lower socio-economic status and those owning houses or cattle in the Ciskei, but even in these groups the proportion supporting the idea only slightly exceeded 40 percent.¹² He also found that while the Pedi, Zulu and Xhosa respondents felt that an independent homeland constituted an improvement on the perceptions of the present, it presented no real gain over the prospects perceived in South Africa at the end of the decade. The extent of this response was reflected by the finding that 42 percent of all Xhosa interviewed would neither apply for a homeland passport nor vote in homeland elections.

Only 27 percent of all respondents felt that the independence moves of Transkei and Bophutatswana had been positive, while 44 percent thought they had been negative and a further eight percent felt there had been no change. 'Some variation according to area is apparent: only 16 percent of city Xhosa and 15 percent of migrant workers felt that the effects of independence had been positive, compared with 24 percent among those in the urban Ciskei.

'Among the reasons for assessing the independence of these two territories positively, economic opportunity, education and freedom from discrimination feature prominently. The reasons for assessing the independence of the territories negatively reflect considerable awareness of conditions in the Transkei. The heavy taxation was the most prominent reason, particularly among migrant workers. Other reasons are the expected ones of lack of employment opportunity, restrictions on freedom of movement, loss of South African citizenship, high prices and a high range of practical and materialistic concerns.'¹³

An examination of the detailed responses shows that negative feelings towards Transkei's independence are to be found among rural Xhosa, as well as among the more predictably antagonistic people in the urban areas outside of the Ciskei. Thus, 43,9 percent of the people owning cattle gave negative responses, while the response of the more traditional Xhosa ranged from a 43,6 to a 47,6 percent negative vote. Altogether, 52 percent of rural Ciskeians responded negatively towards Transkei's independence and 48,8 percent of migrants. Only among people living in the urban areas of the Ciskei were there more positive feelings than negative responses to independence: 37,8 percent compared to 26,5 percent.¹⁴

Schlemmer did find, however, that over 70 percent of the

Xhosa said they would be willing to accept the notion that Africans have 'rights and a future in homelands like the Ciskei but should govern themselves completely.' This type of response to the survey was also reflected among both the Soweto Zulu and the Soweto Pedi. He comments: 'These rather aberrant results may indicate that the independence of the Transkei, Bophutatswana and by implication that of any of the other homelands under the present dispensation is seen as a white-imposed arrangement with Pretoria dictating circumstances to a great degree. Somehow the notion of 'complete self-government' carries with it the belief for quite a substantial proportion of blacks that an autonomous legitimate black government of the homeland could do a great deal to improve the lot of its citizens.'¹⁵

To extend this further, it would seem that the people surveyed saw the independence of Transkei as white-imposed from Pretoria and therefore regarded the territory's government as illegitimate.

In line with the other surveys Schlemmer found the overwhelming preference of all groups surveyed was for one-man-one-vote in a unified South Africa: 90 percent of all Xhosa opted for this, while 92 percent of the Soweto Zulu and 97 percent of the Soweto Pedi also supported this approach. 'The notion of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state clearly has pride of place in the preferences of Africans all over South Africa. This for decades has been the goal of the ANC and of the black intelligentsia — it is the eminently 'respectable' solution espoused by exile groups and much of world opinion, and is implicit in the gospel message of the unity of mankind as interpreted by most present-day Christian spokesmen.

'In terms of what people are realistically willing to accept, however, certain other alternatives are not far short of the ideal, and for some groups are equally attractive. For the rural and urban Ciskeian residents, the Eastern Cape Xhosa and migrant workers from the Ciskei, enlarged, economically viable and independent (one presumes "truly" independent) homelands are equally attractive as one-man-one-vote . . . For all Xhosa except the "city people" three-way "consociational" rule by homeland leaders, elected leaders and whites almost attains the popularity of the larger homeland and one-man-one-vote options . . . The results suggest that for all except the highly modern and politicised city Xhosa, the field of political options is fairly wide open for negotiation, *provided that the present-day homeland status is not*

included as an option.' (Our emphasis)¹⁶

It is understandable that Schlemmer should conclude 'that the present homeland dispensation, with or without independence, has an image among most blacks which all but destroys its acceptability as an alternative for the future in their eyes.'¹⁷

It is possible, but highly unlikely, that Transkeians, or rather those classified by Pretoria and Umtata as Transkeians, have different views. Stultz has a valid point when, conceding with Southall that Matanzima 'had little claim to a popular mandate for leading the Transkei to independence,' he goes on to say that Southall had not demonstrated 'his more sweeping contention that a majority of Transkei citizens either "strongly opposed" Transkei independence or were "pressurised" (presumably against their wishes) to accept it.'¹⁸

But, in view of the survey findings, particularly those of the 1979 Quail Commission, the likelihood of Southall's claim being correct is pretty strong: in the post-October 1976 period, only extensive repressive measures have made it possible for the Matanzimas to control a visible and extensive dissent.

The rejection of Transkei's independence was underlined by a comment of Schlemmer's: 'It is this author's view that the pending independence of the Transkei in June 1976 contributed to the mounting tension among the group which by all accounts took a lead in the disturbances, the Xhosa-language youth.'¹⁹ Kane-Berman agreed: 'The looming independence of the Transkei almost certainly played a role in heightening tension in Soweto and other townships in the months immediately preceding 16 June 1976.' He added that the black anger in Soweto was 'almost certainly a contributing factor in the continuing disturbances when, contrary to Matanzima's assurances, Xhosa-speaking people discovered that they had lost their South African citizenship.' Ten days before October 26 that year, Matanzima could only draw 2 000 people to a 'celebration' meeting in Dobsonville, adjoining Soweto.

In Cape Town's black areas, Transkei's independence was greeted with the worst series of violent outbreaks in a month. Police opened fire on a mob marching on the Guguletu police station, and later confirmed that 'several hundred' in the crowd had been wounded. There were incidents of stoning in both Guguletu and Langa throughout the night and on the eve of 'independence' police described the situation as 'very tense'.^{19a}

Even the Cillie Commission into the 1976 disturbances in South Africa said that although the homeland policy was not a direct cause of the riots, 'differences over the policy were sometimes the reason for actions which gave motivation for insurrection. Dissatisfaction with the policy and the feeling of frustration over certain aspects of the policy contributed to a degree to the general inclination for resistance and insurrection.' The Commission felt that homeland residents were, on the whole, in favour of the system, but that 'a considerable number' of city dwellers were against it. The Commission found three reasons among others for their attitude: that the surface area of the homelands was too small for the number of inhabitants; that the borders were not adequately defined nor sufficiently consolidated; the policy that blacks could not own ground in the white areas; rejection of the citizenship certificates; the compulsory link to a particular homeland; and the necessity for permits which had to be renewed. It pointed out that the slogan 'Away with Bantustans' frequently appeared on posters and in pamphlets. Other than a reference to intimidation against some people who wished to celebrate Transkei's independence in Cape Town, there is no direct reference to Transkei as a cause of the disturbances, but the reasons for rejecting the homeland policy make it clear, once again, that support for an 'independent' Transkei was minimal, at least outside the territory where the pressures to give at least token support to the system are not so great.^{19b}

This rejection was illustrated with shocking clarity shortly after October 26. Thirty thousand people fled from the Herschel district to the harsh, remote Thornhill area of the Ciskei rather than live in an independent Transkei. Herschel had been part of the Ciskei but was transferred to Transkei, without a referendum, shortly before independence. By January 1977, the official death figure among the refugees was 69, but the actual figure was almost certainly higher with some reports putting the death rate at 300.²⁰ Even then, more refugees from Herschel had to be prevented from settling at Thornhill: on one day in January 1977, 500 families had to be stopped from fleeing.²¹ And eventually the South African government enforced an April 30, 1977, deadline on more refugees. In March 1976, a newspaper could report: 'People from Herschel, which has become part of the Transkei, say it is hell living there,' and then quote residents to back up its story.²²

As indications are that Herschel was not the only district of hell in Transkei in October 1976, it is necessary to examine how it was possible for Pretoria and Umtata to make it look as though it was the nearest thing to heaven.

PROCLAMATION 400: A RECIPE FOR TYRANNY

When the first self-government elections were held in Transkei in 1963, the restrictions on political activities in the rest of South Africa, including the outlawing of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, were in force in the territory. There is no need to examine these here, but to understand how support could be engineered for 'independence' in 1976 it is essential to analyse the emergency regulations enforced throughout the pre-independence period in terms of Proclamation R400. (Both Pretoria and Umtata nevertheless maintained that there was no emergency, saying that these vast powers were only necessary to maintain law and order, and to protect chiefs from violent attacks.)

In terms of the proclamation a Bantu Commissioner, or a commissioned or non-commissioned officer of the South African Police (later Transkei Police) could arrest and detain any person for interrogation for an unlimited period if the officer concerned suspected that such a person had taken part, or intended to take part, in the commission of any offence, or that the person had information about the offence. The detainee could then be interrogated at the place of detention and held until 'the said person has answered fully and truthfully all questions put to him which have any bearing upon the said offence or intended offence.' The person could not consult with a legal adviser on any matter unless the Minister of Police authorised it. A detainee could be released at any time by the Minister on conditions he could determine.

In 1963, the year of the first elections, 592 people were detained under these provisions. (In that year, the South African Police also detained the secretary of the Eastern Pondoland People's Party, Leonard Mdingi, in Durban although he and seven others of his party had been nominated for the election — he was held for the duration of the campaign²³ — and imposed restriction orders on Hamington Majija, a member of the Liberal Party, who

had been campaigning for election.)

The following table indicates just how many people were detained in the pre-independence self-government period:

PROCLAMATION R400 (1963 – 1976)

Year	Detained	Convicted	Released Without Charge
1963	592	?	?
1964	86	?	?
1965	137	32	74
1966	109	16	72
1967	19	3	15
1968	32	3	27
1969	26	4	22
1970/ March 1971	37	—	13
1971	30	—	1
1972	6	—	5
1973	30	—	1
1974	19	?	—
1975	3	—	3
June 1976/ Nov 1976	44	?	3
	1 170	58	261

(Figures taken from the *Annual Survey of Race Relations*, published by the SA Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.)

The table shows that between 1965 and 1976 at least 492 people were detained without trial under Proclamation R400 and that 261 of them — that is, over 53 percent — were released without charge.

Not surprisingly, opposition complaints about Proclamation R400 were persistent, but without effect. Among these were:

'I assure you that 99 out of 100 cases in gaol at present are innocent. I was released last May and I left a number of them who are still there. In fact, some of them have died. Why prolong this injustice?' *Mr C N Nogcantsi, 17 May 1964.*²⁴

'I want to tell the house that I have also had experience of detention. In my prison card the Proclamation quoted was R400 and I was being

questioned as to why I was opposed to this Constitution and why I was favouring another.' *Mr L Z Majija, 27 May 1964.*²⁵

'The main argument against this piece of legislation is that first and foremost power is given into the uncouth hands of men who are ignorant of human rights, men who are ignorant of what is happening in the world, men who want to practise malpractices on their citizens without hindrance.' *Mr C Diko, now a deputy minister in Transkei, 28 April 1965.*²⁶

'In Engcobo there were two stock thieves in my area who accused two people of being members of Poqo and one of these people was a chief of the Hala clan who persecuted thieves. That chief was arrested for a period of eight months. On his return there was not a single beast left at his kraal, and these cattle were stolen by the very thieves who reported the thief.' *Mr G G Kutu, 30 April 1971.*²⁷

'Some of the chiefs who transgressed the terms of Proclamation R400 were arrested, but when they were released from gaol, they were not reinstated if they were not on the Government side.' *Chief Mdanjelwa Mtirara, 30 April 1971.*²⁸

In 1969, a TNIP member of the Legislative Assembly, Mr B Langa, was detained under the emergency regulations, but it was only on the eve of the pre-independence elections in 1976 that they were used to the full to limit opposition and engineer consent. After listening to the then Chief Minister, Kaiser Matanzima, warning in the Legislative Assembly that those opposed to his government should use constitutional means to voice their aims, the leader of the Democratic Party, Mr Hector Ncokazi, was detained in terms of Proclamation R400.²⁹

In a three-day swoop, police rounded up the DP's only two elected members of the Legislative Assembly, Mr A S Xobololo and Mr L L Mgudlwa, its national chairman, Mr J B Nkosiyané, the secretary of its most active region (Dalindyebo), Ms Florence Mangcotywa, her assistant, Mr P S Fadana, and a former government clerk, Mr Loyisa Mpumlwana.

While the Chief Minister was publicly claiming that 'parliament is the mouthpiece of the people in any country and anyone who wants to have a political ideology should voice it in Parliament,'³⁰ his own police were legally preventing his most vociferous

opposition from doing precisely that. Not only did the detentions prevent the six people from being nominated the following week for the pre-independence election, but it threw the DP machinery, which in any event was weak, into chaos — and scared off other potential candidates. A surviving member of the DP executive, Mr V C Mase, said: 'This action is a big blow to us — it took us completely by surprise and left us no time to regroup and reorganize.'³¹ However, some DP candidates did manage to get nominated — including the deputy leader, Mr O O Mpondo. Then he too was detained along with three other candidates, including Mr Anderson Joyi, the personal representative of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo. Chief Sabata himself was the only top DP man to survive undetained before the election. Even the Commissioner of Police, Brigadier Sid Matthys, a seconded South African, was unaware of the detentions until journalists approached him about them.³² The Commissioner of Prisons, Major Rodney Keswa, later head of the Transkei Army, attempted to rationalise the detentions by accusing the opposition of having 'resigned themselves to extra-party means.'³³ The intentions of the Matanzimas were clear. They wanted to prevent the DP becoming the official opposition and they hoped that Mr Knowledge Guzana's more moderate New Democratic Party would win a small number of seats so that Transkei would appear to be a multi-party democracy even if, in reality, it was a tightly controlled one-party state.

These detentions made the pre-independence elections on September 29, 1976, less than a month before 'independence', 'meaningless' — the word Stultz uses to describe them. When the results were announced ten days before October 26, the TNIP had won all but four of the elected seats. With the backing of all but three of the 75 chiefs in the new parliament, TNIP hegemony was complete. The only part of the strategy that did not succeed was the failure of the ineffective NDP leader, Mr Knowledge Guzana, to whom the Matanzimas had already offered a cabinet post although he rejected it, to be re-elected.

In the circumstances, the election of the DP's Mr N P Nkosiane as MP for Mqanduli was miraculous. The 1976 election was anything but what Kaiser Matanzima claimed it was. 'The voters have given an unqualified victory for independence,' the new Prime Minister said, happily.³⁵

Before official 'independence' another two detentions, this time of the internationally celebrated actors, John Kani and Winston

Ntshona, provided a foretaste of the methods to be used after October 26 by the forces of law and order in Transkei to control dissent. The two actors were arrested after a performance of their play, *Sizwe Banzi is Dead*, in the Butterworth Town Hall, during which security policemen sat with tape recorders in their pockets. Chief George Matanzima afterwards gave the reason for their detention. The play, which had been shown around the world and had not been banned in South Africa, was 'vulgar, abusive and highly inflammatory.' He told the press — in what was to become a familiar explanation of detentions — that they would be released as soon as they had replied satisfactorily to 'certain questions' put to them. Later, he went a step further and declared that they would be charged and put on trial.³⁶

While the South African Embassy put out a statement in Washington explaining that they had been arrested 'after black Transkeians complained of inflammatory remarks during performances of the play,' the real reason emerged: 'It is believed that the authorities were offended by the players' open criticism of Transkei independence. Transkei was referred to as a dumping ground for South Africa's dispossessed blacks.'³⁷

Thirty-nine hours before 'independence' and after two weeks' detention the two actors were released without charge on the personal order of the Chief Minister — on condition that they never returned to Transkei. 'The police who arrested us were very civil, but no explanation was offered why we were being detained,' Mr Ntshona explained.³⁸ It was to become a familiar pattern.

Proclamation R400 had other provisions which were used to great effect. These established total control over all meetings in Transkei. Any meeting was unlawful unless it was authorised in writing by the Bantu Commissioner for the area in which it was held and unless it was held at the time and place specified by him, subject to any further conditions which he could determine. For the purpose of the prohibition, a meeting meant 'a meeting, gathering or assembly at which more than ten natives are present at any one time.' Certain specified meetings were, however, exempted, such as those conducted for religious, domestic, official, educational, entertainment and sports purposes. Even those meetings could be prohibited by the Bantu Commissioner or any member of the South African Police or the Defence Force.

It was an offence for any person to convene or participate in an unlawful meeting, to allow it to take place on premises under his control, to omit to comply with any condition imposed in respect of a meeting, or to act contrary to a prohibition. With specific exemption from civil or criminal liability, a Bantu Commissioner or any member of the police or the defence force could order people at an unlawful meeting to disperse, and, if the order was not obeyed, he could authorise the use of force.

The effect of this provision was that every single meeting, whether it was during an election campaign or not, had to receive permission before it took place. The opposition claimed frequently during the self-government years that they had found considerable difficulty in obtaining permits.

Professor A S Mathews of the University of Natal has described how other provisions in the proclamation provided chiefs with an armoury of powers, including a 'very broad'³⁹ prohibition on 'subversive' statements. 'Any person who makes a verbal or written statement, or does any act which is intended or which is likely to have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority of the State, the Chief Bantu Commissioner, a Bantu Commissioner or any other officer in the employ of the state, or of any chief or headman, is guilty of an offence.'⁴⁰ (Mathews' emphasis.) The effect of this provision, Mathews said, was 'to throw a mantle of infallibility around the State and all its officials (down to the most junior employee) and to exact from the population the unquestioning obedience to authority that is enforced in military establishments. Even if the prohibition is not frequently enforced, the fact that a person who openly questions the judgement of authority may be severely punished, is in itself intimidating.'

Any person who organises (or takes part in) a boycott of an official meeting or who organises a boycott of a person with the object of harming him or who makes any verbal or written statement or does any act which threatens another with boycott, violence, loss, disadvantage or inconvenience, or who refuses or neglects to obey the lawful orders of a chief or headman or who treats a chief or headman disrespectfully or fails to show him respect or obedience, is guilty of the offence created by the regulation dealing with subversive statements. These prohibitions also impose far-reaching restraints on speech and action. The provision that prohibits statements threatening another with in-

convenience or disadvantage appears to render criminal any advice to another person that action taken by him will be followed by unpleasant consequences, for example, an expression of annoyance by his neighbours.

In this way extraordinary and dictatorial measures were incorporated into Proclamation R400 to limit dissent and to bolster the power of those in authority, particularly those in daily authority over the mass of the people — the chiefs, the cornerstone of TNIP power.

The proclamation also conferred banishment powers on chiefs in terms of which they can order a person to remove himself, his household and his belongings from one area to another, although this provision was subject to an appeal to the Chief Commissioner. An uncle of the Matanzimas, Chief Tambekile Matanzima used this power in 1965 in an attempt to deport Mr S K Mgudlwa, a prominent member of the DP but an appeal to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Cofimvaba reversed the decision.⁴¹

The regulations also authorised the Minister of Police to prohibit people from remaining in or departing from Transkei or any specified part of the territory. In terms of this provision, as well as the Black Administration Act, the government had the power to serve banishment orders ordering a black person to a particular part of South Africa. This much-used mechanism of removing dissidents from their home areas has been taken over by the Transkei government and in April 1978, for example, it banished the former detainee and representative of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo, Mr Anderson Joyi, then a member of parliament, to Qumbu. His brother, Mr Bangilizwe Joyi, was banished to the Cofimvaba district.⁴²

Matthews commented on Proclamation R400:

The most objectionable features of the regulations are their unlimited duration, the arbitrary powers which they place in the hands of minor officials, the confusion of opposition with subversion and, more generally, the virtual destruction of personal and civil liberties they bring about. The abrogation of rights and liberties authorized by the regulations would be extreme even if they were strictly limited to periods of genuine unrest. Their application for ten, now twenty continuous years in the Transkei puts a serious question mark against the 'self-government' experiment which has been introduced there.⁴³

Proclamation R400 showed the extent to which the South African Government and its Transkeian allies were prepared to go to control and manipulate the situation. These vast powers were necessary both to maintain an unpopular system of government and to ensure that Transkei would appear to have opted for 'independence' freely. The extreme measures were successful.

To win, the authorities had to enlist, bolster and preserve the institution of chieftainship. Proclamation R400 was one instrument used for that purpose, but there were others.

KAISER'S CHIEFS

The official estimate is that there were 2 487 300 people classified as Transkeian in 1978.⁴⁴ In 1976 there were 343 300 migrant workers — 14,3 per cent of the de facto population — working in South Africa as migrant workers.⁴⁵ A further 32 378 were living in proclaimed towns inside Transkei.⁴⁶ Although this last is a 1975 figure it seems a bit low even after allowance has been made. In any event, it does show that some two million people are living in the rural areas of Transkei under the direct control of the chiefs and tribal authorities. Both through the legal powers given in terms of Proclamation R400 and other measures, the chiefs have immense powers over the vast majority of people in Transkei, eighty per cent of whom survive on the basis of peasant farming and the remittances of migrant workers. With a population density of 60 people per square kilometre⁴⁷ and a preliminary estimate of earnings from agriculture in 1976 of R115 172 000 (more than R100 million of it non-marketable)⁴⁸ — that is total annual agricultural earnings of R57,59 per person, or marketable earnings of R7,55 per head — survival is the only way the existence of those people can be described. The local chief or headman is the most immediate form of authority and control over the survivors.

The institution of chieftainship is one of the key elements of social control used by the Matanzimas to reinforce support for their government. It is little wonder that tribal affairs are controlled from the office of the Prime Minister, rather than by the Department of Local Government.⁴⁹ Direct control of the tribal authorities and the chiefs is fundamental to the system of government.

This has been the case ever since the Bantu Authorities system,

inaugurated by the South African government in 1951, was introduced in Transkei in terms of Proclamation No. 180 of 1956. It transformed the chiefs — theoretically at least the guardians of the interest of their people — into loyal, government-paid officials. They became key functional elements of the system of government.⁵⁰ Not only were they paid by the government, but were also dependent on that same government for their survival in office — predictably, they could be removed.

Chiefs and headmen have the power to allocate the most precious commodity in the average Transkeian's life: land. They have judicial powers and in the 1977/8 financial year levied fines totalling R72 419, according to the accounting-general's report. Subject to appeal, they can order individuals to different areas. In matters such as pension claims, they are the link between the people and the government.

The extent to which this form of government permeates throughout Transkei is underlined by the fact that the accounting-general, Mr R L Ngcai, could give details of income and expenditure of 157 tribal authorities in 1977/8. Their incomes totalled R1 915 688 and their expenditure included items on buildings and roads, health, agricultural shows and crop competitions, and so on. For every 12 739 rural Transkeians there is, on average, one tribal authority.

The political advantages to Kaiser Matanzima were obvious before independence, and he became an enthusiastic supporter of the Bantu Authorities system. Particularly in his own area of Emigrant Tembuland and its surrounding districts he actively canvassed support for the new system.

All the fruit of the land is enjoyed by those who obey the Government
... If there are any things you do not want, nominate good men to
fight them from within ... I have come to show you the right way. I
appeal to you to take my word ...

he was minuted as saying to the Ehlatini Authority on December 23, 1957.⁵¹ Even at that stage, his political ambitions and the goals of the South African Government tailored neatly.

In the Bunga in 1955, three-quarters of the members were either chiefs or headmen. Carefully nurtured by Chief Matanzima and government officials, it was hardly surprising that this body decided on 64 chiefs and 45 elected members when it considered

a constitution for self-government. Nor was it surprising that these members reversed the upshot of the first election in 1963 by voting for Kaiser Matanzima rather than Paramount Chief Victor Poto as the first (and only, as it turned out) Chief Minister. Forty-two chiefs and only 12 elected members helped him to the power which he has entrenched ever since.

Throughout the self-government period the TNIP argued that the opposition was opposed to the chiefs and the traditions of the people. With two Paramount Chiefs in the opposition, this was not a convincing argument — but it helped to ensure that the majority of the chiefs never deserted Matanzima. Because they were dependent on the government for their salaries and because they realised that their power was based on the continuation of the tribal system — as developed by the Bantu Authority concept — the interests of the chiefs converged with those of the TNIP.

With the support of the police, the Proclamation R400 powers and the government, a powerful system of control developed and, in spite of abuses, the mass of the people could offer no effective resistance. There was considerable opposition in Tembuland and Eastern Pondoland, which in the latter area developed into open rebellion.⁵² But the rebellion was put down and the system of control, under traditional leadership, established.

The Matanzimas also skilfully built up a tribal alliance, with the support of the Eastern Pondo, Sotho and Gcaleka chiefs, to retain power. The composition of the first cabinet reflected this: there was one chief from the Maluti (largely Sotho-speaking) region, one from Umzimkulu, one from Eastern Pondoland and three from his own Emigrant Tembuland region. When the Eastern Pondoland member of the cabinet — the Minister of Agriculture, Mr C Madikizela, a trusted and loyal supporter of the Paramount Chief — retired he was replaced by Stella Sigcau, the Paramount Chief's daughter. In October 1976, Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau became Transkei's first president.

Although that alliance has now collapsed with the dismissal from the cabinet of both Stella Sigcau and Chief Jeremiah Moshesh (the Sotho chief from Maluti), Chief George Ndabankulu, from Eastern Pondoland, is a senior minister and the remarkable Cromwell Diko, also from Eastern Pondoland, is a deputy minister. Other ministerial appointments over the years have reinforced the tribal alliance, although it is also true that Kaiser Matanzima's Emigrant Tembuland has been over-represented in

the cabinet. Matanzima's support for the chieftainship system and his construction of the tribal alliance has resulted in continued backing for the government from the chiefs — and this has had significant political implications, particularly in the limitation of dissent and the creation of apparent support for the system.

Kotze, in particular, has written about the substantial influence the chiefs and the headmen have had on the outcome of elections in Transkei:

Chiefs and headmen have been accused of abusing their powers and of intimidating their followers to influence their voting behaviour. There is little doubt that these practices exist, and in a debate in the Legislative Assembly, members of the DP and TNIP referred to it.

He also quoted from random interviews conducted by three black journalists in 1965. They found that instructions given by chiefs was one of the factors which voters said had influenced them. After the 1963 election, the country was divided into 26 electoral districts and this, Kotze said, 'enabled the smaller chiefs to exercise a more direct influence on voting.'⁵³

In Matanzima's Emigrant Tembuland less subtle influences have been reported: in the 1963 election, a chief is alleged to have brought three people opposed to Kaiser Matanzima to Matanzima's Great Place at Qamata where they were assaulted by his bodyguard.

Information regarding these alleged occurrences were released to three national daily newspapers. None of the three chose to publish this information, however. Possibly to do so might have constituted an infringement of another provision of Proclamation 400 which makes it an offence to interfere with the authority of the state or of its officers — including chiefs and headmen — in the Transkei.⁵⁴

The TNIP has over the years also claimed that it was wrong to advocate policies in areas where they were opposed by the chiefs. Implicitly, this means that the chiefs should decide for the people and elected officials should then back up the chiefs. This neat inversion of democratic process provides a rationale which encourages consent in the system. Thus Kaiser Matanzima could argue in 1964 that the opposition was 'mistaken' to say they were the representatives of the people because 'the elected members

were elected by the people to come and support their chiefs in this Legislative Assembly.'⁵⁵ Mr E Ka-Tshunungwa, a TNIP front-bencher and once staunch ally of Kaiser Matanzima, interrupted an opposition speaker in 1971 to ask him:

He comes from the Qumbu district and the chiefs in the Qumbu district, Chief Isaac Matiwane and Chief Sigidi Matiwane are supporters of the government on a policy of separate development. Would it be proper to go out to organise meetings to preach a policy that is against that policy supported by the chiefs who are the rulers of that area? Wouldn't that meeting of his create confusion and affect the administration of the chiefs who are supporting the government? '⁵⁶

With that approach, the divine right of the chiefs to decide for the people is clear — which, more or less, is what the system of government in Transkei amounts to, as long as the Matanzimas can decide for the chiefs.

Superficially, Transkei has the modern institutions of a parliament, a cabinet, a prime minister and a president. However, the bastions of TNIP power are the chiefs and the tribal authorities. It is true that the majority of elected MPs are supporters of the government. But a whole range of factors combine to place added importance on the tribal structures: the system of voting; the power of the tribal authorities; the policy of the Matanzimas that the elected representatives should support their chiefs; the fact that the TNIP is not a mass party — and thus not an alternative source of power to the traditional leadership.

When a mass party independent of these chiefs and headmen is formed, or when the majority of people live in urban areas and industrial environments where the traditional authorities have little influence, the basis of the Matanzimas' power will be broken. This is not to say that a party like the TNIP cannot adapt to changing situations — it obviously can — but it is very unlikely to do so.

While an impoverished mass remains dependent on those traditional authorities for its land and other resources, and while the governing élite and the traditional élite see their interests as being linked, major dissent is unlikely to flourish. As Transkei has shown since 1963, this system of government has been effective and is likely to continue so for a while yet.

Of course, the situation is changing and the TNIP's merger of

traditional and modern élites cannot last for ever. But it is in the interests of the ruling group to try to minimise the rate of change for the mass of the people as much as possible.

It is in the more modern institutions — trade unions, industries, schools, universities, business and professional groups — that the alternatives to traditional systems of government will develop. These sectors of the modern élite are likely increasingly to reject tribal rule.

Given this situation, any transformation of land occupation rights or any introduction of democratic local government responsible to the electorate, is simply not on for the TNIP because it would destroy the basis of its power in Transkei. Ever since the early 1960s, and the Tomlinson Commission before that, the need for productive agriculture has been blatantly obvious. As early as 1933 Pim analysed overstocking, then ranging from 25 percent to 50 percent, and recommended land reform. He argued for individual tenure of land to overcome the 'inertia of custom'.

Whether there is individual tenure, or collective tenure in co-operatives, it is clear that security of tenure in productive units is essential if there is ever to be any chance of Transkei's inefficient agriculture system being transformed. But the moment the chiefs lose their power to grant or remove land rights, they lose one of their major holds over the majority of the people. A Matanzima-controlled government cannot afford to embark on reform of land tenure. It has too much to lose, even if the stalling of reform ensures the persistence of survival farming by too many people with too many animals. Yet agriculture remains the only possible form of internal wealth . . .

As Hugo put it: 'The Transkei, more so than in many other African states, has perpetuated the traditionalist aspects of African productive practices, as well as the organisational linch-pin of such practices, viz the chieftainship principle. As is well known the present political leadership in the Transkei is vitally dependent upon the support of this traditional leadership category and from the point of view of its own political survival, the Transkei National Independence Party would, to put it bluntly, be committing political suicide were it to fly in the face of traditionalism and all that it entails.'

This, he said, put the then Prime Minister (Kaiser Matanzima) in a dilemma because 'on the one hand he is committed to enhancing the productive capacity of his country (which despite having an

essentially agricultural base is incapable of feeding itself.) On the other hand, as stated above, he is bound by political imperatives to bolstering traditionalist productive practices such as communal land tenure agriculture. This gives rise to a state of affairs which I think can aptly be summed up by the following equation: "The land belongs to everyone — the land belongs to no one — import mealies from the Free State!"^{56a}

Unless the Matanzimas are prepared to transform the TNIP into a mass party which the traditional leadership will have to recognise as legitimate, this cycle of poverty and inefficient farming is going to continue. Sadly, if understandably, political power comes first, and development after that.

Already, the conflict inherent in this situation has led to the traditional authorities resisting meaningful change. This partly explains the opposition to the South African government's betterment schemes in the 1950s. It is clear today that many chiefs in Transkei are obstructions to agricultural development: 'Time and time again it emerged from conversations that the inhabitants of a particular area have expressed support for a particular development scheme, but then it collapsed because of the resistance of the local chief or headman.'^{56b} This situation is unlikely to change in present circumstances while the traditional authorities remain essential to the system of government.

There are significant related problems. The Minister of Agriculture, Mr S.K. Ndzumo, said in 1978 that it was the government policy to move non-productive farmers off the land and to accommodate them in the industrial and mining sectors. The land would then be divided into ranching and crop production. The main aim of this policy was to make Transkei self-sufficient in food. On various occasions, similar plans have been mooted by agriculturalists.

The problem is that there are no alternative forms of employment. As it is, the industrial sector does not absorb the economically active people coming onto the labour market each year — to increase the flow of work-seekers would be disastrous. No wonder Mentz called this policy 'over ambitious'.

The political implications of such a policy are enormous. Mentz wrote that the resettlement of people on this scale would result in substantial problems of unemployment. 'At this stage a percentage of the unemployed are absorbed in agriculture and they "disappear" in the rural population, but if they were forced off

the ground, the situation could change markedly, because there are not adequate facilities for them in the urban areas.^{56c}

Kotzé pointed out that there were no plans for the hundreds of thousands of workers who would enter the labour market if land allocation policies changed: 'The consequences for social and political instability are, to say the least, explosive.'^{56d}

The situation is complex. If surplus labour and non-productive farmers cannot be absorbed anywhere else, they will remain on the land, which will become steadily less productive, and the territory and its people poorer. With the traditional and effective leadership in the rural areas firmly incorporated into the system of government, and while this cycle of unemployment and under-employment obtains, the easiest solution is to reinforce the status quo — and hope that the South African labour market will absorb as many migrants as possible.

In her analysis of the élites, Charton came to the conclusion that both the traditional leadership and the modern élites — the teachers, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and, to an extent, the small professional group — had a vested interest in the present regime. With both sets of élites gaining wealth and some security, she concluded that 'Transkeian society is being steadily dichotomised into "have" and "have not" groups. The norms of material welfare are set for the élites by South African whites, and the gap between them and their people begins to approximate the gap between white and black in the Republic itself. This is the most serious challenge of all to the developing political system. If some groups are left out of the process of economic and political development, or if the contributions of some are emphasised and rewarded at the expense of others, there will be alienation. In the long term that will spell political instability.' She also pointed out that 'élite competition too may give rise to serious political instability in a situation where new political institutions command little legitimacy from the masses.'^{56e}

It is clear that these tensions already exist. The old and the new are already in conflict. The Matanzimas have opted for the system they inherited from the South African government. They place their faith in the traditional élite and tribal institutions, rather than in a mass party with deliberate modernising goals which would aim to spread the benefits of independence as widely as possible — in the mould of pre-independence parties like the United National Independence Party in Zambia and the

Tanganyika African National Union in Tanzania.

With the conflict between the old and the new exacerbated by the dominance of the old, the stage is set for the emergence of a popular movement as an alternative to the TNIP. It is unlikely, however, that it will be voted in.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS: ELECTIONS IN TRANSKEI

There has never been such a thing as a free vote for the mass of the voters in Transkei. As a result, all the elections held in the territory have been as dubious as that which swept Bishop Abel Muzorewa into temporary power in pre-independent Zimbabwe. Unless the vote is both free and secret, the outcome of the elections cannot be accepted as a valid expression of the will of the people. As we have seen, vast state powers and the controls exercised by chiefs and tribal authorities have blatantly been used to engineer consent. The voting procedures provide further insurance against accidents.

Stultz argues that the 1963 and 1968 elections may have been valid reflections of the views of the voters in Transkei, but since 1968

there has been no mandate not to seek independence, that is, to keep Transkei a part of South Africa, which was Chief Poto's position in 1963. But the equation of TNIP's strength in parliament with public support for independence is unconvincing . . . The political separation of Transkei lacks that critical and widely-accepted legitimacy a more democratic decision-making process might have provided.⁵⁷

In truth, however, the earlier elections must be looked at with some doubt for precisely the same reasons as occur to one in rejecting the later polls.

Nothing emphasises the unfree nature of this vote more than the procedures devised for illiterate people to vote. Proclamation 142 of 1963, as amended, provides for a secret vote, but Section 55 makes provision for voters unable to exercise a secret vote — by which was meant, to make a cross in the privacy of a polling booth — to voice their vote to a polling or presiding officer and two witnesses. The names of the candidates are to be read to the voter who then is to instruct the election official where to vote, and the

witnesses are to ensure that he does so as instructed. Laurence comments:

Whatever the justification for the procedure, it cannot be described as a secret vote. By any logical definition, a secret vote is known only to the person making it.⁵⁸

As the election officials are frequently headmen and other local government officials, it would be remarkable if an illiterate voter, whose daily life is subject to the control of those who are witnessing his vote, were not to hesitate before voting for the other side.

Indeed, Kotzé gives evidence on the influence of headmen:

Thus, according to an official present at the counting of votes, ballot boxes from administrative areas (subdivisions of districts/constituencies) where the headmen support a certain party, have an almost 100 percent return for that particular party, while ballot boxes from neighbouring areas, whose headmen have different political loyalties, showed an almost 100 percent return for the other party.⁵⁹

With the South African government's own research body, Benbo, giving an illiteracy rate of 56,1 percent in 1970⁶⁰ and given the fact that a minimum of four years' schooling is required for literacy, the number of illiterate voters is very high. It is, moreover, difficult to fault Laurence's calculations:

It is apparent that 1 276 340 people out of the total population of 1 644 640 had not had more than four years' schooling. Even when all Transkeians under the age of 20 are deducted to eliminate people too young to vote, that still gives a total of 340 320 — or more than 48 percent of the adult population. But the percentage of illiterate voters is probably higher because many Africans who complete only a few years' schooling lapse into illiteracy afterwards.⁶¹

After the 1973 elections the cabinet issued a directive, without giving reasons, barring male teachers from serving as polling officers. The ruling came after a communications breakdown between the Transkei Teachers Association and the government following allegations of malpractice by the Minister of Education.

It can only be speculated that the cabinet feared that male teachers would influence voters against the TNIP in their capacity as polling officers.⁶²

The Transkei government has also consistently refused to introduce the system of voting by symbols which has been used in many other countries where there are large numbers of illiterate voters. In 1971, the then Leader of the Opposition, Knowledge Guzana, specifically challenged Kaiser Matanzima to introduce the system.

We have repeatedly pointed out that the majority of the electorate in the Transkei is illiterate and that a more realistic system of voting should be introduced where symbols should be the preferred method at the ballot box. None of us can gainsay the fact that that would be an intelligent form of voting over the ballot system as at present, which is not an intelligent form of voting for the illiterate person. We have always insisted each party should nominate a witness to the voting, but this the government has turned down; and so I would also enjoy a majority in this House if I were in the comfortable position in which the Government is under the present electoral system. I would certainly not be inclined to change things, so the majority goes to whoever has the whip hand.

Not surprisingly in view of his actions prior to the 1976 elections, the Chief Minister rejected this call with the weak claim that 'the system of voting is not advantageous to the government . . . It is advantageous to the opposition as well.'⁶³

Southall⁶⁴ and Stultz also raised the issue of the votes of people officially classified as Transkeians but living outside the territory. Stultz even calculated that if all these people did in fact register and vote, 'they might represent as much as 43 per cent of the entire Transkei electorate.'⁶⁵ It is clear that the urban vote is minimal and that the South African government, by refusing to allow a 1972 request from the Transkei Legislative Assembly to establish five seats outside the territory for those Transkeians in South Africa to elect their own representatives, may have contributed to their lack of interest in the elections.

Equally, however, these people, many of whom are permanently settled outside Transkei and have few links with their alleged homeland, are only Transkeian in the sense that the South

African and Transkeian governments have defined them as such. Certainly, they are directly affected by the citizenship agreements reached between the two governments in 1976, and they are subjected to South African influx controls. But their identification with Transkeian politics is slight and only 12 percent of the vote in 1976 was cast outside the country — in spite of extensive advertising in the press about the availability of voting facilities and appeals by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development that employers should give their workers time off to vote.⁶⁶

Non-participation was to be expected. These potential voters are, after all, only Transkeian in a technical sense. The manipulation of voters inside Transkei to create the impression of support for the system is of greater relevance.

PAYROLL POWER: THE STATE AS EMPLOYER

Through the allocation of government resources and the government-owned Transkei Development Corporation, the state machinery possesses tremendous 'payroll power' and patronage. Apart from peasant farming (where even the right to land is dependent on the goodwill of a government-paid headman or chief), migrant labour (where, in any event, recruiting is subject to government controls and tribal authorities), a few professional people like lawyers and doctors (there were 43 in 1971) and traders (many of whom have loans from the TDC and are dependent on TDC-owned wholesalers), everyone inside the country who has a job is employed by the government or TDC-inspired industry. Government employment predominates: by the end of March 1978 industry had employed only 7 165 Transkeians,⁶⁷ and 1 201 black people in its own undertakings.⁶⁸ In 1978, the Transkei government employed 61 000 black people and 300 whites, mostly seconded officials.⁶⁹ KwaZulu with a population of comparable size — 2 234 300 — employed 28 348 black people and 510 whites. The civil service establishment of 16 000 is twice that of Botswana.⁷⁰

In case they hadn't got the message from their benefactor before, in 1974 Kaiser Matanzima publicly warned state employees that his government would not tolerate civil servants who belonged to political organisations or any organisations

whose objectives would prejudice the smooth functioning of the government service.⁷¹

In 1978, there were 13 984 teachers in Transkei,⁷² and the government was their sole employer. 'Appointment, promotion, transfer and discharge of teachers lie within the competence of the Minister of Education. Misconduct which may lead to dismissal is very widely defined in the Transkei Education Act of 1966; it is conniving "at anything which is prejudicial to administration, discipline or efficiency of any department, office or institution of the Government" ... They may have benefited from the Government, but they remain politically subordinate to it. Rising salaries and rapid promotion keep them politically compliant, if sometimes restive and resentful.'⁷⁴

Charton goes on to point out that the tribal élite, which had become relatively wealthy under the current political structure, and the modern élites — the teachers, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs as well as, to an extent, the professionals — 'all have a vested interest in the present regime', even if one cannot talk at this stage of a ruling class.⁷⁵ The wealthier segment of the Transkeian society is dependent on the government both for its continued wealth and for its employment.

In addition to this, the Transkei government paid R20,5 million out in the 1978/9 financial year to 84 183 pensioners, R7,8 million to 34 400 disability and leprosy pensioners, R402 500 to 1 750 blind pensioners, and R4 800 to 17 military veterans.⁷⁶

With so many of those people lucky enough to be employed or to be paid pensions, while everyone else struggles in abject poverty, and with no other alternative, modern-day feudalism is entrenched. It is little wonder that so few are prepared to risk losing their only possible source of income, outside of migrant labour, by challenging the system.

THE RULING PARTY

Stultz sees the TNIP as a 'patron party'. Typically, patron parties are weakly articulated and have small memberships, limited resources and a narrow range of activities. He reports that at the end of 1975 the TNIP had only 3 358 members, according to the secretary-general's report, and that some constituencies did not even have TNIP branches. The party's finances were meagre: in the

first quarter the party spent about R50 other than on rent, and had only R500 in its bank balance at the end of April. 'The party has had an unpretentious headquarters in Umtata and at least one paid official, but less than one month before the 1976 elections the party office was closed on each of the fifteen visits I paid to it, and the paid official (the secretary-general) was said to be occupied with private business.' The TNIP had also not established links with other voluntary organisations. Given the dominance of Kaiser Matanzima in leadership and decision-making, Stultz says this situation has implications for the process of political succession both in the TNIP and in the government which 'is likely to be unpredictable and confused' and the 'consequences of succession, in policy terms, could be quite sweeping.'⁷¹

This is true enough, but the present disposition of political power is convenient for the Matanzimas. Control through the chiefs and patronage is much easier, and effective party networks would provide avenues for rivals to their leadership. A challenge at a party congress from someone with legitimacy in the party — legitimacy of the kind that Curnick Ndamse was building up before he was dismissed from the cabinet and then thrown out of the party — could have unfortunate consequences for the Matanzimas. The base of their support is not popular acclaim or a strong party: it lies in the chiefs and the resources they control. The party is merely a necessary symbol of a 'modern' state, and not the instrument of power.

'AN UNQUALIFIED VICTORY FOR INDEPENDENCE'

With these words, Kaiser Matanzima welcomed the results of the 1976 election, but while they may have been useful for public relations purposes, it is quite clear that it was anything but a free expression of the will of the people. With the significant elements of the opposition safely in jail — although it is very doubtful whether, if they had been out of jail, they would have materially altered the effective outcome — the 1976 election was a farce. The newspapers proclaimed the results as 'a landslide'. And so it was.

Yet in spite of all the power at its command, the Transkei government could only manage a 43,4 percent poll a month before 'independence' — hardly a sign of mass support on the eve of alleged *uhuru*. The electoral officer, Mr B Lottering, a seconded

official, actually claimed publicly that there was a 65,95 per cent poll, which would have been a happier position for both Pretoria and Umtata — but he achieved this figure in a unique way: he added in 100 percent voter turnout in the 16 unopposed seats. 'If there are no opposition candidates you can assume 100 percent support,' he explained. It was a good try, but no academic or journalist has supported his claim, and Schlemmer's description of it as 'weird'⁷⁰ is hardly unfair.

It was remarkable that independence was not put to the voters in a referendum. Kaiser Matanzima did, predictably, claim that there had been such a referendum and consultation. General meetings of the different tribes, public bodies and civil service associations were asked to discuss independence and pass resolutions on it. 'There was no secret vote,' wrote Laurence, 'only discussion at gatherings of tribesmen organised by pro-Matanzima chiefs equipped with draconian powers, or at meetings of civil servants paid by the Transkei Government. Not surprisingly, the Chief Minister reported: "At the moment the position is perfectly clear that the Transkei people overwhelmingly want independence. The figures at present are: in favour 137 166 and against 27 113. The opponents are not even a quarter of the people who want freedom."'⁸⁰

Another journalist, Bill Krige, wrote about the 'referendum':

The outcome stretches credibility to the limit. Of the 229 bodies polled, 148 failed to record a single vote against independence. Of the 60 urban boards scattered in the three province, only seven recorded any vote at all against iinkululeko. And the total 'no' vote recorded by Transkeians in white South Africa was 21 in a poll which included the sprawling complexes of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. The sampling can be considered only as unrealistic and unreliable.⁸¹

The opposition called on the government to hold a proper referendum but Kaiser Matanzima rejected these calls as an unnecessary expense. Laurence was closer to the real reason: 'More pertinent to his refusal is the political aphorism: politicians don't hold referendums unless they are certain of winning them.'⁸²

Even Kaiser Matanzima's claims, if they were valid, don't add up to much: there were 1 083 175 voters in 1976, of whom 354 489 actually went to the polls in the election. The total

number of people voting in the 'referendum' totalled 164 279, that is, in his own terms, 15,17 percent of the people. And this means that 12,67 percent actually supported the idea of independence.

Nor were they given any option. It was either independence or nothing. There was no choice as to whether they would prefer to live in a one-man-one-vote South Africa, or a federation, or whatever. It is certainly conceivable that some people would prefer to live in an independent Transkei where there was an element of local black control rather than continue living under a white-controlled government practising apartheid. But whether any other claim to support, either for the TNIP or for independence in 1976, can validly be made is extremely doubtful.

KAISER'S LOYAL OPPOSITION

Days after the official creation of the Republic of Transkei, the MP for Tabankulu, Mr Cromwell Diko, unexpectedly resigned from the TNIP. In the National Assembly he said: 'As a thorough democracy and a Christian and a traditional leader I would not allow Transkei to go on the lines of a one-party state, and the formation of this party is by no means an attempt to take away power from the Honourable the Prime Minister, Paramount Chief Daliwonga Matanzima, whom we all respect. What we want to do is guard him so that he does not fall on false grounds and become a dictator . . . What has led me was the natural death of the democratic leadership of the party. It has died a natural death by evolution.'

Government member: 'Who appointed you as a leader?'

Mr Diko: 'My party appointed me. You know nothing. You are in the dark.'

Prime Minister: 'What party?'

Mr Diko: 'The Freedom Party. That is, the Transkei People's Freedom Party.'⁸³

He then announced that the DP's only MP, Mtabayitshi Nkosiyanane of Mqanduli, was joining him in the TPFPP, together with the independent MP for the same constituency, Mr B Z Bacela and Chief Dilikile Bacela, also from Mqanduli.

It was a neat move which prevented the three-man DP from forming the official opposition, weaned Mr Nkosiyanane away from

the DP, and enabled Mr Diko to act as though he was the opposition. His initial announcement nearly gave the game away, as did the announcement a few days later by Kaiser Matanzima that the cabinet had decided to recognize Mr Diko as Leader of the Opposition. It was an unusual procedure for the cabinet, not the parliament, to decide who was leader of the opposition. Even more extraordinary was Mr Diko's expression of thanks to the cabinet in the course of an attack on a report in the *Daily Dispatch*. He assured Matanzima that he would be a constructive critic and ended his thanks by a traditional salute of 'Bayete, Daliwonga!'⁸⁴

In Umtata it was frequently rumoured that the cabinet had inspired the revival of the TPFPP — this was the name of a party formed in 1968 by Mr Diko and Mr Shadrack Sinaba, then Chief Whip of the TNIP and later a squatter leader in the Transvaal. Mr Diko had joined the DP after the 1963 election, but lost his seat in 1968 when the TPFPP was defeated in all the seats it contested. Mr Diko resigned from the DP in 1968 because of its 'vacillating leadership'.⁸⁵ After five years in the political wilderness, Mr Diko returned to the assembly in 1973 as the TNIP representative for Tabankulu and he was re-elected in 1976.

To the outside world, it appeared as though Transkei was a multi-party democracy and Mr Diko frequently attacked the government. But on key issues he backed Matanzima. For example, he supported Transkei's independence and his opposition to the Public Safety Act was superficial to say the least. In June 1977, he said publicly that he endorsed and supported everything the Prime Minister has done.⁸⁶ His 'party' never got off the ground and its first annual congress was called off in July 1977 because only three people turned up.⁸⁷

In January 1978, Mr Diko predicted a split in the TNIP when tensions between the Eastern Pondo representatives and the Matanzimas began to peak. 'You cannot expect people to stay where their opinions are suppressed,' he said then.⁸⁸ He repeated his prediction after he was expelled from the assembly in March when he demanded to know why Miss Stella Sigcau had been dismissed from the cabinet. He refused to withdraw an 'insinuation' that Miss Sigcau had been dismissed, and on the same day had discussions with a number of Pondo members of the TNIP about the formation of a new party.⁸⁹ There was little surprise in Transkei when on the following day six Pondo MPs resigned from

the TNIP,⁹⁰ to be followed by a number of others, reaching 16 in April. Shortly afterwards the government recognised them as the official opposition — they formed the Transkei National Progressive Party — with Mr Sizakele Mda as its leader in the assembly.

His role completed, Mr Diko calmly announced in May that he was disbanding his “party” and rejoining the TNIP. His remaining two supporters did not follow him into the governing party and he alleged he had been rejected by the Pondo group, which, in any event, he predicted would split.⁹¹

In 1980, he was rewarded by the Prime Minister with a deputy minister’s post — hardly the sort of treatment one would expect to be meted out to an apparent dissident. But, then, he had done his job well.

The persistent rumours that the formation of the TFPF and the recognition of Mr Diko as leader of the opposition was, in fact, a government-engineered plot were confirmed, inasmuch as they ever will be confirmed, by Kotzé, whose accuracy on facts has never been queried. He wrote:

According to information which was given to me confidentially and which was confirmed, Diko’s small escapade was as a result of a suggestion by the Prime Minister who wanted to strengthen the opposition by such a move in order to create an international image of democratic tolerance.⁹²

In the light of Mr Diko’s action, no other explanation seems feasible or logical.

THE IMPUNITY OF KAISER MATANZIMA

The laws adopted in Transkei since 1976 have made it impossible for the opposition to function effectively or put their views across. The first — the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act — has banned any meaningful discussion about the dominant figure in Transkei politics, the second State President Kaiser Matanzima. The second — the Public Security Act — has outlawed the central plank of opposition policies: the reunification of Transkei with the rest of South Africa.

Legally both laws are effective and smart. They have been

used, either jointly or singly, in all the convictions of opposition leaders. They embody massive restrictions on political activity and they make the concept of democracy in Transkei even more of a farce.

Although it was intended that the Transkeian President should be a figurehead of state, there is not, as in the South African constitution, complete clarity on this point. Discussing the Transkeian constitution, Vorster came to this conclusion:

The authority of the head of state is ostensibly a formal one, and he is supposed to act on the advice of his ministers. However, this presupposes constitutionalism and normal relations between the head of state and the government. The difference between formal and actual power becomes blurred if power is expressed in such absolute terms in the constitution, and qualified by conventions which are incorporated by reference only, or by rules which can be comprehended only against the background of a whole intricate system.⁹³

The State President has powers, subject to the advice of the cabinet, to appoint and dismiss ministers, summon and prorogue parliament, dissolve parliament, recommend budgetary measures in the National Assembly, assent to bills or return them to the National Assembly, appoint judges and confirm the appointment of chiefs and the institution of new chieftainships.⁹⁴ He also has a discretionary power in terms of section 17(4) to act without advice in summoning, proroguing and dissolving the National Assembly and in appointing ministers.⁹⁵

On the South African model, the Transkeian President’s powers would have been absorbed to such an extent that it might truly be said that ‘he has no will but that of his ministers.’⁹⁶ In accordance with the dignity and respect that should be accorded to such a non-executive figurehead president, the Transkeian constitution, like the South African constitution, provides that ‘any person who commits any act which is calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the State President or the Acting State President, shall be guilty of an offence . . . and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand rand or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.’⁹⁷ It was regarded as a minor clause in the constitution at the time. It was not debated in the Transkei Legislative Assembly when it was discussed on May 18, 1976. Vorster did not refer to it, nor did

anyone else.

Kaiser Matanzima, however, in a short speech that takes 12 lines in the Hansard of the TLA saw the possibilities. He said then:

The provision is to stop irresponsible people saying anything about a person in such high office. Even the press, the hostile press, will find themselves in difficulties. I wonder what they will do one day when I become President, because they are so used to insulting Matanzima (laughter). I wish I would become President one day to find out if certain members will keep on their behaviour.⁹⁸

His wish came true. Shortly after he became President in January 1979, this provision was used to silence opponents. His arch-opponent, Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, was tried and convicted under it.

Nimrod Mkele wrote that although no one had been prosecuted under this clause while Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau was President, "at least 22" people, according to the people detained with him, had been charged in terms of it by the end of 1979.

The question arises: why the sudden spate of cases attacking the dignity of the presidency now that KD is president? Is he perhaps unduly sensitive as has been suggested? Or has there in fact been increased criticism of KD's overlordship of Transkei? Or is it convenient to invoke presidential privilege in order to whip the opposition into line regularly through the courts? The answer is all of these and more. It is true that KD Matanzima is an autocrat who loves to exercise power. Like all autocrats, he brooks no criticism, which he regards as a personal affront.⁹⁹

What is beyond doubt is that this apparently innocuous clause has removed the dominant figure in Transkeian politics out of the range of effective debate. Although technically a figurehead president, Kaiser Matanzima is still running the country, with the aid of his close advisers. Nearly everyone in Transkei confirms that he is still the central figure in Transkeian politics — for example, according to Mkele, the cabinet does not meet in the government buildings or the Prime Minister's office, but in the president's offices 'under his stern and watchful gaze'¹⁰⁰ — and yet neither his actions nor his past can be analysed or criticised.

This provision in the constitution is a conveniently "lawful"

restraint on opposition. It has, publicly at least, made Kaiser Matanzima inviolable. 'He wants Transkei as his fiefdom,' Mkele said.¹⁰¹ This law helps.

THE NEW SECURITY LAW

If the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act removed the pivotal figure out of the ambit of Transkeian political debate, the Public Security Act of 1977 removed the pivotal issue. Section 3 of this all-embracing law says quite simply: 'Any person who verbally or in writing or in any other manner propagates any view or doctrine, or disseminates or promotes the dissemination of any view or doctrine, which defies, or is repugnant to, or aims at the subversion of the sovereignty of Parliament or the constitutional independence of Transkei, should be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties provided by law for the offence of treason.'

With a maximum penalty of the death sentence, the assembly adopted a law which meant that the 'independence' of Transkei cannot be questioned inside the territory. As it is likely that the majority of black people — in and out of the territory — rejected this 'independence', and as the reunification of Transkei and South Africa is fundamental to the opposition's policies, this provision is plainly ridiculous, even if it does suit the Matanzima purpose. Certainly it has damaged the concept of democracy in Transkei beyond repair.

In a vain but brave speech in Umtata in September 1979, Professor J D van der Vyver of the University of the Witwatersrand said that on examination of the Public Security Act

one is left with the impression that the government responsible for its enactment must have come dangerously close to the situation where its laws and executive actions have lost track of the sense of justice generally entertained by a substantial portion of the Xhosa and Sotho, because certain provisions of that Act seem to suggest that exceptionally extensive and oppressive powers are needed to cope with the country's security problems.¹⁰²

On the surface, the Public Security Act looked a welcome improvement on the security legislation inherited from South

Africa. It repealed sections of the 1927 Native Administration Act, the Internal Security Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Public Safety Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Unlawful Organisations Act, various amending laws and the notorious Proclamation R400.¹⁰⁴ When the law was gazetted in October 1977, Transkei was without emergency laws for the first time in 16 years. That state of legal 'normality' did not last long: a state of emergency, as we shall see, was reimposed in June 1980.

Other than the temporary suspension of the emergency provisions, the Public Security Act, Act 30 of 1977, is a wide-ranging measure which imposes extensive restrictions on dissent. Van der Vyver analysed some of these restrictions. In terms of section 29(1), the Minister of Justice may

restrict in a variety of ways the activities of a person who happens to be a communist. These restrictions may include not being permitted to serve as an office-bearer, officer or member of organisations to be decided on by the Minister, denial of the right of serving on public bodies or holding public office as specified by the Minister, and being precluded from attending any gathering, concourse or procession. The Minister may also require such person to report regularly at a police station and to keep the authorities informed of his place of residence or employment. Furthermore, a person on whom a notice has been served under the present provisions may not practise as an advocate, attorney, notary or conveyancer in Transkei, unless the Minister of Justice certifies that he has no objection to such person practising in any of these capacities.¹⁰⁵

In any event, as he points out, Section 1 of the law contains 'a lengthy and somewhat intricate definition of "communism" which is supposed to serve as criterion' for action against individuals or publications — 'but that definition is in a sense superfluous for the simple reason that leaving aside the very limited scope of a right of review, there are no procedures available to contest the merits of the President's (or the Minister's) decision.' As the decisions are not subject to judicial control, any actions taken are final.

In short, the arbitrary features of the Internal Security Act in South Africa are incorporated into Transkei's version: dissidents can be disciplined by politicians whose actions cannot be questioned in a court of law.

The restrictions do not apply only to individuals. In terms of

the law, the President is empowered to prohibit the printing, publication and dissemination of a periodical or other publication, and to declare an organisation to be unlawful 'if he is satisfied, inter alia, that the publication or organisation entertains sympathies or upholds alliances with communism in a variety of ways specified in the Act.' The procedure is simple:

a publication or organisation is communistic if the President believes it to be such, or simply if he states that he believes it to be such, and that's that. Since neither his belief nor the criterion can be challenged in any way, the President is virtually free to ban publications and organisations at will.

It was in this way that organisations like Inkatha, the South African Society of Journalists and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Congress were banned at the end of 1979.¹⁰⁶

Van der Vyver says that 'even more startling are the powers entrusted to the police and the Minister of Justice in terms of Section 47 of the Act. A commissioned officer of police may by virtue of that section order the detention for an indefinite period of a person if the commissioned officer is of the opinion that such person has committed, or intends to commit, an act of sabotage or terrorism as defined in sections 6 and 7 of the Act, or is in possession of information relating to the commission or the intention to commit statutory sabotage or terrorism. If the suspected act, intention or knowledge of the concerned persons relates to any other offence created by the Public Security Act, the commissioned officer may cause the detention of that person for a period of 14 days only, but the Minister of Justice is then authorised to order his detention for an indefinite period. The Commissioner of the Transkeian Police may order the release of a detainee when he is satisfied that the detainee has satisfactorily replied to all questions put to him. The detainee may, however, make representation in writing to the Minister of Justice (a very theoretical provision in practice) who may at any time order the release of the detainee.

Section 47(2) of the Act expressly removes the jurisdiction of courts of law to pronounce upon the validity of any action taken under this section. Consequently not even a right of review remains. The Com-

missioner of Police and the Minister of Justice is therefore, if not *de jure* then at least *de facto*, empowered to permit the continued detention of a detainee for no reason at all, or for reasons that may be entirely irrelevant.

As demonstrated by the action instigated in Transkei Supreme Court against the detention of journalist Peter Honey, which the government lost with costs, and by the payment of costs of the intended legal action against the detention of journalist Sidney Moses, this provision is not entirely without potential review in the courts. The scope is, however, extremely limited.

Van der Vyver continues: 'The same applies to the detention of witnesses by virtue of section 49 of the Act. The decision to detain a witness who is likely to give material evidence for the State in certain criminal proceedings, is taken by the attorney-general if he believes that the witness may be tampered with or intimidated, or may abscond, or that his detention would be in the interest of the witness himself or of the administration of justice. Although the Act prescribes a maximum period of six months for such detention, there is no provision in the Act that would prevent the arrest and further detention of the witness immediately after his release upon the expiration of the first or a subsequent period of six months. Section 49 (7) again excludes the jurisdiction of courts of law to order the release of the detainee, or to pronounce upon the validity of regulations issued by the Minister of Justice with regard to the detention of witnesses under the present provision, or to question certain administrative decisions taken in connection with the detention in isolation of the witness.'

In other words, while Proclamation R400 was repealed, detention without trial now became a permanent feature of Transkeian law.

The law also makes provision for people to be listed as communists, as in South African law, although it does allow 'a reasonable opportunity' to show why they should not be included on the list. But this principle is not followed in the outlawing of any organisation or publication which is being investigated. 'Such an investigation is conducted by "an authorised officer" appointed by the Minister of Justice who, it would seem, executes his enquiry in total secrecy, taking special care that persons with an interest in the publication or organisation under suspicion will not learn of such suspicion and without giving the interested parties

an opportunity to state their case. Under such circumstances, the reports upon which the entire livelihood of the publication or organisation may depend, can at best be half-baked.'

Detainees can be held in total isolation without any recourse to legal representation or spiritual comfort 'without the right to be heard in their own defence, and, in the appropriate cases, without the prospect of being brought to trial before a court of justice.' Van der Vyver added: 'Those detained are, in fact, hardly better off than the *monstrum* of Roman Law, or the *fagabundus* of Germanic Law; that is, the law no longer provides them with meaningful protection, but instead their well-being is left in the hands of human beings.'

Other provisions add further protection to those in power, or at least incorporate the protections given them under Proclamation R400. Thus, section 2 provides: 'Any person who makes any statement, verbally or in writing, or performs any act which is intended or likely to have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority of the State or any officer in the employ of the State, shall be guilty of an offence . . .' Every single civil servant is given this extraordinary and wide-ranging protection.

The definition of terrorism includes anyone who 'has committed or attempted to commit, or conspired with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit, or incited, instigated, commanded, aided, advised, encouraged or procured any other person to commit the act alleged in the charge, and that the commission of such act, had or was likely to have any of the following results . . .' Among the possible results are 'to hamper or deter any person from assisting in the maintenance of law and order'; 'to promote, by intimidation, the achievement of any object'; 'to cripple or prejudice any industry or undertaking or industries or undertakings generally or the production or distribution of commodities or foodstuffs at any place'; 'to cause serious bodily injury or to endanger the safety of any person'; 'to cause substantial financial loss to any person or the State'; 'to cause, encourage or further feelings of hostility between different population groups of Transkei' or 'to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State.' In such cases, the accused person has to prove his or her innocence 'beyond all reasonable doubt.'

In terms of Section 11, it is not only an offence to cause feelings of hostility (which, in any event, could be terrorism) but

it is also an offence to do anything 'which consists of or contains any threat that any person or group of persons or any population group will suffer any violence, loss, disadvantage or inconvenience.'

The following section in the law incorporates Proclamation R400's provisions to protect chiefs and headmen. This makes it an offence for any person to make any statement, verbally or in writing or perform any act which is intended or likely to have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority of any chief or headman.' It is also an offence not to obey any lawful order given by a chief or a headman, as it is to treat any chief or headman 'with disrespect, contempt or ridicule or fail or neglect to show that respect and obedience and to render such services to such chief or headman as should be shown or rendered in accordance with customary law.'

Section 13 makes it unlawful 'to commit an offence by way of protests against a law or in support of any campaign for the repeal or modification of any law or the variation or limitation of the application or administration of any law.'

It is even an offence in terms of Section 18 to use 'any opprobrious epithet or any jeer or jibe to or about any person or to or about any of his relatives in connection with the fact that such other person has undertaken, continued, returned to or absented himself from work or refused to work for any employer.' The same section makes it an offence to publish any information about such activities.

Section 20 outlaws strikes because it makes it an offence for anyone to endeavour 'to induce any person employed on those premises unlawfully to cease work or leave any particular piece of work; or unlawfully to refrain from returning to work.'

Section 33 enables the Minister of Justice to ban meetings, other than religious, sporting, tribal or official meetings, without permission in certain areas, but it adds the condition 'that the Minister or the Secretary for Justice may at any time, if he deems it necessary or expedient for the maintenance of the public peace, prohibit any gathering exempted from the provisions of this section.' Section 34 enables magistrates to ban gatherings whenever 'a magistrate has reason to apprehend that the public peace would be seriously endangered by any gathering in his district; or by a particular gathering or any kind of gathering at a particular place or in a particular area or wheresoever in his district' for a period not exceeding 48 hours. Section 36 enables

police officers above the rank of warrant officer to close off certain areas to the public, while Section 37 enables police officers to disperse gatherings.

In Section 40 chiefs are empowered to banish individuals without prior notice although a 30-day appeal against the order is allowed.

The next section gives the President vast powers: 'The President may, whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest, without prior notice to any person concerned order that, subject to such conditions as he may determine, any tribe, portion of tribe, community or person shall withdraw from any place to any other place or to any district within Transkei.' In other words, the President has the power to banish whole tribes. Reasons for the order should be given to any person affected if, in the opinion of the Minister of Justice, they can be disclosed 'without detriment to the public interest.'

Inevitably, the President has the power to declare a state of emergency, in terms of Section 44, in Transkei or any area of Transkei for 12 months, but he has the power to extend the declaration. Under clause 45 (4), interestingly enough, the Minister has to notify Parliament within 30 days, or within 14 days of the commencement of Parliament if it is not sitting, of the names of people detained under the emergency regulations and any regulation issued in terms of the emergency powers. Parliament does not have that right for people detained under Section 47.

In essence, the network of South African security legislation and the key features of Proclamation R400 have been incorporated in one law.

When the bill was introduced into the Assembly in May 1977, the opposition attack was, to say the least, superficial — but then this was not surprising since Cromwell Diko was Leader of the Opposition. The debate focused largely on external, 'Communist' aggression and the bill's limitations on internal opposition were largely ignored. The clause preventing any criticism of Transkei's independence was hardly discussed.¹⁰⁷ The strongest attack came from Hector Ncokazi who said: 'It is really unthinkable and unimaginable that a so-called black government can table this iniquitous bill against its black subjects in defence of its political and moral wrongs. They are now defending a despotic system of government based on the dictatorship of the chiefs and police-

men.¹⁰⁸ Mr Diko tried to get the bill referred to a Select Committee but this was rejected.

Kaiser Matanzima announced in 1977 that a Treason Act would be tabled in 1978, with a maximum penalty of death, against anyone who rebuked the sovereignty of Transkei and propagated the view that Transkei should fall under another independent state. The legislation was to be made retrospective to October 1976,¹⁰⁹ but it was not, in the end, introduced — presumably because this offence was covered by the Public Security Act.

In 1980, the Public Security Act was amended to waive a requirement that people charged under it be tried in the Supreme Court and to provide for joint trials of two or more people charged under the Act or the Transkei Constitution Act.

Earlier, the DPP moved a motion calling for a review of the law. Chief D D Mlindazwe, the opposition chief whip, said the Act had been used to suppress the formation of political parties whose philosophy was contrary to that of the government and to undermine the institution of chieftainship. Mr Mda said it would lead to a situation like that in Iran and Idi Amin's Uganda. 'What exactly was the intention of our struggle for freedom — to make us freeze for fear of Security Police? No amount of eloquence by government members will justify the notorious operations of this Act. A state is built by winning the hearts of the people and this particular legislation is not in the hearts of Transkeians at all,' Mr Mda said. In a deliberately low-key response, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Mr David Tezapi, replied to the debate, accused Mr Mda of misusing parliament and claimed: 'There is democracy in Transkei and this country is coping well with minor mistakes like any other developing state . . . There is no freedom without limits.'¹¹⁰ Mr Diko, ever dutiful, said that people were only complaining about the Act because they wanted to continue importing firearms into eastern Pondoland.¹¹¹

Neither the criticisms of the professor nor the token opposition in parliament ever looked likely to force the government to reconsider the law. If Van der Vyver hoped his plea would result in any changes, the conference committee had a simple, if spurious, reply signed by Digby Koyana, former Minister of Justice: 'The conference gave Transkei an opportunity once more to tell the world to stop equating Transkei with South Africa, as the latter (RSA) uses security legislation to keep the black majority from seeking political rights, while the former (Transkei)

allows anyone irrespective of colour to get to Parliament and there is therefore no justification for resorting to extra-parliamentary methods of struggle.'¹¹²

In these powers the Matanzimas had the legal machinery to entrench themselves — and they used it with telling effect.

OTHER LAWS

Besides the Public Security Act, and the Transkei Constitution Act, a number of other laws limiting possible dissent have been passed by the National Assembly since October, 1976. These are in addition to the unrepealed laws taken over from South Africa, whose traditions, as Van der Vyver put it, 'were destined to become the hereditary foundation of the Republic of Transkei.'¹¹³

The Intelligence Service and State Security Council Act (1977)

This law provided for the establishment of the Transkei Intelligence Service, TIS, which was modelled on South Africa's Bureau for State Security (BOSS) as it was then called. It took over the functions of BOSS in Transkei. TIS, according to the law, was directly responsible to the Prime Minister and its functions were to collect and evaluate information relating to national security and to detect, identify and advise the Prime Minister of any threat or potential threat to the security of Transkei. TIS, the law provided, would operate under a special account, the Intelligence Service Account, which would be determined and directed by the Prime Minister and would be confidential. It also provided for the establishment of a state security council, which would formulate national policy and strategy with regard to the security of Transkei.

Introduced by Chief George Matanzima, the bill was supported by the opposition. In his speech replying to the debate, George Matanzima revealed that he had recently been talking to the head of BOSS, then General Hendrik van den Bergh, whom he described as 'a man of high integrity', and he revealed that General van den Bergh had 'said his duty was to go to the Prime Minister and tell him the very truth, even if that truth will hurt the Prime Minister.' He also claimed that 'these security measures will never come to anybody. It will be somebody who will go and bump against the

security measures.¹¹⁴

Since its inception, TIS has been headed by Mr Fuzile Ngcai, a close adviser to Kaiser Matanzima, a former employee of both the South African Security Police and BOSS. From the outset it has had white advisers — among them the long-serving Mr L F Heunis and Mr E L Brown, a Broederbond member — even when diplomatic relations between South Africa and Transkei had officially been broken. Little is known about its operations except that its image was blemished in September 1979 when a senior official in TIS and former BOSS agent, Mr Kolisile Nelson Jajula, was found guilty of 24 counts of fraud in the Umtata Supreme Court. After pleading guilty on all counts, he was sentenced to six years' jail, three of them being suspended. In evidence, it was disclosed that Jajula had helped himself to R28 100 in 15 months and that the director of TIS had described him as 'an exceptionally good man'. One of the conditions imposed by the Chief Justice, Mr Justice George Munnik, for suspending half of the sentence was that Mr Jajula 'does not disclose information about the activities of TIS.'¹¹⁵

When the Select Committee on Public Accounts met on July 10, 1979, it was revealed in evidence by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr M Lujabe, that TIS had spent R188 896 during the previous financial year although a sum of R476 507,82 had been paid over to it. The remainder had been invested. Mr Lujabe said the savings, according to what he had been told by the director of the intelligence services, had been due to 'non-recognition of Transkei, so that officers could not be posted abroad;' the non-introduction of a subsidized car scheme and because 'special technical devices were not yet purchased.' He was satisfied with the way the money was being handled but under questioning admitted that because it was a secret service 'it is not exposed to public scrutiny as are the rest of public moneys.' His department could not get full details because the activities of TIS were 'very confidential'.¹¹⁶

In spite of this evidence, the vote for TIS was R489 600 in the 1979/80 financial year. George Matanzima, the Prime Minister, said this was 'not for public disclosure.'^{116a}

TIS clearly has a wide brief, covering most aspects of Transkeian society. In a Supreme Court action in September 1979, Rev Morgenthal Mdolo, a Methodist priest, revealed that when he appeared before a committee of five priests investigating

allegations of misconduct against him, a mob of people led by Mr Ngcai had appeared armed with sticks and threatening violence. The mob was removed after he had called the police and a riot squad appeared. It was claimed later that the mob consisted of 100 people and that they were there to support complaints against Rev Mdolo,^{116b} but even if that were so it was a somewhat unusual role for the head of an intelligence service. Then, too, TIS tried to muscle in on the meetings in eastern Pondoland to choose a new Paramount Chief, but Chief Justice Munnik, in another Supreme Court action, said its actions might be misinterpreted if it did so.^{116c}

Other than that, little is publicly known about the intelligence service but one can imagine that its activities are modelled on those of BOSS, now called the Department of National Intelligence, in South Africa.

Transkei Publications Act (1977)

This law provided for the establishment of censorship committees appointed by the Department of the Interior from a list of suitably qualified people, to be compiled every three years. These committees exist to check what the then Minister of the Interior, Miss Stella Sigcau, called 'the infiltration of undesirable literature, films and public entertainments and to uphold the Christian convictions of the people of the Republic of Transkei.'¹¹⁷ The bill was passed with the unanimous backing of the assembly.

In June 1978, the Acting Minister of the Interior, Mr Ramsay Madikizela, disclosed that a publications committee was scrutinising all books and publications banned by the South African Government before Transkei gained its independence.¹¹⁸ In fact, very few books banned by the South African Government have been sold in Transkei, but the book *Biko* by the former editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, Mr Donald Woods who is banned in South Africa, has been sold in Transkei and there have been some films which are banned in South Africa shown in the territory. Essentially, however, the censorship norms in Transkei vary little from those enforced in South Africa.

Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act

Based on South African legislation, this law provided for the

registration of newspapers and imprints and imposed a requirement that a deposit of up to R20 000 be paid by proprietors. The deposit could be forfeited in certain circumstances. The political aims of the law were made quite clear by Miss Sigcau, still Minister of the Interior, when she proposed the bill. She said it would be foolish 'to allow a newspaper which professes by its name or otherwise to be a publication for propagating the principles, or promoting the spread, of communism,' and the legislation renders vulnerable any newspaper which 'is published or disseminated by or under the direction or guidance of an organisation which has been declared an unlawful organisation by or under any law, or was published or disseminated by or under the direction or guidance of any such organisation immediately prior to the date upon which it became an unlawful organisation.'¹¹⁹

The effect of this provision, read in conjunction with the list of banned organisations in Transkei, would make the distribution of *Dimension*, published by the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, or the *Journalist*, published by the South African Society of Journalists, illegal. Steps taken by the Transkeian government to control the flow of information about events inside the territory are detailed later in the section on the media: this law made it easier for the government to act.

General Law Amendment Act (1978)

This made provision for the courts to sentence any person, male or female, under the age of 21 convicted of any offence to receive corporal punishment not exceeding ten strokes. According to the explanatory memorandum, this measure had become necessary 'because in cases of unrest at education institutions it has been found that juvenile females are being put forward to cover up for the real instigators of troubles, as it has become known that there is at present no practicable manner in which female juveniles can be dealt with by the courts.'¹²⁰ The Minister of Commerce, Mr Ramsay Madikizela, who moved the bill on behalf of the present Prime Minister and then Minister of Justice, Chief George Matanzima, conceded that it was rather a drastic change in the law but 'it is sometimes necessary to fight fire with fire.' The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Mda, argued that Transkei was putting itself on the world map 'by being the first country to introduce corporal punishment for female offenders.'¹²¹ It is certainly one way of

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reducing dissent.

Undesirable Organisations Act

The President is empowered to declare 'any organisation whose presence is prejudicial to the interests of the state or any section of the population' undesirable. A body could be declared unlawful through association with an organisation outside Transkei which the President considered a threat to the state. The Minister was given the power to order such an organisation to rectify matters or suffer his ban. Membership of a banned organisation was made illegal in terms of the Public Safety Act. The aim of the law, George Matanzima said, was to take action against organisations (read: Methodist Church of Southern Africa) which could not be dealt with appropriately under the existing security legislation. He also said that the legislation would enable 'the government to protect that which is dear to the Transkeian people, their nationhood, against undermining forces.'¹²² The bill was uncharacteristically rushed through the assembly — with the second reading, committee stage and third reading all taking place on one day (May 17, 1978) — and eight days later, the Methodist Church was banned. That remarkable event is described in detail later in this book.

Prisons Amendment Act (1979)

The existing South African legislation was extended, making it an offence to photograph or sketch any prison, part of a prison, prisoner or prisoners, or the burial or cremation service of a prisoner or prisoners.

Transkei Constitution Amendment Act (1980)

This law, which was made retrospective to October 1976, meant that ministers in Transkei could no longer be sued in their official capacities. Apparently drafted on the instructions of a seconded South African official, Mr A Coutts, Transkei's State Attorney, the amendment was undoubtedly aimed at blocking legal actions by the Transkeian Government's former adviser, Mr Humphrey Berkeley, who had issued summons against the Transkei Government for breach of contract. He had also claimed damages of

R350 000 for alleged defamation against George Matanzima and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr F Qaba. It was reported that the amendment was drafted at the instruction of George Matanzima.¹²³

Backed by South African law, all of which was transplanted into Transkei in 1976 unless it was specifically repealed, and strengthened by these wide-ranging new laws, the Matanzimas now have a legal armoury capable of immobilizing virtually any activity which displeases them. They have laws, but little justice.

CONFLICT: THE SOTHOS

Although the original concept of separate development was that each black South African nation should have its own homeland, it would be wrong to assume that this was the South African government's intention when it made Transkei the first independent homeland. Not only was the Xhosa 'nation' divided into two separate political entities — on the 1978 government estimates, there were 549 900 Xhosa classified as Ciskeian¹²⁴ although the Quail Commission found this to be an underestimate and suggested there were 2 099 000 Ciskeians¹²⁵ — but in 1978 there were 92 300 Sotho-speaking people in Transkei, more than in their 'homeland' of Qwaqwa, and a further 27 600 Zulu-speaking in the territory. There have been sabre-rattling exchanges between Kaiser Matanzima and the KwaZulu Chief Minister, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, over the Transkei government's claims to Harding and other parts of what were officially KwaZulu, and KwaZulu's claims to Umzimkulu and East Griqualand,^{125a} but other than these there were few signs of tribal conflict involving Transkei before 1976. The exodus of thousands of refugees from the Herschel area to the Ciskei had tribal undertones because many Sotho lived there, but that was about all.

Moreover, the Matanzimas had managed to incorporate representatives of most of the different groups in the territory into both the TNIP and the cabinet. They had proclaimed an official policy of non-racialism, scrapped the petty apartheid laws of South Africa, and appeared to have created a non-racial state in Transkei. Indeed, in terms of black/white relations this is possibly the most positive aspect of the whole exercise — and by June 6, 1978, 23 whites and 58 coloureds had applied for Transkei citizen-

ship.¹²⁶

But it soon became clear that there was mounting tension in the Sotho-speaking areas of Transkei, particularly in Maluti which is near the Lesotho border. It is certainly conceivable that this tension was stirred by Sotho ethnic activists, particularly from the minute Qwaqwa homeland, but the methods adopted by the Matanzimas to deal with the situation were nevertheless instructive.

In August 1976, three people were detained under Proclamation R400 for campaigning for the right of the Sotho area to secede from Transkei before it became independent. Perhaps coincidentally, this was at the start of the election campaign. Two of those arrested were Chief Neo Sibi, a member of the assembly from Matatiele, and Mr A Letsholo, secretary of the Maluti-Herschel South Sotho Central Committee. The Chief Minister of Qwaqwa, Mr Kenneth Mopeli, immediately sent a telegram to the South African Prime Minister protesting against this action and it was reported that the Prime Minister referred the issue to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.¹²⁷ A few days later, Mr Mopeli sent a second telegram to the Prime Minister requesting an urgent meeting with him and said, 'It is high time that form and content is given to your policy in regard to the South Sotho.'¹²⁸ The Qwaqwa cabinet also called on South Sotho nationals to regard Transkei Independence Day as a day of mourning for more than 40 000 of their people who would become 'enslaved' in Transkei on land that historically belonged to the South Sotho. It also pointed out that the Basotho living in the Herschel district had not been given the option of moving and being granted alternative land. Mr Mopeli urged Sotho-speaking people living in Transkei not to apply for Transkeian citizenship and to regard themselves as South African citizens.¹²⁹ Later he urged Sotho people 'to seek protection at the South African Embassy in Umtata because we still hold the South African Government responsible for the plight in which the Sothos find themselves in other homelands . . . We would like the Government to carry its policy to its logical conclusion by granting each ethnic nation group its rights.'¹³⁰

Certainly, in terms of its theoretical framework, the South African government could have no logical counter to these claims. Quite clearly two of the 'national' groups were being forced, without any referendum, to live in one independent homeland. In practical terms, the South African Government had no alternative but to

leave the Sotho and Zulu inside Transkei — underlining that in the final analysis its policies are not based on separate national groups but on a clear divide-and-rule structure. The Qwaqwa concern about the Sotho in Transkei was partly explained by the tactical advantage gained by Qwaqwa's ruler — he could claim more territory and thus obtain greater credibility among the Sotho living in South Africa. Lesotho had also strongly rejected Transkei's independence and was about to exploit the alleged closure of its borders to gain international attention and aid.

The Matanzima response was not aimed at trying to meet the Sotho frustrations but at suppressing them. Tensions were exacerbated in December 1976 when one of the people detained under Proclamation R400 with Chief Sibi, Mr T Mosala, died in the Butterworth prison.¹³¹ Mr Mopeli responded with a hard-hitting telegram to Kaiser Matanzima: 'The South Sotho mourn the death of Mr Mosala who stood up boldly to champion the cause of the South Sotho in Transkei. R400 will not deter the South Sotho from campaigning actively for their liberation from the oppressive laws of Transkei.' He also said the inclusion of the Maluti region in Transkei would be 'a festering sore' and he called for the release of all prisoners detained under the emergency regulations.¹³² Although Sotho resentment sharpened, the fact that Chief Jeremiah Moshesh was still in the Transkei government helped ameliorate the situation. But it was not to last.

In March 1977, Chief Neo Sibi finally appeared in court under charges relating to the secession of the Maluti region from Transkei. Surprisingly — the terms of Proclamation R400 are so wide — he was acquitted by Chief Justice Munnik. Chief Sibi summed up his views in a statement to an Idutywa magistrate in which he said that 'he, together with other chiefs requested the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to allow Basothos to stand on their own. They were not forcing matters. It was a request. They have not received a reply.' He had been summoned before Kaiser Matanzima and 'warned to leave the matter, but said he would not because he had not received a reply from the Department of Bantu Administration. Chief Kaiser had instructed him not to hold meetings. He realised he was working against the government.' Although he assured the government that things would proceed in the future as they had in the more peaceful period of the Bunga, he also said that 'it was his wish that Maluti should join Qwaqwa.'¹³³

The response by the Matanzimas to his acquittal was characteristic: in April 1977, Chief Neo Sibi's deputy was sworn into the assembly as an Acting Chief — he was still there in 1980 — and Kaiser Matanzima said Chief Neo Sibi would now have to face a departmental inquiry.¹³⁴

In March 1977, a Sotho MP, Mr Pascoe Ludidi, former Secretary-General and then Chief Whip of the TNIP, suddenly resigned from the party and crossed the floor.¹³⁵ A month later, he fled Transkei and sought exile in Lesotho with his wife. He accused the Transkei government of 'trying to isolate me from public opinion with a view to suppressing me or to isolate me from public opinion before detaining me.' He also said Lesotho was 'the safest place for me.'¹³⁶ At the end of September 1978 his seat was filled in a by-election. A Sotho who had tried to work within the system had run foul of it.

Six months after Ludidi quit the country, Transkei Security Police arrested 12 people from the Maluti region for allegedly recruiting people for Qwaqwa. They included Chief Sekake Moshoeshe, leading member of the Moshoeshe royal family in Maluti, a former MP and the uncle of Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, then Transkei's roving ambassador.¹³⁷ Those arrested included the unfortunate Chief Neo Sibi. At the end of January 1978, they were released without being charged.¹³⁸

In March 1978, Chief Moshesh was dismissed from his post in the government. At the same time newspaper reports appeared speculating that his dismissal was the result of anti-Transkei attitudes allegedly being adopted by Sotho-speaking people in the Matatiele and Mount Fletcher districts. Chief Moshesh attacked those reports and said he did not know of any rift between the government and the Sotho.¹³⁹ He then joined the opposition and was a founder member of the Transkei National Progressive Party in April that year. He had served in the cabinet since self-government in 1963 and, at one time, was freely tipped in Umtata as a possible successor to Kaiser Matanzima. But, like Stella Sigcau and Curnick Ndamse among other potential challengers, he could not last the pace.¹⁴⁰

A year later, in June, Mr Mopeli's Dikwankwentla Party was declared unlawful in Transkei and the Secretary of Justice, Mr J D Zeka, warned that anyone who contravened the ban would be jailed for up to ten years. He also said the party had branches in Herschel and Maluti. 'This party instigates people against the

government of Transkei and influences the Sotho-speaking people to join Qwaqwa. We have decided to ban the organisation because its existence is illegal and dangerous to the country's security.' Police had found a number of members of the party organising counter-attractions to draw people away from the inauguration of the State President (Kaiser Matanzima) earlier in the year, he said.¹⁴¹ So the Dikwankwentla Party became the first organisation to be banned under the Public Security Act. In November 1979 an organisation called the Maluti Lesotho Organisation was banned, presumably for the same reason.¹⁴² The Dikwankwentla Party leader in Transkei, Mr W Malefane, and his deputy, Mr D Tseki, fled Transkei for Qwaqwa. Mr Malefane, who had been detained for six months by Transkei police, said he would continue to work for the inclusion of Sotho living in Transkei into Qwaqwa.¹⁴³

On his arrival in Qwaqwa, Mr Malefane disclosed that he and other Sotho leaders had met Kaiser Matanzima in September 1976 'after we were given assurances of protection.' At the meeting they 'pulled no punches' but, he claimed, the government leaders had turned the meeting into a joke. 'We had regarded this issue as very serious and it should have been closed to the public. The impression we gained was that we were in a court of law and being prosecuted or disciplined like naughty boys.' They had been detained after that meeting. 'On being released six months later we were taken before a Major Ngceba who told me that when we were detained the Transkei did not have a treasonable offence. But if I were redetained I would be charged with treason and sentenced to hang by my neck until I die. To me the man was serious and I also took the threat seriously. He was welcomed in Qwaqwa by the homeland government and given a government guest house.'¹⁴⁴

In September 1979, it was disclosed that Qwaqwa had actually offered to buy the Sotho-speaking regions of Transkei at talks between the two governments. The Qwaqwa Commissioner-General, Mr J S Pansegrouw, said the initial offer was for the Herschel region, but Maluti was another potential item on the bargaining agenda. Qwaqwa alternatively proposed a land swap which would have brought Herschel to Qwaqwa and given Transkei compensatory land elsewhere. Both offers were, however, declined by Kaiser Matanzima.^{144a} It was speculated at the time that Transkei might be given East Griqualand — ostensibly the cause of the breakdown of diplomatic relations in April 1978 —

but it seems unlikely that the Matanzimas would go along with this because they argue that East Griqualand belongs to the Pondos, and therefore to Transkei, independently of any other issue. In any event, the Sotho conflict has remained unresolved and in February 1980, Mr Malefane called for the release of another five Sothos from the Herschel area who, he said, were in detention in Transkei.¹⁴⁵

Later in 1979, Chief Moshesh was himself detained and charged in January 1980 on two counts under the Public Security Act. On the first count, he was charged with making statements which were intended or likely to have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority of the State, and on the second, he was charged with propagating a doctrine which defied, or was repugnant to, or aimed at the subversion of, the sovereignty of parliament or the constitutional independence of Transkei. He was alleged to have said that the Transkei government ill-treated, arrested and detained innocent people at random; that he was saddened by the arrest of his Sothos because he belonged to the Basotho and not the Xhosas; that his land belonged to Lesotho, not Transkei, and that for this reason his people should be loyal to the Lesotho government not the Transkei government.¹⁴⁶ During the trial, the prosecutor claimed that he had told the people not to obey the TNIP government because it was giving the Sotho people a raw deal. Mr Victor Mabandisia, a TNIP organiser in Maluti, said Chief Moshesh had told people at a meeting in July the previous year that he was not prepared to live with TNIP members in his area as his land was for Sothos. 'Part of the audience hailed him and said they knew he was going to destroy the Xhosa government,' he was reported as saying. An uncle, Mr Motlatsi Moshesh, claimed in evidence that in September 1978 Chief Moshesh had instructed him to tell meetings that the Transkei Government was not treating the Basotho people well and that the Basotho people should rely on Lesotho. Chief Moshesh had been applauded by the Sothos when he said 'Let's go to Lesotho.' In his evidence, Chief Moshesh disclosed that his house had been ransacked by the security police when he had taken his children to Maseru, the Lesotho capital, to go to school.¹⁴⁷ In February he was found guilty and sentenced to 12 months suspended for three years. The magistrate, Mr D B Muir, said the suggestion of seeking a clandestine and unofficial alliance with Lesotho in the event of trouble in Transkei was clearly one which would have the effect of sub-

verting or interfering with the authority of the State.¹⁴⁸

Chief Moshesh got the message. Shortly afterwards, he resigned from the DPP,¹⁴⁹ and was made Transkei's consul in Durban in July, 1980.¹⁵⁰ But for a TNIP loyalist (from the inception of self-government) to turn so sharply against his previous allies, there must have been, and must be, serious dissent among the Sotho people in Transkei. That dissent is still there, even if it has been suppressed. One element of the original Matanzima alliance has been alienated.

CONFLICT: THE EASTERN PONDO

March 21, 1978 was an embarrassing day for George Matanzima.

The Deputy Prime Minister, as he then was, rose in the Assembly and launched a blistering attack on the *Daily Dispatch* for predicting a split in the TNIP. He denied the accuracy of the report: 'I want to say to them that when they do speculate, their speculation must not be malicious . . . We know the *Daily Dispatch*; we know their old attitude toward the ruling party, and I want to say to them that if they have got nothing to write, they must not write rubbish. I want to say to them that if they think there is going to be a split in the TNIP they are living in a fool's paradise.'¹⁵¹

It was not the newspaper that was living in a fool's paradise, but the Deputy Prime Minister himself. The very moment he sat down, the Speaker read out six letters from Eastern Pondoland MPs resigning from the TNIP. The Matanzima/Sigcau alliance which had dominated Transkeian politics since 1963 was over. By April, 16 MPs had resigned from the TNIP and formed a new party, the Transkei National Progressive Party, under the leadership of an elected MP, Mr C S Mda, formerly deputy chief whip of the TNIP. The new party included the former Minister and Roving Ambassador, Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, a Sotho.

Mr Mda said that the party, in apparent contravention of the Public Security Act, 'sought the unification of the people of South Africa under a constitution which would provide a federal form of government.'¹⁵² Kaiser Matanzima immediately dismissed the new group as 'a tribal group' — a valid point — but its significance was greater: the Matanzima hegemony had been challenged.

A month later, in the Assembly, Kaiser Matanzima was still

relatively placatory, dismissing the split as a 'storm in a tea-cup' and adding that 'I feel confident that some of them have followed the course they have taken through ignorance of the true facts and that now that the true facts have been told to them the better wisdom of the more mentally balanced among them will teach them the damage they are doing to the cause of our struggle against white oppression by their indiscreet and ill-timed action.'¹⁵³

His line on the new party soon hardened, however, especially when the TNPP linked up with the DP under the leadership of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo.¹⁵⁴ Threatened by the possibility of an Eastern Pondo-Sotho-Tembu alliance which advocated reunification with South Africa, the Matanzimas moved fast. With the aid of the Public Security Act, they struck hard, though they stopped short of outlawing the party.

The apparent cause of the split was the dismissal of Stella Sigcau, the daughter of the State President, Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau, from the cabinet in November 1977 because of her relationship with Chief Moshesh, whose child she was carrying. Kaiser Matanzima said in April 1978 that Miss Sigcau had resigned from the cabinet, and had not been dismissed. When she had been elected to the Assembly in 1968, 'I warned the Ministers to have no love associations with Minister Sigcau, as such an affair would be a scandal at cabinet level, similar to the Profumo scandal in Great Britain.' He had warned one minister about this and he had repeated the warning in 1973. 'When it became clear to the general public that Miss Stella, an unmarried woman, was in an advanced stage of pregnancy, I advised her to resign from the Cabinet to avoid the scandal. According to the rules of public administration, no unmarried woman can serve the state in any public capacity if she is pregnant, as her pregnancy would be regarded as scandalous and against the principles of morality.' This principle had been upheld by Miss Sigcau herself, he added, when she dismissed 82 teachers between 1970 and 1973 when she was Minister of Education.¹⁵⁵

A few days later, in a speech frequently interrupted by Kaiser Matanzima, Miss Sigcau strongly rejected his interpretations of her morality, claiming that in terms of Pondo custom, it was quite acceptable for a widowed woman to have children without being married. 'Such a custom, or any relationship to do with that custom, is never called "an unsavoury relationship", unless you insult our traditions . . . nor is the child of such a union regarded

as a child of sin . . . Ask any Pondo in this house who knows our customs if that is not so. Further ask the two honourable Ministers from Eastern Pondoland if that is not so, for they do not only know but also practise the custom, yet they still remain honourable.' She later said she had been questioned by many people about the affair, why her private life had been interfered with, and 'one of them even went on to say: honestly, is it a question of a man scorned?' Ending her speech, she said: 'Blessed is the man who has no skeleton in his cupboard.'¹⁵⁶ No one disputed her claims about Pondo customs, but her suggestions of further scandals in the government clearly angered the Matanzimas.

In the end, it is apparent that her resignation/dismissal raised deeper issues than her relationship with Chief Moshesh and the birth of her third child, named Jeremiah.

A member of the TNIP Executive and former Robben Island prisoner, Mr Louis Mtshizana (who was himself to run foul of the Matanzima machine later) said as much in a lengthy statement in the *Daily Dispatch* which appeared to reflect the line of the party hierarchy. He made the obvious point that the Pondos from the east were dissatisfied with the handling of the Moshesh-Sigcau affair. He then went on to say: 'In fact, certain appointments to certain important positions in the political hierarchy of Transkei are construed in some political circles in Transkei as part of Chief Kaiser's strategy to immobilise the Pondo group from the east and to drive a wedge, politically speaking, between eastern and western Pondoland.' He said it was a revolt of the Pondo group rather than a rebellion against the avowed policy of the ruling party: 'What has happened is that the tribal group from Eastern Pondoland is protesting against treatment meted out to their fellow tribesman and the person concerned, most unfortunately, happens to be a member of the royal family and Pondos generally are very sensitive about the status of members of the Royal family . . . Pondos are notorious for enforcing discipline among their fellow tribesmen and, to their credit, I must say they are the most disciplined tribal group in the whole of Transkei.'¹⁵⁷

Besides the leadership issues isolated by Mr Mtshizana, Cromwell Diko, whose role in the dispute was dubious as has been discussed previously, raised another: the actions of what he called 'trigger-happy police'. He said a man in Bizana, in eastern Pondoland, who refused to have his livestock attached was shot dead and

his son bundled into a police van and taken to the charge office. Relatives had never been offered an explanation of the killing. 'Why should a police officer shoot a defenceless man while the government sits back doing nothing about it?'¹⁵⁸ His complaint reflected an unhappiness with the role of the police in eastern Pondoland.

Then, too, the TNIP leader Mr Mda raised yet another issue in the assembly shortly after the break: why had development in Transkei not been more widely spread? 'One need only drive to the northern areas of Transkei [a reference to the Matanzima-ruled Emigrant Tembuland] to see the fallacy of the Prime Minister's statement [a seven-pronged development plan announced in 1970.] You sometimes see extensive development through rose-coloured spectacles. How long, for example, will the growth potential in extensive eastern Pondoland be thought of and confined to the Lambasi scheme [a tea estate]? Can you really say that the potential of Eastern Pondoland has been explored and exploited to its maximum? Agriculturally, Eastern Pondoland could easily be the pantry of the Republic of Transkei but it has been neglected, or at least there has been no energetic exercise on the part of the government to exploit the potential of the area.'¹⁵⁹ Both the Matanzimas disputed this claim, but clearly Mr Mda was voicing a widely-felt view in Eastern Pondoland that the region had not been getting its fair share of the (somewhat limited) spoils.¹⁶⁰ There was disenchantment over the new stock taxes imposed in 1977;¹⁶¹ there were allegations that eastern Pondos were being discriminated against in the recruitment of soldiers for the army ('many able-bodied young chaps . . . are not given a chance to join, simply because they are from Pondoland,' Chief Twentyman Sigcau said);¹⁶² and it was pointed out that the Bizana Hospital did not have a single doctor.¹⁶³

Thus, although the immediate cause of the split in the ruling alliance was the departure of Stella Sigcau and Jeremiah Moshesh from the establishment, there were certainly other issues. It was not an ideological split although later, particularly after the formation of the DPP, clear differences in policy appeared.

It was not long before the Matanzimas took their revenge on the Pondos for breaking away. On April 5 1978, Kaiser Matanzima announced in the Assembly that Paramount Chief Sigcau's representative in parliament, Mr A Jikizwa, had been sitting in the Assembly since October 26, although this was

contrary to the constitution — he quoted the relevant clause in support of this. It was 'an oversight', he said, that had enabled Mr Jikizwa to attend the 1976 and 1977 sessions.¹⁶⁴

A month later, the government proposed an amendment to the constitution: that the number of ex-officio chiefs for Lusikisiki be reduced from four to one. All four chiefs had been involved in the split and were all from the Sigcau royal family. The amendment, which was adopted in the Assembly by 125 votes to 20, increased the number of chiefs in Bizana from three to six. George Matanzima said that in the 1963 constitution Bizana had six chiefs and Lusikisiki one, but the 1976 constitution had injured Bizana by reducing their representation to three and giving Lusikisiki four. Mr Mda said that the government should have consulted the regional authority, and that the seats should have been redistributed throughout Eastern Pondoland.¹⁶⁵ The opposition later disputed the official voting figures in the Assembly, saying that at least three members who had been absent had been recorded as having voted for the amendment. It claimed the figure should have been 89 - 20.¹⁶⁶ Whatever the count, the Sigcaus were beginning to learn what it meant to cross the Matanzimas.

In September 1979, the mobile unit and security branch of the Transkei police raided the homes of the late Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau; his daughter, Stella; the leader of the opposition, Mr Mda, and four other opposition members of the Assembly, Mr W M Dweba, Chief H Z Sigcau, Chief Lowell Sigcau, and Chief D D Milindazwe. At the Paramount Chief's Great Place, the police arrived in 17 vehicles and surrounded the royal house before producing a search warrant. They confiscated 12 rifles and two revolvers, which a family spokesman said were part of a collection belonging to the late President. His son, and eventual successor, Chief Mpondombini Sigcau, was summoned to appear in court and later found guilty.

Three months later, Chief Lowell Sigcau was detained in connection with an ambush by young Pondo tribesmen on a police patrol investigating a murder in the Flagstaff district.

Then the Pondos ran into time-consuming bureaucratic delays over the choice of a successor to Botha Sigcau, who died in 1978. On February 16, 1979, the Quakeni Regional Authority voted by 22 votes to three in favour of Chief Mpondombini Sigcau, the late Paramount Chief's eldest son and expected successor. The other candidate was another son, Chief Zwelidumile Sigcau. However, the government — in particular the Prime Minister's department —

did not accept this result and organised a series of further meetings at Bizana, Flagstaff, Tabankulu and Lusikisiki in May. Chief Mpondombini tried to stop the meetings with an urgent application for an interdict in the Transkei Supreme Court, but the action failed. He claimed that both he and the people of Eastern Pondoland would 'suffer irreparable harm in that the dignity traditionally accorded to the office of the paramount chief will be permanently eroded by the appointment of the paramount chief by way of elections instead of the customary manner of succession.' The Secretary for the Prime Minister's department, Mr Mtutuzeli Lujabe denied this, saying that the meetings were intended to precede the regional authority's statutory designation of a successor. Significantly, he said the President (that is, Kaiser Matanzima) 'would not have been able to exercise his discretion properly without ascertaining the views of the people themselves in view of the dispute over the paramountcy. The President has the right to refer back to the authority any previous designation of appointment in the exercise of his discretion.' Refusing the application, Chief Justice Munnik said the President was not just a 'rubber stamp' for the regional authority's decision but had to find out the feelings of the people. But he did say it seemed unusual that the Secretary or Deputy Secretary 'should attend the meetings with the Security Police and head of the intelligence service. The presence of the two officials might be misconstrued. In his view, they should not attend the meetings.'¹⁶⁷

Two significant aspects emerged. Whether or not it had been taken over from South African law, the President had established the legal right to approve the election of a Paramount Chief. Such a power clearly could not have had any customary base, even if the colonial governments usurped it. Secondly, the attempt to use security and TIS officials as a mechanism of persuasion was yet another illustration of undemocratic behaviour by the Transkei government.

Mr Lujabe later said that at each of the meetings the two contenders had gone to a spot where they were surrounded by supporters. Four counters, two from each side, then counted the number of supporters for each chief. He justified this move by saying that the voting at the regional authority meeting had indicated a dispute.¹⁶⁸ In October, he disclosed that the matter had reached 'its completion stages' and all that was awaited was

the State President's signature before Chief Mpondombini was installed.¹⁶⁹ That at least indicated that the Pondos had won their succession battle, but they had nevertheless been shown who was the real boss and what would happen if they moved out of line. It was a warning to any other tribal group who might decide to break with the Matanzimas. Mpondombini Sigcau eventually became the Paramount Chief in 1980. He sat on the TNIP benches after his installation.

CONFLICT: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Once Mr Knowledge Guzana — frequently described as 'constructive' by the Matanzimas who offered him a cabinet post, which he turned down — was ousted as leader of the Democratic Party in January 1976, the Transkei Government did what it could to restrict the party's activities. The election of Mr Hector Ncokazi as leader of the DP resulted in an immediate break-up of the old DP alliance which had been the basis of its existence since 1963: The Western Pondo chiefs, including Paramount Chief Tutor Ndamase, the son of the late Paramount Chief Victor Poto, the first leader of the DP, crossed over to the TNIP. Mr Guzana, who took the leadership from Paramount Chief Poto, resigned from the party and formed the New Democratic Party with seven other members of the Assembly. After the 1976 election, the NDP collapsed after Mr Guzana lost his seat and it won only two seats when two veteran members of the Assembly — Mr H Zibi (Mount Fletcher) and Mr G N Jafta (Qumbu) — retained their seats.

The DP, under Mr Ncokazi's leadership, then became the focus of opposition in spite of the fact that it only won one seat in the 1976 election following the detention of its leadership (and that one MP, Mr Ntabyitshi Nkosiyané, joined Cromwell Diko's TFPF after the election.)

From the moment of the Ncokazi takeover, the Matanzimas made it abundantly clear that they rejected the right of the reconstituted DP to existence and made it very difficult for the party to survive. Possibly the only factor that prevented it from being outlawed was that it was supported by Paramount Chief Dalindyebo. At the first opportunity he had in the assembly, Kaiser Matanzima rejected a move for Mr L L Mgudlwa (later detained while still an MP) to deputise for Mr Ncokazi. As the DP

was a minority party in the Assembly, that was justified. But the Chief Minister went on: 'I want it made known that the government does not recognise the so-called leader as leader of any party in the Transkei . . . He does not recognise this House, he does not recognise the Transkeian government, therefore how can he seek recognition from the Transkeian government? And whoever is associated with this gentleman will not be recognised in this House as being a member of any opposition party.'¹⁷⁰

Mr Guzana himself contributed to the attempted isolation of his old party when he said the DP had been associated with the kind of liberation movement that was linked to highjacking, kidnapping, holding people to ransom and subversion. 'It dissociates itself from dialogue and consultation and uses force to attain its ends . . . the Democratic Party as a liberation movement could not care less whether there is a parliament or not, whether there is a government or no government and it seeks to secure its purpose by extra-procedural means.' Whether or not this was simply sour grapes at being ousted from the DP, Mr Guzana, in spite of preaching the right of free speech and free association, helped to undermine the legitimacy of the reconstituted DP.

George Matanzima, in the same debate, went even further. He moved an amendment to the no-confidence motion, expressing 'grave concern at the communistic orientation of the Democratic Party with a view to imposing a Marxist Transkei on the unwilling inhabitants. It is obvious to this House that it is a further object of this Party similarly to cause chaos and confusion in the Transkei before, during and after the independence celebrations. This House directs the government, in view of the objects aforesaid, to take all reasonable steps to foil any activities that may be taken by this Party with a view to causing such chaos and confusion and thus safeguard our country.' He gave no evidence in his speech to back up this amendment and, indeed, more or less contradicted it when he called Mr Ncokazi 'a political colt'.¹⁷¹ Mr Mgudlwa was nearer the point when he said, 'everybody who fights for his rights is now a Communist.'¹⁷² The way, however had now been cleared for action against the DP.

It began with the detentions which all but eliminated the DP from the 1976 election.

Then, on November 1, 1976, Mr Nkosiyané was detained along with eight other people. They were the first to be detained after October 26. Mr Nkosiyané, an uncle of the Matanzimas and a close

adviser to Paramount Chief Dalindyebo, was first arrested in connection with the murder of a member of his family, Headman Gwebinkulu Nkosiyané. Later, the head of the CID said he had been released from that charge and redetained under Proclamation R400. Captain Nkalitshana said, on 10 November, that the detainees were being held 'for questioning' on an allegation that they had 'incited the youth to cause an uprising and disturbances as a sign of protest against the independence of Transkei.'¹⁷³ Mr Diko immediately attacked the detentions, called for Mr Nkosiyané's release and described Proclamation R400 as 'inhuman and autocratic.'¹⁷⁴ The next day George Matanzima repeated the allegation that Mr Nkosiyané had incited 'youths in his district to cause chaos during the independence celebrations' but said he would be released.¹⁷⁵ On 15 November Mr Nkosiyané took his seat in the Assembly again. He refused to comment on his detention until the other eight people had been released.

In September 1977, Mr Nkosiyané finally appeared in court on a murder charge with one other person. He was accused of killing headman Nkosiyané and assaulting his wife on the day before independence.¹⁷⁶ But in April 1978 he was acquitted in the Supreme Court.¹⁷⁷

In February 1977, it was reported that four DP leaders — Mr Jackson Nkosiyané, the national chairman, Mr S A Xobololo, the national treasurer, Mr Anderson Joyi, a former MP and the representative of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo in the Assembly, and Chief Bangilizwe Joyi — had been released from detention without being charged. Earlier on, four others had been released without being charged, but another four including Mr Ncokazi, were still in detention.¹⁷⁸ Later that month Mr Ncokazi, after 212 days detention, was released unconditionally together with his deputy leader, Mr O O Mpondo and the Dalindyebo regional secretary, Miss Florence Mancotywa.¹⁷⁹ During his detention, he was allowed to attend the funeral of his mother under police escort.¹⁸⁰ He also gave evidence in a Suppression of Communism Act trial.¹⁸¹ During the trial in November 1976, Mr Ncokazi told the defence counsel that he had not been questioned once during his detention. He also disclosed that he had started a branch of the PAC at school in 1959 but dissolved it when the organisation was banned.¹⁸²

After his release, Mr Ncokazi bravely said: 'Despite the major setback we have suffered, the DP is not dead. We are very much

alive.'¹⁸³

But already the state machinery was in action. The DP's national organiser, Mr P S Fadana, a former member of the ANC who had spent eight years on Robben Island, was arrested under Proclamation R400, then released on February 11. He was re-arrested on 22 February 1977. After his release, but before his redetention, Mr Fadana said: 'I want to show the world that my time in jail was meaningless. No person can change my ideas by putting me in jail. The only thing that can change my ideas is a bullet.' He also said: 'It is the Matanzima family's independence, not the people of Transkei's independence.'¹⁸⁴ Such bravado was clearly too much for the 'forces of law and order' to take.

Like Fadana, Mr Ncokazi said, after his release, that he had not been interrogated once during the seven months he had spent in detention.¹⁸⁵

The fact that all 12 DP members were released without being charged (even after George Matanzima had accused it of being Marxist and of wanting to cause chaos in Transkei) and that at least two of them, including the party's leader, had not been interrogated at all, made it quite obvious why they had been detained: to prevent the DP from operating as the official opposition and to control, at all costs, Paramount Chief Dalindyebo. The Matanzimas' actions were unsubtle and harsh. But effective.

On April 5, 1977, George Matanzima, in his capacity as Minister of Justice, said Mr Fadana 'will appear in court as soon as the police investigations have been completed.'¹⁸⁶ In June, the editor of *Isaziso*, Mr Vuyani Mrwetyana, challenged George Matanzima to charge or release Mr Fadana,¹⁸⁷ but in August when Mr Ncokazi was redetained, he was still being held.¹⁸⁸ At the end of September, Mr Fadana was released, redetained for 'a few days', then finally released.¹⁸⁹ He had spent some 14 months in detention without being charged.

After six weeks in detention, the prospects of Mr Ncokazi's release were raised when the then head of the Security Police, Major Martin Ngceba, said he and others would be released if they answered questions satisfactorily.¹⁹⁰ On October 18 he was released 'unconditionally' and Major Ngceba said he had answered questions satisfactorily. Mr Ncokazi said, after his release, that George Matanzima 'should tell the world why he detained me' and claimed Major Ngceba had told him that 'as a civil servant I am

acting on instructions of my superior'. He also said it had been alleged that he had been recruiting people for military training abroad and that he was involved in an anti-Transkei campaign. Major Ngceba had also told him to write an apology to George Matanzima, but 'I told him in no uncertain terms that I would never make an apology to a politician.'¹⁹¹

Meanwhile, on September 23 that year Chief Bangilizwe Joyi and Chief Anderson Joyi, Paramount Chief Dalindyebo's representative in the Assembly, were detained along with 200 other men from Mputi location after members of Transkei Battalion and Transkei Police raided the area. Eventually 18 men were detained under Proclamation R400 and they were told 'we conducted night meetings with a view to overthrowing the Government.' They were released in March 1978 without being charged.¹⁹²

In January 1978, Miss Mancotywa was detained again for the third time. She was released the following day after she had been questioned about a letter she had written to the *Daily Dispatch* in which she had said: 'We in the Democratic Party stand firmly for a united democratic South Africa where all people will participate in decision-making regardless of race, colour and creed.' She had to submit an 18-page written explanation about this paragraph.¹⁹³

Shortly afterwards, Mr Ncokazi was detained again, apparently because he had said at a DP congress that Transkei was 'cursed with the worst government in the history of mankind.'¹⁹⁴ A few days after his wife expressed concern about his health, Major Ngceba said Mr Ncokazi would be charged under the Public Security Act.¹⁹⁵ Later that month he was admitted to hospital but a spokesman said his condition had improved.¹⁹⁶

Finally, on 27 April — after 101 days detention — he was brought to trial on two charges under the Public Security Act. He was charged with subverting the authority of the state and its officers and with disseminating views subverting the sovereignty of parliament or the constitutional independence of Transkei. In a prolonged trial which began in October 1978 and continued, sporadically, until May 1979, he was found guilty on both counts. He was, however, granted bail for its duration. During the trial, the state applied for the hearing to be held in camera but this was rejected by Chief Justice Munnik 'because in civilized countries trials had to be held publicly for the people to see justice done.'¹⁹⁷ During the trial the defence contested the validity of a letter written by Mr Ncokazi to Major Ngceba in which he said the state

had a *prima facie* case against him but it had kept him in jail 'as a punitive measure for two months.' The court, however, accepted it as evidence. Major Ngceba said that Mr Ncokazi had been detained in connection with matters other than the speech on which the charges were based.¹⁹⁸ Evidence given by a security policeman who said he had been at the congress where the speech was made was rejected. Judge Munnik said it was clear he had not attended the congress. The court, however, was satisfied that he had made the speech. He was fined R500 or 18 months' imprisonment. He also got a sentence of three years suspended over a period of three years, for propagating a view repugnant to the sovereignty of parliament or the constitutional independence of Transkei, and a further 18 months, conditionally suspended for three years, for intending to interfere with the authority of the state.¹⁹⁹

It was alleged that Mr Ncokazi had said in his speech that 'to think that the outside world can recognise any of the independent bantustans is an advertisement of political buffoonery. With the backing of the OAU and the UNO, we shall fight the independent bantustans . . . Now the South African government, in connivance with TNIP, has limited our scope of political operation by legally forcing us to operate within an area bounded by the Umzimkulu and Kei Rivers. We do not want to swim with the whites on beaches. We want to swim with them in the legislative chambers of South Africa. These Transkei leaders are living in luxury, getting thousands of rands per month, when the masses are floundering in poverty. They are rich because they have unduly enriched themselves and when we ask them why they do this, they react by locking us in their prisons. The Transkei people are cursed with the worst government in the history of mankind, a government that is scandalously corrupt and is prone to suppress the DP which always castigates them for their corrupt deeds. They waste money on propaganda and other trivial undertakings when people are smothering in poverty.'²⁰⁰

Undoubtedly, in terms of the law, Mr Ncokazi was guilty. But the limitations placed on what should be normal political opposition are extraordinary. The DP's essential policy was made illegal by the Public Security Act, and the trial of Hector Ncokazi proved that conclusively.

In April 1979 the government acted against the Joyi brothers. They were banished again, Chief Anderson Joyi to Qumbu and Chief Bangilizwe Joyi to the Cofimvaba district. George Matanzima

said the two men had been implicated in a number of unsolved murders and other serious crimes. They were also suspected of being the brains behind the Bashee River murders. He said the crimes remained unsolved because there was always a lack of evidence against the men who wielded a lot of influence over people in their area. After they had been detained the previous year, the Mputi area 'enjoyed peace and quiet for the first time in years.'²⁰¹ As was often the case, these extremely serious allegations were never proved in court and the Joyis suffered.

In October 1978, Anderson Joyi was arrested at Paramount Chief Dalindybo's Great Place for breaking his banishment order.²⁰²

In August 1979, there were two unusual events, both originating in the DP. On August 17 a former DP secretary, Mr Joseph Kobo, was detained. After the DP leadership had been arrested in 1976, he fled Transkei for the Ciskei where he was granted Ciskei citizenship, detained under the emergency regulations and then deported. He returned to Transkei and was on his way to see George Matanzima when he was detained.²⁰³ (According to recent detainees, he was still in detention in July 1980 and had not been questioned once.²⁰⁴) A few days later, a warrant was issued against Mr Ncokazi for non-payment of his fine, but this was an administrative error and the warrant was withdrawn.²⁰⁵

The DP had paved the way for the DPP. To be in opposition in Transkei was not going to get any easier.

CONFLICT: THE DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY

The formation of the Democratic Progressive Party did little to halt police actions against the opposition. The tone had been set during Hector Ncokazi's leadership of the DP. Some of these actions have been described in the sections on the Sothos and Eastern Pondos, and they reflect a determination by the Matanzimas to prevent the DPP from operating effectively, if at all.

Just over a month after the formation of the DPP, its national organiser, Mr B C Pikashe, who had been nominated to stand for the DP in the 1976 election but was detained shortly after nomination and released in February 1977, was detained again.²⁰⁶ His detention followed a letter to an Umtata newspaper,

Intsimbi, in which he described the Matanzima government as an aristocracy rather than a democracy. 'A government born of apartheid could never see the real issues,' he wrote.²⁰⁷

Then, at the end of July, the government, in one of its most extraordinary moves since 1963, arrested Paramount Chief Dalindybo, who had been elected leader of the DPP. He later appeared on charges under the Public Security Act, in a trial which is described in Chapter 13.²⁰⁸ This action led to the resignation of the head of the Transkei Police, Brigadier Elliot Cwele, after he refused to have anything to do with the detention. That action paved the way for Ngceba, who was promoted to the rank of colonel, and who was the key figure in all the moves to restrict dissent. He was now both head of the security police and head of the police.

This was followed by a raid on Hector Ncokazi in August as well as on Mr S A Xobololo, a former DP and MP who was detained in 1976. The indefatigable Mr Ncokazi said: 'If, by this provocation, the Transkei government is trying to harass me, they are barking up the wrong tree. They are trying to shake the unshakeable, repress the irrepressible.'²⁰⁹ Shortly afterwards, Chief Moshesh and Chief Ntsikayesizwe Sigcau were detained.²¹⁰ And Miss Mancotywa was detained again for leading a protest against the detention of Paramount Chief Dalindybo.²¹¹ She was released three months later to face charges under the Public Security Act.²¹²

In spite of these difficulties, the DPP was still optimistic about its support and Mr Ncokazi said in November that he was confident the party would win the next election — if it was allowed to organise freely. 'Generally the people in Transkei are against the policies of the TNIP. If we are allowed to organise we will win the election but I am confident we won't be allowed to as was the case in 1976. The government fears the DPP like a bogey.'²¹³ Subsequent events showed just how much it did.

In December Mr Pikashe, who in October said he would continue to criticise Kaiser Matanzima if he was still a member of the ruling party,²¹⁴ was found guilty of charges under the Transkei Constitution Act and the Public Security Act, and sentenced to a fine of R200 or 200 days in jail. It was alleged by the State that he had committed an act calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the State President. In addition to claiming that the TNIP wanted to create an aristocracy, he said Kaiser Matanzima wished to deliver the people to an authoritarian

police state. The letter, which was published in *Intsimbi*, also accused Transkeian chiefs of holding sway by instilling terror, persecuting and torturing people.²¹⁵

Early in January 1980 the DPP held its first congress, but there was, not surprisingly, 'only a handful of delegates and observers.'²¹⁶ Nevertheless, it expressed solidarity with political detainees, awaiting trial security prisoners, and others who had been banished, deported or forced into exile while involved in the liberation struggle. The congress, at the suggestion of Mr Xobololo, urged Transkei to stop detaining people indefinitely and to refrain from using the army for duties normally assigned to the police. Mr Pikashe accused the Transkei Police of being one-sided in administering the Public Security Act. And, characteristically, two women who were introduced as delegates from Libode, were later found to be members of the Security Police.²¹⁷

Shortly after the DPP's youth organiser, Mr Teddy Mpahlwa, was detained,²¹⁸ 500 people attended the inaugural conference of the DPP Youth League and elected Mr Zolwa Dunywa, a journalist, as its president. With shouts of 'One nation, one Azania' and 'Amandla', the youth league identified, and agreed to work hand-in-hand with, 'other liberation organisations'. 'We live at a time when truth is misconstrued as treason, advice as device. However, some must make sacrifices for others to succeed,' Mr Dunywa told the congress.²¹⁹ A few days later he learned what that meant in real terms.

Nevertheless, the formation of the DPP youth wing was a significant event in a Transkei in which the Security Police and the Matanzimas had done so much to restrict dissent. *The Star* commented: 'In comparison to the ruling TNIP, which has lately shown signs of dissatisfaction and internal wrangling, the formation of the opposition's youth wing is regarded by political observers as the most significant step an official opposition party has taken since the TNIP started to dominate the scene. The ruling party has never succeeded in forming a youth wing, and when more than 500 young voices were raised for an almost dying opposition, veteran government politicians had to sit up and take notice.'²²⁰

Indeed, the veterans did take notice, in their typical style. Days after the congress, almost the whole executive of the DPP youth was detained: its deputy leader Mr Mda, Mr Xobololo, Mr Pikashe its national organiser, Mr M Dweba and J Kati. The president of

the University of Transkei Students' Representative Council, Ezra Mtshontshi was also held.²²¹ Another DPP youth executive committee member, Mr Mvikili Matutu, was detained shortly afterwards.²²² In spite of the detentions, the DPP youth continued to hold meetings and called on the government to release the detainees.²²³ The detentions were even criticised at the congress of the TNIP in March and in the debate both the party's general-secretary, Mr Gibson Bodlani, and the Minister of Works, Mr H D Mlonyeni, said no provision for the youth had been made in Transkei. Mr Bodlani said if the youth were relegated to the background they could become easy prey for undesirable organisations.²²⁴ Mr Diko even criticised the detentions. Shortly afterwards, Mr Mda, Mr Xobololo, Mr Pikashe and Mr Kati were released, as were eight members of the youth league.²²⁵

Before this, however, Mr Mda joined five other detainees in a hunger strike.²²⁶ A day after this was reported, Ngceba, now a Brigadier, announced that the police had completed their investigations into the DPP and the dockets had been forwarded to the Attorney-General, Mr G Muller.²²⁷ In less than a week, Mr Muller decided there was no case and he declined to prosecute. Mr Muller announced that he had already made up his mind but that it was up to Brigadier Ngceba to make this decision public. Although the Attorney-General had clearly taken little time to dismiss the police case, an astonishing rebuff to the head of the police and security police, Brigadier Ngceba could still say that although the release was unconditional, they could be arrested again tomorrow. Without showing remorse for removing the 12 people from society for six weeks, Brigadier Ngceba said 'he was compelled to be satisfied with Mr Muller's decision.'²²⁸ Clearly he was not satisfied, but such temporary defeats bothered neither him nor his masters.

A week later the DPP's Chief Whip, Chief D D Mlindazwe said the detentions were clear indications that democracy was doomed in Transkei. He made this statement in the absence of his leader, Paramount Chief Dalindyabo, who had been suspended pending his trial, and in the absence of his deputy leader, Mr Mda, who was in hospital after his detention. When George Matanzima had said the DPP would be watched, 'it never occurred . . . that the watching meant a total prejudicing of the freedom of speech.'²²⁹

In April, Hector Ncokazi, who had spent another four months

in jail without being charged, was released yet again.²³⁰ This may have had something to do with the trial, at much the same time, of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo. By then, however, he had spent some 475 days in jail since 1976 without having been sentenced. In July 1980, a DPP youth member, Songezo Ndletyana, was detained.²³¹

Whether the DPP can hold out against all the restrictions placed on it by the government — Chief Moshesh, for example, resigned in February 1980 after he had been convicted under the Public Security Act — remains to be seen. In July 1980, Major T L Tyelela of the Security Police prevented the DPP's executive from meeting under the emergency regulations.²³² But the determination of its much-detained leadership certainly does indicate that only downright suppression will stop it from operating. The Matanzimas are, of course, capable of doing just that, but then their claim to any significant support will be further weakened.

MORE CONTROLS ON POLITICAL PARTIES

As if the practical difficulties faced by the DP, the TNPP and the DPP were not enough, the government introduced new restraints on political parties in 1979 in terms of the Electoral Law Amendment Bill. This measure introduced a system of registration for political parties, a requirement of a R500 deposit and a R50 annual registration fee. Parties could only be registered if they had 50 foundation members. Section 39 (d) provides for the prohibition of registration of political parties. In the words of the then Minister of Interior, Mr H Pamla, registration could be refused 'where the abbreviation of the name of a political party is similar or so closely resembles another party already registered that it may lead to confusion amongst the voters, or where the abbreviated name is indecent, obscene, offensive, harmful to relations between sections of the population, ridicules or is contemptuous of a section of the inhabitants of Transkei or is prejudicial to the safety of the State, general welfare or peace and good order.' Although appeals, within 30 days, to the Supreme Court against rulings of the electoral officer were provided for in the law, the registration qualifications imply extreme conformity to the parameters narrowly defined by the ruling party.

A more rigid barrier against potential opposition was contained in Section 40 of the bill where the election deposit for candidates was raised by 800 percent, from R50 to R400. The DPP bitterly attacked this provision, alleging that it prevented poorer people from standing for the Assembly. 'Only the privileged classes will be able to contest,' Chief T N Sigcau said. 'The amount of R400 is not important in the assessment of a candidate's ability, but it might preclude people who wish to offer themselves as candidates. People who might otherwise be elected to this House will now be prohibited because of this exorbitant amount. This House will consist of . . . voting robots who will be no use at all,' Mr W M Dweba argued. 'The amount should be reduced because our people, on the whole, have no funds and it should be remembered that we are a new state in the embryonic stages and money is scarce,' Mr N G Jafta said. 'How can you expect a person who is paid a meagre wage to pay a deposit of R400? It is the same as expecting a man who is earning R20 a month to pay taxes of R30,' Chief D D Mlindazwe added. The opposition tried to get the deposit reduced to R100, twice as much as the previous deposit, but the request was rejected.

The government's attitude was, perhaps, best summed up in a revealing statement by Mr Pamla when he denied that the new deposit was despotic. 'If a man wants to stand for election, the first thing we must expect from that man is, firstly, he must be a knowledgeable person; secondly, he must at least be living a decent life, and anybody who lives a decent life can surely afford R400. We are trying to eliminate the scum from some of these political rallies that take place when nomination time comes. We get a lot of people, some of them with Sub B education, wanting to represent the people of a district. This is an utter disgrace, and in areas where political parties have not been properly organised some of these people are able to scrape through by using certain methods which make it possible for them to come to this House.' With that, Mr Pamla dismissed about half of Transkei's electorate; with his R400 deposit he dismissed almost everyone else from qualifying for parliament.^{232a}

While Mr Pamla claimed that the measure was aimed at ensuring that only parties and individuals interested in the welfare of Transkei would take part in politics, what it did, in fact, was to make it more difficult for new parties to contest elections. It would also make it much more difficult for those without financial

resources or backing to stand for election. And opposition in Transkei became that much harder.

DETENTIONS

'It is my policy that nobody should be detained unless that person is going to be brought before the courts,' Chief George Matanzima said on November 6, 1979.²³³

This statement by Transkei's Prime Minister may, theoretically, reflect his intentions — but they bear little relation to reality. Some Transkeian detainees (that is, people detained without trial under Proclamation R400 or the Public Security Act) have eventually been charged, but the majority have not. In Transkei, detentions are used quite openly as a means of discouraging dissent or punishing those who step out of line, or both. The following examples illustrate how blatantly the power to detain is used in the political interests of the Matanzimas.

Two people who were not charged gave horrifying accounts of their detentions early in 1980. One was the *Daily News* correspondent in Transkei, Peter Honey, who was released after an action in the Supreme Court in which the legality of his jailing was challenged. Because of the prohibitive costs of such actions, particularly if they fail, this is a procedure that the vast majority of detainees cannot afford. If they could pay the costs, Mr Honey wrote afterwards,²³⁴ 'I believe many would be free today were they allowed access to the legal process.' He had been detained for refusing to disclose his sources of information for a story he had written.²³⁵ He was first detained at Umtata's Wellington Prison and then at Sterkspruit. At Wellington, his cell was two metres by three metres. It contained a lavatory and a washbasin. He was given a sisal mat and some blankets.

'The food is the same for all the estimated 2 000 prisoners at Wellington, and consists of mealie meal porridge and sugar for breakfast, samp and soup for lunch and a supper of mealie meal porridge with either vegetables or meat substitute and soup. Meat was included in the diet on Wednesdays. The periods of exercise varied from one prison to the next: in Umtata the detainees spent most of the day together outside their cells, although weekend staff reductions meant shorter hours in the sun. At Sterkspruit prison no contact between political prisoners is permitted. There

were, however, means of communication which no regulations could prevent. One of these was to empty the water out of the lavatory bowl and talk through the sewerage pipe. The smell, however, reduced talk to a series of outbursts between deep breaths.

'The lack of communication with the outside world is perhaps the single most frustrating aspect of detention. Warders are not even allowed to pass on the time of day to detainees, and I had no idea of the intense legal tussle which resulted in my detention being declared unlawful.

'While the criminal prisoners seemed resigned to their lot, the political prisoners talked quietly among themselves or sat alone in thought. The graffiti — "WE ARE MORE SEDITIONARY THAN BEFORE" — in my cell summed up their reaction to detention, which was one of bitterness, hopelessness and in some cases, confusion.'

Another person who was not charged and who was detained after writing a letter to the *Daily Dispatch*, Nimrod Mkele, a psychologist who had been active in the black consciousness movement, also wrote about his detention. He was detained for 30 days at the end of 1979 and then released without charge and deported from Transkei.²³⁶ He ended up in a stateless limbo because although he was Xhosa-speaking, he had been deported from Transkei. He said, however, that he regarded himself as a South African.

Mr Mkele said he was not surprised when he was detained for no reason because Transkei's 'so-called' government was scared of urban people, particularly those from areas on the Reef.

He had been picked up on November 30, 1979, after the letter had appeared in the *Daily Dispatch*. 'When I asked to be allowed to pick up some of my clothes, I was refused permission. A few days later, I was again called to the offices of the security police where I was asked personal questions.' Among these questions was who his personal friends were.

He said the conditions in the Umtata prison were terrible. The white magistrate who visited the detainees while he was in detention, when told of complaints from the detainees, said he could not help but would refer the complaints to the security police. Detainees were not allowed any clothes besides those they had on. Prison food was 'lousy'. Detainees who were sick were not allowed to see a doctor; nor were they taken to hospital without the permission of

the Security Police.

A Methodist priest, Rev Morgenthal Ndolo, who was later banished after he issued summons for damages against the government following his detention, was brought to prison in his clerical gown, with a bible and a clerical collar. He stayed in his gown for the rest of his detention. Although he was ill for some time, his complaints were ignored. When he was finally taken to hospital, the then Colonel Ngceba tried to make public relations mileage out of the fact.²³⁷

The now-exiled Umtata editor, Vuyani Mrwetyana, described his captors as 'sadists'. During an earlier detention, he was admitted to hospital after 25 days in detention. A journalist who saw him there was told by a warder that 'visitors were not allowed to supply the journalist with any food or reading material.'²³⁸ Mr Honey was denied visitors.²³⁹ Another journalist who was detained and then released without charge, Sidney Moses, was taken to hospital. His wife saw him there and even kissed him, but the security policeman guarding him 'said I had no right to get that close to him without his permission.' Later, Mr Moses was moved out of the hospital back to prison, and a nurse said 'they had been given instructions that all people detained under the security laws must be transferred to the prison as their relatives and friends had easy access to them in hospital.'²⁴⁰

In short, the conditions of detention are harsh. The cases quoted here are those of people who have some access to the media and the courts; those less privileged may have worse stories to tell. However, there have been relatively few complaints of maltreatment of detainees by assault. Many of the detainees have publicly conceded that within the context of detention the Security Police were polite. Peter Honey quoted one Wellington Prison detainee as having said that 'he was made to stand continuously in a room for four days, under close security police supervision, until his legs had swollen to the extent of making standing impossible.' Mr Mda had to spend time in hospital after his release. A Sotho detainee, Mr T Mosala, died in detention in 1976 but an inquest court found no one was to blame for his death. Other than that there have, in comparison say to South Africa, been relatively few complaints of assault and other forms of violence against detainees.

However there have been numerous complaints that detainees have been 'forgotten' in prison or that they have never been

questioned. Those DP candidates who were prepared to be quoted after their release in 1977 said that they had not been questioned at all. The former DP secretary, Joseph Kobo, had still not been questioned after ten months in detention. Sidney Moses was questioned. Mr Tembekile Tshunungwa, former Cape Secretary of the ANC, once a strong supporter of Kaiser Matanzima and an MP until his conviction on charges of theft cost him his place in the Assembly, was questioned once in 94 days. In February, 1980 Peter Honey wrote: 'At least two detainees I spoke to in Wellington said they had not been questioned and still did not know why they had been detained. One had been arrested in November and the other in December.' Considering the long detentions suffered by many people and the large number of people who have been released without being charged, it is clear that detention without trial is used as a punishment, though the 'sentence' has not been imposed by any court or judicial process. The detentions are administrative decisions by the Security Police who also decide when detainees are to be released. The implications for democratic process are obvious.

Detention, it is clear, is a punitive weapon wielded by the Security Police. Mr Honey was detained for not revealing his sources. He was told by Brigadier Ngceba that the security chief would make him 'dance'. The Press were told that Mr Honey would be held until he 'talks', that the Brigadier was acting within the law, and that the law would be amended if this was not the case.²⁴¹ In the subsequent court action, a *Daily News* reporter, Mr O A Kinnear, testified that Brigadier Ngceba had told him that 'We have the right under the law to squeeze Mr Honey until he gives us the name'²⁴² although the brigadier denied having said this. In any event, the court ordered his release.

Sidney Moses was detained on April 17, 1980, after he had questioned George Matanzima about a phone call he had received. He was freed after 30 days, shortly before lawyers were to make an urgent application for his release. The Transkei government then paid his full legal costs, an admission that his detention was illegal. Mr Moses was not questioned, but it was suggested that he had obtained his information through the *Dispatch* tapping the Prime Minister's telephone. Predictably, Brigadier Ngceba said, shortly after his detention, that Mr Moses would be charged soon with 'some subversive matter'²⁴³ but that never happened.

Among the reasons given to Mr Mkele for his detention was the

allegation that he had illegally obtained a Transkei passport. He was not charged for that criminal offence.

Some detainees — Mr Ncokazi, Miss Mancotywa, Chief Moshesh, Paramount Chief Dalindyebo, Mr Pikashe and others — were subsequently tried under the Public Security Act but many others did not come up for trial.

An instructive illustration of how the detention laws are applied in practice is the arrest in November 1978 of five alleged PAC terrorists in Transkei. Their detention was announced in a radio broadcast by the then Minister of Justice in South Africa, Mr Jimmy Kruger, indicating perhaps just who the real boss was.²⁴⁴ At that stage, the PAC was a legal organisation in Transkei. It was only banned a year later. In 1977, the PAC as well as the ANC were to be made illegal in terms of the Public Security Act but this provision was dropped from the bill²⁴⁵ when Kaiser Matanzima said, in October 1976, that both organisations would be allowed to continue 'their liberation struggle' against South Africa on condition they did not take up arms against South Africa.²⁴⁶

The day after Mr Kruger's statement, Colonel Ngceba said publicly that he had no knowledge of the arrest of the PAC 'terrorists'. He lashed out at Mr Kruger, saying that he had no business to comment on events in another country.²⁴⁷ The next day Mr Diko, then back in the TNIP, called for the release of the five PAC members. Mr Kruger's statement, he said, was proof that he did not recognise Transkei's independence. He added that if the reports were indeed correct he wanted the men to join the guerilla force he was organising to defend the land that had been taken away in East Griqualand.²⁴⁸

Finally, in March 1979, the Minister of Justice in Transkei, Mr Digby Koyana, announced that a number of communist-trained, armed infiltrators had in fact been detained. They had been mobilising for an onslaught on South Africa, Transkei and Bophutatswana. All were Transkeian-born except for two who came from South Africa. They had been trying to establish cells in the Umtata, Xalanga and Cacadu districts. Those arrested included Mr Mawethu Vitshima, Mr Sabelo Gqwetha, Mr Xola Trevor Mketi, Mr Synod Madlebe and Mr Alec Mabhuza. Mr Vitshima had been found in possession of a Russian Makarov pistol and nine rounds of ammunition; Mr Gqwetha had a Mao Tse-tung booklet, and Mr Mketi had a Browning pistol with eight rounds, four of them blank. 'Some of those arrested,' said Mr Koyana, 'have been arrested for

the part they played in harbouring and rendering assistance to those trained in guerilla warfare. Among those are Mr Synod Madlebe and Mr Mack Maboza.' They aimed to spread communism throughout Transkei so that a social democratic government could be established which would train recruits for guerilla warfare against South Africa.

Mr Koyana emphatically denied that the prisoners had been handed over to South Africa and said Transkei was continuing investigations. He added that PAC and ANC members were welcome to return to Transkei on the clear condition that they should return in peace, unarmed, and with full acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the state.²⁴⁹

Some months later, Mr Mkele virtually confirmed Mr Kruger's original statement when he disclosed that Mr Vitshima had been detained on October 27, 1978, and was still in detention; Mr Gqwetha had been detained on November 3, 1978; and although the initials did not correspond to those given by Mr Koyana, he said that a Mr M Mketi had been detained on October 27, 1978; Mr Vuyisele Mketi was taken in on December 13, 1978, and a Violet Mketi on December 8, 1978; Mr Madleba had been detained on December 18, 1978. There was no Mr Alec Mabhuza on his list but Mr N Mashoza, a former Robben Island prisoner, had been detained on March 3, 1979. He also named Mr S Maalibe, who was detained on December 18, 1978; Mr W Toboti, also a former Robben Island prisoner, who was eventually released in April 1980;²⁵⁰ Mr Z Gushu, detained on November 7, 1978; a man known only as 'Lucky', detained on October 27, 1978; Mr S Mapundolo, detained on November 6, 1978; and Mr Clarence Makwetu, another ex-Robben Islander, who had been banished on his release.²⁵¹ In short, Mr Kruger had been right and Mr Koyana, by implication, confirmed this by saying they had been arrested between October 1978 and March 1979.

It seemed that there was a clear case against the detainees, even if membership of the PAC was not one of the offences. In March 1979, George Matanzima said the government was aware of three cells in Umtata that had been formed for the overthrow of the Transkei government. He was replying to a plea for clemency by Miss Sigcau who said the refugees might not have known the conditions under which they were welcome to return to Transkei.²⁵² In October, Colonel Ngceba confirmed that they were still in detention, but declined to say when they would be brought to

court. In November, George Matanzima said: 'These men who were arrested last year had been trained overseas and the investigations have to go as far as that.' He would not give a date for their trial, but said, 'As far as the police are concerned I have the assurance they will be brought before the courts as soon as it is humanly possible to do so.'²⁵³

Mr Mkele disclosed that Mrs N Mketi, the mother of the Mketis, had herself been detained for 90 days after she had tried to visit them, then released.²⁵⁴ Shortly afterwards it was announced that she had briefed Johannesburg lawyers to act on her behalf to get them released or charged.²⁵⁵ By July 1980, however, they were still in detention and had not yet been charged.

In February, Peter Honey reported that 'one detainee, who had been jailed in November 1978, was on hunger strike in support of his demands for legal representation, a change of clothing and better clothing. Throughout my time in Wellington prison, Mr Xola Mketi lay in his cell naked, except for a covering of blankets, and refused any food. On January 21, when I was removed from Wellington he had begun his 21st day on hunger strike.' In February, he was taken to hospital and fed intravenously before being returned to prison. However, other alleged PAC detainees had joined the hunger strike.²⁵⁶ By early March, six of the detainees, including Mr Mda, were in hospital following their participation in the hunger strike.²⁵⁷

In general, it is extremely difficult to say how many people have been detained under the security laws since 1976, but certainly a picture has emerged.

On November 11, 1976, there were 24 people in detention. All but two were eventually released without being charged, and the two charged, including Mr Nkosiyan, the MP for Maqunduli, were eventually acquitted of murder.²⁵⁸ In February 1977, DP activist P S Fadana was detained a second time. Although George Matanzima said publicly that he would be charged, he was released at the end of September.²⁵⁹ A student, Peter Majola, was detained in March and released without being charged 16 days later.²⁶⁰

In April, George Matanzima announced that nine people who had been detained by the South African Police before October 26, 1976, would be released. On the same day he confirmed that five people were still in detention under the security laws, including a South African Council of Churches worker, A M Msoki, who had already been detained for 295 days.²⁶¹ He was released, finally, at

the end of May without being charged.²⁶² Of the five, two eventually appeared in court. One, Rev K Masela, was tried for sabotage, alternatively arson, but was acquitted in June,²⁶³ while the other, Goodman Matotie, was jailed for trying to influence witnesses in a Suppression of Communism Trial.²⁶⁴ In August nine people, including Hector Ncokazi, were detained but they were released in October.²⁶⁵ On October 12, 1977, a public service inspector, Harrison Calaza, was picked up but released later. On October 18, Rev Prince Ntintili, Secretary of the Transkei Branch of the South African Bible Society, and on October 27, Rev M O Xundu, programme officer of the Black Community Programmes, were detained for organising transport for people to attend the funeral in King Williams Town of the black consciousness leader, Steve Biko. Both were released at the end of January the following year.²⁶⁶ Early the next month, a former Robben Island prisoner Fikile Bam, a lawyer, was detained again. He had already spent time inside between July 28 and September 17, 1979, and was then released at the end of January without being charged.²⁶⁷ DP Secretary Florence Mancotywa was detained and then released in January 1978.²⁶⁸ At the end of that month 12 Sothos, including Chief Neo Sibi, and two men believed to be in favour of Umzimkulu going to KwaZulu, were released without being charged.²⁶⁹

With the release in March 1978 of 18 tribesmen of Mputi location,²⁷⁰ the detention tally for the period of October 1976 to March 1978, for known and publicised detentions was:

75 detained
4 charged
1 convicted

After this period, the picture becomes confusing. More and more people were detained and the authorities increasingly refused to confirm or disclose detentions. At the end of March, however, Mr Msoki was detained again. A few days later, police confirmed that a Butterworth headmaster, overseas-trained Phumelele Vanda, had been detained on November 4. Towards the end of July, he was found not guilty of possession of literature banned in South Africa. He was charged with possessing Kwame Nkrumah's *Africa Must Unite*.²⁷¹ He was acquitted after having spent over six months in detention.

In May, George Matanzima said six people were then in detention and that three of them would face charges. He also said

33 people had been detained between October 1977 and May 1978, 27 of whom had been released.²⁷² The following day, Colonel Ngceba gave the names. One was Hector Ncokazi who was later found guilty under the Public Security Act, as we have seen. Another was Mr Vanda who was eventually acquitted. A third, Maford Mfazwe, a former Robben Islander, had been found guilty of possession of explosives and was shortly afterwards evicted from his house in the Ilinge resettlement camp.²⁷³ Three others, Florence Mancotywa, Welamazwe Bango and Christopher Nyamela were being detained.²⁷⁴ Miss Mancotywa was eventually released. Mr Bango who was charged with insulting Kaiser Matanzima was released on bail, then acquitted. It is uncertain what happened to Mr Nyamela.

In August the same year, Vuyani Mrwetyana and Anderson Majeke, a magistrate, were detained. They were eventually charged with breaking prison regulations.²⁷⁵ Mr Mrwetyana was acquitted in February the following year.²⁷⁶ In October, the first black mayor of Butterworth, another former councillor and four others were detained for two weeks, then released.²⁷⁷

In February 1979, a Methodist priest, Rev Amos Fadane, who refused to have anything to do with the takeover of the Methodist Church, was detained, then released in March.²⁷⁸ Another priest, Rev M Mdolo, who successfully challenged a Supreme Court move by the Transkei Methodist Church to transfer him out of Transkei was detained for 82 days. He was banished after he issued a summons for R42 000 for his detention.²⁷⁹

In March, the Minister of Posts, Mr Armstrong Jonas, said 40 people were being detained under the security laws. It transpired that at least 12 of them were being detained for PAC activities. Mr Jonas would not name them 'because this might tamper with the investigations.'²⁸⁰ The next month, Minister of Police Chief George Ndabankulu said that the Security Police, who had attended 'vigilantly' to security matters, had detained 40 people and charged four. He did not reply to charges relating to the remaining 36 detainees.^{280a} Following this, various DPP officials were detained: they included Mr B C Pikashe (convicted under the Public Security Act in December), Paramount Chief Dalindyabo (convicted under the same Act in April 1980), Miss Florence Mancotywa (convicted in 1980), and Chief Jeremiah Moshesh (convicted in 1980). Chief Tembekekile Sigcau was also detained in August,²⁸¹ and Mr Ncokazi later in the year, while Mr Kobo, who was still in

detention in July 1980, was picked up in August. Also in August, a recently returned exile, Dr Mxolisi Ntlabati, was detained and then deported.²⁸² In November, former Robben Islander, Mr Clarence Makwetu, was released without being charged after 76 days in detention.

On December 4, 1979, Nimrod Mkele was detained, released and deported — he was escorted over the Umzimkulu bridge — on December 29.²⁸³ The detention of the president of the Transkei Toastmasters Association, Mike Kahle, also took place that month.²⁸⁴

Early in January 1980 journalist Peter Honey was detained and released, following a court action, after 16 days.²⁸⁵ Another journalist, Sidney Moses, was detained for a day in February and for 30 days in April and May, even though Brigadier Ngceba said he would be charged.²⁸⁶ Also in January, first the DPP's youth organiser, Teddy Mpahlswa, and then both youth league and executive members were detained, only to be released six weeks later without being charged, as was the president of the University of Transkei SRC, Ezra Mtshontshi.²⁸⁷ Another ex-Robben Islander, Siphon Ndalaleni, was detained in January. On the same day, a Cape Town businessman, Gert Kotze, was released on R1 000 bail after being charged with fraud. He had been detained for two months. In February, the Sotho leader, William Malefane, claimed there were five Sothos being held incommunicado.²⁸⁸

In April, Hector Ncokazi was released again, as was Waters Toboti, after more than seven months in detention. Also released was Mike Mrwebi, a businessman, but he faced criminal charges and was given bail.²⁸⁹ In the case of Mr Mrwebi and Mr Kotze, the use of the Public Security Act is extraordinary, to say the least.

Mr Mkele claimed that an Indian, Ebrahim Nustradien, had also been detained²⁹⁰ and that a white man from Durban, Mark Morgan, had been detained for four days, then released and deported after going on a hunger strike.²⁹¹ Neither of these detentions have been confirmed but in view of the accuracy of his other information, they seem likely. Excluding them, however, the minimum count for security detainees from March 1978 appears to be:

Released 30 (maybe 35 if 5 Sothos included)
Charged and Acquitted 3
Guilty 7
Still in Detention 6
Trial pending 14

These are tentative figures, but together with the last count, they mean that the Transkei police have detained at least 134 people since October 1976 and obtained seven convictions, most of them under the Public Security Act, a loaded piece of legislation if there ever was one. George Matanzima's claims, quoted at the start of this section, that the policy is to charge detainees, is at least 88 percent hot air according to these figures.

When Nimrod Mkele said 'KD is on a rampage, attacking almost everybody and shielding himself with his presidential privilege'²⁹² he wasn't exaggerating.

TRIALS

Other than the much-publicised Public Security Act trials involving members of the opposition, there have been relatively few major political trials.

In March 1977, four men were sentenced to four years' imprisonment in Umtata for furthering the aims of communism. They were: Dumisa Ntsebeza, Lungisile Ntsebeza, Meluxolo and Matthew Goniwe. A fifth man, Michael Mgobozi, was given a suspended sentence. It was found that between January 1974 and June 1976, they had set up secret groups to spread the doctrine of Marxist socialism. Mr Justice Munnik said that as the Suppression of Communism Act had not been repealed by the Transkei Government — it was, in fact, repealed and replaced by the Public Security Act shortly after the trial — he had to assume that the policy of the Transkei government was opposed to all forms of communism.²⁹³ During the trial, Judge Munnik refused an application to have the charges quashed on the ground that they were committed against South Africa and not Transkei. Professor John Dugard, of the University of the Witwatersrand, said in evidence that he thought the state of Transkei had a different legal personality from the Republic of South Africa and that for this reason the accused could not be convicted of an offence against the Republic of South Africa in the courts of another country. During the trial, the accused denied the existence of a Marxist front and said they had been involved in a discussion group.

It was, perhaps, significant that one of the witnesses, Miss

Zingiswa Nosa, informed the court that she had been told by 'a Captain Dreyer' in November, after 'independence', that should she refuse to give evidence if she were called as a state witness, she would be prosecuted.²⁹⁴

In July that year, a Proclamation R400 detainee, Goodman Matotie was found guilty on a charge of attempting to obstruct the course of justice by influencing witnesses in the communism trial to flee the country.²⁹⁵

In June 1977, another detainee, Rev K Masela was acquitted of sabotage charges²⁹⁶ while in November that year, a headmaster, Macocobela Damane of Port St Johns, was acquitted of public violence.²⁹⁷

In February 1978, two government clerks were charged with xeroxing the Human Rights Congress bulletin, *The Transkei Myth*; a document entitled 'Detainees', and a speech by Mrs Winnie Mandela.

In May the following year, a 29-year-old municipal worker, Welamazwe Bango, previously a detainee, was charged with insulting Kaiser Matanzima. He said he had been detained for six weeks before he was told why he was being detained. A security policeman, Mr Luvuyo Nqamqelo, claimed to have overheard Mr Bango saying: 'Where are men like Mandela and Sobukwe? They are fighting for the nation on Robben Island. One Azania, one nation, Mayibuye I-Afrika. Transkei is a homeland and I cannot talk about Matanzima because he is a dog. Transkei is a homeland and I cannot stay in a homeland. Transkei is a poor country because of Matanzima.' But his evidence was not accepted and the accused was acquitted.²⁹⁸ Nimrod Mkele claimed there had been 22 similar trials in Transkei but these have not been reported.

The Public Security Act is the main instrument of political restraint, but clearly the Transkei Constitution Act and other laws taken over from South Africa have the same function.

A trend towards holding security trials in secret has also started, although Chief Justice Munnik has stressed, in the past, the need for justice to be seen to be done. In June 1980, the State requested that a trial involving the distribution of pamphlets be held in camera because it did not consider it to be 'in the interests of public order that the pamphlets be published.' The defence lawyer also wanted it placed on record that, 'I was refused permission by the Security Police to consult my client unless I did so in their presence.' Brigadier Ngceba told the defence lawyers

that it would be a privilege for his client to see an advocate.²⁹⁹ The implications of this situation are clear: the right to lawyers and open trials will be at the discretion of the government.

BANISHMENT

Another legal mechanism available to the Matanzimas is banishment, a device taken over from the 1927 Native Administration Act, in terms of the Public Security Act. The banishments of Chiefs Bangilizwe Joyi and Anderson Joyi, in March 1978, were discussed earlier.³⁰⁰

Chief Bangilizwe had been banished twice before by the South African government.³⁰¹

Shortly afterwards, 27 Transkeians who were sentenced in the 1950s for their involvement in the Poqo movement, were found guilty of attempting to assassinate Kaiser Matanzima. It was reported³⁰² that they had been banished to remote areas of Transkei and 'an informant claimed that the men were being made to work for local chiefs in return for only a bowl of food — an allegation Major Ngceba would neither confirm nor deny, but found "highly unlikely".' Major Ngceba was also quoted as saying, 'They are taken as murderers by people and would have been killed. We came to their rescue.' But, in another report, he denied they had been banished and said they had been transported to Western Transkei. He said no restrictions had been placed on them.³⁰³

In November 1979, the now Colonel Ngceba did, however, confirm another banishment when the former superintendent of the Buntingville circuit of the Transkei Methodist Church, Rev M D Mdolo, was banished to the Xolobe Location in the Tsomo district. The banishment was imposed after he had successfully challenged in the Supreme Court a move to transfer him to Namaqualand. Shortly after that, he was detained for 82 days and then released without being charged. He then issued summons for R42 000 against various police officials for wrongful detention. Colonel Ngceba denied that the banishment had anything to do with the goings-on in the Methodist Church but added, succinctly, that 'the government has the right to banish anybody.'³⁰⁴

There is no appeal against banishments, which cannot be challenged in court. The Matanzimas have another weapon of control.

BANNING

If anything reflected the Transkei government's approach to security-related issues it was the decision to ban 34 organisations in November 1979. While it was understandable that an authoritarian regime should outlaw bodies like the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa, it was considerably less understandable to ban the moderate and defunct Union of Black Journalists which had been banned in South Africa in 1977. The Writers Association of South Africa, on the other hand, which is undoubtedly opposed to any form of balkanisation of South Africa and strongly antagonistic to the Matanzimas, was left unbanned. Even non-existent bodies were banned. At the same time, the Minister of Justice, Mr Tsepo Letlaka, who had been a leading member of PAC when it committed itself to violent overthrow of the South African regime, said publicly that he still supported the principles of the PAC. If he were required, however, to sign a notice banning the PAC, he would do his duty 'as required by law.'³⁰⁵

It was a bewildering performance. No one ever tried to explain how the list of 34 bodies was drawn up, who drew it up, why the bodies were included (other than a general allegation that they were opposed to Transkei), or whether the cabinet approved the list. What is quite clear is that it severely damaged the credibility of the Intelligence Service (it was, perhaps, the first public display of their skills), the Security Police (who must have been involved), Mr Letlaka, his cabinet and government decision-making in general.

They were not the first bodies to be banned in Transkei after 1976. In May 1977, the ANC and PAC were to be outlawed in terms of the draft Public Security Bill, but the automatic banning of these bodies was dropped during the committee stage because, according to George Matanzima, it would be inappropriate for an independent Transkei to continue policies initiated by South Africa.³⁰⁶

The following year the Assembly rushed through, in one day, the Undesirable Organisations Bill which empowered the government to declare certain organisations undesirable. George Matanzima explained that it was the duty of the government to take effective action against any organisation in Transkei which aimed at interfering with the right of Transkeians to enjoy and lead a political life of their own choosing. The bill would protect the

people of Transkei against 'undermining forces'. 'It has come to me as a great shock,' he said, 'to note that this evil spirit of jealousy of our political achievement could be so powerful as to contaminate even the most unexpected quarters like religious organisations.'³⁰⁷ A week later as expected, the new law was used against the Methodist Church of Southern Africa which was declared illegal in Transkei.³⁰⁸

The ruling party in the Qwaqwa homeland, the Dikwankwentla Party, became the first organisation to be outlawed in terms of the Public Security Act in June 1979.³⁰⁹ It was alleged at the time that it was a danger to Transkei's existence.

Five months later Mr Letlaka, then Minister of Justice, announced that the government had decided to ban 34 organisations from Transkei. 'Jointly and separately, they have attacked the liberation of the people of Transkei and the independence of the Transkei state.' Twelve of the 34 organisations were banned in South Africa and many of them were defunct. While the ANC, PAC and South African Communist Party, all of whom were banned, operated illegally in South Africa or in exile, organisations like the Union of Black Journalists, the Zimele Trust Fund and the Black Peoples' Convention, all of which had been banned in October 1977 in South Africa, had ceased to exist.

Besides the ANC, the PAC and the SACP, the other organisations banned included: The South African Students Organisation (SASO), Marxist Front, Black Peoples' Convention, Institute for Black Studies, Azanian Liberation Movement, Black Community Programmes, Young Christian Workers, Union of Black Journalists, Students' Christian Movement, Maluti Lesotho Organisation, Human Rights Committee of South Africa, Zambian Economic Co-operation, Unity Movement of South Africa, South African Council of Churches, Dependents' Conference, Independent Churches of South Africa, South West African Foundation, African Teachers' Association of South Africa, World Council of Churches, Black Parents' Organisation, Christian Institute of Southern Africa, South African Students' Movement, Zimele Trust Fund, Azanian Peoples' Organisation (Azapo), South African Congress of Trade Unions, South African Society of Journalists, South African Council of Churches, Inkatha, the United Africa National Council, and the Black Power Movement.

The banning of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC of Zimbabwe

was inexplicable. Organisations not known to exist at all included the 'Black Power Movement', the 'Zambian Economic Co-operation' and 'Marxist Front'. Even Colonel Ngceba did not know of the 'Black Power Movement' and he presumed the 'Marxist Front' was a foreign organisation. He added: 'We want our own organisations in Transkei. We are cleaning house to start afresh.'³¹⁰

Mr Letlaka claimed that 'after three years of patience and endless long-suffering, the Transkei nation has been constrained to give an appropriate answer to the spurious and unbridled assaults by a coterie of persons and organisations in South Africa and elsewhere claiming to be the apostles of the liberation of the black man in South Africa.' Transkei also reserved the right 'to foil the subversive activities of those who scheme to destroy the heritage of her people.'³¹¹ Later that month, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and previous Minister of Justice, Mr Digby Koyana, told a group of Swiss businessmen that the bannings were 'a symbolic move' and would be automatically lifted by a system of registration for all organisations in the territory.

'The whole idea is that we want to stop the incessant sprouting of organisations and start with a clean slate,' he said. He also stressed that the opposition party had not been banned and was still allowed to organise meetings. The fact that only two opposition leaders had been arrested under the security laws showed that Transkei was a highly democratic country when compared with some African states.³¹² Other than such generalized comments, no justification for the bannings was felt to be necessary.

Certainly the alleged South West African Foundation did not exist. An organisation with a similar name was the Proswa/Namibia Foundation, an offshoot of the conservative South African Foundation! The Proswa/Namibia Foundation president was, understandably, a little surprised.³¹³

The basis on which some of the South African organisations were selected for proscription was equally confusing. Only eight of the 18 organisations banned in South Africa on October 19, 1977, were included. Those not included were: the Soweto Students' Representative Council, the National Youth Organisation, the Black Women's Federation, the Border Youth Organisation, the Eastern Province Youth Organisation, the Transvaal Youth Organisation, the Western Cape Youth Organisation, the Natal Youth Organisation, Medupe and the Asso-

ciation for the Education and Cultural Advancement of Black People.³¹⁴

Naturally, those organisations still legal in South Africa but now illegal in Transkei protested against their bannings, but this seemed to have little effect on the Transkeian leadership. The SA Council of Churches stopped R250 000 much-needed relief work, including crèches, flood relief programmes and agricultural development schemes.³¹⁵

Two weeks after the bannings, Mr Letlaka hinted that some of the bannings might be lifted where justification was found³¹⁶ — in fact only the ban on the Students' Christian Movement was lifted³¹⁷ and by July 1980 no system of registration, as predicted by Mr Koyana, had been introduced. Mr Letlaka also tried to clear up some confusion: he said that the UANC banned by Transkei was not Bishop Muzorewa's UANC: 'I think there has been some unfortunate mistake in interpretation here,' he said.³¹⁸ He did not even know about the United African National Congress and said the police department should know. But Col Ngceba refused to even confirm the accuracy of the minister's remarks. Mr Letlaka was also asked if the bans on the organisations which did not exist would be lifted. His quoted explanation was unbelievable: 'If organisations do not exist, there is certainly no prejudice to anybody, and it becomes a purely academic question as to whether the bans should be lifted, since if they don't exist it is impossible to ban them, because an impossibility does not amount to a reality.'³¹⁹ Which is a very logical reply.

At the end of the month, the Transkei Council of Churches decided to suspend its activities until the ban on the South African Council of Churches was lifted. The TCC executive disclosed that it had met Mr Letlaka on 14 November and he had advised them to submit a memorandum. The TCC, which handled the SACC's projects in Transkei, said it would be forced to discontinue its work unless it could work with the SACC. 'The only way we can continue is if the ban is lifted,' a spokesman said.³²⁰ The ban on the SACC has not been lifted which indicates that the memorandum to Mr Letlaka has gone the way of most written submissions to governments. And the TCC has ceased functioning.

In December, the government-appointed liquidator of the 34 organisations, Mr Gilbert Sineke, confiscated all properties belonging to the Black Community Programmes and said people

affected could appeal to the government if they wished.³²¹

The number of organisations banned in Transkei rose to 36 again in January 1980 when the Transkei Youth League was banned. The organisation had been launched a month previously after a three-day conference at the instigation of Kaiser Matanzima's son-in-law, Prince Madikizela, a practising attorney. Mr Madikizela had condemned Transkei's independence at the conference, saying the course of colonialism still ran powerfully in the country despite independence. He said: 'The liberation of the whole of Southern Africa and the restoration of freedom and human dignity to those brothers and sisters still under the colonial yoke of the white minority remains our immediate and most important task.' He also told the Transkei government not to imitate white South Africa who 'keeps our leaders in jail.'³²² Later, Mr Letlaka justified the action by saying that the Transkei Government could not encourage or even connive at the establishment of movements 'which place themselves outside the ambit of the Transkeian constitution or set themselves in the course of conflict with the country's security legislation.'³²³

And so, with the laughable but tragic action in November, the Matanzimas have unleashed another powerful weapon to limit freedom in Transkei. Few satisfactory reasons for the bannings have been offered but the effect is quite clear: dissent has been controlled even more stringently than in South Africa.

THE ARMY

Shortly before independence, Transkei obtained a South African-trained army consisting of 254 soldiers and signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa. In 1977, the defence budget was R1 342 000. In the budget speech Kaiser Matanzima, as Minister of Defence, outlined plans for a civil defence division.³²⁴ The following year the budget had almost trebled to R3 651 000. The Transkei Battalion was brought to full strength (720 men) and plans were outlined for a second battalion.³²⁵ In 1979 the new Minister of Defence, Chief George Ndabankulu, outlined plans to establish a military base in each of the nine regions³²⁶ and in 1980 George Matanzima said that all able-bodied Transkeians between the ages of 18 and 65 should undergo compulsory military training to fight 'the terrorist onslaught' and Marxism which resulted in 'disaster, destruction of innocent lives, robbery,

banditry, orphans, widows and above all, chaos.' The national training should be regarded 'as a fulfilment of a national obligation by Transkeian patriots,' he said.³²⁷

The need for an army both in prestige and in conventional military/security terms is understandable. After all, every independent country has to have a defence force. And its borders have to be protected, particularly in the case of Transkei whose relations with Lesotho have been — at least verbally — tense at times. With the open opposition of the ANC, the possibility of guerilla attacks cannot be ruled out either.

But armies also have internal roles. The spate of army-led coups in Africa has shown that they are, or can be, alternative sources of power. The theoretical possibility of such a coup in Transkei cannot be ignored. However, the head of the army, Brigadier Rodney Keswa, head of Prisons before he was promoted, has up to now been a Matanzima loyalist, and one of George Matanzima's sons is a senior officer in the Transkei Army — Second Lieutenant Qaqumbile Matanzima received a 'Transkei Independence Medal' at a parade in May 1977.³²⁸ Their presence would seem to reduce the possibility of an officer-led coup. The Matanzimas have maintained a close liaison with the army: until he became President early in 1979, Kaiser Matanzima was both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. For a short while, Chief Ndabankulu was Minister of Defence, but George Matanzima took over the portfolio later.

Total control over the aspirations of those in the army is obviously not possible. This was underlined by a statement by Nimrod Mkele that three Transkeian soldiers — he named them as Hofmeyr Sese of Nqamakwe, Bafo Skosana of Herschel and Menziwa Gcasamba of Butterworth — had been in detention at the same time as he had been. It was speculated in the same report, presumably at Mkele's suggestion, that their detention 'is linked with the recent circulation of anonymous pamphlets threatening to overthrow the government by military means.'³²⁹ The possibility of a coup — the only possible counterforce would be the police which had 1 440 members in 1978³³⁰ — cannot be ruled out.

The more insidious internal use of the defence force is as a means of social control. When one of the main reasons for having an army is to fight 'the Marxists' and when the Prime Minister claims the opposition wants to impose a 'Marxist Transkei' on the

inhabitants,³³¹ it is well-nigh impossible to draw a distinction between the potential military threat of the 'Marxists' and that offered by the legal opposition.

The broader role of the army was initially outlined by its first head, Brigadier Phil Pretorius, a seconded South African Defence Force officer. Back in South Africa in 1980 he hit the headlines as the officer responsible for sending out a circular which drew up a strategy to 'nullify the opposition' and to manipulate the media in a psychological action plan.³³² In April 1976, Brigadier Pretorius said he saw the army not only as a means of defence, but also as a provider of essential services to the rural population. Roving army patrols could supply remote villages with medical supplies and assistance where needed. They could also maintain roads, bridges and farming equipment. 'Defence is not only with weapons, but through the hearts of the people,' he said.³³³ Such an extended role for the defence force in any country has obvious political implications.

This new role was underlined in what was headlined as the 'FIRST PRACTICAL TEST FOR TRANSKEI'S FLEDGING ARMY'.³³⁴ In an incident at Queensdale township near Queens-town 100 soldiers assisted the police in cordoning off the township. Colonel Gordon Nkalatshana, who led the police action, confirmed the army's support. He said the action had taken place after there had been trouble in the township. 'Our action was largely routine to prevent trouble in the township and to catch troublemakers. The army cordoned off the township. They were not armed and were used for support only.' Major Ngceba of the Security Police was also involved.³³⁵

In fact, it was not the first practical test for the army, because three weeks previously, on September 23, 1977, members of the army assisted the police in its round-up of 200 people, including Chiefs Anderson Joyi and Bangilizwe Joyi, at Mputi location. Details of the army involvement were published after the men were released without being charged and were not contradicted.³³⁶

After these two incidents there was little news of military actions which are, inevitably, covered by secrecy laws incorporated into the Defence Act of 1978. In April 1978, however, Brigadier Keswa denied that the army had been called in to stop faction fighting in Pondoland. 'Quelling of faction fights is a police duty. Faction fighting is not anything new and the army

has never before been called in to assist in quelling faction fights, however bloody, in Transkei. The army was never called into Eastern Pondoland as was alleged.' The report continued: 'Although the army had been called upon in the past to accompany the police in their raids they performed such assignments as training and the throwing and manning of cordons, said the army chief.'³³⁷ Earlier, it had been stated that the army had been called into the Lusikisiki fighting.³³⁸

In March 1980, the editor of the Catholic newspaper *Intsimbi*, Father Michael Reidener, agreed to pay an admission of guilt following a report that Transkei Battalion soldiers had combed the Lady Frere district while investigating a criminal offence. Although the accuracy of the report was not, at the time, disputed, Father Reidener refused to disclose the author's name, saying that it was against the ethics of his profession to do so. He had been told by Brigadier Keswa that he had committed an offence under the Defence Act by publishing the report.³³⁹ In April, the army was involved in the arrest of 28 people near the Qamata Great Place of Kaiser Matanzima. Clearly more than cattle-rustling was at stake, but government sources denied an attempt to assassinate the President.^{339a}

In May, George Matanzima, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, accused *Intsimbi*, along with *Sunday Post*, of setting out to 'belittle, abuse, distort and generally ridicule' the army. *Sunday Post*, against whom legal proceedings had been instituted, was under fire for an article it carried on the establishment of a 23-man Transkei Navy. The Prime Minister also revealed problems in the army: 'We have had to tighten discipline and deal mercilessly with undesirable types such as dagga smokers, drunkards and criminals.' He also revealed that a few individuals had been stealing firearms and ammunition to sell to the public. The culprits had been arrested.³⁴⁰

Whether or not these two reports of army involvement in counter-criminal actions are true, they were certainly in line with numerous unconfirmed reports from people living in Transkei about military action inside the territory — for example, the DPP complained in January 1980 that the army was being used for police duties. With the declaration of an emergency in June 1980, described in the following section, the army's participation in restraining dissidence became extensive. The position of the army inside Transkei had in any case been well stated by Chief

Ndabankulu in March 1979 when he said: 'The Defence Force is also concerned in the keeping of law and order in Transkei — never mind that it is the function of the police. The police may call in the defence force to assist.'^{340a}

The army's role in Transkei must be seen as supplementary social control and if bases are established in all nine regions it could be conspicuously effective in this role. Although there have been plenty of speeches by politicians about going to war against South Africa, particularly over East Griqualand, the army's only confirmed operational actions have been internal. Given the fact that South Africa would undoubtedly aid Transkei against any major external aggressor, internal control is its major function other than to appear at parades and march through the streets of Umtata.

ANOTHER EMERGENCY

After less than three years (out of 19) of 'normal' government in Transkei the Matanzimas re-imposed emergency rule — 'KEI REIGN OF TERROR', *Post* called it³⁴¹ — in June 1980. Officially, the measures were aimed at countering school boycotts and protests at the University of Transkei, but it soon became clear that dissidence was not confined to educational institutions. The maintenance of roadblocks in towns and the searching of cars and buses which one policeman described as 'routine'; the intensification of patrols;³⁴² the use of the army; the call-up of civil defence units; day and night patrols around government institutions³⁴³ — these measures were not aimed merely at students.

The President of the Transkei Teachers' Association, Mr P N Tshaka, said it was unfortunate that police had beaten up innocent youngsters who had played no part in the burning of schools or boycotts. 'Those not involved must be protected from police who baton charge anybody. I have no sympathy for arsonists, but very careful steps must be taken to ensure innocent students are not beaten.'³⁴⁴

The army's role in the emergency measures was confirmed by Brigadier Keswa who said the civil defence measures had started when disturbances arising from the commemoration of the 1976 unrest were expected. The servicemen would be kept on active

service for as long as the emergency situation remained in Transkei. 'We make no secret of the new security measures we have taken. Calling up the civil defence force for active service is nothing new in a country under a state of emergency,' he said.³⁴⁵

Amid mounting protest by the public against the 'iron-handed' tactics employed by the police in the emergency, George Matanzima defended the police against manhandling, beating up and robbing people suspected of contravening the emergency regulations.³⁴⁶

In terms of the regulations (Proclamation No. 9) which were issued in terms of a special Government Gazette on June 4, 1980, the police were empowered to declare anyone an 'affected person'. The proclamation prohibited students and affected persons from being in public places, and from leaving their homes except to attend classes, or church on Sundays. It made it an offence for students to be absent from classes without permission, to threaten or encourage others not to attend classes or distribute publications calling for a boycott. Students were prohibited from attending meetings or demonstrations without the permission of the Commissioner of Police, carrying weapons or objects which could injure others or cause damage, and shouting or showing slogans which might incite others to boycott classes. Affected persons could only leave their residential premises or school hostels from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. solely for the purposes of attending a funeral ceremony or for medical treatment if they had permission from a magistrate, a chief, a headman or the police. During weekdays affected people could only move from one area to another with the permission of a magistrate or the police, in the urban areas, or with the permission of a chief, headman or the police, in the rural areas. The emergency regulations gave the police, of any rank, the right to arrest and detain without warrant anyone who contravened the regulations or any other law. No person convicted under the regulations could in future be admitted as a scholar or be employed as a teacher or lecturer at any institution. No interdict or other legal process would be allowed for the stay of any order issued and decision made, directions given or action taken under the regulations. Nor could any such order, decision, direction or action be suspended by reason of any appeal against a conviction under the regulations. Police could search people, premises or vehicles without notice and seize vehicles, weapons or publications.³⁴⁷

The provisions for 'affected persons' were harsh. Far more severe and ominous, however, were the powers given to the police. In terms of section 4, any member of the police force, regardless of rank, could, without warrant, 'arrest and detain any person who commits any offence under these regulations or who he has reason to believe has committed or intends committing an offence under these regulations or any other law.' The same section empowers the police to raid any premises, without warrant, 'as he deems necessary' and to search any person found on them.

The Commissioner of Police, or any officer acting under his direction, may detain any person arrested under the proclamation at any place or detain 'any other person if the said Commissioner or such officer has reason to believe that such other person has committed or intends committing an offence under these regulations or any other law or is in possession of any information relating to the commission of any such offence or the intention to commit such an offence.' In either case, the people may be detained 'for such period as may be necessary for the proper investigation of the offence or suspected offence concerned or the proper interrogation of such person or any other person or the maintenance of law and order.' Police officers can also give orders to any person or group of persons 'as he may deem necessary for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance of law and order,' close any road or part of it, close any public place or part of it, ban any meeting other than the National Assembly, prohibit people from entering an area or confine a person 'to any district, area, place or premises.'

Section 6 of Proclamation 9 shifts the onus of proof in suspected contraventions onto the accused and, just in case, the following section prohibits interdicts or any other legal process for the duration of the emergency.

In short, the police, in terms of the regulations, were given absolute power to do as they pleased. And there was no legal check on them.

These extraordinarily severe, even desperate, measures were unprecedented, even in Southern Africa, as measures to deal with student protests. They said much about the insecurities of the Matanzima government — and about the power of the students, as well as the support they were getting.

It is too early, at the time of writing, to assess the emergency and its consequences, but one thing seems quite clear: the Matan-

zimas have successfully alienated the youth of Transkei. Even Kaiser Matanzima's own daughter was expelled from a University of Transkei hostel. More enemies had been created.

GENERAL

The overall effects of all these measures and actions was summed up in an article by David Thomas of the Argus group in 1979, when he reported on the reaction of Transkeian parliamentarians to the installation of a closed circuit television in the Assembly. It was presumed that a monitor screen in the presidential palace would enable Kaiser Matanzima to watch what was going on in the Assembly, since there was 'an uneasy feeling' among parliamentarians that the President 'was not too happy with the way things were being run in his absence.'³⁴⁸

That feeling of being watched does not apply only to parliamentarians: Big Brother, as Thomas put it, is everywhere in Transkei. After three years of independence George Matanzima claimed: 'We have no security problems. When they arise we solve them — even to the extent of arresting a Paramount Chief.' This was clearly a political statement rather than a fact. The truth is that through legal powers, police actions and political trials, dissent has been limited and minimised, but it is ever present. Security raids, detentions without trial, bannings and emergencies cannot, in the long run, provide real security in Transkei.

The Matanzimas may claim, when banning commemorative services for those who died in Soweto on June 16, 1976, that those disturbances were relevant to South Africa and not Transkei, and that therefore such services were being used to undermine the government's authority,³⁴⁹ but they will never be able to isolate Transkei from the mainstream of black thought. They can attack the ANC as much as they like, they can reject black consciousness, they can ban newspapers and detain journalists but they are modern-day Canutes. Oppression, in anyone's terms, is simply no basis for the survival of a state.

In his 1979 speech in Umtata, Prof van der Vyver summed it all up succinctly: 'It stands to reason that the greater the propensity for the subjects to rebel against the political and legal system, the greater the need to increase the powers of those entrusted with the maintenance of law and order. And although

coercion and compulsion backed by powerful implementation media can go a long way to secure order within the community, power is not in itself enough to do so in the long run.

'In the process of resistance to the law and counter-resistance sanctioned by means of increasing oppressive measures, one can reach a stage where the depositories of state authority would find themselves compelled to resort to government by brute force. In a sense, excessive powers of that nature amount to lawlessness on the part of the government, which in my opinion is the worst form of anarchy.

'To prevent such a state setting in, the strong arm of government ought always to be counterbalanced by, inter alia, respect for the law on the part of the subjects of state authority — which, in turn implies that the legal institutions of the involved political community must reflect the respect of the persons in authority for the dignity and worth of the subordinates.'³⁵⁰

The Matanzimas, and their allies, naturally ignored van der Vyver. But in their attempts to engineer consent and suppress dissent, they have lost (if they ever had it) the legitimacy that is necessary to the survival of any political system in the long run.

FOOTNOTES

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2. *Daily Dispatch*, 8 July 1980.
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7. Schlemmer in *Quail Report*, page 5.
8. *Ibid*.

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15. Schlemmer, *Quail Report*, page 16.
16. Ibid, page 20.
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18. Newell M Stultz, *Transkei's Half-Loaf, Race Separatism in South Africa*, David Philip, Cape Town, 1980, page 55.
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24. Debates of Transkei Legislative Assembly, 1964, page 141.
25. Ibid, page 145.
26. Ibid, 1965, page 65.
27. Ibid, 1971, page 115.
28. Ibid, page 111.
29. *Daily Dispatch*, 28 July 1976.
30. Ibid.
31. *Cape Times*, 11 August 1976.
32. Ibid.
33. *Daily Dispatch*, 10 September 1976.
34. Stultz, op cit, page 56.
35. *Daily Dispatch*, 16 October 1976.
36. *Argus*, 13 October 1976.

37. *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 October 1976.
38. *Cape Times*, 25 October 1976.
39. A S Matthews, *Law, Order and Liberty*, Juta, Cape Town, Page 244. The outline of Proclamation R400 is from this book.
40. Ibid.
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42. *Daily Dispatch*, 28 April 1978.
43. Matthews, op cit, page 247.
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87. *Daily Dispatch*, 3 July 1977.
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89. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 March 1978.
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94. Ibid, page 97.
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133. Ibid, 22 March 1977.
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138. *Daily Dispatch*, 28 January 1978.
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161. *Cape Times*, 11 April 1978.
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184. Ibid, 17 February and 23 February, 1977.
185. Ibid, 26 February 1977.
186. Debates of the National Assembly, 1977, page 146.
187. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 June 1977.
188. Ibid, 15 August 1977.
189. Ibid, 13 October 1977.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid, 19 October 1977.
192. Ibid, 8 March 1978.
193. Ibid, 6 January and 7 January 1978.
194. Ibid, 19 and 21 January 1978.
195. Ibid, 3 March and 8 March 1978.
196. Ibid, 23 March 1978.
197. Ibid, 26 October 1978.
198. Ibid, 28 November and 29 November 1978.
199. Ibid, 12 May 1979.
200. *Post*, 25 May 1979.
201. *Daily Dispatch*, 5 April 1979.
202. Ibid, 28 October 1978.
203. Ibid, 18 August and 21 August 1979, and *Indaba*, 24 August 1979.
204. Private source.
205. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 August and 23 August 1979.
206. Ibid, 2 May 1979.
207. *Post*, 6 May 1979.
208. See section on Sabata trial.
209. *Post*, 26 August 1979.
210. *Argus*, 31 August 1979.
211. Ibid, 31 July 1979.
212. *Post*, 30 November 1979.

213. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 November 1979.
214. *Post*, 4 October 1979.
215. *Daily Dispatch*, 25 September 1979 and *Rand Daily Mail* 18 December 1979.
216. *Sunday Post*, 6 January, 1980.
217. Ibid.
218. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 January 1980.
219. Ibid, 28 January 1980.
220. *Star*, 30 January 1980.
221. *Star*, 31 January 1980, and *Daily Dispatch*, 1 February 1980.
222. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 February 1980.
223. Ibid, 11 February 1980 and 12 March 1980.
224. Ibid, 18 March 1980.
225. *Imvo*, 28 March 1980.
226. *Star*, 6 March 1980.
227. *Daily Dispatch*, 8 March 1980.
228. Ibid, 18 March 1980.
229. Ibid, 25 March 1980.
230. *Cape Times*, 15 April 1980.
231. *Daily Dispatch*, 17 July 1980.
232. Ibid, 8 July 1980.
- 232a. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, pages 120 - 139.
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236. Unless indicated, references are from *Post*, 2 January 1980, *Star*, 3 January 1980, *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 January 1980 and *Sunday Post*, 6 January 1980.
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238. *Post*, 15 February 1979.
239. Ibid, 14 September 1979.
240. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 April 1980.
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242. *Argus*, 30 January 1980.
243. *Cape Times*, 22 April 1980.
244. *Daily Dispatch*, 20 November 1978.
245. Ibid, 31 May 1977.
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248. Ibid, 22 November 1978.

249. *Argus*, 22 March 1979, and *Daily Dispatch*, 23 March 1979.
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251. His full list was published in the *Rand Daily Mail* of 3 January 1980.
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253. Ibid, 6 November 1979.
254. *Post*, 2 January 1980.
255. *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 January 1980.
256. *Sunday Post*, 10 February 1980.
257. *Star*, 6 March 1980.
258. Total from *Daily Dispatch*, 24 November 1976.
259. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 February 1977 and 13 October 1977.
260. Ibid, 31 March and 14 April 1977.
261. Ibid, 5 April 1977.
262. Ibid, 26 May 1977.
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264. Ibid, 2 July 1977.
265. Ibid, 13 August, 15 August and 19 October 1977.
266. Ibid, 18 October and 27 October 1977 and 27 January 1978.
267. Ibid, 5 November 1977 and 1 February 1978.
268. Ibid, 28 January 1978.
269. Ibid, 8 March 1978.
270. Ibid, 31 March 1978.
271. Ibid, 20 July 1978.
272. Ibid, 17 May 1978.
273. *Indaba*, 23 September 1978.
274. *Daily Dispatch*, 18 May 1980.
275. Ibid, 21 August and 23 November 1978.
276. Ibid, 23 February 1979.
277. Ibid, 7 October 1978 and 21 October 1978.
278. Ibid, 5 February 1979, and *Argus*, 12 March 1979.
279. *Voice*, 28 April, 1979, and *Post*, 25 October, 1979.
280. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 March 1979.
- 280a. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, pages 372 -3.
281. Ibid, 31 August 1979.
282. *Post*, 24 August 1979.
283. Ibid, 2 January 1980.
284. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 December 1979.
285. *Argus*, 15 January 1980 and 31 January 1980.
286. *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 February 1980 and *Daily Dispatch*, 17 May 1980.
287. *Daily Dispatch*, 31 January 1980 and 18 March 1980.
288. *Post*, 23 January 1980.

289. *Cape Times*, 15 April 1980.
290. *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 January 1980.
291. *Post*, 2 January 1980.
292. *Sunday Post*, 6 January 1980.
293. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 September 1977.
294. *Ibid*, 23 February, 1, 2 and 3 March 1977.
295. *Ibid*, 2 July 1977.
296. *Ibid*, 14 June 1977.
297. *Post*, 10 November 1977.
298. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 and 29 May 1977.
299. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 June 1980.
300. In the section on the Democratic Party.
301. *Post*, 31 March 1978, and *Daily Dispatch*, 3 April 1978.
302. *Post*, 11 June 1978, and *Daily News*, 9 June 1978.
303. *Daily Dispatch*, 10 June 1978.
304. *Daily Dispatch*, 1 November 1977, and *Imvo*, 2 November 1979.
305. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 November 1979.
306. *Ibid*, 31 May 1977.
307. *Daily Dispatch* and *Post*, 18 May 1978.
308. *Daily Dispatch*, 26 May 1978. See also the section on the Methodist Church.
309. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 June 1979.
310. *Cape Times* and *Daily Dispatch*, 3 November 1979.
311. *Daily Dispatch*, 3 November 1979.
312. *Daily Dispatch*, 19 November 1979, and *Citizen*, 20 November 1979.
313. *Daily Dispatch*, 5 November 1979.
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315. *Star*, 7 November 1979.
316. *Daily Dispatch*, 15 November 1979.
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320. *Citizen*, 1 December 1979.
321. *Ibid*.
322. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 December 1979, and 8 January 1979.
323. *Ibid*, 23 January 1980.
324. Debates of the National Assembly, 1977, pages 142 - 3.
325. *Ibid*, 1978, pages 182 - 3.
326. *Imvo*, 31 March 1979.
327. *Daily Dispatch*, 16 February 1980.
328. *Ibid*, 25 May 1977.

329. *Post*, 2 January 1980.
330. Debates of the National Assembly, 1978, pages 320 - 1.
331. See section on Democratic Party.
332. *Sunday Times*, 23 March 1980 and *Cape Times*, 24 March 1980.
333. *Daily Dispatch*, 13 April 1976.
334. *Sunday Tribune*, 16 October 1977.
335. *Ibid*.
336. *Daily Dispatch*, 8 March 1978.
337. *Ibid*, 21 April 1978.
338. *Post*, 5 April 1978.
339. *Daily Dispatch*, 4 March 1980.
- 339a. *Ibid*, 15 April 1980 and 17 April 1980.
340. *Post*, 21 May 1980.
- 340a. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, page 227.
341. *Post*, 6 June 1980.
342. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 June 1980.
343. *Sunday Post*, 22 June 1980.
344. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 July 1980.
345. *Post*, 22 June 1980.
346. *Post*, 29 June 1980.
347. *Post*, 6 June 1980, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 June 1980.
348. *Daily News*, 26 April 1979.
349. *Post*, 22 June 1979.
350. Van der Vyver, op cit, pages 6 and 7.

Chapter Two

THE BROTHERS MATANZIMA

A Biographical Account of Kaiser and George Matanzima

KD is on a rampage, attacking almost everybody and shielding himself with his presidential privilege . . . He wants to run Transkei as his fiefdom.

— Nimrod Mkele, 1980, after one month's detention without trial.¹

For more than 20 years, Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, with the crucial support of his brother, George Mzimvube Matanzima, has dominated Transkei. At first through the Bunga, then through the position of Chief Minister in the 'self-government' phase of separate development, then as Prime Minister of the 'independent' Transkei and finally as State President, Kaiser Matanzima has been the most powerful figure in Transkei for a long time. Now, with the aid of the Security Police headed by Brigadier Martin Ngceba and the South African Government, he rules supreme.

Kaiser Matanzima is an extremely shrewd and able politician — Patrick Laurence described him as 'tough and determined',² while Kotzé acknowledged 'his force of personality and intellectual ability'.³ He used whatever sources of support he could to build up his power base. In the process he outmanoeuvred his rivals in the Bunga, particularly Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, his arch-enemy. He obtained and used the support of the majority of government-paid chiefs to capture the chief ministership in 1963. By 1976 he had consolidated his position to such an extent that he was able to create the appearance of popular support and legitimate backing from most sectors of Transkeian society.

Throughout this study, we shall look at the methods used by the Matanzimas to consolidate that position of power. But there

were other factors. There was personal drive and ambition, an appetite for power, status and wealth; the skilful use of popular issues to legitimise their position; the crushing of opposition and internal TNIP challenges to their leadership; the use of key advisers; the special role of George Matanzima, the friendlier and more open brother.

An aura of success and power now surrounds the brothers Matanzima yet in reality their leadership is fragile and erratic. It could collapse at any time, and no provision has been made for the time when Kaiser Matanzima fades from the scene.

To understand both the reality of their power and its peculiar vulnerability we must look more closely at the history of this fraternal partnership.

THE BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD

Kaiser Matanzima was born on June 15, 1915, at Qamata in the St. Marks district of Emigrant Thembuland; his brother was born a few years later on December 26, 1918. They were the only sons of Chief Mhlolo Mvuzo Matanzima Mtirara, who until his death in 1932, was chief of the region. Their father went to school up to Standard Four, and their mother, Mogedi, received no formal education. Kaiser Matanzima went to Ntlonze Primary School and the Qumanco Primary School, before going on to the Lovedale Missionary Institute in 1930 where he obtained his Junior Certificate four years later. The tribe then sent him to Fort Hare where he matriculated and then graduated with a BA in Roman Law and Politics in 1939. His brother's education was much the same: he was educated at Mhlobo Primary School — it was named after his father — then at Ntlonze and Isikoba Primary Schools. In 1940 he obtained a first class Junior Certificate from Lovedale, and four years later he obtained a BSc degree from Fort Hare.

Kaiser Matanzima started serving legal articles in 1940 but was appointed chief of the Ama-Hala tribe in June 1940 and two years later was appointed by the South African Government to the Bunga. In his autobiography, sponsored by the Foreign Affairs Association, he reveals that as a chief, he earned the princely sum of £8 a month: 'The best way to control a chief who thought he was educated was to starve him!'⁴ He resigned from the Bunga in 1944 to resume articles, this time in Umtata. He was articled to a

firm of attorneys whose partners included Mr T Gray Hughes, a United Party M.P. who was to represent Transkeian Territories in the South African Parliament from 1948 to 1977. In the same year that Gray Hughes became an MP, Kaiser Matanzima passed his Attorney's Admission Examination, winning in the process the Cape Law Society's prize of a set of law books valued at R20. He never practised as a lawyer but he was empowered to hear civil claims at his Great Place at Qamata. He rejoined the Bunga in 1955 'with the object of killing it.' He did this because he saw in the recently-passed Bantu Authorities Act 'the foundation for the eventual independence of the African people.'⁵

From then on, his path was set. In total opposition to relatives like Nelson Mandela and Sabata Dalindyebo, but with the key backing of the South African Government, he set out to secure his position with status and power. Thus, in 1958, he won his long battle to become Regional Chief of Emigrant Thembuland despite the opposition of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo. His victory laid the foundation for his appointment by the South African Government as a Paramount Chief of equal status to Sabata in 1966, although this had no precedent in tribal law. For whatever reason, one of the driving forces in the Kaiser Matanzima make-up seems to have been a determination to prove himself superior to his distant cousin, Sabata Dalindyebo, King of the Thembus. Indeed, he is visibly angered whenever Dalindyebo is referred to as the King of the Thembus. But, try as he will and manipulate as he may, he will never attain that position in tribal law. And that irritates him, which is strange for someone who appears so wedded to the upholding of traditional values and systems. His glowing prominence in the territory was underlined when he succeeded Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau as Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority in 1961. From his position as TTA Chairman and as a regional chief, he was able to launch himself as a candidate for the chief ministership in 1963.

George Matanzima followed a slightly different course. He taught for a year in 1945, and then served legal articles with Mr A Quanta of Engcobo. He passed his Attorney's Admission exam but went back to teaching for two years. In 1952, he started practising at Engcobo as an attorney, interrupting his practice in 1959 – 1960 when he acted as the chief of the Emigrant Thembus. Then, in June 1963, came the great disaster in Matanzima history: George Matanzima, the future Minister of Justice and Prime Minister of

Transkei, was struck off the roll of attorneys for misappropriating trust funds and Mr Justice van der Riet declared him to have made a false statement before the Eastern Cape division of the Supreme Court. The then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr Daan de Wet Nel, initially said he was unaware of the case and did not have much knowledge of George Matanzima. A month later, he defended him in the Senate, attacked the 'mean press campaign' against him and said he had 'paid back his last penny of debt and not a single person has suffered any damage.'⁶ The opposition dismissed his attempted defence and said it was inconceivable that he would have offered a similar defence of a member of the South African Parliament.⁷ Kaiser Matanzima accused the *Sunday Times*, which broke the story, of acting maliciously and of meddling in the affairs of Transkei, but said nothing more. Strangely, the opposition in Transkei barely raised the matter in the first session of the legislative assembly, and George Matanzima survived, albeit with a much-tarnished reputation.

The incident said much about the Matanzimas. In later years, members of the assembly lost their seats after having been acquitted under Proclamation R400 (Chief Neo Sibi), found guilty under the Public Security Act (Chief Jeremiah Moshesh), found guilty of fraud (Mr T.E. Ka-Tshunugwa) and found guilty of extortion (Chief H. Dinizulu). But George Matanzima could continue to sit in the assembly, become Minister of Justice, of all things, and then Prime Minister. It was a strange situation for someone as shrewd as Kaiser Matanzima to land in, but blood is, after all, thicker than water . . .

In any event George Matanzima entered the 1963 assembly, not as a chief, but as an elected member for Emigrant Thembuland. Once he had made his way into Kaiser Matanzima's cabinet, the partnership never looked back. Although the two brothers will sometimes say disparaging things about each other in private, and although there have been conflicts, they have rarely been publicised and, in the final analysis, the survival of each depends on the support he can give the other.

Their political development prior to 1963 is not without interest. Not only were they related to the ANC's future leader, Nelson Mandela, but they were also at Fort Hare when a number of prominent activists and nationalists were there. The ANC's leader in exile, Oliver Tambo, was at Fort Hare then. But the

Matanzimas avoided direct involvement in the nationalist movement and in the development of the ANC's youth league. For someone then embittered with the treatment blacks had received from whites, as Kaiser Matanzima was to describe himself later, that was a strange position to take — and there must have been a conscious decision not to become involved. However Carter and her co-authors claim that George Matanzima was actually a member of the All-Africa Convention, while Kaiser Matanzima was 'closely and sympathetically associated' with it: at that stage he emphasized the dangers of revived tribalism.⁸ Given their later history, the Matanzimas' participation in the AAC is even stranger than their avoidance of the ANC. Linked to the Non-European Unity Movement, it was influenced by Trotskyism and refused to associate with 'racial' bodies. Attempts to unite it with the ANC in 1943, 1944 and 1948 — the years when the Matanzimas were involved — failed because the AAC insisted on a federal structure with ANC affiliation, while the ANC hesitated to launch a black (or what Walshe called, a Non-European) united front. There were other differences, and the Trotskyist members of the AAC clashed bitterly with the ANC members of the Communist Party.⁹ A key element of the AAC policy was one of 'non-collaboration' and it set its principles out in a 'Ten Point Programme' which called for universal franchise and equal rights irrespective of race, colour and sex. While the strategy of non-collaboration makes it clear that there was a complete about-face by the Matanzimas later, it is also true that in June 1936 the AAC President, Dr D.D.T. Jabavu, defined the alternatives: 'segregation and colour bars must go; alternatively we want a separate state of our own where we shall rule ourselves freed from the hypocritical position.'¹⁰ It may well have been this aspect of AAC thinking which appealed to the Matanzimas, rather than the non-collaboration aspect.

In any event, later — according to Carter — AAC leaders said that Kaiser Matanzima 'attempted to destroy all vestiges of AAC influence in the Transkei, particularly in his own district.'¹¹ The Matanzimas have never really referred to that part of their lives in any detail although they have tried to present this period of their lives as a credential for their participation in the liberation struggle.

Thus, in the no-confidence debate in 1976, the then Leader of the opposition, Mr Knowledge Guzana, said: 'If I remember the history of the political struggle of the black man in South Africa,

it laid emphasis on participation in the highest legislative body in South Africa. When whites represented blacks in the legislative assembly of the Republic, the black man said: Let a black man go and represent us there. They sought to make it a multiracial body.'

GEORGE MATANZIMA: 'When was that?'

MR GUZANA: 'It was at the time when you were associated with political organisations which became banned.'

GEORGE MATANZIMA: 'Yes, that was when you were doing nothing, and you only decided to join politics when this House was formed.'¹²

The implication was that he had been active in the struggle. It was an attempt to claim legitimacy for the path the Matanzimas had chosen, and there was no attempt to explain that, while the organisations alluded to had refused to have anything to do with the bantustan system, Kaiser and George had worked wholeheartedly within it. It also seems that George Matanzima was more willing to associate himself with the nationalist movements than was his more reserved brother.

Tony Ryder wrote in 1975 that while Kaiser Matanzima was at Fort Hare, fellow students recalled that 'he was studious and anxious to absorb all he could. His father had died. He would be returning as a BA graduate with Roman law and politics as his majors to take over the chieftainship. Student flirtations with radicalism and liberalism were not for him. Others could talk on the campus of the realignment of racial forces, of the emergence of the sleeping black man. He remained a conservative with his interests centred on the chieftainship waiting for him at Qamata; on how the black man in the Transkei could regain his lost heritage.'¹³

In the end, whatever the youthful associations or links with nationalist organisations, the Matanzimas decided in the 1950s to work within the Nationalist Government's new policies. How much and why they changed, what changed them, when they changed, is not clear. Ambition, the prospect of power, probable disillusionment with the results of nationalist confrontation with the government, were all probable factors.

POWER AND STATUS

Ever since Kaiser Matanzima became a chief in 1942, he has aspired

to greater things. His father was Chief of Emigrant Thembuland and his first aim was to reclaim that position. But to do so, as is outlined in the section on the trial of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo he had to counteract the traditional leadership. In this the support of the South African Government was essential – and he had to show that he was worth supporting. He returned to the Bunga in 1955, the year before it was turned into a territorial authority in terms of the new legislation. From all accounts, including his own, Kaiser Matanzima was a very important figure in the debates in the Bunga which lead to the decision paving the way for self-government and eventual 'independence'. In his view the Bantu Authorities Act 'laid the foundation for the eventual independence of the African people.'¹⁴

The rewards followed. In a letter dated June 19, 1956, from Mr T D Ramsay, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories, Kaiser Matanzima was told that the Secretary for Native Affairs 'will not take any disciplinary action against you for persisting in calling yourself chief of the Emigrant Thembus and for failing to attend the Paramount Chief's tribal court when summoned to do so.' He said that the decision had been reached 'in view of the reconciliation between you and Chief Sabata.' The letter added: 'The Secretary, however, insists that there shall be the highest measure of co-operation between you and the Paramount Chief . . . You have both made mistakes – Chief Sabata by interfering in your area and you by using the title of Chief of the Emigrant Thembus. This however, is, I trust, a thing of the past.'¹⁵

Within two years, the South African Government had changed its position to such an extent that Kaiser Matanzima was installed as Regional Chief of the Emigrant Thembus, over the head of his Paramount Chief. Given his undoubted ability – in 1963 the *Daily Dispatch* called him the most talented politician in Transkei – and the support of the South African Government, there was no holding him back. By 1980, the tables had been turned. Paramount Chief Dalindyebo was convicted of 'wrongfully and unlawfully' committing acts 'which were calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the President of Transkei.'¹⁶ Sabata Dalindyebo had been found guilty of insulting Kaiser Matanzima, and was then deposed.

After he had been installed as the Regional Chief of Emigrant Thembuland, Kaiser Matanzima went on accumulating power and status. In 1961, he was elected the second Chairman of the Transkei

Territorial Authority; in 1963, he was elected Chief Minister; in 1966, he was appointed a Paramount Chief by the South African Government; in 1976, he was elected Prime Minister of Transkei; and in 1979, he became State President. During the course of these advancements he also obtained an honorary doctorate from his alma mater, Fort Hare. That was in April 1974.

His position was reflected by his official titles: His Excellency, the Honourable Paramount Chief Dr Kaiser Matanzima. And, whichever way one looks at it, his name has been written into the history books. It was a spectacular achievement.

WEALTH

The extraordinary Kaiser Matanzima says the South African authorities have always treated him with contempt.

I don't know.

When one looks at his free farms, houses, cars and all the other prerequisites of office one tends to believe he has been treated rather well . . . – Hogarth in the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* in April, 1978.¹⁷

The Matanzimas have become wealthy people. Not only have they acquired healthy state incomes, tribal (in the case of Kaiser Matanzima) and private farms,¹⁸ and government mansions paid for by the South African taxpayer, but they have acquired substantial business interests. Transkei abounds with unsubstantiated rumours as to the extent of these interests. What seems clear is that the Matanzimas, as well as acquiring political power, have also become significant figures in the Transkei economy. It has even been alleged that Kaiser Matanzima is critical of his brother's entrepreneurial side. He feels that George Matanzima should devote more attention to the affairs of state. In many societies, this conflict of interest between private and government interests has led to key political figures declaring their personal interests and then leaving them in the hands of managers. Thus, Jimmy Carter placed his peanut business in trust when he became President of the US, to avoid suggestions that he might use his political power to the advantage of his commercial interests. Not so in Transkei. When some details of their private interests were published in the *Sunday Times*, Kaiser Matanzima actually said:

'What is wrong with ministers of state taking shares in public and private companies?'¹⁹

The article in question, which Kaiser Matanzima called 'lies', was never disputed in detail and, indeed, it confirmed some of the rumours in the territory. A spokesman for the firm which acted as secretary to seven Transkei hotel-owning companies — all registered at the same address and having the same eight directors — confirmed that Kaiser and George Matanzima owned 'a lot' of shares in at least two of the companies, Dalindyebo (Pty) Ltd and Qamata Bantu Trading Company (Pty) Ltd. These companies and their associates bought hotels which had been taken over by the South African Bantu Trust, later called the South African Development Trust, often paying less than the South African Government had paid for them. White property-owners had been granted immunity against losses sustained through the implementation of the bantustan policy, and those lucky enough to sell their properties to the Trust were able to leave Transkei with their assets. The Trust then had to find black owners to take them over. These seven companies were among those that stepped in. It was confirmed that the Matanzima brothers had shares in Dalindyebo and Qamata Bantu, although George Matanzima, who refused to confirm or deny his own shareholding added: 'My wife owns shares in these companies.' Dalindyebo bought the Cofimvaba Hotel at Cofimvaba and the Gordon Hotel at Elliotdale from the Trust, while Qamata Bantu bought the Qamata Poort Hotel. The other companies linked to these two were Rhoda Bantu (Pty) Ltd, which bought the Masonic Hotel in Idutywa and the Coldstream Hotel at Ngqeleni, Quakeni (Pty) Ltd, Maluti Bantu (Pty) Ltd, Emboland Bantu (Pty) Ltd and Fingolands Bantu (Pty) Ltd. The newspaper said that it could not confirm 'conclusively' that the Matanzimas owned shares in these companies, but Mr W.S. Mbanga, then a Butterworth businessman and a director of the companies, and later Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Transport, confirmed that both brothers were shareholders in Dalindyebo and Qamata Bantu, and that Kaiser Matanzima was a shareholder in Rhoda Bantu. The common directors of the companies were: Dr W.K. Mbekeni (Chairman), Mr Mbanga, Mr S.G. Nyamatazi, Mr M.S. Letlaka, Mr A.M. Mayaba, Mr E.M. Dyarvane, Mr S.P. Madasa and Mr. A. B.D. Njokweni.²⁰

Two weeks later, the *Sunday Times* revealed that the Cofimvaba Hotel had been bought by Dalindyebo for R8 000, which was

R23 193 less than what the Trust paid for it; that the Qamata Poort Hotel had been bought by Qamata Bantu for R21 000, which was R10 000 less than the Trust paid for it; that the Masonic Hotel in Idutywa was bought by Rhoda Bantu for R45 000, which was R16 926 less than the Trust paid for it; and that the Coldstream Hotel in Ngqeleni was bought for R110 000 by Rhoda Bantu at R6 442 less than the Trust paid for it. They were, in short, good deals.

The official explanation for these hotel deals, given by a spokesman for the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, was that the companies had been allowed to lease these hotels before buying them. The price of Cofimvaba Hotel appeared low because the hotel had become dilapidated during the time the Trust owned it and while it was being leased by Dalindyebo. The spokesman said that all sales of land in Transkei were advertised at magistrates' offices. In most cases the highest offers were accepted, but he admitted this did not always happen.

The newspaper also disclosed that Kaiser Matanzima himself had been involved in some personal purchases. He bought two plots in Cofimvaba for R600 on December 28, 1971, while the Trust had bought the two plots and four adjoining ones for R37 379 three years previously. All the plots were the same, which meant that their average price was R6 229, nearly R6 000 more than Kaiser Matanzima paid for them. On April 30, 1973, Kaiser Matanzima bought two plots in Umtata for R5 520, while the Trust had bought them from a widow a month earlier for R8 264. In the same article, it was revealed that Kaiser Matanzima had divided the farm he inherited from his father at Qamata, and had been paid R10 395 for the half he sold, although the entire farm had been valued in the estate at R2 313 (in 1961). The division of the farm had taken place in 1966. In addition to the R10 395 cash, he had been given a R60 110 farm, Zenzeli, in the Glen Grey district. He was still the owner of the other half of the original Matanzima farm.²¹

When one considers the other farm deals it becomes very clear that the acquisition of power and status has been accompanied by a substantial acquisition of wealth.

Besides personal gains, there were also benefits for Emigrant Thembuland which, as the eastern Pondos were to complain later, received a disproportionate share of the allocation of resources. In 1963 the disastrous Qamata Irrigation Scheme, which initially cost

R3 million and was meant to water 5 000 morgen for 2 500 settled families, was an early sign. In 1980, another large irrigation scheme was opened by Kaiser Matanzima at Ncora, also in Matanzima territory. While these schemes are necessary for the development of agriculture it is remarkable that both should have taken place in northern Transkei. It is just as remarkable that the Umtata-Queenstown road has been tarred and that, although this road was meant to extend to Port St Johns, the tarring seems to have stopped on the other side of Umtata. Since 1963 there has been talk of new hospitals and other developments in Emigrant Thembuland, which had had so much more than its fair share of the allocation of the territory's meagre resources. Undoubtedly this has helped Kaiser Matanzima to legitimize himself in his home area, but it has antagonized other regions.

THE ROUGH RIDER: MATANZIMA'S WAY WITH OPPONENTS

I wrote an account of my impressions of Matanzima and his views. I said he was strong-willed, had plenty of ability and determination to the point of being ruthless in achieving his aims. His brother, George, sought me out in the street in Umtata on the day after the election. 'That was a beautiful exposition of my brother,' he said.

— Tony Ryder in 1965.²²

Kaiser Matanzima has seldom resorted to subtlety in dealing with his opponents, or with challenges to his leadership. His brother's praise for Ryder's 'beautiful exposition' was not misplaced, if one may judge from a number of other publications although, inevitably, this characteristic is difficult to document. One may say, though, that the actions of the Security Police have harmonised very well with Matanzima's own approach.

An affidavit signed by Mitchel Damane, a headman in the Matanzima-controlled St Marks district in Emigrant Thembuland, on April 4, 1957, served as an indication of what was to follow. He said that on March 16, 1956, on the instructions of the Native Commissioner, he had held a meeting in his location at which the residents decided unanimously that they wanted their own tribal authority 'independent of the tribal authority of Chief Kaiser Matanzima of Qamata' on the grounds that they were Fingoes, not

Thembus. The Commissioner, Mr Damane said in his affidavit, thereafter confirmed that the seven Fingo locations, including the Ncora location, came under the jurisdiction of the paramount chief of the Thembus 'and not under Kaiser Matanzima or any of the lesser chiefs.' The Commissioner suggested that the seven locations form a community authority. 'Thereafter Kaiser Matanzima carried on agitation in my location in order to swing the residents in his favour.' A few months later the Commissioner showed him a list of 116 people who, he said, wanted to acknowledge the authority of Kaiser Matanzima. Mr Damane was instructed to call another meeting. At this meeting, which was attended by representatives of Chief Matanzima, including Mr T.E. Tshunungwa, 71 voted against and 35 for Kaiser Matanzima.

The same month Kaiser Matanzima held a meeting without his authority and permission in the location, but the people dispersed when he told them to do so. After this, he said, Kaiser Matanzima held another unauthorised meeting and installed one Alfred Damane as headman. He had called the police when yet another unauthorized meeting was held, but they did not arrive. He tried to lay a charge against Alfred Damane but the police did not take any action. He was then instructed by the Magistrate (and Native Commissioner) of Cofimvaba to call another meeting on November 28 to enable the Commissioner to ascertain for himself what authority the people wanted. In this instruction, the Native Commissioner said: 'Residents of other locations will not be permitted to attend this meeting.'

Whatever the background to the events and whether Mitchel Damane gave the full picture or not, the following part of the affidavit is revealing. On November 27, the day before the authorized meeting, Kaiser Matanzima 'arrived in my location with more than 200 horsemen armed with sticks and weapons. These men rode up and down my location making provocative remarks and obviously looking for a fight.' They then went to Alfred Damane's kraal, and afterwards to another, where beer was provided and a beast slaughtered. The following day the residents of the location assembled for the meeting with the Native Commissioner. 'Chief Kaiser Matanzima's contingent also attended the meeting and rode their horses provokingly and dangerously in the midst of the assembly, and a fight at that stage was narrowly averted.' He tried to phone the police but the line was out of order. When the Commissioner arrived, he reported what had happened and asked

him to remove non-residents, but the Commissioner said they could stay 'in the company of their chief.' He claimed that the police then searched opponents of Kaiser Matanzima for alleged possession of weapons with the result that many of them left before the meeting started. Immediately after the meeting, Matanzima supporters, named in the affidavit, assaulted two opponents. He said the police were nearby and fired three shots in the air, but made no arrests. He took one of the assaulted people to the police station but they did not take a statement from either of them.²³

With the complicity of the South African authorities, this unobvious approach of intimidation with beer-and-meat rewards for supporters was successful, because Ncora did eventually fall under Kaiser Matanzima and not under Sabata Dalindyebo. After this, Kaiser Matanzima summoned Mitchel Damane to his Great Place. When he did not turn up, he was ordered to do so at a later date. When the Acting Paramount Chief of the Thembus took up his case and protested, the Chief Magistrate wrote back to him saying that Mr Damane should have obeyed Kaiser Matanzima's summons and that 'he was foolish to think that he would be harmed while he was there.'²⁴ When the Acting Paramount Chief replied to the Chief Magistrate, he pointed out that in a letter on October 6, 1955, to both Kaiser Matanzima and Sabata Dalindyebo, the Chief Magistrate had 'specifically stated' that Kaiser Matanzima had jurisdiction over 22 locations at Cofimvaba and these excluded the seven abaMbo locations, including Mitchel Damane's. His protests were dismissed, inevitably, and Kaiser Matanzima got his extra locations, shortly afterwards becoming a Regional Chief. The Acting Paramount Chief, in turn, was warned against criticising the Chief Magistrate and threatened with dismissal!²⁵

There were other reported incidents which show that this was not an isolated case. According to Carter et al: 'One chief in Emigrant Thembuland is alleged to have intimidated certain individuals among his tribesmen who were suspected of being politically opposed to Matanzima and to have delivered three such persons to Matanzima's Great Place at Qamata where they were assaulted by Matanzima's bodyguard.' This information was given to three daily newspapers, but they did not publish any details, possibly on the grounds that it might have infringed Proclamation R400.²⁶

In 1965, Ryder wrote: 'His discipline is the strictest of the

Transkei chiefs. In his tribal court he has fined errant tribesman up to R60 each for "disrespect". Others have been deported. This has not endeared him to his tribesmen.'²⁷ Nor has his use of the Security Police and the other forces of law and order endeared him to the people of Transkei.

In the circumstances, it is not so surprising that some of his opponents have resorted to desperate means. Towards the end of 1962, three attempts were made by the PAC's armed wing, Poqo, to kill Kaiser Matanzima. In one attempt, made on November 12 that year, Poqo recruits gathered near his Great Place at Qamata and, according to the Commissioner of Police, were joined by local tribesmen.²⁸ In 1966, after five opposition members of the assembly had been detained two of them, Jackson Nkosiyanane and N. Nogcañtsi, were found guilty of conspiracy to kill Kaiser Matanzima. It was possibly this history of assassination attempts which provoked the strong Matanzima reaction to the report in the *Daily Dispatch* about the rumours of another murder attempt in 1980.

Kaiser Matanzima has been no more subtle in dealing with challenges to his leadership within the party. The first came in 1966 when a member of the assembly, Shadrack Sinaba, and another TNIP man, Joseph Kobo, started trying to push the Matanzimas into asking for independence. Their campaign was both a challenge and an embarrassment to Kaiser Matanzima. Not only was the South African press writing front-page stories about the possibility of a request for independence, but they were mentioning a date — May 5, 1967 — predicting what the South African Government's response would be and finding significance in the fact that Shadrack was the TNIP's chief whip. His attempts were rejected by the Matanzimas, and he resigned to form the first Transkei Peoples Freedom Party with Mr Kobo. They were joined in 1968 by the ever-remarkable Cromwell Diko.

The next challenge came from another member of the assembly, P.M. Sobahle, former chairman of the Transkei Public Service Commission. He was dismissed for 'flirting' with the DP but there was also suspicion that he spearheaded a campaign promoting the influence of Eastern Pondoland in the government.

This was followed by the most serious, potential challenge. It came from a member of the cabinet, the formerly banned Fort Hare lecturer, Curnick Ndamse. There was no doubt that he was gaining support and influence throughout Transkei. He was

accused of being self-seeking, of flouting party decisions and opposing them, and of violating the confidentiality of party material. He successfully defended himself against these allegations at the TNIP's 1972 conference, but his days were numbered. An attempt to expel him from the party failed, and he remained in the caucus. But when he lost the party nomination in 1973, he stood as an independent, was expelled from the TNIP, and won. He died shortly afterwards, but if he had survived, he might have presented the Matanzimas with a longer-term threat to their leadership.²⁹

Other challenges have ended in much the same way: Stella Sigcau and Jeremiah Moshesh were soon despatched from the cabinet when they became too powerful.³⁰ Another potential opponent was Mr T. E. Tshunungwa, but he lost his seat following a criminal conviction. In 1980, Saul Ndzumo was dismissed and then detained after disclosing rumours of a coup. At the time of writing there is no challenge to the control of the Matanzimas in the party and the government. There is simply no alternative.

THE IDEOLOGICAL VACUUM: MATANZIMA'S POLITICAL IDEAS

When the statements and actions of the Matanzimas over the years have been examined in some detail it becomes impossible to locate an ideology or system of beliefs that has guided them. They have frequently been described as 'pragmatic' (George Matanzima particularly) and, in the end, that may be the fairest label. The drive for power, status and wealth is obvious and many of the things they have done or said have logic in terms of those goals. But when less tangible motivations are looked at, it is impossible to discern any coherent ideological framework. Laurence concluded: 'Stripping away the politicking, the man that emerges is a Xhosa nationalist dedicated to restoring Xhosa hegemony in the lands historically occupied by the Xhosa-speaking people. Apartheid was a means to an end, to be praised or criticized as the occasion demanded. African unity, the long-cherished dream of a new African nation arising from the ruins of military defeat and political subjugation, was of marginal importance compared to Xhosa nationalism. Where it served the Xhosa cause it was propagated, but where it became an obstacle it was discarded.'³¹ That view must be qualified. Undoubtedly Xhosa nationalism was

a useful legitimizing notion, but the Matanzimas would not back Xhosa unity if they were not running the show. They have alienated Xhosa-speaking people in the urban areas of South Africa, sacrificed their citizenship rights on the altar of independence, and ignored their views and aspirations. As the Quail Commission attitude survey showed clearly, they have alienated their Xhosa-speaking brothers in the Ciskei in spite of politic pleas for a greater Xhosaland. If it was ever suggested that a greater Xhosaland be created with the Ciskei's Chief Minister, Chief Lennox Sebe, at the head, the Matanzimas would kill the notion. The anchor of their interest in greater Xhosa unity is their personal ambition.

Lacking an ideology, they exploit issues cleverly as legitimizing factors for their regime. Thus, the demand for land or the call for the release of Nelson Mandela are first and foremost popular issues which make it look as though they are in line with broad African aspirations. The demand for Queenstown, say, is popular and most black people would support the demand if it were not linked to incorporation in an 'independent' homeland — because it is believed that Queenstown belongs to black people, historically. Similarly, the vast majority of black people believe Mandela is being held unjustly on Robben Island. Although there can be no realistic hope that a Nationalist Government would release Mandela — certainly not because Kaiser Matanzima expressed his views on the issue — or that Nelson Mandela would ever accept release into the custody of the Matanzimas, it nevertheless serves a legitimizing purpose for the Matanzimas to be counted on the side calling for Mandela's release. These calls, which may be dropped as soon as they become inconvenient or less popular, are not part of a Matanzima ideology; they are the currency of expediency, issued by a regime bankrupt in firm political ideas.

Inconsistency is thus the hallmark of Matanzima's political vocabulary. For example, in June 1965, he actually stood up in the assembly and claimed that the word 'African' was a Communist plot: 'The term "African" was coined by the Communist Party under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, and the Komintern, which was a Communist movement, spread it right through the world. The connotation behind this common word used by the Communists was to destroy the idea of separate national entities on the African continent by substituting the internationalism of Communism in its stead.'³¹ Yet when his own

autobiography came out just over ten years later he himself used the word 'African' to describe black people . . .

Some of the issues used as catchcalls over the years were:

Land

Down the years and today, the conquest of black people and the deprivation of land has been a major issue in black politics. The Matanzimas have made it quite clear that they reject the way the South African Government has divided the land. They have, on various occasions, claimed neighbouring areas, the land between the Fish and the Kei, East Griqualand (the ostensible cause of the diplomatic break with South Africa), parts of Natal, and virtually any land that has been inhabited by Xhosa people. Kaiser Matanzima has threatened war over the issue, made numerous speeches on the matter and continually returned to the theme that Xhosa land was 'cynically raped' from the people. In 1977 Kaiser Matanzima could say: 'This country belongs to all its citizens irrespective of colour or creed; in spite of the establishment of separate nationalities the racial problem in South Africa will never be solved as long as whites protect their own interests under a wrong assumption — that South African land belongs to them only and that they have the right to apportion what they regard as belonging to blacks without consultation with and consideration of the latter's claims. As long as Transkeian land is retained by the whites of South Africa, so long shall the blacks of Transkei join their counterparts in the Republic of South Africa in the struggle for liberation . . .'³² That stand was typical of the numerous statements made on the land issue. And it was very useful as a legitimizing factor.

Liberation

Although the Matanzimas never had much time for either the ANC or the PAC, certainly not since they embraced the Bantu Authorities system, they have frequently tried to argue that the independence of Transkei was part of the process of 'liberating' black people from white supremacy. In Transkei, they have argued, the black decided his own future and controlled his own destiny. This approach reflected a perceived need to be seen as part of the liberation struggle of all black people. It was a shrewd

attempt to legitimize the acceptance of independence, in spite of the fact that the ANC, the PAC and the Black Consciousness movement bitterly opposed it. To further this image ANC and PAC were invited to establish offices in Transkei as long as they did not attack South Africa. They also invited exiles to return to Transkei to join the struggle — and the harvest included Tsepo Letlaka, ex-PAC and a member of the cabinet; Tennyson Makiwane, ex-ANC and in the department of foreign affairs until he was assassinated in Umtata in 1980; and Ngqondi Masimini, ex-PAC and Transkei's ambassador in Northern America.

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Digby Koyana, twice went much further in an attempt to create ANC legitimacy for the Transkeian Government. In 1978, he claimed that Kaiser Matanzima was told by the ANC and PAC leadership to push ahead with the drive for independence. He said the leaders had been told by Kaiser Matanzima in the presence of himself and Mr Letlaka that Transkei was taking independence because the people wanted it. They allegedly said: 'Yes, K.D., carry on — we shall meet at Blaney.' (Blaney is a small railway junction between King William's Town and East London.) 'They said they would meet him at Blaney because they were going to conquer from South Africa and we would conquer from this side and meet at Blaney and then shake hands because the task would be completed.'³³ A year later, he disclosed that Kaiser Matanzima had actually met Oliver Tambo and Robert Resha, both senior leaders of the ANC in exile. He had also met PAC leaders. 'They realized it would be foolish to continue to subject three million people to oppression when there was a chance of liberating them, and gave their full blessings to the move.' They had even made the customary 'A! Daliwonga!' salute at Heathrow airport in London when they saw him off. However, after this, 'they met the Joe Slovos and other comrades of the former Communist Party of South Africa, and all agreements reached between the black leaders were unilaterally abrogated.'³⁴ Quite what was discussed has never been confirmed, but the effect of these claims was clear: even the ANC had accepted that the independence of Transkei was a step in the direction of liberation of the black man. The banning of the ANC and the PAC and 30 organisations at the end of 1979 destroyed the illusion, but the claim that independence was a part of the process of liberation has been maintained. For obvious reasons.

Political Prisoners

Over the years, the Matanzimas have publicly called for the release of political prisoners from Robben Island. They have stated that Transkeians should be returned to Transkei and there has been much public posturing about the issue. According to one source a plan for the release of some alleged Transkeians like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki was actually drawn up by the two governments. But, the authors have been told, the ANC leaders refused to have anything to do with it.³⁵ In any event, in May 1977, the South African Minister of Justice, Mr Jimmy Kruger, said a request had been received from the Transkei Government, but it could not be acceded to.³⁶ Clearly, it would have been a coup if people like Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki had accepted these conditions of release, which would have meant recognition for the Transkei Government, but even though the plan failed, it served their purpose well. It made the Transkei Government look as though it was in favour of their release and it served to reinforce the image that it was part of the liberation struggle. The fact that Winnie Mandela, the banished and banned wife of Nelson Mandela, has been allowed to visit Transkei and to see Kaiser Matanzima a number of times over the years has also served this image.³⁷

Anthem

The official anthem of Transkei is *Nkosi Sikele i'Afrika*. The government had no real choice about the anthem, in that there was no other song possible, but it was also the ANC's anthem . . . And the apparent identification between liberation and the Matanzimas was strengthened.

Black Consciousness

The Matanzimas have been decidedly intolerant of the black consciousness movement. When the students from the itinerant Federal Theological Seminary appeared in Transkei and started promoting black consciousness, the seminary was told to leave. Two priests who organized transport for the funeral of Steve Biko were detained. A commemorative service in June 1979 to mark the 1976 disturbances in Soweto and elsewhere was banned

The Brothers Matanzima

because, according to George Matanzima, it was 'highly irregular.'³⁸ Yet in 1973 when Kaiser Matanzima returned from the United States he suddenly announced that the black power salute — the clenched fist — would be the salute of the TNIP, even though it had been adopted by the black consciousness movement. It was a clever move. It made the Matanzimas appear to be in line with the black consciousness movement. Kaiser Matanzima's own explanation rather destroyed the logic behind the ploy: 'The slogan of my party is unity. In a physical sense this was shown by the clenching of the fist.' It did not, however, mean that Black Power was to be a slogan of his party: 'Black Power is a foreign slogan. One finds it in the United States for instance.'³⁹ But he started talking about black pride and black dignity, to the intense annoyance of the black consciousness movement. It was a shrewd move which appealed to the Africanist elements in his own party.

Donald Woods

Shortly after the banned former editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, Mr Donald Woods, who had grown up in Transkei and who spoke Xhosa fluently, fled into exile, Kaiser Matanzima said he could come and live in his 'fatherland' anytime he liked. He described Mr Woods as 'a constructive critic, a man of respect who respected others.'⁴⁰ It was a clever statement. It made him look anti-South African and his invitation was broadcast over BBC.

Racism

Simmering beneath South African politics and black/white relations is an anti-whiteism among black people. Given the system of government they have been forced to live under, this is hardly surprising. In many respects, the Matanzimas have played down this racial antagonism, removing all signs of petty apartheid and promoting a policy of non-racialism. But every now and then they have lashed out, bitterly, at the South African Government. Kaiser Matanzima, as far as is known, has never attacked Afrikaners — indeed he has praised them for getting their freedom⁴¹ — although members of his party have lashed out at the Broederbond. Matanzima has, however, attacked whites for their greed and English-speaking whites in particular for raping Xhosa land and for being jingoes. When the PFP's Mr Harry

Schwarz said the South African Government had a moral obligation to ensure that Transkeians could get passports to travel abroad, Kaiser Matanzima strongly attacked him for being a member of the 'herrenvolk' and described white MPs as 'oppressors'. Not to be outdone, George Matanzima went further: 'If I am not mistaken, Mr Schwarz is a Jew and you know what the Jews have been doing to our people in this country.'⁴² When George Matanzima was snubbed by the Greek Government, he warned that there might be repercussions for Greek nationals living in Transkei: 'The Greek Government should remember we have a lot of Greek nationals in the Transkei conducting various types of businesses and the Transkei Government might re-think their future in the independent territory.'⁴³

The effect was clear: when it suits the Matanzimas to be non-racial, as it generally does, they are thorough non-racialists, but if it is necessary or desirable to stir racial feelings, they don't hold back.

The list of issues used by the Matanzimas to express their views, and to claim legitimacy, is extensive. But there is little ideological coherence. Whatever issue will serve to bolster their image and power is used — pragmatically, and often very effectively.

VULNERABILITY OF THE BROTHERS MATANZIMA

In the development of the Matanzima power system, a highly centralized form of government has arisen. At the centre is Kaiser Matanzima, whether as Prime Minister or, as now, as State President. Although supported by close advisers, with the invaluable aid of his younger brother, this concentration of power holds considerable dangers. Whenever Kaiser Matanzima fades from the scene, the process of succession will be traumatic and complicated. Without Kaiser to back him, George Matanzima's power base will disappear — and it is unlikely that he could ever exercise the same hold over the party or the government. He certainly does not enjoy the same legitimacy in the eyes of Kaiser Matanzima's key support groups, such as the chiefs, the party, the army and the police. What this means is that in the process of succession, a new leadership, with very different policies and interests, could develop. It could even be that some form of military and/or police coup will be the only way to establish

initial stability. What is clear is that there will be drastic leadership changes in Transkei when Kaiser Matanzima's long political career does, finally, draw to an end.

The manner in which the Matanzimas have ruled has also meant that they have created many enemies: they, too, will be waiting for an opportunity to get their own back.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Sunday Post* 6 January 1980, *Post*, 2 January 1980.
2. Laurence, op cit, page 5.
3. Kotzé, *African Politics*, op cit, page 214.
4. Kaiser Matanzima, *Independence My way*, Foreign Affairs Association, Pretoria, 1976, page 8.
5. *Ibid*, page 11.
6. *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 February 1964.
7. *Daily Dispatch*, 12 February 1964.
8. Carter et al, op cit, page 133.
9. Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, the African National Congress, 1912 - 1952*, C. Hurst and Co, London, 1970, page 383.
10. Gwendolen N Carter, "African concepts of Nationalism in South Africa" in Heribert Adam (ed) *South Africa: Sociological Perspectives?* Oxford University Press, New York and Cape Town, 1971, page 118.
11. Carter et al, op cit, page 133.
12. Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1976, page 10.
13. *Natal Mercury*, 1 July 1965.
14. Matanzima, op cit, page 11.
15. Copy of letter is contained in Appendix P of "The Tembu Reject Bantu Authorities." op cit.
16. From the indictment. The charge was in terms of section 71 of the Transkei Constitution Act.
17. *Sunday Times*, 16 April 1978.
18. See section on corruption.
19. *Cape Times*, 13 October 1976.
20. *Sunday Times*, 3 October 1976.
21. *Sunday Times*, 17 October 1976.
22. *Natal Mercury*, 1 July 1965.

23. Appendix E in 'The Tembu Reject Bantu Authorities.'
24. Appendix H and J, *ibid.*
25. Appendix K and L, *ibid.*
26. Carter et al, *op cit*, pages 137/8.
27. *Natal Mercury*, 1 July 1965.
28. Laurence, *op cit*, page 73/4.
29. Kotzé, *African Politics*, *op cit*, page 122/3.
30. See sections on Eastern Pondos and Sothos.
31. Debates of Legislative Assembly, 1965, page 295.
32. *Citizen*, 24 June 1977.
33. Debates of the National Assembly, 1978, page 256.
34. *Daily Dispatch*, 19 November 1977.
35. See section on Sabata trial as well.
36. Survey of Race Relations, 1977, *op cit*, page 25.
37. For example, *Daily Dispatch*, 14 November 1979.
38. *Post*, 22 June 1979.
39. *Daily Dispatch*, 8 June 1973.
40. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 January 1978.
41. *Cape Times*, 11 June 1973.
42. Debates of the National Assembly, 1977, page 56/61.
43. *Daily Dispatch*, 20 July 1976.

Chapter Three

A FRIEND IN NEED

Transkei's Financial Dependence on South Africa

Transkei became 'independent' in 1976 with a per capita income of only R175 per annum and a per capita domestic product of only R70 per annum.¹ It was also subsidized by South Africa in the 1976/77 financial year to the tune of R134 million.² This latter figure was made up of taxes collected from Transkei citizens in South Africa; Transkei's share of the Common Customs Revenue Pool; compensation paid in terms of the Monetary Agreement (which represents a return on the Rand currency circulating in Transkei); and an amount paid to Transkei in terms of the Agreement Regarding the Development of Certain Areas and Related Matters.

While figures are not available for the per capita income and per capita domestic product in 1980, indications are that they are unlikely to have risen much — may even have dropped in real terms since 1976. This can be inferred from the amount of money collected in taxes by the South African government from Transkeian citizens inside South Africa and paid to the Transkei government in 1970. Whereas in 1976, R8,3 million was collected from these people and paid to the Transkei government, the figure for 1980 was only R5,7 million.³ This drop, perhaps occasioned by the diminishing number of jobs for potential migrant labourers inside South Africa, will have had a serious effect on the Transkei's per capita income and per capita domestic product, as these figures are calculated with the inclusion of taxes on migrants paid to Umtata.

At the time of writing (July 1980), South Africa had subsidized Umtata to the tune of R231 million for 1980/81 — almost double the 1976 amount, and this figure does not include the income expected to derive from the Customs Revenue Pool,

Monetary Agreement and the Agreement Regarding the Development of Certain Areas.⁴

These figures illustrate that far from moving toward real financial independence, Umtata has come to rely increasingly on South Africa for its budgetary needs.

This trend obviously has serious implications, both economic and political, for the people of the territory. It is therefore not surprising that the Matanzimas have had to use an ever-increasing overt repression in order to quell political dissent which centres on the issues of Umtata's continued dependence on South Africa and the economic plight of those who are willy-nilly citizens of an impoverished territory.

From 1976 to 1980 South Africa has given (the 'visible' figure) about R1 024,4 million to the Transkei. This amount is made up of direct cash grants, payments of taxes collected in South Africa (as listed above), and other occasional payments which have been made public in press reports.

The massive subsidization of the Transkei government is evidence that the Transkei does not have an economy of its own, but is an integral part of the South African economy (as is of course confirmed by the employment of Transkeians as migrant workers in South Africa). This dependence may soon undergo an adaptation as the South African government intensifies its efforts to create a privileged middle class in the region, in line with the 'constellation of states' and Total Strategy. Indications are that we may see an attempt to create a peripheral industrial/agricultural economy based on capitalist relations in the reserve: a path that previously has been frowned on by the architects of the bantustan strategy — for specific economic reasons discussed in the concluding chapter of this book.

An aspect of this dependence which warrants further investigation is the gross financial ineptitude of untrained and — at times — corrupt financial administrators. Inescapable, too, is the ineptitude and naiveté displayed in the development planning of the region, and in the implementation of this planning. The history of Transkei since independence also shows the sensitivity of both Pretoria and Umtata to scandals, corruption and wastage of money. The overriding theme is the undisguisable master-servant relationship which has coloured financial dealings between the two capitals. Government-oriented South African statisticians have often appeared to distort figures giving the extent of Umtata's

dependence on South Africa, in an effort to imprint a more legitimate stamp on the mirage of Transkei independence.

One such instance was in March 1976, when the Director of the Bureau for Economic Research into Bantu Development (Benbo), Dr J Weidemann, said in an interview that the Transkei was better off than about 85% of African countries. This report, which was presented to the Transkei cabinet, suggested for instance that the Transkei's gross national product had increased by about 35% per annum in the 13 years of Transkei self-government, amongst other questionable statistics.

On receiving Dr Weidemann's report, Kaiser Matanzima said he was overjoyed because the press had always painted such a poor picture of Transkei. 'We are all thrilled by your analysis,' he told Weidemann.⁵

Some time later, however, two Rhodes University academics, P Black and J Seiler, exploded the basis on which the Benbo figures were calculated. They showed that these were based on the inclusion of the earnings of migrant workers and Transkeian citizens living permanently in South Africa — to paint a more realistic picture they should have been based only on figures drawn from the permanent settled population of Transkei.⁶

It is not generally accepted international practice in the stimulation of national income accounts to include all income earned by workers temporarily outside their countries of citizenship. If it were, it would mean (to give one example) that the entire income earned by migrant Turkish workers in West Germany would be counted toward the Turkish national income, even though the largest share of it is spent in West Germany and thereby contributes to that state's economic growth.

The lack of adequate — and accurate — statistical data relating to Umtata's financial position, which is epitomized by the conflict mentioned above, has made research very difficult for academics, historians and journalists who have investigated the various facets of Umtata's relationship with Pretoria in the past. This difficulty is likely to be perpetuated in the future, as most of the available statistics originate either from Transkeian or South African government departments. Independent researchers are hampered by several other barriers. They are often told to report to the security police in the districts in which they are conducting their

research, must inform them of their movements, and are even expected to allow the security police to accompany them on their travels. Also, the inaccessibility of parts of Transkei has limited the extent of much research to specific magisterial districts. Although an indication of general national trends may be inferred from the data gathered in this way, the only all-embracing figures available emanate from official sources.

In November 1976⁷ the Transkeian Minister of Finance, Tsepo Letlaka, said the territory would only be able to 'maintain its freedom' if it could pay its way. In the same year Umtata relied on R134 million from South Africa. A R14-million deficit had been offset by the raising of a loan on the South African capital market, said Letlaka, who added: 'In the very crucial field of financial management we must succeed, on the one hand, to help our friends to recognize us, and on the other hand, to confound our enemies.' In the event, he accomplished neither.

Presenting Umtata's record budget to date in March 1977, Letlaka announced a 50% increase over the previous year: a total figure of R239 million.⁸ Of this, R169,7 million originated from the South African sources mentioned earlier. R52 million was allocated to the Department of Works and Energy, which was engaged in 'certain capital projects' believed to include expensive hydro-electric schemes; and R44,6 million went to the Department of Education, which was engaged in financing the construction of the multi-million rand University of Transkei (Unitra).

Umtata could raise only about R31 million from its own resources, R15 million of which was to be obtained from general taxes, with only R118 000 expected to come from income tax. In April 1977 it was announced that the Transkei Development Corporation had assets valued at more than R89 million when it became a Transkei government corporation and all its liabilities were taken over by the Xhosa Development Corporation.⁹ Loans granted to Transkeians by the TDC totalled R2,7 million, while loans granted to non-Transkeians, including industrialists, were R11,6 million. These loans resulted in the creation of only 4,791 job opportunities. These figures were released by the Minister of Planning and Commerce, Ramsay Madikizela.

The difficulties experienced by Umtata in its attempts to raise large loans on 'foreign' money markets were illustrated in October 1977 when the government attempted to raise a R16 million loan on the South African money market.¹⁰ The South African govern-

ment indicated that it would not be prepared to underwrite the loan as Umtata was a 'foreign government and it would not be constitutional for South Africa to guarantee the loans of another government.'¹¹ Press reports speculated, however,¹² that South Africa would be certain to give the loan its unofficial backing.

The loan was eventually secured¹³ with the help of Central Merchant Bank, but Umtata had to accept a 12½% interest rate.

The decision by Transkei to break diplomatic ties with South Africa in 1978 led some newspapers to speculate whether South Africa would withdraw the R169 million it was scheduled to contribute to that year's Transkei budget of R239 million.¹⁴ It is certain that had South Africa withheld the cash, it would have forced the Transkei into backing down over its stand — but there were other issues at stake and the withdrawal did not occur.

Shortly after the diplomatic break, Transkeian government sources claimed that they had managed to secure a R168 million loan from overseas investors.¹⁵ Two days later Finance Minister Letlaka presented a record estimate budget of R328 million to the Umtata National Assembly.¹⁶ According to Letlaka, there would, however, be a budgetary deficit of R102,7 million, and he did not disclose how he would meet this shortfall. His budgetary breakdown included the following departmental allocations: the Department of Works and Energy (still engaged in 'vital' capital projects) was to receive R61 million; Education, R55,5 million, of which R6,7 million was for Unitra; Finance, R39 million (up from R2,6 million); Defence, R3,6 million; and security intelligence — part of the Prime Minister's Department — R537 000 (an increase of R500 000). General tax and income tax was expected to bring in R18,4 million and stock tax R3,1 million.

This record budget, with Transkei still so dependent on South Africa, was to lead to disastrous consequences for the cabinet.

Letlaka had announced an extremely heavy tax of R10 per person on all able-bodied men and women over the ages of 18 and 21, and also a controversial central stock tax. It was obvious from the start that the majority of the inhabitants of Transkei would not be able to afford these new taxes.¹⁷ Opposition MP Caledon Mda and opposition leader Cromwell Diko attacked them in the Assembly. Diko said Letlaka should realise that 'peasants in Transkei did not keep stock for business purposes' and it was therefore wrong to tax them. Referring to the R10 per person tax,

he said: 'Where are our red-blanketed girls going to get the money? The government is going to drive them to places like Durban where they can get work The Transkeian people will not like that.'

When Letlaka announced the R10 tax, he said that 'The government, in response to popular demand, and for sound financial reasons, had decided to impose a special tax of R10 per person'^{17a}

In the meantime, Transport Minister A N Jonas had given an indication of the widespread abuse of official vehicles, many of which had been crashed while in unauthorized use — one cause, in the eyes of many, of the budgetary deficiency.¹⁸

Tabling his departmental vote on May 19, he said the repair costs of government vehicles that had been involved in accidents or had been withdrawn from service because of accidents amounted to approximately R450 000.

In May, the London *Financial Times*¹⁹ said in an article that Transkei was 'rapidly degenerating into a tragic parody of the problems of Third World Development A combination of political autocracy and financial incompetence are leading the impoverished tribal homeland rapidly towards a financial crisis or even into insolvency.'

On May 25 Letlaka announced that three government departments — Agriculture and Forestry, Foreign Affairs and Information, and Police — had overspent by a total of about R90 000.²⁰ And a few days later the South African government announced that another R1,9 million had been budgeted for assistance to Transkei.²¹

By July 1978 the South African English press was predicting a massive financial crisis for the Transkei government.²² Letlaka had still not confirmed — or even publicly suggested — that his government had managed to secure internationally-financed loans to cover the approximately R100 million budgetary deficit for the year,²³ although it seemed by this stage that rumours to the effect that such a loan had been raised were put out by the government earlier in the year to mislead the press.

The *Financial Mail*²⁴ suggested that international bankers were not prepared to lend the money 'to a country which has no background of sound financial discipline. The latest budget . . . has done nothing to improve this image.'

Transkei departmental secretaries were reported to have drawn

up a list of priorities for capital expenditure,²⁵ but although it had been out for months it had not yet been looked at by any of the cabinet ministers.²⁶ The *Financial Mail* suggested that it would be in Umtata's interests to chop capital expenditure, but even that would not be enough to make up the deficit. Current expenditure would also have to be squeezed, the FM said, but with salaries for government 'coming out at 26% (SA: 11%) of total expenditure it should be a natural target—but politically dangerous.'

Such a strategy would have been politically dangerous simply because the state bureaucracy was one of the TNIP's two most powerful supports (the other being the majority of Chiefs in the Assembly) — and it would have been politically unwise to alienate these 'clients' by chopping their salaries. It seemed that Umtata preferred taxing the impoverished classes with harsh taxes such as the R10 per head tax mentioned earlier.

In another financial setback for the Transkei government, the Department of Local Government and Land Tenure announced that it had had to write off debts totalling R424 000 from the funds of the Transkei Township Board, which had become defunct in 1976.²⁷

Sensitive to the critics of Transkei's financial dependence on South Africa, Kaiser Matanzima said in October 1978²⁸ that the R113,5 million statutory amount budgeted annually by the South African Treasury for direct transfer to Umtata was not regarded as 'aid' by the Transkeian government. This money was 'rather' a 'moral obligation' South Africa had to fulfil to the Transkei as a 'form of compensation for the low wages paid to Transkeian workers in South Africa.' In December he strongly denied that Umtata was running short of cash²⁹ for running costs, such as salaries and funds required for the implementation of normal interdepartmental programmes, even though it was short of capital for development projects to the tune of R96 million. The implication of this statement was that the R113,5 million paid as a 'moral obligation' by South Africa in compensation for the low wages of migrants was not, in fact, being used in the interests of those migrants.

'The fact that we are not recognized is irrelevant to us because we will get assistance from friendly countries such as we are getting from Taiwan and Austria. We are (also) getting assistance from German companies and the Swiss,' he said, and added: 'Many countries are going to come in because Transkei's independence is now a fact and it cannot be reversed.'

In March 1980 Letlaka tabled his third budget since 1976 — and

for the first time it was not a 'record' one. He announced³⁰ a decrease of R75 million from the previous budget with cuts in most government departments. This budget's breakdown was as follows: Education, R43 million (down R12 million over the 1978/79 budget); Works and Energy, R40 million (down R20 million); R30 million each to Agriculture and Forestry and the Finance Departments; R37 million to the Interior; Commerce, R23 million; Health, R21 million; and Defence R3,8 million.

In his budget speech, Letlaka demonstrated a significant change of attitude from the somewhat over-confident image he had projected the year before. He said the government could not afford a deficit year after year.³¹

Attempting to save face over his disastrous budget of the previous year, Letlaka said the aim of that budgetary deficiency had been 'to encourage economic development.'³² Of his new 'balanced budget', he said: 'I know that (it) will result in unpalatable sacrifices . . . It is, however, a fact of life that money is in limited supply. A developing state has to sacrifice luxuries and instead foster a steady and balanced development.'

Without detailing plans for this 'balanced development', Letlaka went on to condemn the 'distorted conclusions' of the overseas press, which had predicted bankruptcy for the Transkei.

Later that month Letlaka expressed 'concern' over the continued mis-appropriation of government funds and unauthorized expenditure by Transkeian government officials. These practices were undoubtedly having an effect on his vain efforts to balance the budget.

He warned that he was going to put a stop to these malpractices, and said outside investors who could lend money 'to save the country's ailing economy' were unlikely to do so without the assurance that the Transkei government had no taint of corruption.³³

The problem of unauthorized use of government motor vehicles came up for its annual scrutiny in the Assembly in April, when Transport Minister Jonas said an 'alarming' 33% of the government's motor fleet had been involved in accidents during the previous year.³⁴

On April 13 the new Premier, George Matanzima, tabled a white paper in the House of Assembly titled 'The Development Strategy 1980-2000.' In order to provide work for the number of Transkeians entering the labour market, and to improve the agricultural

system drastically, the Development Strategy called for the complete restructuring of the Transkei economy (*sic*). It said: 'One can hardly speak of a Transkei economy in any meaningful sense; more properly one must consider it a labour reserve. Nor can it be considered a subsistence economy. Domestic production does not even cover the basic necessities of the present population.'³⁵

The document suggested that one of the cornerstones of the economic restructuring of Transkei would have to be the development of its agricultural potential by a change in the land tenure system. But this was a sensitive area, as we have seen in other sections of this book. To change the land tenure system would mean undermining the main base of Matanzima's and the TNIP's political power. It would amount to political suicide.

The *Financial Mail* of April 27 pointed out, with regard to the latest Letlaka budget, that the Minister of Finance had failed to identify Transkei's priorities by going ahead with 'glamour projects' such as the prestige Capital Radio project and the purchase of a new 40-seater aircraft for Transkei Airways, each at a cost of about R4 million.

In June³⁶ the South African government voted an extra R11 million to Umtata in terms of the 1976 agreements.

At the same time, the Transkeian auditor general, Mr K Mdleleni, and the chairman of the Public Accounts committee, Chief SS Majeke, had completed their report on financial irregularities involving government officials, but had refused to release details.

Finance Secretary Maqubela said in an interview with *Post* at the end of July that Transkei had recently secured two 'substantial' loans from overseas sources — allegedly enough to ensure the territory's financial stability for 'many years to come'. He said: 'We keep silent about these things because countries friendly enough to assist us financially cannot afford to deal openly with us while Transkei is denied official recognition by the international community.' He denied reports that Transkei was 'so broke that civil servants were being paid either from the pension fund or from the reserve fund maintained by the state.'³⁷

His claim to have secured 'substantial' overseas loans was to be proved a pipe dream some time later.

In a press interview shortly afterwards,³⁸ the Chairman of the Bank of Transkei, Mr D van Huyssteen, revealed that because of

limited finances Transkei's much-needed education and health services had had to be further pruned. This would inhibit the territory's growth potential, he said, but Letlaka's decision to cut back on the budget had been 'praiseworthy'.

When the auditor-general's report was finally released on August 20, it showed that unauthorized government expenditure for the period 1977/78 totalled R4,7 million, and that the government's Revenue Fund was R1,4 million in the red.³⁹ Both these factors had contributed to a R24,5 million increase in the Transkei's state debt to R39,5 million. 78,5% of the total debt was externally-owed, and the cost of raising loans to the Transkei Revenue Fund was R192 000. R2,38 million interest on the loans was owed by the Revenue Fund.

When the report was formally tabled in the Assembly a month later,⁴⁰ it blamed the massive unauthorized expenditure on 'a complete disregard of financial regulations, Treasury instructions and the ignorance of the important functions of the Auditor General by accounting officials.'⁴¹

The largest single example of unauthorized expenditure came from the Education Department, from which R4 million was missing — this amount being put down to 'administrative difficulties' by departmental officials.

An insight into where much of the money may have gone came from the Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs (which department was found to have spent R96 000 on air fares alone). Mr B Pukwana told the committee: 'Well, sometimes the department gets a directive and it comes from the Prime Minister that he should be given so much, and it is not so easy for the Department to say "no" if the Prime Minister says he must be given so much.'⁴²

The expected debate on the report in the Assembly failed to materialize, while the 'members of the house haggled over a government motion to refer the report to a commission of inquiry to investigate charges of maladministration and incompetence.'⁴³

The *Daily Dispatch* said of the non-debate:⁴⁴ 'If the special session revealed anything, it was to reconfirm the ineffectiveness of an intimidated opposition against the ruling Transkei National Independence Party.'

The Matanzima government's finances were now more entangled than at any stage since 1976 and so, despite the continued diplomatic impasse between the two countries, Transkei made

an urgent request to Pretoria for more cash.⁴⁵ Publicly excusing this request on the grounds that the money was needed to match salary increases granted to black civil servants in South Africa, George Matanzima managed to secure R74 million from South Africa.

When about 20 South African officials visited the Transkei on October 18, Transkei government sources said the money granted by South Africa to the Transkei included 'substantially more' than R74 million.⁴⁶ The South African delegation was sent, presumably, to monitor and advise on the use of the new funds in order to try and ward off a further financial debacle in the region.

But things did not seem to improve for Umtata. In December 1979 *Post* reported that if the Transkei government did not raise a loan of at least R32,4 million by February 1980 it would go 'completely bankrupt'.⁴⁷ *Post* based this assumption upon a document leaked to it by government sources. The document was a seven-page memorandum drawn up by the Finance Department. It recommended that the Transkei government accept a R20 million loan already offered by South Africa and meet the remaining shortfall of R17 million by reducing the salaries of cabinet ministers, civil servants, members of parliament, chiefs and headmen, and also by bringing to a total halt government construction and maintenance programmes.

The deepening crisis for the Matanzima cabinet was reflected in a *Cape Times* report two days later: 'With less than R6 million in its coffers and a R37 million deficit in the current financial year, Transkei is in desperate need of finance to pay the salaries of its 30 000 civil servants.'⁴⁸

By December 12 'top-level and confidential talks' were being held between the South African and Transkeian governments in Pretoria. The four-person Transkei delegation, headed by George Matanzima, met with the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, and the Minister of Finance, Owen Horwood.⁴⁹

According to reports, the only way for Transkei to raise the loans it needed from private banks to salvage part of the damage was through an agreement authorizing the South African government to pay Transkei's share of the customs revenue directly into the banks concerned.⁵⁰ It is likely that an agreement of this nature was reached at the meeting, although neither party was prepared to comment.

In January 1980 the new Transkeian Minister of Finance,

Ramsay Madikizela — Letlaka had been axed from the portfolio, apparently on Kaiser Matanzima's orders as part of a cabinet reshuffle — said the territory's finances were now on a 'sound footing'.⁵¹ This was as a result of stringent measures.

'I wish to avail myself of this opportunity of allaying the fears of creditors and investors that their claims will be fully met on due date and that the salaries of civil servants will be paid,' he said. It was obviously no more than an attempt to seal any financial deals that were still in the pipeline, for later in 1980 it was to be revealed that Umtata's financial position had changed little from the disastrous state of a few months before.

On March 24 the opposition in the Assembly called on the Transkei government to resign and hand over to white South African officials 'because of maladministration of the affairs of the state and the failure to satisfy the needs of its people.'⁵²

The opposition was responding during the no-confidence debate to continued financial mismanagement and unauthorized expenditure. On May 30 the details of this ineptitude were revealed when the 1980 auditor-general's report was released. Madikizela said that 'flouting treasury instructions had become the order of the day,' and that unauthorized expenditure totalled almost R3 million — a drop of no more than R1 million from the previous disastrous year.⁵³

He said the state debt was now some R77,5 million — just less than double the same debt a year previously. Madikizela said the Treasury had not approved, for instance, the Department of Transport's R2,5 million splurge on new cars, neither had the sale of 12 ministerial cars for R29 000 taken place at a public auction, as laid down in Treasury instructions.

Deputy Opposition leader Caledon Mda said it was becoming 'a perennial disease for this house to be presented with an unauthorized expenditure bill of this nature.'⁵⁴

Was it time to go to Pretoria again?

South Africa was now in a position where it had become an embarrassment and a political danger to allow this state of affairs to continue in Transkei. Signs of restlessness amongst the worker/peasant/unemployed of the region were — and still are — becoming increasingly evident, and Umtata wasn't capable or financially able to do anything about this state of affairs. It would be politically unwise for the 'mother country', South Africa, to allow civil strife and open class conflict to develop because of the ineptitude of the

Matanzima government, and the constellation of states came increasingly to be seen as the only way out for the total strategists. This trend is more fully explained in the concluding chapter of this book. Here it is pertinent to end this section with a table illustrating the visible extent to which South Africa has propped up the Transkei, with ever-increasing amounts, in the years since 'independence' was granted in October 1976.

The figures given below have been calculated from questions put to South African cabinet ministers in the South African Parliament, Institute of Race Relations Surveys, and press reports. They should be considered as conservative estimates, for there are many ways in which the South Africans have disguised their financial support for Umtata. One such method is the payment of the salaries of South African officials seconded to the Transkei government and TDC by South Africa, not Umtata, and there have been many hints of under-the-counter loans to Umtata, as well as Pretoria's guaranteeing of loans from other sources.

South Africa's annual contributions to the Transkeian Treasury

(Based on statutory grants, revenue from the customs pool, the taxing of Transkeians in South Africa, etc, and occasional cash grants which have been made public.)

(Millions of Rand)

1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	Total
134,00	169,71	190,70	211,96	231,04	1 025,41

Total includes R14 million for the completion of development projects, R74 million emergency grant in 1979.⁵⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. *Argus*, 12/2/76
2. *SAIRR Survey*, 1978, p. 302.
3. Question number 608, Houses of Parliament, Cape Town, 1980.

4. *Imvo*, 4/4/80.
5. *RDM* 3/3/76.
6. *Ibid* 23/6/76.
7. *Daily Dispatch* 19/11/76.
8. *Ibid* 23/3/77.
9. *Ibid* 27/4/77.
10. *RDM* 13/10/77.
11. *Ibid* 13/10/77.
12. *Ibid* 13/10/77.
13. *DD* 3/11/77.
14. *Cape Times* 13/4/78.
15. *DD* 17/4/78.
16. *DD* 19/4/78.
17. *DD* 21/4/78.
18. *DD* 19/5/78.
19. *Post* 25/5/78.
20. *DD* 26/5/78.
21. *Cape Times* 31/5/78.
22. *Daily News* 11/7/78.
23. *Ibid* 11/7/78.
24. *Financial Mail* 11/8/78.
25. *Ibid* 11/8/78.
26. *Ibid* 11/8/78.
27. *DD* 7/9/78.
28. *Ibid* 14/9/78.
29. *Ibid* 1/12/78.
30. *Ibid* 15/3/79.
31. *Ibid* 16/3/79.
32. *Ibid* 16/3/79.
33. *Post* 30/3/79.
34. *Daily News* 11/4/79.
35. *DD* 13/4/79.
36. *Ibid* 5/6/79.
37. *Post* 31/7/79.
38. *DD* 17/8/79.
39. *Ibid* 21/8/79.
40. *Daily News* 19/9/79.
41. *DD* 20/9/79.
42. *Ibid* 20/9/79.
43. *DD* 24/9/79.
44. *Ibid* 24/9/79.

45. *RDM* 10/10/79.
46. *DD* 18/10/79.
47. *Post* 4/12/79.
48. *Cape Times* 6/12/79.
49. *Ibid* 12/12/79.
50. *Ibid* 12/12/79.
51. *DD* 8/1/80.
52. *Natal Mercury* 25/3/80.
53. *DD* 30/5/80.
54. *Ibid* 30/5/80.
55. *SAIRR Survey*, 1979, p. 336.

Chapter Four

THE LABOUR RESERVOIR

Migrant Labour and Transkei

No matter how distorted their human values and ideals might be, the Government strategists have shown no irrationality that we can detect, and the Bantustan strategy, indeed, indicates an acute appreciation on their part of the conditions under which the interests of the ruling groups in Southern Africa have to be realized. — Frank Molteno, 'The Historical Significance of the Bantustan Strategy', *Social Dynamics*, 1977.

The Status of Transkei Act, passed in the Cape Town parliament in 1976, was the most revealing item of Transkei 'independence' legislation passed that year.

The Act contained provisions for the enforced registration as Transkei citizens of all Xhosa speaking people whose lineage could be traced to the Transkei area. This meant that about half the approximately 3 million people who fell into this category, and lived permanently or as contract workers in South Africa, would be forced to become citizens of an artificially-created country. This would entail the loss of all rights as citizens — albeit 3rd class — of South Africa. The vast majority showed that they rejected the whole cynical exercise by failing to turn up at the 'Independence Celebrations' held by the Transkeian government in the major urban areas of South Africa.

What was the South African government's motive in demanding the inclusion of this clause in the Act, in the face of strong resistance from the masses and (inconsistent) pressure even from Kaiser Matanzima? The intention was to sophisticate, still further, the methods the government had at its disposal for controlling the country's vast, unskilled black work-force. It followed in the wake

of decades of legislation designed for this purpose — the influx control regulations, the Bantu Authorities Acts, the Land Acts and so on.

The development of South Africa's agricultural, industrial, manufacturing and mining sectors had, up until the mid-'70s, been dependent on the abundant supply of cheap, unskilled labour. This labour had been provided, through legislation passed in a parliament in which those affected had no representation, by the creation of native reserves, or bantustans, which limited the land occupation and ownership rights of 87% of the South African population to 13% of the total land area. Because traditional peasant farming did not enable this 13% of the land to support its population, hundreds of thousands of people were forced out of the reserve areas into the growing industrial centres of South Africa — there to seek sufficient employment to keep their bellies at least half-full. But this new, dispossessed group of people could not be allowed to roam around the urban centres at will looking for work (and 'making trouble' when they couldn't get it) so the South African government imposed a particularly callous set of bureaucratic controls on their movements. All 'natives' were required to carry reference or pass books, which would be used to record places of origin, employment, and other facets of their personal history. If, for instance, a person wished to leave Umtata to look for work in Cape Town, he would have to report his presence to the Bantu Authorities in Cape Town and register as a 'workseeker'. If he was unable to find work, he was endorsed back to his homeland. Millions of people were, and still are, controlled in this way. The hundreds of thousands of people arrested each year by the South African authorities are enough evidence of that.

The primary motive for pushing Transkei into accepting independence appears to have been a political one: in this way the South African government hoped to defuse African anger and resentment at exploitation and oppression in the urban areas, by allowing a certain form of political independence in the homeland. It was also an attempt to legitimize the apartheid system in the eyes of the world. Thus, although the mechanisms of labour control functional to the South African economy were already in existence, there was a need to make the whole system less unpalatable — on the surface, at least. It was hoped that by giving independence to the Transkei this would be achieved.

But there was also an economic reason for the decision taken to 'help and guide' the bantustans toward Pretoria's gift of independence. The 1970s were witnessing a structural change in the nature of the South African economy: a move toward monopoly power in all sectors. This was having the effect of transposing production from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive footing, with the concomitant sophistication of technology, especially in the manufacturing and industrial sectors. This sophistication of the technology of production was leading to a reduction in the demand for cheap migrant labour and an increase in the demand for settled semi-skilled and skilled labour in the urban areas. This process was beginning to create masses of unemployed people — functional up to a point in that the unemployed serve the purpose of keeping wages down — who had to be sent to the homelands to avoid the havoc they might, in their desperation, wreak in the urban areas.

But even shunting the problem to the homelands was not a final solution for the South Africans. Some of these unemployed and unemployable people had to be employed there — or their disruptive potential would simply have been relocated, not nullified. Hence the decentralization-of-industries programme, begun in the seventies on the homeland borders, and the financing by the state of the homeland development corporations.

But the proportions of the problem were vast, and it was considered in the State's interest to push for independence in order to hasten the process which might create a privileged middle class in the homelands and batten down discontent there.

In this experiment, Transkei was the guinea-pig. In an interview with the *Rand Daily Mail* shortly before independence was formally granted to Kaiser Matanzima in October 1976, the then South African Minister of Bantu Administration, M C Botha, made some pertinent observations. He said: 'We are living now in a position where about half of all the blacks are in the white areas and half in the homelands. And we are working daily to shift more and more into the homelands . . .'

' . . . It will depend on how many blacks go back to their countries [sic] should their countries become independent . . . not only because their country has become independent, but also because of development. The position isn't static — it's fluid, with a big tendency from our side to help the drift to the homelands.'¹

At the time of independence a large government bureaucracy

already existed, created to maintain the infrastructure that had been developed around the Assembly, its departments and the TDC. In a period of only one year, 1975, the size of this civil service, excluding teachers, grew by 89% to 11 554 posts.² In the twelve months of 1976, this figure grew by half again to 17 320 posts.³ This growth was able to mop up some 40% of those coming onto the job market for that period, and although this was not nearly enough, it did show how independence helped ameliorate the unemployment crisis to some extent.

Although there are no figures available, it seems that the percentage of the Transkei's population engaged in migrant work in South Africa has dropped with the economic changes taking place in South Africa as described above. This estimate is supported by the decreasing amount of money paid into the Transkei's coffers by the South African Treasury in return for taxes collected from Transkeians in South Africa between 1978 and 1979. In 1978/79 South Africa paid R9,9 million collected in this way to Umtata, while in 1979/80 the amount decreased to R5,7 million, indicating perhaps a significant drift of people back to the Transkei.⁴

It is against the above background that the following two sections of this chapter should be seen. The information in these has largely been gleaned from the only available source: newspaper reports.

MIGRANT LABOUR FROM TRANSKEI TO SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1976

In February 1976 the then Minister of the Interior in the Umtata government, Ms Stella Sigcau, said the Transkei would never become a reservoir of cheap labour. She was speaking on a tour of Europe with a party of other homeland functionaries, which perhaps explains why she neglected to mention that the territory was already — and had been for decades — a reservoir of labour for South Africa.⁵

She also neglected to mention that migrant labour was, apart from massive cash grants from South Africa, the territory's largest revenue-earner. By 1977 migrant workers in South Africa remitted money orders worth about R1 million to the Transkei each month.⁶

Relations between the Transkei government and the main labour recruiters at the time were cordial – and profitable. In July 1977 the Sugar Industry Labour Organization (Silo) donated a tractor to the Transkei State President, Chief Botha Sigcau. The Eastern Pondoland region over which Sigcau reigned as Paramount Chief provided a massive percentage of Silo's cheap migrant labour.⁷ Several days later Stella Sigcau 'made history', according to a press report, when she became the first female 'cabinet minister' to go on an underground tour of a South African gold mine.⁸ Sigcau and seven other Transkeian government MPs were visiting the gold mines of the Reef as guests of The Employment Bureau of Africa (Teba). Although she said she had accepted Teba's invitation to visit the Reef 'with considerable misgivings about the living conditions of the mineworkers,' she had been highly impressed by the amount of welfare work, the high standard of living and the cleanliness of the living quarters. She said the Transkei government could learn much from the mines when it came to housing conditions and catering for people.

The wife of the Transkei consul-general showed the other side of the coin when she employed a black cook and a cleaner at her Houghton home. The cook received 'just over' R50 per month, and the cleaner 'just under' R50 per month. The national organizer of the Domestic Workers and Employers Project suggested that 'the representatives of a State such as Transkei, many of whose citizens make up close to a million domestic workers in South Africa, should set an example in their employment practices.'⁹

In August 1977 the leader of the opposition Democratic Party in the Transkei, Mr. Hector Ncokazi, criticized the consul general who, he said, 'lives in luxury in a R190 000 house in Houghton.' Ncokazi said thousands of Transkeians living on the Reef were being told by white employers to go back to the Transkei, which had job opportunities for them.

'We warned the government before that as a result of the present status being conferred on Transkei only a few enlightened visitors would benefit, while thousands would languish in poverty and unemployment. They are now objects of injustice, ridicule, and ruthless exploitation,' he said.¹⁰

Meanwhile, in Cape Town, about 40 000 Transkeians, living in the Cape Peninsula, were given until the end of 1977 to get back to their homeland. Later in the year the shacks belonging to these

squatters living in Unibel, Modderdam and Werkgenot were demolished by the South African authorities, and large numbers of squatters were put on trains or trucks for Transkei.¹¹

In December that year a newspaper investigation revealed that many young children, some recruited from Transkei, were being paid virtual slave wages as workers on large sugar plantations in coastal Natal.¹²

One of the plantations, Doomkop Estate, which had been owned until a few months previously by the British sugar company, Tate and Lyle, paid boys and girls, ranging from 13 to 15 years old, about 50 cents per nine-hour day. No food, or only mielie pap, was given to the children and the adults they worked alongside. None of the children went to school.

The workers lived in compounds with wings for single men, women, boys and girls. Mr Hlabinkomo Mthinbi, a migrant from Transkei working at one of the plantations, earned R66 per month as a cane cutter: 'There is nothing to do here. We wake to go to work and come back home, sit around a little, sleep and go to the fields the next morning,' he said. On Sundays, the workers' only day off, they sat around drinking sorghum beer, Mthinbi said. 'The white man sells it to us for 15 cents a pint.'

The sugar firm's net profit for 1977 was R2 715 000. On the same day that newspaper reports on the use of child labour at the plantations were published, five British companies operating in South Africa issued statements denying that they were paying their migrant workers starvation wages.¹³

Two days after the reports appeared a Transkei Interior Department official said the Transkeian Department of Foreign Affairs had been instructed to investigate the conditions under which Transkeian juveniles were working on Natal's sugar plantations. He said it was illegal for recruiters to contract juveniles of 16 years of age or younger without the consent of their parents or guardians. At the same time Transkei government officials were meeting with representatives of the largest sugar company in South Africa, C G Smith and Co., to discuss the issue. The company chairman, Mr Frank Jones, said after the meeting: 'As far as we are concerned this nonsense is cleared up and any further moves will have to be initiated by the Transkei authorities.'¹⁴ There was no indication as to what the government had discussed or agreed upon with the sugar owners, but Umtata stopped issuing strong statements on the matter after the meeting.

Jones might have persuaded them by pointing out that the Sugar Employers' Association drew more than 16 000 workers from Transkei every year, so that it was in Transkei's interests as well as the sugar industry's to have the workers in Natal. Jones had added that it was important that good relations existed between the sugar industry and the Transkei government. His point seemed to be taken, for by 1980 the sugar owners were guests of honour at the inauguration of the new Paramount Chief of Eastern Pondoland — the son of the late State President of Transkei, Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau. (Sigcau, as mentioned earlier, was given a tractor as a present by the Sugar Industry Labour Organization.)

In March 1978, hundreds of women who arrived 'illegally' in Johannesburg from the Transkei were ordered back to the homeland. Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for the area, F P du Randt, said the women were entering Johannesburg to find work and/or to join their husbands. He said this influx presented his office with a difficult predicament. The women were arriving in Johannesburg without jobs or accommodation, and in the light of the 'high level' of unemployment in the city, the influx 'could lead to chaos.' As had become common practice, the Transkei consul had been informed of the situation in the hope that 'people in the Transkei would be told they could not enter urban areas illegally.'¹⁵

Transkei consuls in the various urban centres of South Africa were being drawn increasingly into helping the South African authorities in matters pertaining to labour control and unrest, and were used as go-betweens, on some occasions, between the administration boards and workers.

After the break in diplomatic relations, Transkeian officials remained in South Africa, despite the withdrawal of 'diplomatic staff', to 'represent the interests' of Transkeian labourers in the country,¹⁶ although it is clear from the above what their real function was.

One of the economic functions of the independent Transkei was highlighted in September 1978 by the Western Cape Chairman of the Trade Union Council of South Africa (Tucsa), Mr Norman Daniels.¹⁷ He said that 'unfair competition' from Transkei, where trade unions had been banned by the Matanzimas in an attempt to maintain political control and attract industrialists to invest in the territory, and where wage rates were lower, was preventing

Western Cape employers from paying higher wages.

He said that wage rates in Transkei were less than a third of those paid in South Africa. This clearly enabled South African employers to hold wages down in the urban centres.

The growing unemployment rate in South Africa was having a grim effect in Transkei, as unemployed workers were endorsed back to the region from South Africa¹⁸ in increasing numbers as evidenced by the following story.

Lady Frere.

The grim story of unemployment is told in this dusty Transkeian village where hundreds of men wait daily outside the government labour office in the near non-existent hope of gaining employment. A labour contractor's truck from Tulbagh in the Western Cape suddenly pulls in. The street is at once alive with excitement, men making a dash to get in first.

Mr and Mrs I Walker, the prospective employers, are overwhelmed by the rush of men, who have hardly had a bath or food for days — then have to pull up their windows despite the heat.

Getting signed up on a job contract in this part of Transkei means climbing right round the cab of the truck for a chance to push in the unavoidable reference book before the other hundreds can do so. Jobs and contracts are a rarity here . . .

The newspaper interviewed one of the men trying to get a job with the Walker couple:

How are we going to pay the taxes that inevitably come with independence? With what shall we feed and educate our children? In many homes there is hardly a cent for house money. People literally have to beg for food.

Child mortality or deaths generally are our daily bread . . . But without food or money no medicine or medical service will help. We can't eat medicine. It is taken after or before meals.

Without work we are without meals.

The *Daily Dispatch* sent reporters to the area a week later. They wrote that many of the hundreds of men gathered in the town had been waiting each day, some for up to six months, to get work, 'work anywhere in South Africa or Transkei and at virtually any wage.'¹⁹

Attempts by the newspaper to obtain Transkei government comment on the situation 'proved fruitless.'

A recruiting officer in Cacadu, Mr. Donald Sithungu, told reporters that about 300 people came to his office every day looking for work. Only about 40 per week were successful.²⁰

'People are so desperate for employment that some go to the extent of putting R5 and R10 notes — which they can ill-afford — into their travel documents when visiting recruiting officers.'

In March 1979 a TNIP MP called on the South African government to transfer all Unemployment Insurance money owing to Transkeians into the Transkei Treasury.²¹ Mr A Matolengwe said the manner in which the fund was explained to workers was 'so flowery' that they were unaware of certain implications.

He said he had raised the issue because the situation was becoming 'crucial'. 'Our people working in South Africa are being ejected and many have suffered heavy losses because workers are unaware of the conditions under which they are entitled to UIF benefits.'

The squatter issue was again highlighted in March 1979 by George Matanzima. Speaking shortly before — and probably in an effort to influence negotiations about — the reopening of diplomatic ties between Umtata and Pretoria, Matanzima said the Transkei would not become a dumping ground for South Africa's 'so-called squatters.'²²

He said it had become general practice to endorse all unwanted Transkeians out of South Africa.

'If they thought we took independence to solve their problem of urban blacks, they have made a terrible mistake,' he said. But it was Matanzima who was making the mistake: although he and his brother may have chosen independence for somewhat more personal reasons, it had become an irrefutable fact that this was the function independence was designed to serve. In the final analysis, the Transkei government had no say in the matter, as it had agreed to the citizenship clauses in the Status of Transkei Act that enabled South Africa to dump as many 'unwanted blacks' inside the territory as it pleased.

In April 1979 the Transkei Minister of the Interior, H. Pamla, announced that about 400 000 Transkeians had worked in South Africa the previous year.²³

The Transkei government-commissioned 'Development Strategy 1980' was tabled in the Umtata House of Assembly the same

month. It contained some brutal truths for the homeland government.²⁴ The report stated that 'one can hardly speak at present of a Transkei economy in any meaningful sense; more properly one must call it a labour reserve.' More than 60% of the entire Transkeian male labour force were working as migrants in South Africa.

'The migrant labour system, unlike the system in Southern European countries, is, in effect, the basis of the economy.' The report did not see any possibility of eliminating this dependence, and foresaw that about a third of the territory's male workers would still be migrants by the year 2000. Migrant labour perpetuated the poverty of the territory. Migrants did not concentrate on improving their agricultural potential at home because they looked to migrant work as their chief source of income. And, 'while migrant labour creates profits and tax revenues in the country in which it is employed, the social costs fall on the migrant's home country, to which he contributes no more than the fraction of his earnings which he remits to his family,' the report said. It also suggested that the government seek ways of ensuring that all migrants were unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 32, who would settle down to marriage and serious farming after their spell in South Africa. Umtata should enter into negotiations with South Africa to transmit a substantial part of the dividends of migrant labour back to the Transkei to finance the 'social costs'.

Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof said in Cape Town in May 1979 that 500 294 Transkeians were registered in South Africa as 'foreign black workers' at the end of June 1978. He said Transkeians represented the following percentages of the total work force in the sectors in which they were employed:²⁵ agriculture, 44,1%; mining, 33,1%; manufacturing, 46%; construction, 50,6%; wholesale and retail trade, 31,3%; and 47,8% in government services.

Meanwhile, there was no doubt that the Transkei government was feeling the political effect of having to accommodate the thousands of unemployed workers who were being sent back to the territory by the South African authorities, acting within the framework of the influx control regulations.

The Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions established by the South African Parliament reported back in 1979. It can be argued that the commissions were an attempt both to stifle the increasingly

disruptive effects of labour unrest on the South African economy and to further control and divide the work force in South Africa in response to the changing nature of the economy. Misleading acclaim from liberal opposition quarters greeted the publication of the recommendations of the two reports, which suggested a strategically-motivated (but superficial) liberalization of labour policies.

Wiehahn and Riekert suggested several structural changes to the South African labour regulations — such as a call for the recognition of certain of the previously-unacknowledged black trade unions — that would deflect foreign pressure on multinationals to disinvest in South Africa and make it easier for foreign interests to invest in the country. The recommendations were also seen as an attempt to divide workers inside South Africa on an urban-rural basis, by granting certain privileges to workers with permanent urban rights while withholding them from migrant workers — thus attempting to decrease the constant threat of unified labour unrest.

Among the commissions' central recommendations were calls on the government to ease prosecutions under the harsh pass law and influx control systems, which regulate the flow of labour between the urban and homeland areas; to implement heavy penalties such as substantial fines and even jail sentences for employers found to be harbouring 'illegal' black workers (those without rights outside the homelands); and to recognize certain easily-controllable forms of black trade union, whose memberships would be restricted to those with permanent and semi-permanent urban rights, thus attempting to drive a wedge between the unity of workers by creating a division between the urban work-force and the massive, but increasingly less employable migrant labour force. It was also recommended that the right of trade union associations to restrict membership on a racial basis should be removed — but individual unions would, on the other hand, be able to determine those eligible for membership.

While these recommendations were hailed as an 'historic' breakthrough in race relations by South African employers, their selective acceptance by the South African government — and the intrinsic tendency of the recommendations themselves — were condemned by progressive trade union leaders as nothing more than a tightening-up of the already awesome system of labour control.²⁶

The government effectively doubled the surveillance and control of pass law offenders from the homelands by rejecting Riekert's call for the easing of pass law prosecutions and accepting his recommendations that employers be heavily penalized for hiring 'illegals'.

After the Wiehahn-Riekert euphoria had come and gone, the complex labour recruitment and surveillance mechanisms utilized by the South African state to allocate and control a cheap supply of labour for the needs of the economy were — and still are — in full operation. Labour recruitment bureaux in both the homelands and the urban centres continue to ensure a steady flow of cheap labour to the sectors in which such labour is needed, at the rate at which it is required, while the homelands themselves serve as nothing more than vast labour reservoirs, overpopulated and underdeveloped by the apartheid system.

In short, the Wiehahn and Riekert commissions represented one facet of the National Party's drive to build a 'total' response to the most fundamental threats facing the continued hegemony of the ruling groups over political power and the economy. The commissions attempted to create the external appearance of a commitment to the removal of racism and injustices, while at the same time modernizing apartheid as the base of South Africa's economic system.

Responding to the imposition of a minimum R500 fine on employers caught employing 'illegal' workers, Transkei Prime Minister George Matanzima said the penalty would have 'the most tragic effect on millions of blacks in South Africa and stir resentment to breaking point.'²⁷ The truth of this statement is indisputable, but Matanzima's reasons for making it were not as altruistic as they might have seemed at first. The R500 fine meant, indirectly, a new political threat to his government, as it would exacerbate unemployment in the urban centres and have the effect of drastically increasing the flow of unemployed and underemployed Transkeians back to Transkei. These unemployed people would find no work for them in their 'homeland' and would inevitably have to resort to illegal methods of staying alive — which was likely to lead them into direct confrontation with the Umtata regime.

Matanzima said that the Transkei government felt strongly that apartheid was a 'gigantic miscalculation, a divider not only of bodies but of hearts and minds as well. The very opposite in fact

of what was needed in South Africa.' He neglected to mention, of course, that by accepting independence in 1976 he and his government had demonstrated irrevocably their commitment to apartheid.

A bizarre new twist was added to Transkei's migrant labour arrangements in January 1980, when the Transkei government announced its approval of the employment plan of one H A Hambsch of Johannesburg, who had recruited 100 Transkeian women to work as domestic servants in West Germany.²⁸ The Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, E Z Booï, said there were more than 100 women 'available at Ezibeleni to take up such employment,' and the Transkei government was ready at a moment's notice to arrange all the necessary documents. It is presumed that the women did eventually go to West Germany, for Booï also announced that the West German Government had approved their three-year stay in that country.

The use to which influx control regulations and the homeland citizenship provisions were being put by the South African government and employers was graphically illustrated in February 1980²⁹ when 280 strikers from CMGM, a civil engineering firm with a Saldanha Bay site, were sent back to the Ciskei and Transkei. They were put on buses for the two homelands one night after they had refused to continue working following the dismissal of a fellow-worker, who was a member of the unregistered Western Province General Workers' Union. The workers felt that he had been dismissed because of his union activities, refused a management offer to re-employ all except the dismissed worker, collected the wages owing to them, and were put on buses for their homelands.

On their arrival in Umtata, a spokesman for the workers was interviewed by the *Daily Dispatch*.³⁰ His comments provide an insight into how the whole migrant labour system was used by employers and the state to control worker action and the supply of labour.

The spokesman for the workers, Mr Z Qubeka, said: 'The site manager refused to give us a hearing. He sacked us all, and said, "I will recruit another 500 from Transkei to replace you."'

He said that when the workers had originally approached management over the unfair dismissal:

no satisfactory reason was given. Instead, seven more workers

were sacked.

We demanded all eight men be reinstated and we refused to work. We were hurriedly issued with our pay packets, bundled into buses, and dumped at the railway station. We were issued with tickets as far as Queenstown and had to pay extra for the continuation of our journey to our home districts in Transkei where we were recruited. Some were stranded because they did not have enough money. Management told us that the dispute would be settled at the Umtata labour bureau in the presence of Transkei labour officials.

We were told that we should be in Umtata on Monday as the matter was to be settled on Tuesday or Wednesday. Workers arrived as early as Sunday to attend the talks with the hope that the representative from management would be present as promised. Some workers, because of lack of accommodation, slept at the railway station while others slept in the veld.

We were disappointed to learn that no representatives of the construction firm arrived. It was worse when we were told by a labour official that the firm had recruited other workers to replace us.

Besides illustrating the plight of Transkeian migrant workers under the South African labour regulations, the incident showed clearly that Transkeian government labour officials are singularly ineffectual in resolving labour disputes and representing the interests of Transkeian workers generally. Although they had people working on the dispute both in Cape Town and Umtata, these officials were unable to persuade management to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the whole issue.

In March 1980 the Black Sash stated in a report that up to 8000 Transkei and Ciskei families were likely to lose breadwinners in the Western Cape because of the R500 fine for the employment of 'illegal' black workers.³¹

The report said many employers had applied to the Department of Co-operation and Development to have their 'illegal' workers registered, citing special reasons, but only a few had been successful. The rest had been refused permission, and most employers felt that they had no option but to dismiss employees of many years standing. The report added that Dr Koornhof had said during an interview with the Black Sash that there were as many as 8 000 'illegal' women working as domestic servants in the Western

Cape.

It can be safely assumed that many, if not most of these women lost their jobs because their employers were afraid of incurring the R500 fine.

Finally, another two cases of repatriation of workers involved in labour disputes in the Western Cape are cited below to emphasise the uses to which labour legislation affecting the independent Transkei has been put.

On April 30, 1980, 85 striking contract workers at a Grabouw apple co-operative had their contracts cancelled and were sent back to the Transkei.³²

In June, 1980, forty-two striking meat workers were ordered to return to Transkei after they were found guilty of being in Cape Town illegally.³³ With about 750 others in the Cape Town meat industry, the workers had gone on strike in support of demands for democratically-elected workers' committees to represent their interests. They had then been sacked by management. The court found that they were no longer employed and therefore had no right, in terms of the Urban Consolidation Act, to remain outside the Transkei.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE TRANSKEI

The acid test of whether any country is truly independent lies in its ability to provide for the food, employment and social welfare needs of its people without undue reliance on foreign aid. Given the conditions that led to the birth of the Transkei, a further test may be considered necessary in order to assess whether, in fact, the region *can* in future become economically independent from South Africa in the areas mentioned above. In short: can the Matanzimas ever release their 'citizens' from economic bondage to South Africa? Do they envisage such a possibility, and if so what steps are they taking toward the realization of this goal?

In 1960, 48% of the Transkei's gross national income derived from the remittances of Transkeians working in South Africa's industrial and agricultural areas, and direct grants from the South African treasury. By 1976 this figure had increased to almost 70%. At the same time, of the estimated 25 800 Transkeian work-seekers entering the labour market every year, about 85% cannot be accommodated inside the Transkei and have therefore to turn

to the South African migrant labour market as the only available means of earning enough to keep themselves and their families alive.

How did this situation arise? Prior to contact with white settlers in the nineteenth century, there existed a common system of land tenure in the areas occupied by the Xhosa tribes. This system, based on subsistence agriculture and free-range grazing, formed the basis of a peasant mode of production in which the land was owned by the clan, or tribe. There was no private property, and no land transactions took place.

After the first contacts between the Xhosa-speaking peoples and the English settlers, those peasants in closest geographical proximity to the settlers began producing a few new crops exclusively for the market-place, namely: winter wheat, oat hay, fruit and cotton.³⁴ Cattle remained the most important livestock, but flocks of sheep were kept by some peasants, and wool became an important item in commodity trade with the settlers.

Soon, however, the Transkei area came under the direct rule of the British. As more and more peasants began farming crops for trade with the settlers, in direct competition with white farmers, the colonial authorities began seeking ways of eliminating this competition. An added incentive to undermine the peasant economy was provided by the discovery of diamonds and gold. Both these booming new ventures required masses of cheap labour to do the digging and other menial tasks.

Colin Bundy³⁵ has said that peasant production, for a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, boomed and was as efficient, if not more so, than settler agricultural production at the time. The colonial authorities were concerned with the effect of this efficient use of the land by the peasants on the flow of migrant labour to the mining, agricultural, and later manufacturing and industrial sectors of the South African economy. As the land was providing subsistence for most of those living on it, as well as a marketable surplus, there was no incentive for Xhosas to seek work in South Africa.

This situation had to be countered by the authorities. Consequently, stiff taxes on people, livestock and huts were imposed on peasant producers, resulting, in most cases, in their being unable to meet the costs of reproducing themselves and their families. Although there were several instances of resistance to these harsh measures, they eventually forced large numbers of

people, mainly men, into the migrant labour system.

South African employers thus obtained an abundant supply of cheap labour which already partly supported the cost of reproducing itself by limited subsistence farming in the reserves — thus enabling the employers to pay even lower wages than they would normally have paid.

This process, in which the peasant mode of production was sucked into the developing South African capitalist system, created what has been termed a core-periphery relationship between the economy of the South African heartland and the reserves. Transkei, along with the other homelands, has thus been forced to supply the cheap labour on which the process of industrialization in South Africa was based.

Of necessity and by grand design, this supply of labour has been maintained through the continuing dependence of the rural (now semi-rural) peasantry on the remittance of migrant wages in order to survive.

It has been observed that the initial stages of this process had significant and disturbing effects on family and tribal customs and organization — all of which had to change and modify in the face of the changes in the economic environment.

Because of money earned from migrant work, young men were able to pay lobola for their brides at an earlier age, instead of being dependent on their families in this regard.³⁶ As a result, smaller homesteads became more prevalent and a smaller proportion of men took more than one wife (not least because of the Christianization of many by missionaries). Agricultural innovations, especially the use of the plough, enabled smaller families to live independently of larger kinship groups.³⁷

With many, even most of the men away as migrants in the urban centres or as labourers on South African farms, maize took over as the chief crop because it was easier to cultivate and it was easy to plant other crops, such as pumpkins, between maize rows.

'A smaller family without men could therefore cope with a larger area of land. This meant that women became even more responsible for agriculture, even sometimes taking over ploughing as the taboos against them working with cattle broke down.'³⁸

These adaptations to changing economic conditions made it possible for many families to cope with a certain — limited — form of subsistence agriculture, but by the 1930s, there had been a gradual decline in the quantity and quality of food production.

'Cattle epidemics, drought, the monopolistic practices of white traders, population pressures . . . and the favoured treatment accorded to white farmers impoverished the African peasantry and transformed' most of the male peasants into migrant labourers who only returned to their home areas for the ploughing season.³⁹

Transkei has been described as the potential 'pantry' of South Africa⁴⁰ yet the region produces maize yields which are seven times smaller than those produced in the Orange Free State.

What are the main factors in this declining food production? *Ideas and Action*, the UNESCO publication, lists them as follows:

Less labour available: With the men away, families were stretched to their labour limits; it was not possible to plough effectively under these conditions, with women working under an ever-increasing burden as both child-raisers and farmers.

Natural resources in decline: Serious overgrazing as more and more people were confined to the small geographical area of Transkei. This overgrazing was caused by the system of freehold grazing, which does not encourage peasants to cull their stocks as there is no incentive to do so when none of your neighbours will. Overgrazing was in turn leading to bad soil erosion in many areas, and this was contributing to the further impoverishment of the soil. Absence of crop and land rotation systems, as opposed to the pre-colonial period when there was enough land to sustain the agriculture of those living on it, and the lack of adequate fertilization led to the soil's rapid deterioration.

Holdings became smaller: As the land area of Transkei did not increase concomitantly with the pace of population growth, the annual amount of land available for each family decreased. Even though all Transkeian taxpayers were entitled to a plot of land, the fruitlessness of trying to maintain subsistence production on tiny plots forced many families to leave for the urban centres to seek employment, many illegally. The movement to the urban centres remained mainly male, however, which meant that many families still remained on their traditional plots. Instead of having enough land on which to farm efficiently, by the 1960s each family had an average of only 2,5 hectares on which to farm.

Limited capital for investment in agriculture: Households had to spend more and more of their annual income on consumer goods — and food in times of drought — which left little or no money available to peasants to improve farming methods.

Transkei's present agricultural crisis is therefore deeply rooted in

history and is closely related to the migrant labour system.

Since the territory became self-governing in 1963, the Transkei Department of Agriculture has encouraged farming co-operatives and farmers' associations to provide capital for agricultural improvement, but most of these schemes have failed through corruption, lack of funds, lack of agricultural education and the inability of the schemes to repay loans and interest.

As the process described above evolved into the 1970s, a rapid increase in migrancy occurred because so many people had been forced off land that was no longer able to support them. This increasing landlessness has been caused by the population increase and by rigid apartheid practices such as the expulsion of Xhosa families from urban areas back to Transkei because of the overabundance of labour that occurs periodically. Fewer and fewer people, relatively speaking, have either land or livestock: 50% of families have no livestock whatsoever. More and more young men — and women — have been forced into migrancy as a result.⁴¹

The coming of independence in 1976 saw the chiefs firmly entrenched as the effective rulers of Transkei, for they had the power to allocate and remove rights of land tenure, and constituted 50% of the Transkei National Assembly. Most were members of the Transkei National Independence Party — a fact which is explained elsewhere in this book — and enforced methods of control over the peasantry established by the South African and Transkeian authorities. They were responsible for collecting taxes. One of the factors militating against the holding of larger herds of cattle and other livestock is the heavy livestock taxation that was first applied by the colonial authorities in an effort to force more peasants into migrancy. Only 3% of Transkeian households have 15 or more cattle — the minimum number economically viable under Transkeian conditions.⁴²

Increasing landlessness had created a massive number of work-seekers, most of whom were forced to become migrants. But the South African economy could not take all of these potential migrants, a factor which led to the creation of the territory's massive post-independence unemployment problem. In February 1976 the Transkei Yearbook isolated as the main problem then facing Transkei, the need to create jobs in the urban areas (e.g. Butterworth, Umtata). With the male population expected to grow by 15 700 annually, and only about 4 000 jobs being created

in the same period, there was an annual employment gap of 11 000 jobs. This did not take into consideration those already unemployed and underemployed, nor the ever-increasing number of migrants who were finding it increasingly difficult to renew their contracts.

The yearbook said that a major recommendation of the economic planning branch was accelerated urbanization inside the territory. This was viewed as essential for the success of agriculture.⁴³

The success of agriculture in post-independence Transkei depends on sensible land reform and development, but neither has taken place. Although the 1978/79 budget devoted some R39 million to the Department of Agriculture, the money has not been used in a manner suited to the needs of an impoverished Third World country. Instead, the Transkei government has embarked on ambitious high-cost agricultural schemes that have, with the exception perhaps of the Magwa tea plantations, failed miserably to begin serving even the most basic needs of Transkeians. The two largest agricultural schemes, situated at Ncora and Qamata, are located where the Prime Minister and President of Transkei, George and Kaiser Matanzima, have some of their largest farms. These schemes have cost millions of rands and yet they show every indication of present or incipient failure. The Qamata scheme collapsed, allegedly, because the Taiwanese developers left for their home country.

Land reform — a change in the land tenure system being the basis of any meaningful reform in Transkei agriculture that might take place — has simply not been attempted since independence, for a very simple reason. The Tomlinson Commission recommendations on land reform were rejected by South Africa as early as 1955 on the grounds that such reform 'would undermine the tribal structures.'⁴⁴ This certainly holds true today, for the right to allocate land is the basis on which the chief's power rests. To remove this function would be to remove their power and thus undermine the whole power structure in the National Assembly in Umtata — something that Kaiser Matanzima, and South Africa, cannot allow.

We have seen how various conditions and measures in Transkei's historical development have given rise to a form of agriculture which serves only to keep the vast majority of the population of the region in perpetual dependence on migrant work.

This situation may change as more money becomes available, through the constellation of states, to Transkei agriculture — but the change is unlikely to be of a fundamental nature, as such money appears likely to be ploughed into prestigious development schemes that do not really effect the material welfare of the mass of semi-peasant producers.

However serious Umtata may be about changing the nature of agricultural production, it faces historically rooted conditions that militate strongly against any fundamental changes.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Rand Daily Mail* 14/10/76.
2. Stultz, op cit, p. 63.
3. Ibid, p. 63.
4. Question 608, House of Assembly, 1980.
5. *Daily Dispatch* 13/2/76.
6. *DD* 27/4/77.
7. *DD* 19/7/77.
8. *DD* 22/7/77.
9. *DD* 27/7/77.
10. *DD* 4/8/77.
11. *Argus* 6/10/77.
12. *DD* 20/12/77.
13. *DD* 20/12/77.
14. *DD* 24/12/77.
15. *Argus* 20/3/78.
16. *Cape Times* 4/5/78.
17. *Argus* 19/9/78.
18. *Queenstown Representative* 14/11/78.
19. *DD* 21/11/78.
20. *Imvo* 16/12/78.
21. *DD* 16/3/79.
22. *Post* 30/3/79.
23. *DD* 3/4/79.
24. *Finacial Mail* 27/4/79.
25. *DD* 16/5/79.

26. See, for instance, the Western Province General Workers' Union's 'Comments on the Position of the Unregistered Trade Union Movement', paper, 1979.
27. *Post* 27/7/79.
28. *DD* 7/1/80.
29. *DD* 7/2/80.
30. *DD* 14/2/80.
31. *Cape Times* 12/3/80.
32. *Cape Times* 1/5/80.
33. *Cape Times* 19/6/80.
34. Bulletin 126, 1978, Action for Development, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p. 41.
35. Bundy, C: *The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry*.
36. Bulletin 126, p. 41.
37. Ibid, p. 41.
38. Ibid, p. 41.
39. Stultz, op cit, p.31.
40. Ibid, p. 31.
41. Bulletin 126, op cit, p. 43.
42. Ibid, p. 44.
43. *DD* 9/2/76.
44. Stultz, op cit, p. 33.

Chapter Five

TILL DEATH DO US PART

Transkei and South Africa: Why There Was No Divorce

On August 20, 1977, less than a year after Transkei's 'independence', Foreign Minister Digby Koyana said on his return from a visit to Cape Town that the basis of friendship between Umtata and Pretoria was rapidly diminishing, and questioned whether there was any justification for continued diplomatic relations with South Africa.¹ He was responding to the treatment of so-called Transkeian citizens squatting in the Cape Peninsula, who were at the time being bulldozed out of their shanties and 'repatriated' to the Transkei by the South African authorities.

His threat to consider terminating diplomatic relations with Pretoria was the first hint from his government that the breaking of ties with South Africa would be used as a lever on the South African government.

A month later, on his first official visit to South Africa as Transkei Prime Minister, Kaiser Matanzima met Prime Minister B J Vorster to discuss the issues of Transkei citizenship and Umtata's claims to more land in East Griqualand. After the talks, which he described as 'brutal', Matanzima returned to Umtata where he told reporters he and Vorster had been reconciled and come to certain 'amicable resolutions', which he would not reveal. He also said, in obvious reference to Koyana's statement a month before, that the 'friendly relations' between Umtata and Pretoria would not be disrupted by Transkei — the onus was on South Africa 'to maintain these relations or incur the wrath of the Transkeian people.'²

To many observers at the time the statements by Matanzima and Koyana seemed little more than impotent political posturing, which had previously characterized the Transkei's parade of grievances. Yet even though Matanzima may not have known it at the time, these open challenges were eventually to lead to the April 1978 break in diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Transkei's claim to territory outside its October 1976 borders was again in the news at the end of 1977 when Matanzima said after his return from the Bophutatswana independence celebrations: 'The writing is on the wall for South Africa, unless they change their cunning ways and carry out their policy of separate nationalities by restoring to the rightful owner that land which belonged to him before 1910.'³ He said that South Africa's attitude to homeland leaders' land claims would lead it to the same fate as the Portuguese had suffered in Mozambique and Angola, and called on South Africa to rethink Umtata's land claims or face the consequences.

The disrupted territory was at the time subject to the scrutiny of the Steyn Commission, set up to establish the advisability of incorporating East Griqualand into Natal. East Griqualand had been annexed by the Cape in 1874, when Sir Henry Barclay was governor. Ever since, the territory had been the subject of disputes between the Cape and Natal Provincial Administrations, and between Pretoria and Umtata. Natal, despite maintaining the infrastructure of the area, could not get the Cape Provincial Administration to cede its authority. In 1976 — after Transkei's independence has physically separated East Griqualand from the Cape Province — the Administrator of the Cape, Dr L.A.P.A. Munnik, agreed to meet a deputation from East Griqualand to examine their proposals.⁴ After the meeting, Dr Munnik and the Natal Administrator, Mr Ben Havemann, called on the government to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry: the Steyn Commission.

Munnik and Havemann met again in May, 1977⁵ and, on the commission's recommendation, agreed that East Griqualand be incorporated into Natal as from April 1978. This decision understandably angered Kaiser Matanzima and his cabinet. The Steyn Commission at no stage took evidence from Transkei concerning its long-standing claim to the territory.

Matanzima's claim to East Griqualand dated back to the days when he was negotiating with Pretoria for independence. In

1968 the Transkei National Independence Party gave South Africa's refusal to accede to Transkei's claims on disputed territories as one of its reasons for rejecting immediate independence. When, four years later, Matanzima tabled his 1972 motion asking South Africa for the independence of Transkei, he made the 'handover of the disputed territory a condition of independence'⁶ — an act of brinkmanship intended to force South Africa into backing down rather than see the failure of its bantustan strategy.

One of Matanzima's dreams was to lead a new nation to independence — in effect a restored 'Greater Xhosaland' including Ciskei, the 'white corridor' between Ciskei and Transkei, and East Griqualand. But by the time he formally announced Transkei's acceptance of independence in 1974, he had backed down on his 'non-negotiable' demands for the inclusion of these lands in an independent Transkei, although he maintained that independence could be used as a lever to force South Africa into giving up the land he wanted.

Prime Minister Vorster had told Parliament in 1972 that the National Party stood behind the 1936 Land Act, and that threats by homelands not to accept independence would not force his government's hand. He was able to exact from Matanzima what was clearly an about-face.⁷ Laurence⁸ traces the influence of Vorster's implacability. When Matanzima stated in October 1973 that 'we have reached a stalemate on the Land question,' — 'but I don't think five years will elapse before the Transkei is independent,' he could not have said so 'unless he was prepared to accept independence without the disputed territory.'⁹ Thus when the Transkei National Independence Party finally led the Transkei into a Pretoria-style independence in October 1976, East Griqualand was excluded from the independent area.

In March 1978, before the Steyn Commission had released its recommendations on the future of East Griqualand, Matanzima told the opening congress of the TNIP that unless South Africa settled the land question with Transkei, and began treating Transkeians in South Africa fairly, 'race relations will deteriorate and a struggle for power will escalate.'¹⁰ He added an oblique threat: 'It should be clear that as a consequence of our struggle for land South Africa may impose economic sanctions against us. Let them act as it pleases them. We cannot buy our independence as a sovereign state cheaply. We have built the economy of the white

man. They are rich and prosperous because of the black slave labour.'¹¹

Several days later the Kaiser-backed leader of the opposition, Mr Cromwell Diko, called on the Transkei government to break away from South Africa if it really wanted international recognition.¹²

Diko quoted Matanzima as saying he would declare war on South Africa if it refused to recognize Transkei's claim to East Griqualand, and added: 'We must declare war on the oppressor who robs us of our land.' He had paved the way for the final break in relations, to be announced several days later by Matanzima.

When, on April 10 1978, Matanzima told the Transkei National Assembly of his government's decision to sever diplomatic ties with South Africa, he must have believed that this move would shock South Africa into acceding to his territorial demands. He did not foresee that when relations were finally normalized, it would be because of Umtata's worsening financial position and absolute dependency on South Africa — and not because South Africa had finally relented and given East Griqualand to him.

Announcing the decision, Matanzima said that the Act passed by the South African Parliament on April 1 ceding East Griqualand to Natal and not to Transkei, was 'contemptuous and brutal.'¹³

'To us it is a declaration of war against Transkei,' he said. With an eye on South Africa's military might, Matanzima said Transkei would 'abide its time before taking up arms to recover the land that has been cynically raped from it.' (This was his favourite catch-phrase to describe the disputed land).

He maintained that East Griqualand belonged to Transkei because the British colonial government had declared it 'as part of Kaffraria proper, belonging to the aborigines of Transkei. This is the most cruel act of a government that has no regard for humanity . . . a people who have callously slaughtered and butchered millions of innocent blacks in the enforcement of their obnoxious apartheid laws.'¹⁴

He stated that his government would train the Transkei army for future military confrontation with the whites of South Africa. This was political rhetoric designed to impress the U.N. He had previously acknowledged the invincibility of the South African Defence Force if challenged by the Transkei army.

Using the break in relations to demonstrate Transkei's claim to

independence, Matanzima then called on Great Britain 'to render all the necessary assistance to us, their former colony and subjects.' He said it was inevitable that South Africa — 'these cruel people' (from whom he had accepted a bantustan independence only two years earlier, knowing full well that they would not cede East Griqualand to the Transkei under any circumstances) — would do everything possible to ostracize the Transkei and apply economic sanctions against it. He appealed to the western nations to come to the Transkei's assistance, and to his 'brethren' in South Africa to continue their fight for human rights now that Transkei had decided to sever relations with South Africa.

The day after the break in relations was announced, the East London *Daily Dispatch* published a feature dealing with serious splits in the TNIP — including the defection of 16 members to the opposition — which led newspapers to speculate that the diplomatic break was being used by Matanzima to restore shattered party unity and entrench the power of his dominant clique.¹⁵

Many of the 16 MP's who had defected from the TNIP were representatives from the Eastern Pondoland region: to them the issue of East Griqualand was of particular importance. Thus Matanzima's announcement of the break with South Africa solicited hearty cheers from these members when he said it was based on the East Griqualand issue. The whole opposition lent him its unqualified support in the decision to sever ties, despite the defections and concurrent animosity directed at the TNIP. The enigmatic Diko followed Kaiser out of the Assembly, shaking his hand and saying: 'This is what I have always wanted.'

Did Matanzima break with South Africa because he feared that the disputed land would be given to Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Kwazulu homeland? The *Cape Times*: 'It is understood that (Matanzima) has accused South Africa of transferring East Griqualand to Natal to hand it to Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of Kwazulu.'¹⁶ More speculation arose on this ground.

When all the factors have been considered one can point to four main causes for the break in diplomatic relations. The East Griqualand dispute is clearly the first of these. Matanzima hoped that by taking such drastic action he would force South Africa into backing down on its strict adherence to the 1936 Land Act. His political shrewdness enabled him to see that Transkei was too important to South Africa as the central cog in the bantustan machine for Pretoria to retaliate through the use of economic or

military pressure.

In fact, on the same day as Kaiser announced his decision in Umtata, the Transkeian secretary for Foreign affairs, Mr S M Qaba said in an interview that he did not see any 'dramatic changes' in any trade or commercial arrangements between South Africa and Transkei.¹⁷ 'Everything will simply carry on as usual; this only affects diplomatic relations.'

Although land was the main cause of the split — Matanzima remarked that were South Africa to hand East Griqualand over it 'would change everything' — the other three issues were of considerable importance nevertheless.

Accustomed to an almost unanimous, intertribal backing in the National Assembly, Matanzima could ill-afford to lose the support of the breakaway Eastern Pondoland group which had helped him into power earlier in his political career. The breakaway had been sparked off earlier in 1978 when Matanzima axed one of his more efficient Cabinet Ministers, Ms Stella Sigcau, because she had been made pregnant by the Sotho leader Chief Jeremiah Moshesh.

The militancy of the Eastern Pondos had been displayed in 1960 during their year-long guerilla revolt against South Africa, which was eventually crushed by the South African army and police. Armed resistance in this powerful region would have posed the most fundamental threat Matanzima had ever faced. He displayed shrewd political understanding in using the East Griqualand issue to bring the Eastern Pondos back into his somewhat overgrazed fold.

The third issue at stake was Matanzima's credibility. He thought he could use the diplomatic break to bolster the legitimacy of the Transkei's independence in the eyes of a world that had unanimously declared the region the 'bastard child' of apartheid. However, his credibility diplomacy was as ludicrous and bizarre at this time as at any other since 1976. The prospect of an unrecognized state which was economically and militarily subordinate to South Africa, declaring war on its 'parent', verged on the absurd. His threat of 'armed struggle against South Africa' only made him the laughing stock of the world community. Although he claimed in an interview that he did not expect the severing of ties to enhance his chances of international recognition, he nevertheless announced that Transkei would apply to the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity for membership. 'In fact, gentlemen, my seat is waiting for me at the

U.N.¹⁸ He would not enlist the military aid of the ANC and PAC. 'If they want to work with us, they must join us. We are independent, I lead over two million people: who do they lead? Just a few boys from Johannesburg who go to be trained up in the north and come back to be butchered at the borders by the South African forces?'

Using every other lever he could think of to push the South Africans into backing down, he and his ministers made thinly-veiled threats to approach Cuba and the Eastern Bloc countries for aid.

The fourth issue was compulsory Transkei citizenship — an aspect of South Africa's grand design which applied to all Xhosa-speaking Africans with roots inside the Transkei's territorial borders — the way these 'citizens' were treated inside South Africa by the South African Authorities.

It is possible that at the time of independence in 1976, Matanzima sincerely expected the lot of Transkeian Africans inside South Africa to improve — but now, some two years later, he could no longer harbour such illusions. By 1978 Africans in the urban areas who had been forced into becoming Transkei citizens were being harassed, arrested, resettled and bulldozed out of their homes at a rate unprecedented in the decade.

If his decision to sever ties was partly motivated by a desire to ease the lot of the urban Transkeians by publicly accusing South Africa of 'callously slaughtering and butchering millions of innocent blacks,' he need not have taken the trouble. He had burned his bridges with this section of 'his people' by accepting the conditions of independence imposed by South Africa in 1976. For the estimated 1,5 million Africans of Transkei origin inside South Africa¹⁹ in October 1976, independence had meant the forced removal of their right to South African citizenship. It had assisted the sophistication of bureaucratic control: more than ever they were a captive labour force, manipulated in the interests of white industry, agriculture, manufacturing and mining.

Knowing that resistance to the citizenship clause of the Transkei Constitution Act was an inevitability, the South African government announced various 'concessions' to Xhosas of Transkeian lineage who voluntarily applied for Transkeian citizenship. These included, inter alia, that 'citizens' of the Transkei would be allowed to remain in any urban area where they were legally present, would require no additional documentation,

would remain in possession of their reference books and could even change their work without having first to return to the Transkei.²⁰

In addition Transkei citizens would, after independence, enjoy freedom of movement within the Administration Board areas where they lived, and would receive preferential treatment in matters pertaining to employment, home ownership, hospitalization, trading licences and the rights of professional persons to practise in urban townships.²¹

That these so-called concessions made no impact on urban Africans in terms of lending credibility to Transkeian independence is evidenced by the fact that the South African government had eventually to resort to coercive measures in order to 'persuade' them to accept citizenship, and that on the night of the independence celebrations in Umtata on October 26 1976, the largely Xhosa-speaking youth of the Cape mounted the heaviest offensive thus far in the rioting that began there in August.²²

The *Daily Dispatch*, in a small 'stop press' item on the same front page as the news of the independence celebrations in Umtata reported that 'Transkei independence was greeted in Cape townships last night with a series of violent outbreaks — worst in the Peninsula for more than a month. Police opened fire on mob marching on Guguletu police station. Police confirmed 'several hundred' in crowd. Wounded taken to hospital . . . Incidents of stoning in Guguletu and Nyanga through the night. Situation described as "very tense".'

When Kaiser's brother, George Matanzima, visited Cape Town some time later to lead that city's Transkeians in their 'independence celebration,' he was greeted by a crowd of about 60 people, most of them security officials and members of the South African police.

Even for members of Kaiser's own cabinet, Transkeian citizenship had proved more of a hindrance than a help in their efforts to gain international recognition. In 1977 Mr Ramsay Madikizela, then Minister of Planning and Commerce in the Umtata government travelled to Europe — but not on a Transkeian passport.²³ It is probable that they used South African passports, although this was never officially admitted.

Mr Harry Schwarz, Progressive Reform Party MP in the South African parliament, was attacked by Premier Vorster in April 1977 for asking what passports the two Transkei officials had travelled

on. 'Questions of this nature serve no useful purpose and can only trouble the good relations which exist,' Vorster told Schwarz.

The plight of those who had Transkeian citizenship forced on them was graphically illustrated by a report in the *Argus* of June 27 1977:

'Bureaucracy has left a former Guguletu resident bewildered. First he was sent to Transkei, then back to Guguletu, and now he is in Transkei again. Mr Christopher Mtbele, formerly of NY 108, was told to leave the peninsula.

' "I was given a 'Section 10' to get out and told to go to Transkei. There, at Mount Frere, the magistrate said I could not get a permit and I must return to Cape Town where I was born," he said.

'Back in Cape Town he was unable to find employment and his mother had to pay the fine each time he was arrested under the influx control laws.'

Many other 'new Transkeians' have been told by their employers 'to go back to Kaiser' if they do not like exploitative conditions of work.

When the independence agreements were being signed between Pretoria and Umtata prior to October 1976, both Kaiser and George Matanzima steadfastly maintained that they did not accept the provisions forcing urban people to become the citizens of the Transkei. But when the Transkei Constitution Act was passed in Umtata on October 26, it contained the clause enforcing citizenship on every person born after independence to a Transkei citizen (defined as any persons born or legally domiciled in the Transkei, together with 'those living outside the territory who spoke any dialect of Cape Nguni and owed no allegiance to any other homeland.') Kaiser Matanzima had backed down in the face of the overwhelming lure of independence.

THE RESULTS OF THE BREAK

Matanzima's decision to break diplomatic ties on April 10 1978 drew comment on the following day from the South African Prime Minister, B J Vorster. Speaking in the Cape Town parliament, Vorster said South Africa would not, under any circumstances, back down in the face of the Transkei's claim to East Griqualand. But South Africa would not resort to using the 'big stick' in order to teach the Transkei a lesson.²⁴ All pre-

independence agreements with the Transkei would be met, although the South African Ambassador in Umtata would be told to comply with Matanzima's instructions to leave Transkei by April 30.

Vorster then said that although he regretted the Transkei's decision, 'Transkei was a completely independent country which had the right to take whatever decisions it saw fit.'²⁵ In this regard Mr Vorster released an interesting snippet of information in his reply to Chief Matanzima. He said that on the eve of independence he had even joked with Chief Matanzima 'that Transkei's only hope of recognition would be to declare war on South Africa.'

Did this mean that South Africa had engineered the break in an attempt to achieve international recognition for the Transkei? This question is difficult to answer, as no information supporting it has yet come to light. Certainly, some observers at the time thought it a feasible explanation. But even if South Africa had suggested the break to Matanzima as a diplomatic finesse, the Prime Minister of Transkei overstepped the mark in Vorster's eyes by declaring that South Africa had 'callously slaughtered millions of blacks.' Vorster accused his Transkeian counterpart of 'lying' by using this statement, and he warned Matanzima that interference in South Africa's internal affairs could lead to real trouble. He said that the reasons behind Matanzima's decision could be the Pondo breakaway and Transkei's lack of international recognition, but the 'lie' about South Africa slaughtering innocent blacks was one that 'not even Cuba would believe.'

Although Vorster clashed sharply with the leader of the opposition, Mr Colin Eglin — who took the incident to be an indication that the National Party's apartheid policy had come to the end of the road — his response to the whole incident was restrained and he did not threaten the Transkei with any form of retaliation.

This was probably because he knew that, because Transkei relied on South Africa for about 80% of its revenue, Matanzima's talk of taking up the armed struggle against South Africa was no more than childish political bluster. Matanzima had indicated that should South Africa impose economic sanctions and cut off its cash grant to his government this would be countered by aid from the communist bloc. But he knew as well as anyone else that no country in the world would be willing to prop up 'apartheid's illegitimate child'. For South Africa, Matanzima's decision could

have only positive results: if greater international credibility accrued to the Matanzima regime there would be a spin-off for the apartheid policy. The move also enabled South Africa to demonstrate to Matanzima who his masters really were.

Matanzima had said that Britain was under an historical obligation to come to the Transkei's aid. But the day after his speech a British Foreign Office spokesman said: 'We do not accept any special obligation towards the Transkei based on past history.'²⁶ The spokesman added that 'since the Transkei does not satisfy our criteria, we do not recognize it as an independent state,' and the diplomatic break had not changed this. Most reports in the British press echoed these sentiments, but imputed motives to Matanzima's decision other than the East Griqualand issue.

Among these were Matanzima's desperation to achieve international recognition and his desire to heal the split with the Eastern Ponds.

The reaction was similar world-wide. Organization of African Unity members in the UN General Assembly were 'disdainful and unsympathetic.'²⁷ One OAU member said: 'We deal with South Africa as a whole, we do not recognize homelands. You can draw your own conclusions.'²⁸ Another added: 'The Transkei cannot survive without South Africa. So did Matanzima agree with Vorster to sever diplomatic relations?'

The South African opposition press reacted in much the same fashion. In an editorial on April 11 the *Rand Daily Mail* said: 'Chief Matanzima's action is, of course, bizarre. How can a country break off diplomatic relations with the only other state in the world which recognizes it? And on which it is dependent for its national budget?' The *Mail* said the decision looked, for the most part, like a 'diplomatic demo' on Matanzima's part after he had been driven to the 'limits of frustration by his inability to negotiate what he considers a fair land apportionment with South Africa, and he probably hopes this will shock Pretoria into being more amenable to his claim . . . meanwhile, one can only wonder — if the Nationalist Government can't get on decently even with those quiescent blacks who accept its policy, what hope can there be of its ever reaching a rapprochement with Africa as a whole?'

The *Argus* pointed out that Transkei was 'in no position to cross economic swords with its parent' — obvious enough, but also prophetic.

On April 13, Transkei's then Minister of Finance, Mr Tsepo Letlaka, gave new reasons for his government's decision to break diplomatic ties with South Africa. These were the treatment of Transkeians in South Africa and the South African government's 'refusal to negotiate' with South African blacks for majority rule.²⁹

These 'new reasons' met with the same international reaction. A revealing insight into how the National Party viewed the issue came in an interview with the former Commissioner General in the Transkei, Mr Hans Abraham, in the *Argus* of April 13. He said Matanzima was a 'horse trader' trying to force South Africa's hand, and predicted that he would come 'crawling back' to South Africa if Pretoria cut off the R113,5 million aid it had budgeted for the Transkei that year. 'I call him downright ungrateful and boundlessly ambitious. He still wants to become President of South Africa.'

Which raises the question of Matanzima's long-term strategy. Stanley Uys³⁰ commented at the time that international observers were waiting to see whether in fact he had a follow-through strategy or whether the diplomatic break was only another impulsive action; Press reports had speculated that Matanzima's adviser at the time, one-time British Labour Party MP Mr Humphrey Berkeley, had suggested the move to Kaiser as part of a militant stance towards South Africa which might lead to increased international support and force concessions.

When, by May 10 1978, South Africa had not yet backed down over the East Griqualand issue Matanzima realised that his new hardline approach would not bring quick results, and announced to the Transkei National Assembly that his government had decided to cancel the defence pact it had entered into with South Africa at the time of independence some two years previously.

He gave as the main reason for renouncing the pact the fact that South Africa had refused to continue training Transkeian soldiers until diplomatic relations had been normalized.³¹ But although this new move sounded warlike enough it had little real meaning: South African military aircraft could not enter Transkeian air space and South African naval vessels could not enter Transkei's territorial waters, but there was no prohibition on passenger or goods traffic. Territorial infringements by the South African airforce and navy would in any case go unnoticed, since Transkei

had no monitoring capacity — let alone the ability to counter such intentions. It was, again, a farce on every level. Even opposition spokesmen in Umtata — who had expressed their fullest support for the break in diplomatic ties several days earlier — overcame their fear of being labelled traitors by Matanzima and said the latest step made the Transkei look 'ludicrous in the eyes of the world'. The leader of the opposition, Mr Sizakele Mda, said: 'This is a matter of life and death. It is the last step toward a declaration of outright war. Transkei depends on South Africa for her existence. What do we do if South Africa cuts off our fuel?' He asked what would happen if South African Air Force planes were provocatively flown over Umtata in deliberate flouting of Matanzima's cancellation of the defence pact. 'We could only go out and call them names.'

Mda said the Transkeian army consisted of only 200 men. 'We are making ourselves look very foolish to the outside world, which knows we are militarily useless.' But Foreign Affairs Minister Koyana countered this by saying the pact was meaningless in the first place, and contradicted his Prime Minister, who had only a month earlier announced his intention of waging guerilla war against South Africa, by saying: 'Neither side is going to attack the other, so what is the point of keeping the pact?'³²

In July 1978 Koyana returned from a trip to Europe and announced on his arrival in Umtata that the Transkei's initiative was taking the territory tangibly close to its goal of international recognition. When Koyana resigned in 1980 he was no closer to that goal.

A claim made in April 1978 that the Transkei had managed to raise an international loan of R167 million to offset its dependency on South Africa was discounted by South African bankers who said that if South Africa, with a GNP of R33 000 million, would find it difficult to raise such a loan on the international market it was highly unlikely that Transkei with a GNP of only some R250 million would be able to secure such an amount.³³

By April 27 1978 the whole farce was finally exposed when Koyana and his South African counterpart, Pik Botha, announced after a meeting in the VIP lounge at East London's Ben Schoeman airport that Umtata and Pretoria were to exchange trade officials to 'look after the interests of each other's nationals.'³⁴ The diplomatic functions of these officials finally gave the lie to the supposedly irrevocable split.

Transkei remained as dependent as ever on South Africa. It could no more afford to sever all ties — especially economic and infrastructural ones — than South Africa could afford to see the Transkei wreck its master-plan. Emphasizing this at exactly the same time was Umtata's emergency request to South Africa — despite the breaking of the defence pact — to supply military helicopters and personnel to help in the rescue of hundreds of people trapped in remote rural areas by serious floods. And just to emphasize to Umtata that its role in relationship to South Africa remained a subservient one, Pretoria let hundreds of Transkeian passport applicants stew for a few days in Tembisa in the Transvaal after the Transkeian officials had returned to Umtata. When the Johannesburg *Sunday Post* approached the then Department of Plural Relations over the fate of the Transkeians, an official said: 'We have not decided yet.'

The situation between Umtata and Pretoria remained more or less constant in the year following the break. But in February 1979 Matanzima visited Cape Town for talks with the new South African Premier, P W Botha. The timing of the talks led observers to believe that Matanzima was making advances. It was time once again to request South Africa's financial help in propping up his country's 1979/1980 budget.

The Nationalist newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, editorialized at the time that Matanzima's visit had to be viewed with 'cynicism'.³⁵ 'It has not gone unnoticed that last year in April, after the South African subsidy to his budget was already an accomplished fact, he broke off diplomatic ties. This year's advances took place on the eve of the budget in which provision will be made for 1979's subsidy. From the bottom of our hearts, we hope that our cynicism is mistaken. We hope that the Transkeian Prime Minister and his government's actions arise out of a recognition of the interdependence of Southern Africa.'

They did indeed. Matanzima needed the money. He took with him to Cape Town what in the Transkei government's terms was the most powerful delegation he could muster, consisting of Deputy Prime Minister George Matanzima, Minister of Finance Tsepo Letlaka, another cabinet minister, George Ndabankulu, several other top government aides and the head of the Security Police, Col Martin Ngceba. The talks, at which Matanzima once again produced his 1894 map to prove his claim to East Griqualand, were described afterwards by both parties as 'cordial', but

the land issue was not resolved and Transkei did not re-establish its diplomatic links. But it did secure 73% of its 1979 budget from the South African treasury.

And on most other levels co-operation between South Africa and the Transkei continued unabated, although Matanzima declared that there was still no chance of his government restoring diplomatic relations.

'Student constables still receive their training in the Republic of South Africa and 72 such students underwent a course of training in Hammanskraal,' Chief George Ndabankulu, Minister of Police in the Matanzima cabinet, told the Transkei Legislative Assembly in 1979.³⁶

South African officials seconded to various departments in the Umtata government continued to operate and advise on the maintenance and development of the Transkeian infrastructure, although several had expressed fears for their safety during the tense period surrounding the initial break in diplomatic relations.

The Transkei Development Corporation, almost totally controlled by South Africans seconded to it from Pretoria, did not lose any staff members and continued to remain instrumental in what development was taking place in the Transkeian commercial, industrial and agricultural sectors.

And the South African 'Trade Representative' in Umtata, Mr Len Brand, remained in the South African embassy on a hill overlooking Umtata — ostensibly to look after the interests of South Africans working in the Transkei. But his function was largely of a diplomatic nature, and he was the first link between the Matanzima brothers and Pretoria. So at every level but the ambassadorial, relations between the two governments continued as ever — for the situation to have been otherwise was unthinkable to both capitals. Under these conditions it would indeed have been surprising if South Africa had done an about-face and acceded to Matanzima's original demands. For the 'pressures' used by Kaiser to try and force South Africa's hand were obviously not pressures at all, but the political posturing of apartheid's spoilt child.

1980: THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PRETORIA AND UMTATA

Why did Matanzima's brother, George, finally decide to reopen

diplomatic ties with Pretoria in April 1980? Had any of his brother's demands been met? If not, what pressure, if any, was applied on the Umtata government to back down from its 'hardline' stand?

When Vorster was forced to resign as South African Prime Minister over the Information Department scandal, Umtata hoped that it might persuade his successor, P W Botha, that its claim to East Griqualand was valid, and began lobbying him. On February 13 1979 Kaiser Matanzima and his top-level delegation flew to Cape Town for talks with P W Botha and the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha. On their return to Umtata, George Matanzima, the new Prime Minister, told the House of Assembly that the purpose of the visit had been to discuss 'the restoration and return of our land which is still being held by South Africa.'³⁷ He said the South African participants in the talks had 'registered shock' when confronted with documentation backing Umtata's claims, and added that his government would not give in on the land question.

In April that year, P W Botha said in Cape Town that despite the continuing diplomatic break, the South African government could talk to Umtata whenever it wished to do so. This was because the Transkei had thrown out the people behind the break — an obvious reference to former TDC Managing Director, Jimmy Skinner, who had been deported, and to Humphrey Berkeley who had recently been abducted from an Umtata hotel by members of the Transkeian security police, beaten up and dumped on the South African side of the Transkei border.³⁸ Botha's inference was clear — these two men — both foreign to Southern Africa — had misled the Umtata government by advising it to break off relations. Botha was giving the Matanzima brothers an excuse to back down on their stand and restore relations.

Four months later 'official sources' were quoted as saying that Umtata was on the verge of re-establishing links, and that the relationship between South Africa and the Transkei was growing warmer.³⁹ The appointment of a new trade adviser in Umtata by the South African government to replace Mr Brand was cited as an indication of this. The new man was a senior diplomat and former South African ambassador in South America, Dr Robert du Plooy.

Du Plooy, who played a central role in drawing up the Transkei's independence constitution, was 'highly thought of' in top government circles in Umtata. The *Argus*, August 29 reported:

'He is particularly well-liked by President Kaiser Matanzima, who is still the most powerful man in Transkei, despite the takeover of the premiership earlier this year by his brother.'

Earlier the same week, Matanzima addressed a South African-hosted special luncheon for Transkeian cabinet ministers in Umtata. He publicly lauded P W Botha's call for the establishment of a Southern African constellation of states, saying that he would be keen to join such a federation. It was the first sign that Botha's manipulation of South Africa's economic pull on the 'independent homelands' was working in favour of his constellation.

The press⁴⁰ quoted sources close to the leadership of the Transkei government as saying that a 'face-saving compromise' on the land issue had been reached between South Africa and the Matanzimas.

On October 11 1979 Kaiser Matanzima, addressing Tswanas in Bophutatswana, said he was looking forward to the restoration of ties with South Africa. Taking a somewhat softer line than his 1978 threat to prepare Transkei for 'armed struggle' against South Africa, he said it was only a misunderstanding between Umtata and Pretoria that had led to the break in ties the year before. He spoke enthusiastically about the 'constellation' plan, saying it would solve, among other things, economic recession, unemployment, labour difficulties caused by influx control regulations and racial discrimination.

Then in November, the Transkei government-appointed Land Commission met in East London with the South African Van Der Walt Commission on Homeland consolidation, and put their claims to East Griqualand to the South Africans yet again.

In February 1980 the Van Der Walt commission released its recommendations, and the South African parliament was later to pass the Borders of Particular States Extension Act on the basis of these recommendations.

The Act finally ceded Transkei more than a hundred farms in the Mount Currie, Maclear, Elliot, Indwe and Queenstown districts in Matanzima's western and north-western borders. These tracts of land thus became 'the face-saving compromise'. The Borders of Particular States Extension Act did not cede one inch of East Griqualand to Transkei.

Although this was a clear defeat for the Matanzima brothers, Chief George Matanzima nevertheless argued that the bill was evidence of South Africa's desire to negotiate with Transkei,

which would in turn begin the process of reopening diplomatic ties with South Africa and resuscitating the Defence Pact.⁴¹

This startling revelation came only a few days before the Foreign Ministers of Venda, Bophutatswana and Transkei were due to meet with their South African counterpart, Pik Botha, in Port St Johns for discussions on the proposed constellation of States and other matters affecting the homelands.

Amid growing indications that the constellation plan was fast taking shape in Pretoria and that Transkei would fit into the plan with little hesitation, relations between Umtata and Pretoria began to warm rapidly.

At the same time, Pretoria had given Transkei 79,4% of its 1980 budget and had averted a financial crisis by loaning the Transkei R70 million to pay the salaries of civil servants.⁴²

The Transkei government had hoped that the break in relations with South Africa in 1978 would help it raise loans on the international money markets — but the hope had proved a vain one. The South African press had speculated earlier that 'since financial and diplomatic issues seem to be connected, financial help from Pretoria in the present situation seems to herald the restoration of diplomatic ties.'⁴³ On March 20 1980 Pretoria and Umtata, in simultaneous announcements, disclosed that diplomatic ties had been restored and the non-aggression pact formally resuscitated.

Yet the Borders of Particular States Extension Bill ceded no part of East Griqualand to Transkei — other than certain farms which had been provided for in the pre-independence agreements of 1975. Kaiser and George Matanzima had, therefore, backed down on their stand when breaking diplomatic ties in April 1978. They had said then that these ties would under no circumstances be restored until South Africa had given the territory 'back to the people of Transkei.' Clearly sensitive about this, George Matanzima defended Transkei's dependence on Pretoria in the House of Assembly a week later.

What a change from the war talk two years earlier! He said: 'Does it matter that I went to Pretoria cap in hand, or even pants off as long as I brought back the money to fill your ungrateful bellies?'

He said Transkei had been financially dependent on Pretoria for years and his government made no apology for this state of affairs. 'Was I wrong to go to Pretoria for these monies which come from the sweat and blood of Transkeians?'⁴⁴

The *Sunday Tribune*, March 23 1980, suggested that diplomatic ties were restored because South Africa had again given Transkei a 'mammoth' financial grant; because the TNIP was unsure of its level of grassroots support; and because the Van der Walt Commission had agreed to give at least some land to Transkei.

It is clear that the transfer of land on Transkei's eastern borders to Umtata enabled the Matanzimas to save face over having had to agree to the restoration of ties, but it is equally clear that the issue represented a defeat for them at the hands of the South Africans.

Thus South Africa, by using Transkei's financial, infrastructural and employment dependence on Pretoria, and by dangling the economic carrot of a constellation of states in front of Umtata's nose, was finally able to force the Matanzima cabinet into restoring diplomatic ties. The fact that the Borders of Particular States Extension Bill had not yet been passed in Cape Town enabled the Matanzimas to claim that negotiations were still in progress over the East Griqualand dispute — with the implication that they had not backed down totally on their original militant standpoint.

The announcement of the resumption of diplomatic ties came the day after talks between P.W. Botha and Matanzima, in which the issues of South African financial assistance and, possibly, the land question, were discussed.

The economic persuasion used by South Africa to bring Transkei back into the fold centred on the lure of the constellation of states — stellar status might conceivably aid Umtata's somewhat confused efforts to build an economy of its own — and Umtata's annual dependence on massive grants from South Africa.

Thanking Pretoria for the annual grants in the House of Assembly on May 7 1980, Finance Minister Ramsay Madikizela admitted it could be said 'without fear of contradiction, that for some time to come, budgetary self-sufficiency will not be reached' by Umtata — a statement characteristic of many made by Transkei government officials openly acknowledging dependence on Pretoria.⁴⁵

These ready admissions make it clear that independence, in the true sense of the word, has never been envisaged by the architects of Transkei. It is clear from such statements, and from abundant evidence in other sections of this book, that in the Matanzimas and their fellow-travellers South Africa had found a set of men — imposed on the people of Transkei by various methods as so-called leaders — who would do Pretoria's bidding at every turn in return for material assistance.

Although these willing puppets had agreed to sell their countrymen's birthright as South African citizens and actively to participate in their severe economic exploitation on the migrant labour market; although they were functionaries in Pretoria's plan to keep the bantustans, and Transkei in particular, in a state of perpetual underdevelopment as a mechanism for the supply and control of cheap unskilled labour — despite these fetters, they did kick back sometimes, and the diplomatic break of April 1978 is the clearest evidence of this.

Yet even in this, his most open challenge to his economic masters, Matanzima had finally to concede his impotence. That he was able to use such vitriolic anti-Pretoria rhetoric at the time of the break is indicative only of the fact that South Africa could afford to tolerate outbursts of temper, knowing full well that at the crack of the financial whip he would 'come crawling back to Pretoria on his belly,' in the words of Hans Abraham.

After the smart of the whip, there was soothing balm: it is now necessary to take a closer look at ringmaster P W Botha's proposed constellation of states, particularly since Transkei has signed a public declaration with South Africa, Bophutatswana and Venda committing itself to becoming one of the satellite members of the constellation.

TRANSKEI AND THE CONSTELLATION OF STATES

At worst, Matanzima's decision to break ties with South Africa in 1978 was a minor irritation to the South African government. The event did not, as some South African newspapers editorialized at the time, represent the death-knell of the bantustan strategy devised by Hendrik Verwoerd on the basis of the segregationist legislation passed by earlier parliaments since the time of Union.

Verwoerd took all the scrappy regulations and laws he inherited upon becoming Minister of Native Affairs, and transformed them into one of the most brutally systematic methods of labour control ever devised. Under him, the homeland policy began to take on an economic consistency serving the interests of the developing South African capitalist economy.

Sections of the press and some commentators described Matanzima's hardline break with South Africa in 1978 as 'the end of the Verwoerdian dream.' They could not have been more wrong.

In 1976, while piloting the Status of Transkei Bill through the South African Parliament, the then Minister of Bantu Affairs, M C Botha, said that 'an organizatory framework, already named a constellation, a common market . . .,' was in the process of being designed for what he termed South Africa's 'multinational dispensation'.⁴⁶

He added: 'Such directional guidance in regard to further patterns of development was already given more than two decades ago by the then Prime Minister (H F Verwoerd), when he declared that the various autonomous Bantu national units, should they demonstrate the potential in due course to develop to this level, would eventually be able to form a commonwealth with white South Africa.'

While Matanzima's 1978 tantrum may have proved something of a diversion, this fundamental goal of apartheid — an eventual constellation of politically but economically dependent black states grouped around the all-powerful white heartland, servicing its economy — was still being worked on in Pretoria by various government departments.

After P W Botha had succeeded Vorster as Prime Minister, he began to put this programme into operation. Of course, his idea of the constellation of states was somewhat more detailed — and modified — than the vague plans spelt out by his predecessors over the years. It had to be. The nature of the South African economy was undergoing changes that had far-reaching implications for the white motherland. As South African industry, mining and manufacturing, displaying ever-increasing monopolistic trends, began taking on a more capital-than labour-intensive face, more and more unskilled labour was being made redundant. This was leading to serious unemployment problems in the urban areas.

While industry, mining and manufacturing began demanding a more settled, skilled, permanent work force in the urban areas, more and more people were coming onto the migrant labour market in the homelands — people crying out desperately for work to supplement the frugal existence they were able to scrape together from the eroded, overgrazed and barren lands in the homelands. When they could not get work legally these potential migrants had no option other than to enter the cities illegally to look for work — posing a very serious threat to the stability of South Africa's industrial heartland. And in the cities no work awaited them.

The state already had one mechanism for countering this threat — namely, the use of the repressive controls embodied in the Group Areas Act, the Urban Areas Act, the Influx Control legislation and all the facets of bureaucratic control.

These troublesome people could, therefore, simply be endorsed back to the homelands by the authorities — and they were, in their thousands. Acting on the recommendations of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions in 1979, the authorities even found it necessary to tighten up on these laws by making provision that any employer caught with 'illegal' black labour (those without urban rights) could be fined R500.

But this solution only displaced the point of conflict to the underdeveloped rural areas — the homelands. Infant mortality rates, malnutrition, starvation, impoverishment and unemployment tell the rest of the story. And where people live under conditions of such all-embracing poverty and unemployment, they are bound to resort to illegal methods of survival, and to vent their frustrations on the immediate symbols of the authority that has forced them down into this poverty.

These scapegoat symbols are the homeland leaders and their functionaries. A situation in which rural anger can no longer be contained by the apparatus of authority in the homelands is one which South Africa cannot afford. Of course the South African police and army could be called in if their Transkei counterparts were unable to cope with rural resistance. The defence pact between the Transkei and South Africa makes ample provision for this type of intervention should the need arise. But attempts could also be made to eliminate some of the root causes of the economic frustration of the people.

It is the latter option that P W Botha has tried to embrace in his updated version of the Constellation of Southern African States. And it is significant that the English-speaking owners of capital in South Africa — the erstwhile traditional and sometimes outspoken opponents of apartheid — have lent their full weight to Botha's conception of a constellation of states. They have even agreed to help plan and implement the proposed constellation.

Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the giant Anglo-American group and long-time backer of the opposition Progressive Federal Party, is perhaps the most significant of Pretoria's new partners in this, the final stage of the apartheid master plan.⁴⁷

The aim of the constellation plan is simple: it is designed to

develop the peripheral homeland economies to the point where they begin to alleviate the potentially destructive problems of unemployment and impoverishment in the rural reserves, and can accommodate some of the surplus labour from the industrial centres. The homelands would then be able to fulfil their function of maintaining the white heartland as the centre of wealth and high-technology capitalist development.

The 'first major step' toward the realization of this plan was taken on July 23 1980 when P W Botha met the Prime Ministers of the Transkei, Bophutatswana and Venda to formalize basic aspects of the constellation and to obtain a declaration from them committing these homelands to the strategy. These three Prime Ministers were hardly in a position to ignore the constellation, as has already been pointed out with reference to the Umtata government. A newspaper report immediately prior to the meeting between Botha, Matanzima, Mangope and Mphephu said that the meeting would 'provide the groundwork for the economic and financial union which it is hoped will be the forerunner of an eventual political confederation.'⁴⁸

Central to the first stage of the plan is the creation of a development bank in which both the independent and non-independent homelands will be represented. The *Sunday Times* reported that the bank was the basis of Botha's plan to 'redraw the South African economic map and provide the economic and financial wheels for the financial confederal structure.'⁴⁹

Before looking at the role that will be played by Transkei in the constellation, it is important to trace the development of Transkei government attitudes to this new economic plan over the four years since October 1976.

In May 1977, Transkei's ambassador to South Africa, Professor Mlahleni Njisane, said his government would be prepared to relinquish its 'full independence' if South Africa recognized racial equality within its borders. He said 'Transkei would be prepared, after a negotiated agreement, to enter into a new union or federation of states in which everyone would have equal rights in South Africa and each state would be self-governing.'⁵⁰ If a canton system was negotiated, Transkei would again become an integral part of South Africa.

Less than a month later, Professor Njisane told a reporter that if Transkei had known that South Africa was moving toward a canton-type system — as Plural Relations Minister Piet Koornhof

had postulated in a speech made at this time — it would not have opted for independence. Transkei would only be prepared to enter into such a system if racial equality was recognized throughout South Africa.⁵¹

Kaiser Matanzima also expressed his support for such a plan in May 1977. Speaking to a large crowd at the installation of a chief near Mount Frere, he said he would be prepared to move into a federal system with South Africa, but only if Umtata's 'sovereignty was little affected.'⁵²

He paid tribute to the British system of government and the monarchy, and said that Britain should be the 'model of the whole world.' Transkei had reason to congratulate the British people for being in line with the Transkei system of government.

Some four years earlier, however, Matanzima had advocated the adoption of a kind of 'United States of Southern Africa' modelled on the USA.⁵³ This idea, first mentioned in 1973, was repeatedly propagated by Kaiser and George Matanzima at that time. It was not, however, part of a consistent policy regarding the federal idea. Transkei's role in the broader South African power structure was a matter the two brothers treated with a certain expediency, guided by the alignments and realignments taking place on the subcontinent.

Thus, in 1972 Matanzima had returned from a tour of the USA to begin actively campaigning for African unity in South Africa — subordination of tribal interests in favour of a black alliance that predictably excluded the powerful exile movements — the ANC and PAC — and concentrated on the 'unity' of the homeland leaders.

This stand — diametrically opposed to the fervent backing of a single Xhosa nationalism for which he was better known — was motivated by two developments, according to Laurence.⁵⁴ The first was South Africa's refusal to back down on his land claims. By linking up with the other homeland leaders and 'adding his voice to theirs in the cry for more land he hoped they would succeed collectively where he and they had failed singly.'⁵⁵

The second development that prompted Matanzima's new position on black unity was the emergence of two new and relatively powerful homeland leaders — Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophutatswana and, especially, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu. Matanzima's relationship with Buthelezi was to prove a love/hate affair, with hate having the predominant say. Buthelezi was

deliberately using his platform as the leader of an apartheid-created institution 'to reflect African aspirations to an acclaim which had eluded his bids to speak out on behalf of his people.'⁵⁶ Matanzima was afraid that his position as the most experienced and widely-quoted homeland leader was being challenged by Buthelezi — and so, in Laurence's words, 'from the moment he stepped off the plane (from America) he made the running as an innovator for more than a year.'

He stated publicly⁵⁷ that he would work for a federation of South African homelands, and would be prepared to work under either Mangope or Buthelezi. He again spoke of his grand ideal — a united Xhosaland including the Ciskei, Transkei and the white corridor running through King William's Town, Queenstown and East London, but 'with one important difference from his previous statements on the matter — restoration of the Xhosa domain was not an end in itself but a prelude to an enlarged area of African paramountcy.'

He also mentioned the prospect of federating with KwaZulu and announced that he and Chief Buthelezi had agreed in principle to link the two homelands politically.

Matanzima, however, publicly dissociated himself from Verwoerd's plan for a commonwealth of nations when he said in 1973 that he supported a federal system in South Africa, 'with representation for independent states of Southern Africa,' which, he said, went beyond Verwoerd's concept of a commonwealth.⁵⁸

Despite this pursuit of links with other homeland leaders Matanzima never abandoned his goal of Pretoria-style independence for Transkei. His idea was that the homelands should squeeze as much land out of South Africa as they were able, become independent, and then 'link together to form the proposed black federation.'⁵⁹

His brother George spoke of a non-racial federal assembly for the whole of South Africa, with representation on a one-man-one-vote system.⁶⁰

But the South Africans did not like the notion of inter-tribal alliances propounded by homeland leaders, and Bantu Affairs Minister M C Botha warned the Matanzimas that their stand could jeopardize the right of homelands to independence.⁶¹ At a conference of homeland leaders held in Umtata in November 1973 it was resolved that federation was 'vital to the unity of the black people' and, in view of this, that the homeland leaders would press

the South African government for further consolidation of the bantustans. The homeland leaders also resolved to act together in negotiations with the Nationalist government, and this decision led to a meeting between all the homeland leaders and the South African Prime Minister, Vorster, in March 1974. But in the face of Vorster's uncompromising stand over the 1936 Land Act, the united front collapsed and Matanzima opted for 'a go-it-alone policy.'⁶²

When Matanzima announced that 1976 had been set as 'independence year' for Transkei, Chief Buthelezi said he regretted that his 'Transkei brothers' had broken the agreements made at the Umtata conference.⁶³ When Mangope later announced that Bophutatswana had set 1977 as the year in which it would take the same road, the solidarity that had looked so promising at the Umtata conference had been completely smashed and Pretoria was once again in its favourite position of being able to deal with the homeland leaders one by one.

We have seen how Transkei's deteriorating financial situation after independence enabled Pretoria to force Matanzima into backing down over the land issue and the concomitant break in diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Umtata's financial dependence on South Africa certainly contributed to its support for the constellation of states plan as propounded by P W Botha, and the speeches made by the brothers Matanzima after Botha's ascendancy to the South African premiership often included favourable reference to the plan. Another factor which may have motivated Umtata to opt for participation in the constellation plan was that it offered an opportunity to the Transkei of once again occupying a leading role (among the bantustans) in negotiation with South Africa.

In August 1979, speaking at Engcobo, Kaiser Matanzima said the future of his country 'bristled with difficulties because of the refusal of the United Nations to recognise Transkeian independence.'⁶⁴ Transkei would, however, have no trouble in attaining 'the highest standards' should the countries (read homelands) of Southern Africa opt for the constellation plan and decide to co-operate in the economic, educational and industrial fields.

Later the same month Professor Wolfgang Thomas, who had been lecturing at the University of the Western Cape before he was appointed to the University of Transkei (and, later, deported from

South Africa) suggested that the homeland would be viable if it became part of a 'Southern African Federation'.⁶⁵

In February 1980 the Matanzima government hosted a 'summit meeting' of the three independent homelands, Transkei, Venda and Bophutatswana, which was also attended by the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha. At this meeting, held in Port St Johns despite the fact that diplomatic ties between South Africa and Transkei had not yet been restored, the homeland leaders were told, in more detail, of the South African Prime Minister's constellation plan.

Although only a terse joint statement was issued after the summit, it is widely believed that it paved the way for the July summit meeting between the Prime Ministers of the three homelands and the South African Premier, after which a declaration committing all parties to the constellation of states was issued.

This declaration represented, yet again, a defeat for Matanzima, implicitly acknowledging the bankruptcy of his statements concerning the proposed black federation in the early 1970s.

In a constellation, as opposed to a federation of states, Transkei will be one of the satellites revolving around the axis of the South African industrialized core. As such it could not have — even when acting in unity with the other independent and non-independent homelands — as powerful a voice as that of the South African government. Economic circumstances have forced Matanzima into this position. As is argued elsewhere in this book, Transkei's chances of becoming truly independent from South Africa have been, and will be at least until the end of the century, non-existent. For Transkei, and for the other homelands, there has never been, and never will be, the chance of cutting the economic and political strings which have been manipulated so shrewdly by Pretoria since the inception of the Verwoerdian master-plan. The articulation of Transkei's future under the Matanzimas lies irrevocably within the constellation framework, as will be discussed more fully in the concluding chapter of this book.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Imvo* 20/8/80.
2. *DD* 17/9/77.
3. *DD* 8/12/77.
4. *The Argus* 2/9/77.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *The Transkei*, Laurence op cit, p 91.
7. *Ibid*, p 92.
8. Horrell op cit p 33, 146; Laurence, op cit, p 107.
9. Laurence op cit, p 96.
10. *Ibid*, p 96.
11. *DD* 15/3/78.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *RDM* 21/3/78.
14. *RDM* 11/4/78.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Argus* 11/4/80.
17. *Cape Times* 11/4/78.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. SAIRR Survey, 1976, p 244.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid* p 234.
23. *DD* 26/10/76 and *Citizen* 12/4/78.
24. *Cape Times* 2/4/77.
25. *Cape Times* 12/4/78.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Citizen* 12/4/78.
28. *Argus* 12/4/78.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *DD* 13/4/78.
31. *DD* 14/4/78.
32. *DD* 11/5/78.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Citizen* 17/4/78.
35. *DD* 27/4/78.
36. *DD* 20/2/79.
37. Debates of the National Assembly, p 372.
38. *DD* 28/2/79.
39. *DD* 21/4/79.

40. *Argus* 29/8/79.
41. Ibid.
42. *Imvo* 15/2/80.
43. *DD* 13/6/80.
44. *Natal Mercury* 12/12/79.
45. *DD* 29/5/80.
46. *DD* 8/5/80.
47. M C Botha, speech to Parliament, 1976, page 13.
48. *Cape Times* 3/10/79.
49. *Sunday Times* 20/7/80.
50. Ibid.
51. *Sunday Times* 1/5/77.
52. *Sunday Times* 29/5/77.
53. *DD* 30/5/77.
54. Laurence op cit, p 99.
55. Ibid p 98.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid p 99.
60. Ibid p 100.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid p 101.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. *DD* 20/8/79.
66. *DD* 24/8/79.

Chapter Six

THE HIGH PRICE OF CREDIBILITY

Diplomatic Fiascos

If the proof of Transkei's national independence is whether or not other independent countries recognize it, then Matanzima's state has been an ignominious failure from the start. Attempting to gain credence in the capitals of a disbelieving world, it has only succeeded in converting stony silence into derisive laughter. Its diplomatic techniques were various and — as we shall see — decidedly unorthodox. Mostly, the government used public relations firms, international lobbyists and businessmen. They were a strange collection and most did not last very long. That was as well for Transkei, since their services were apt to prove expensive.

Initially, the public relations drive was handled by Eschel Rhoodie's Information Department from Pretoria. It saw Transkei's independence as a major opportunity to promote the 'positive' side of separate development. In January 1976, Dr Rhoodie announced a world-wide campaign with a series of books and films. 'The Transkei is the proof of the formula. This is how it can work for the homelands,' he said.¹ They certainly went to town: there was the glossy *Republic of Transkei*, a prestige 300-page book with forewords by both Kaiser Matanzima and B.J. Vorster, which cost R296 809 according to the accountants of the publisher, Chris van Rensburg;² *Independence My Way* by Kaiser Matanzima himself was published by a Department of Information front, the Foreign Affairs Association, and managed to spell the Prime Minister's name wrong on the front cover; *The New Transkei* by Harvey Campion was published by another Department of Information front, Valiant Publishers; and finally in 1978 there was *This is Transkei*, also put out by Chris van Rensburg

but, as the Erasmus Commission shows, planned in the Department of Information. Exactly how much the Department managed to spend on selling Transkei's independence has not been revealed, but a figure of R1 million was quoted in May 1976.³

The sales campaign hatched the next phase: the lobbyists. Andrew Hatcher, a black American then employed by the Department of Information's agents in the United States, Sydney Barron and Associates, was appointed to represent Transkei for three months after independence. Mr Hatcher was paid well to be positive about Transkei: 'The critics are saying the Transkei will have to prove itself. I am convinced it will be a success.'⁴ His appointment followed the withdrawal of Transkeian diplomats previously attached to South African embassies in Washington, New York, Bonn, London and Paris. Kaiser Matanzima said his diplomats would remain in Transkei until after independence when they would be posted abroad as ambassadors⁵ — but they never were.

Mr Hatcher contributed directly to the internal euphoria about Transkei's possible acceptance in the world by predicting shortly before independence that at least six countries would give immediate recognition to the new state. Naturally, he declined to name them but he said there were indications of support from at least 'a couple in the Far East and maybe four in Africa.' He also predicted that there would be no outright rejection of Transkei by the US — though at the very same time Mr Jimmy Carter, then the Democratic candidate, was saying: 'It must be clear to everyone that this is not an effort to permit black South Africans a chance to lead decent lives, but merely one more step on the way toward implementing South Africa's immoral and unworkable policy of apartheid.'⁶ The South African media were predicting that at least Ivory Coast and Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa's Central African Republic would recognize Transkei,⁷ as well as some South American countries.⁸ It was all unrealistic claptrap, but the lobbyists were paid to raise expectations and work international wonders. They were good at expectations but not so good at wonders — a failing usually discovered after they had been paid their sizeable fees.

To aid the campaign, advertisements were placed in newspapers throughout the world, at high cost and with minimal effect⁹ — although the Transkei Development Corporation later claimed there had been 4 000 inquiries resulting from them.¹⁰

Mr Hatcher tried for some time. In January 1977, for example, he claimed that major American textile companies were making inquiries about setting up factories in Transkei and that a wide range of businessmen were contacting his office.¹¹ Such was his success that a second office was established — in Washington — with another black, Jay Parker, in charge. Soon, Mr Parker had taken over from Mr Hatcher. In terms of a deal signed in February 1977, he was paid R9 000 a month plus R60 000 a year expenses to promote Transkei — and on top of this he could bill Transkei with the cost of special projects, cocktail parties, speech-writing and travel. There was a 90-day notice period.¹² It was, in short, a profitable deal for Mr Parker. For Transkei, it was not so profitable. The US did not recognize, and has not recognized Transkei. It refused to allow Transkeians to enter the country, though there were indications, since confirmed, that some Transkeian passport-holders would be exempted.¹³ Shortly after his deal with Transkei was signed, Mr Parker started promoting another lost cause, the maverick Namibian politician Mr Mburumba Karina,¹⁴ who has since faded from the scene.

Next, Mr Parker's US effort was seconded by a former PAC exile, Ngqondi Masimini, who predicted that there was 'a strong possibility' that both the PAC and the ANC would influence the United Nations to change its attitude towards Transkei,¹⁵ and was then appointed Transkei's 'ambassador' to North America. Mr Masimini, who has retained his post longer than most lobbyists, is regarded by the Transkei government as a diplomatic representative but he holds US travel documents and is officially recognized there as a foreign agent. It was an interesting appointment. He had been jailed during the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 1954 potato boycott. He was detained by the South African police in 1956, helped to found the PAC in 1959, and was detained in 1960 after the pass law campaign. In 1962, he left South Africa. He was in exile for fourteen years, and only returned after Transkei's independence. He was once the PAC representative in Guyana, where he met his Washington-born wife. Mr Masimini explained that he had decided to link up with the Matanzimas because the 'Transkei Government and its citizens are committed to social change.'¹⁶ It has to be conceded that his appointment — in contrast with other Transkei hirings — was a shrewd move by the government.

In July 1977, Mr Masimini returned to the US and shortly

afterwards was registered as a foreign agent, which was regarded as a breakthrough for Transkei at that time.¹⁷ Like the other lobbyists, he put his case well: 'The world believes that we were created by South Africa and are under the thumb of South Africa. It is my job to tell the world we are not.'¹⁸ Initially, he worked together with the highly-paid Mr Parker, helping him to create the expectation that countries like Senegal, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Kenya and Gabon would soon recognize Transkei.¹⁹ Before long, Mr Masimini was making statements which established the climate for Transkei's diplomatic break with South Africa. The assumption was that Transkei would only get recognition if it were seen to be anti-Nationalist. In November 1977, for example, he publicly supported sanctions against South Africa in a letter to the *New York Times*, claiming the Republic of Transkei joined with the rest of the world in condemning South Africa.²⁰ His aim — in line with the tactic of the diplomatic break — was to smokescreen the obvious dependence of Transkei on South Africa.

The Parker/Masimini partnership lasted for a while. Early in 1978 Mr Parker, paraphrasing his predecessor Mr Hatcher, said he had received 'many' inquiries from black US businessmen about investing in Transkei. He also said that Transkei's independence had been celebrated by more than 700 guests the year before: however the only guest of any note was the brother of the author of the then best-selling *Roots*.²¹ In spite of a trip to Transkei in January 1978, the partnership was over by March and Mr Parker's contract was terminated. He was replaced by a lawyer, Bernard Katzen, who began to describe himself as the 'counsel of Transkei'.²² Amongst his plans was an information office in Washington. Mr Masimini survived the termination of Mr Parker's contract. Quite what happened to Mr Katzen is not clear, but at the end of 1979 it was reported that a Mr Arnold Smith was now the publicist for Mr Masimini's cause.²³ By then Mr Masimini, who in September 1978 was claiming that 20 African nations were ready to recognize Transkei,²⁴ was notably more subdued about his chances of success.

The failure of the Transkei lobbyists in the US to make any progress beyond maintaining a presence there did not induce despair on the home front. Mr Digby Koyana, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in 1977 after one of his trips that 'I am now convinced that at the rate we are going we will reach international

recognition very soon.'²⁵ And the Minister of Education, Mr W S Mbanga returned from his trip abroad a year later convinced that the isolation of Transkei was at an end.²⁶ Lobbyists have to be good at persuading people, otherwise they don't get jobs.

THE APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS

At one time it was difficult to understand how some of the Transkei lobbyists were appointed. For example, the appointment of Humphrey Berkeley as political and diplomatic adviser did not appear to enjoy the support of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Digby Koyana. In July 1978 he publicly criticized Berkeley and was then suddenly removed from the Foreign Affairs portfolio,²⁷ only to regain it when the Berkeley episode went sour. Often blatant racketeers appeared to find favour in top government circles, and then to lose their places when their true motives were disclosed, or when they failed to deliver the promised goods.

The mystery shrouding these appointments was solved by the Parliamentary Select Committee on public accounts: Kaiser Matanzima himself was often responsible, it turned out. Outré developments like the Berkeley affair and the curious appointment of Dr Richard Blom as a diplomatic representative — as well as the incredible 'harbours-in-the-sky' schemes — could not have taken place without the support of Kaiser Matanzima. Yet at the time there was never any evidence of this, and Matanzima could neatly sidestep responsibility for some of the debacles his government landed in.

The Select Committee's hearings on unauthorized expenditure in the Department of Foreign Affairs for the period from October 26, 1976, to March 31, 1977 told the story. Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mr Sydney Qaba said on May 17, 1978 that there were people in other countries 'who try in various ways to project the image of Transkei, and these people are paid. Some of the people who are included amongst these lobbyists are not appointed by the department. They merely come from the Prime Minister's Department. The Prime Minister brings people from his department and we have to pay them. The moment he has agreed or has made it possible that they also represent Transkei in some way we have to pay them. We have therefore had to pay some gentlemen, for instance, with whom we had not entered into any

contract as a department.²⁸

A year later, the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr B Pukwana, confirmed Mr Qaba's evidence when he had once again to explain why the department had overspent its budget. 'Sometimes the department gets a directive and it comes from the Prime Minister that he should be given so much and it is not easy for the department to say "no" if the Prime Minister says he must be given so much.'²⁹ Indeed. In Transkei no one says 'no' to Kaiser Matanzima unless they are prepared to endure disfavour.

The point to be taken is that many of the lobbyists were people who had managed to persuade Matanzima that they could be of some use to him. Clearly, he was often wrong.

A wide-ranging and expensive network of agents and lobbyists was established. Details of the network were revealed when the contents of a confidential memorandum from Mr Koyana, submitted to Kaiser Matanzima, was published in May 1978. The network consisted of:

Ishmail Khalpey, described as a brilliant travel agent based in what was then Rhodesia. As a travel agent, the memorandum claimed, he 'is well placed for very good contacts at government levels.' Paid R32 000 for the 1978/9 financial year, he was responsible for Rhodesia, Mauritius, India and the Far East. He had visited Mauritius and India 'to cultivate the ground for a ministerial visit.'

Dr Bruno Becchio, based in Switzerland, and described as 'an international lawyer with connections all over Europe.' He was paid R90 000, out of which he paid two 'sub-agents', Mr Eric Norgaard in Denmark and a Mr Berkowski in Sweden. Mr Norgaard, who was 'well motivated', was paid R5 000. Dr Becchio had organized links between the International and Transkei Chambers of Commerce, led a delegation of Swiss and Dutch businessmen to Transkei, and ensured the entry of a Transkeian group to Italy after the Italians refused to recognize Transkeian passports.

Salim el-Hajj, the president of Middle East Commercial and Investment Services. He was described as 'highly respected and in close touch with the Lebanese Government.' He was paid a fee of R225 000 out of which he had to supply a three-man staff, organize 'massive' advertising and undertake flights.

Alan Philips, for whose services in the United Kingdom the department was planning to spend R21 000. In the previous year

it had spent R132 000 on U.K. promotion. An agreement had been signed with Mr Philips who was 'to pursue a 12-month promotional programme' for the R21 000. He would also be reimbursed for 'out-of-pocket expenses'. The memorandum claimed that Mr Philips had been responsible for 'causing the British Conservative Party to invite the minister to speak at the House of Commons last November.' (In fact, he spoke to the party's foreign relations committee.)

Agents in the United States. It was reported that some of the pages relating to aspects of the lobbyist operation in the U.S. were missing, but it was reported that R235 000 was to be spent that year.

All told, the agents cost Transkei R730 000. Nearly a quarter of that went to Salim el-Hajj, but he was to earn even more.³⁰

THE ECUADOR 'BREAKTHROUGH'

On April 4, 1977, proceedings in the National Assembly were solemnly interrupted to welcome a delegation of 'honoured guests' from Ecuador. Kaiser Matanzima described their visit as 'most historical' (which, indeed, it was) and Digby Koyana, the Transkeian Minister of Foreign Affairs, told the Assembly that the credentials of the delegation 'are in order'. Then Vice-Admiral Aurelio Maldonado Mino addressed the Assembly, extended 'the most cordial greetings' from the President of Ecuador and praised Transkei's 'crusade for the conquest of your sovereignty which was acted by your people under your Government's direction.' He also invited Kaiser Matanzima to visit Ecuador. In his reply the Prime Minister proudly announced: 'On this day, in the full glare of all humanity, the free and sovereign people of Ecuador and Transkei have found each other.' A week later, Digby Koyana told the House in his policy statement that the Ecuadorian delegation 'could escalate visits and returns of visits to other countries, particularly Third World countries.' He added that 'there may be some news next month.'³¹ There certainly was some news the following month, but it was not quite what Koyana expected.

Initially, the visit was regarded as a great breakthrough in Transkei. Ecuador had become the first country, other than South Africa, to recognize Transkei. *Die Burger* called it a 'great breakthrough',³² *Die Vaderland* saw it as the most 'open indication' of recognition,³³ and an agreement was signed to promote trade

between the two countries.³⁴

Within a month, however, the news broke: the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry had stated emphatically that 'it has not accredited any official mission encharged with political responsibility to that region of Africa' and had reaffirmed Ecuador's support for the United Nations resolutions on Transkei. Mr Koyana was, understandably, disappointed and offered an excuse: 'I am sure the Ecuador government has taken its new stance because of the pressure on it.' He was amazed that it had taken so long to deny that the delegation was official.

He said that the Ecuador government had come under heavy fire over the visit and implied that it had buckled under pressure. He was convinced that the credentials of his visitors had not been forged. ViceAdmiral Mino had been a special representative of the Ecuador President and he had read out a message on behalf of his head of state. The delegation had included a cabinet minister and a governor of Guayaquil.³⁵

Mr Koyana was not going to admit a hoax, but there was every indication that it had been one — and a mysterious lobbyist/diplomat, Dr Richard Blom, seemed to be at the centre of it. Vice-Admiral Mino had actually praised Dr Blom in his speech in the Assembly for having arranged the visit. Why Dr Blom was nurturing South American contacts became clear soon after the Ecuadorian debacle.

On September 14, 1977, Dr Blom, travelling on Transkei diplomatic papers as well as an Australian passport, left on a mission to South America in the company of Mr Liston Ntshongwana, Transkei's Chief of Protocol. It emerged later — in the Select Committee on Public Accounts³⁶ — that Mr Ntshongwana and Dr Blom had been given R10 000 each by Transkei's Department of Foreign Affairs for the jaunt. That was the last Transkei ever saw of Dr Blom. Mr Pukwana actually said in his evidence: 'I think in connection with this Dr Blom, that it came from above that this doctor must be given R10 000.' He revealed that they had tried to contact him in Ecuador but without success.

Why Kaiser Matanzima should have taken such an interest in Dr Blom is not clear, but a few years ago one of us was travelling on an aeroplane between Windhoek and Johannesburg and struck up conversation with an American woman who revealed that she had worked for Dr Blom in Butterworth before moving to Namibia.

In the course of the conversation she disclosed that Dr Blom had once asked her to take R20 000 in cash to Kaiser Matanzima's Great Place in Qamata. She had been shocked at the suggestion that a lone woman should take so much cash on her own, and she refused. Whatever Dr Blom's motivation, her revelation seemed to imply that there was a business relationship between the two men.

Why Dr Blom should want to leave his luxury home in East London and his various companies became clear soon after his departure. Within a week, the Receiver of Revenue in East London issued a writ for R670 000 against Dr Blom for arrear taxes. A second writ was issued against Dr Blom for R95 594 in his personal capacity. In Umtata, an urgent application for the attachment of a bulldozer and crawler and payment of R52 840 in arrear instalments was made.³⁷ The next day it was revealed that the Transkeian Receiver of Revenue was also about to issue a writ for back taxes and that although he held an Australian passport, he could not return there because he had flouted currency regulations.³⁸ Then it was revealed that he had been appointed a roving ambassador for Transkei after his temporary residence permit had expired in South Africa — and after property, including photographic equipment worth thousands of rand, two skiboats and office equipment, had been attached.³⁹ Mr Koyana was still saying that he had been a great help to Transkei.⁴⁰ In February 1978, a bond of R5 000 was estreated and his arrest ordered in Johannesburg after he had failed to appear on three charges of fraud and two charges under currency regulations. His co-accused was found guilty. The charge related to unlawfully obtaining 40 000 US dollars and attempting to send them out of the country.⁴¹ A few days later it was revealed that there was a deficit of R380 227 in four of his companies.⁴²

In short, he was a dubious diplomatic representative, who faced a R360 000 tax claim in Transkei itself.⁴³ His case and the Ecuador debacle make the Berkeley affair seem less strange than it would in isolation.

THE BERKELEY AFFAIR

For 12 months a former Conservative MP who later joined the Labour Party, Mr Humphrey Berkeley, represented Transkei as a diplomatic and political adviser. It was odd: there is simply no

other way to describe the situation, which became odder as it went on. More details may still unfold as Mr Berkeley has various court actions pending against the Transkei government. The whole affair illustrates very well the Transkei's approach to diplomacy.

After a visit to Umtata in April 1978, Mr Berkeley was appointed to a job worth R100 000 a year following intensive discussions with Kaiser Matanzima. He was introduced to Transkeian affairs by a paid black lobbyist, Mr Scobie Loblack, who had previously expressed the belief that 'Transkei will become an example of how to conduct human relations.'⁴⁴ (There was nothing wrong with that judgement, except that he meant it differently.) It seemed that Mr Loblack had recently lost his job with the Transkei government when he arrived in Umtata with Mr Berkeley, because he was described as 'a former representative for Transkei in London, whose services have since been terminated by the Transkei Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'⁴⁵

After this trip he got his job back, quite possibly through the intervention of Kaiser Matanzima over Mr Koyana's head, which would help explain the Minister's dissatisfaction with the whole Berkeley affair.

With the appointment of Humphrey Berkeley, the British operation was beginning to get out of hand. Besides him and Mr Loblack, who had now saved his job, Transkei had signed a three-year contract with a company called Business Expansion, whose head, Paul Dwyer, was described as Transkei's information and publicity representative. His first bright idea was to announce that the Transkei government intended applying for membership of the Commonwealth and hoped to have its application accepted within three years.⁴⁶ It appears that Paul Dwyer and Humphrey Berkeley were then close friends, and that Mr Dwyer had been with Mr Berkeley and Mr Loblack on the April visit to Umtata. On the face of it, membership of the Commonwealth was not more unrealistic than any of the other schemes that surfaced during this period of Transkei's diplomatic endeavours. But, like so many of the others, it was an excursion to the wilder shores of public relations rather than the pursuit of a realistic ambition.

While the new recruits were in Umtata, Transkei broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa. It was immediately assumed that Humphrey Berkeley, a prohibited immigrant in South Africa and Honorary Vice-President of the Anti-Apartheid

Movement in Britain, was responsible. This assumption, fuelled in the Afrikaans press from good sources, managed to make Mr Berkeley more significant than he was. It has already been pointed out that the idea of a diplomatic break had been floated by the South Africans themselves — as well as by people like Mr Masimini — long before Mr Berkeley arrived on the scene. To win international credibility by appearing to be anti-South African and anti-apartheid, was an obvious as well as a shrewd play. With hints from people like el-Hajj of Arab money and loans, the idea became steadily more appealing.

What probably happened was that Mr Berkeley confirmed and strengthened the thinking behind the strategy. It is doubtful whether he played a bigger role than that, and this more-or-less ties in with his own version of events at the time. 'The Prime Minister had already made up his mind when I saw him,' he said afterwards, but added that he was only prepared to become 'political, constitutional and diplomatic adviser to Transkei' when he was satisfied that Kaiser Matanzima was 'genuinely against apartheid and that he wanted to break free from the stranglehold of Pretoria.'⁴⁷

His strategy undoubtedly appealed to Kaiser Matanzima. First, try and build solidarity with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland — Berkeley believed his personal contacts with the leaders of these countries would be helpful. Second, stress the strategic importance of Transkei to the West: 'If Western nations feel that the sea route around the Cape is vitally important — as is a defence agreement with the southern tip of Africa — it seems possible that at some stage the West would rather have these facilities from Port St Johns than from Cape Town.' A Cape port would prove embarrassing because the West disagreed so strongly with South Africa's policies. The fact that Port St Johns was inadequate as a potential harbour did not worry him: 'One can build a harbour from scratch. Ghana has one of the biggest man-made harbours in the world. One could perhaps visualise the Western nations at some stage saying to Transkei: we will club together and build you a great international harbour, in whose facilities we of course will share.'⁴⁸

With that, Humphrey Berkeley's career as Transkei's diplomatic adviser was launched. The schemes got more grandiose as they went along. A major problem, however, was the fact that Transkei received absolutely no recognition in the outside world for the

break with South Africa. And neither Mr Berkeley nor el-Hajj came up with alternative sources of money — despite the talk of a R168 million loan from Arab interests. Transkei remained tied to South Africa's purse strings. In a sense, Transkei was in a 'Catch 22' situation, in that it could not reject South Africa's money without an alternative, while it could not find an alternative without totally rejecting South Africa. This it simply could not do, even if Matanzima was willing. The effect for Mr Berkeley was disastrous: he could not deliver the goods.

Neither was he helped, materially, by statements from Mr Ntshongwana that the break with South Africa was 'irrevocable' and that 'if it comes to the push, the people of Transkei will be able to survive — we can live on mealies.'⁴⁹ Nor was his cause advanced by his own statements that Transkei would not only apply to join the Commonwealth, but also the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity, and that 'The people of Transkei are no more responsible for the tyranny of blacks in South Africa than the peoples of occupied Europe, during the war, were responsible for the Nazi atrocities.'⁵⁰ It was fair public relations, but the solutions were pathetically unrealistic: in the event, Transkei did resume ties with South Africa and it did not apply to join any of the international bodies listed by Mr Berkeley.

Mr Berkeley soon showed, too, how highly-paid lobbyists are disinclined to criticize the actions of their paymasters. When Peter Kenny of the *Daily Dispatch* was summarily deported, Matanzima's adviser refused to comment on the grounds that 'my advice over the deportation was neither sought nor given.' Nor would he comment on the detention without trial of the DP's Florence Mancotywa — although he did have the gall to say he was opposed to detention without trial — because 'he could not advise on her release without knowing fully what had led to her detention.'⁵¹

Nevertheless, his stocks were still high until the anniversary of 'independence' on October 26, 1978. Within a day of Mr Koyana publicly saying that Mr Berkeley had arrogated to himself the title of 'political adviser', he was demoted and removed from foreign affairs.⁵² The techniques he employed were revealed over the course of time. They included private meetings with heads of governments, foreign ministers and senior government officials in Africa and elsewhere — this was disclosed by Mr Berkeley himself after a television channel revealed that New Zealand's Foreign

Minister, Mr Brian Talboys, had refused to see him.⁵³ It involved a remarkable arms-smuggling operation in which a disguised Dakota flew down Africa without radio contact for 28 days before landing in Umtata. It was believed that the cargo contained machine pistols, carbines and a small quantity of ammunition. The flight aroused the interest of French Intelligence who thought it pointed to a coup attempt somewhere in Africa. American Intelligence flicked an ear because of the presence of the Sixth Fleet near where the aircraft disappeared, while Italian Intelligence thought it might have something to do with a Sicilian separatist movement. The Transkei Government refused to say anything about the incident but having received the arms safely, thus dramatizing its new-found independent spirit, it might well have claimed a successful operation.⁵⁴

Then a delegation from the Ivory Coast, led by one of the vice-presidents of the country's national assembly, Mr Clément Anet Bilé, undertook the first official visit to Transkei from a black African state. It was a minor breakthrough, and this time the credentials of the visitors held up.⁵⁵ At more or less the same time as this visit (end of September 1978) Kaiser Matanzima announced that several heads of state in Africa as well as other African dignitaries had been invited to the independence celebrations of that year. Mr Koyana, then deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, said 'some' African states had promised him during a recent visit that they would attend.⁵⁶

To coincide with the celebrations, two headline-catching statements were made: first, Kaiser Matanzima announced that Transkei had 'engaged the services of one of the leading international lawyers in the world to prepare, on our behalf, an application to the General Assembly of the United Nations to adhere to the State of the International Court of Justice so that we may sue South Africa for our legitimate land claim against her.'⁵⁷ It looked like a clever plan. The UN, by accepting Transkei's right to sue, would thereby recognize its independence. However, the name of the leading international lawyer was never disclosed and the application never made. It was designed to show that Transkei was confronting South Africa, 'on behalf of the oppressed black population of South Africa,' as the Prime Minister put it at the time.

At the same time, Kaiser Matanzima 'invited' the OAU to establish a military presence in Transkei and asked the OAU to

train Transkei's army as well as guerilla forces. He announced this at a press conference and a statement to the same effect was released in London the same day.⁵⁸ In the full statement, he stressed that the construction of a harbour would reduce Transkei's dependence on South Africa and provide 'our neighbour', Lesotho, with direct access to the sea.

A few days later, the Republic of Transkei issued a writ against a London publishing house for alleged injurious falsehood and negligence in including Transkei under the heading of South Africa in a world survey.⁵⁹

All these moves were shrewd and aggressive, even if they were unsuccessful in the sense that Transkei did not win any international recognition as a result of them. The Matanzimas had some cause to be pleased with the late fruits of their heavy commitment to the lobbyists.

But by this time the whole relationship with Berkeley had soured. In April 1979, Mr Mda alleged that a top government official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been paid R40 000 after he had lied to the government that this sum would be employed for 'the benefit of equipping those high-ranking diplomats from that fictitious country to make their trip to Transkei and for the return journey home to their own country.' But his information was that 'there were no such high-ranking diplomats from such a fictitious country and, meantime, the country has spent a great deal of money for a purpose that was still-born.' He also said there were rumours that some of the diplomats were 'opening lucrative banking accounts in these countries and generally engaging in practices that would not face the light of day in the eyes of the government which put them in charge of those missions. We cannot afford Eschel Rhoodies in Transkei.'⁶⁰ There were no interruptions from the government when he spoke and George Matanzima, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, tacitly supported the allegations in the debate when he said he 'appreciated' Mr Mda's remarks. He said the department would have to be 'very careful' in its choice of foreign nationals and admitted that some agents had not been properly screened before they were employed: 'There are wolves hovering around, promising Transkei the moon and the stars, but when once a person promises the moon and the stars you know what generally happens. We never get to the stars and the stars never come to us, nor the moon for that matter. It is time that we become very careful of whom we bring into Transkei,

and we are determined to do so.'⁶¹

George Matanzima revealed in May 1979 that Mr Berkeley had told the government that a number of representatives from various countries would attend the country's independence celebrations — but they had not arrived. He said no satisfactory reason had been given by Mr Berkeley for their non-arrival.⁶² It was clear that the government had hoped that the 1978 independence celebrations would be a great success. A number of local dignitaries were present and even the South African acting President had arrived — in spite of the break in diplomatic relations. But the success of the affair turned on the foreign attendance, and those guests who came (apparently from Nigeria and Ghana) were not of the anticipated stature. In short, the celebrations did not measure up to expectations.

These were not the only issues. In August 1979, Mr Berkeley claimed in an article in *The Spectator* that his relationship with the Transkei government had ended after he had persuaded Nigeria to lend Transkei money and establish a military presence there. He claimed that Kaiser Matanzima had been 'enthusiastic' over the Nigerian offer. However on the day Matanzima was due to meet the emissary, he went to East London instead, dismissed his driver and security guard, and disappeared for four hours. Berkeley said discussions had taken place with the Nigerians in London, Lagos and elsewhere, while Mr Ntshongwana had visited Nigeria with Mr Loblack before returning to Transkei on January 31, 1979.

He (Mr Ntshongwana) had met all the members of the supreme military council and many political figures as well. On February 4, an emissary from Nigeria arrived in Umtata. The following day a cabinet meeting was called. The Nigerian government was, in principle, prepared to make a substantial loan to Transkei. It was prepared to finance a harbour, to train its army and police, and to establish a military presence in Transkei. The Prime Minister was enthusiastic. He had been invited to pay a private visit to Nigeria to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. A banquet was held in honour of the Nigerian emissary and a full day of talks was arranged to take place in his office the following day. The Nigerians regarded their offer as a test of Transkei's desire for genuine independence.' But Kaiser Matanzima disappeared to East London. 'We saw him again on February 7. The meeting was brief and perfunctory. The Nigerian emissary, who left Transkei on February 8, had wasted two days sitting in Umtata rather than

seeing the country as he had been promised.⁶³ The diplomat was 'highly placed in the Nigerian Department of Foreign Affairs.'⁶⁴ Mr Berkeley later claimed that Transkei could have had membership of the OAU and the Commonwealth, sponsored by Nigeria, had it not submitted to South African bribery. 'The Nigerians were prepared to sponsor them provided they stopped all forms of communication with South Africa. The Nigerians had taken a pragmatic view. "Look," they had said, "let's stop arguing about how Transkei got independence," — which was the way most African states looked at it — "and approach it in a different way. Are they prepared to be genuinely independent? Are they prepared to be on the right side if the holocaust comes in Southern Africa?"' The Nigerians also had in mind the 320 km of strategic Transkei coastline. This was how close he had been to achieving recognition for Transkei, but the South African government had thwarted it. 'They had been watching my activities with growing alarm, and decided to move when the Nigerian negotiation was going on and Transkei needed money. In March, South Africa paid Transkei R118 million. The Matanzima brothers may have bought a few years of peace for their country by this but Transkei will be on the wrong side when the holocaust comes.'⁶⁵

It was a remarkable story. He never explained why the Nigerian military government, which had taken a strong line on Southern Africa in the OAU and elsewhere, would have been prepared to change its attitude towards Transkei in such a dramatic and expensive manner. Nor did he explain why Nigeria would act alone on such a controversial issue, particularly at a time when that country was preparing for civilian rule. If either he or the Nigerians really believed Transkei would ever be 'genuinely independent' of South Africa that had to be very naive, particularly given the experience of other countries in Southern Africa. It was conceivable that some Nigerian diplomats might have toyed with the idea, but the promise of full-scale diplomatic, military and financial support seemed far-fetched.

Indeed, it soon became clear why the Transkei government, which had been persuaded to follow some pretty odd schemes in the past, was not convinced by the Berkeley/Ntshongwana plan — at a time when its financial situation was very precarious. When Mr Berkeley was asked for more details of Transkei's contacts in Nigeria, he suddenly dried up, on the grounds that the matter was

'very confidential' and that in any case the intervention 'did not come off.' Pressed for more details about the 'senior' Nigerian official, he admitted that he was neither senior nor official but 'he was in with very senior people.' Nor could he say how much the alleged Nigerian loan would have been — but claimed it would have exceeded the R118 million offered by South Africa.⁶⁶

Some months earlier, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Transkei, Mr Sidney Qaba, had accused Mr Berkeley publicly of knowing that 'the Nigerian exercise is a fake.' There was a dispute between the Transkeian government and Mr Berkeley over leaks to the press, with Mr Qaba pointing out that the first leak had been in the pro-South African Government *Citizen*, based on sources in London, before the plan had even been discussed with Kaiser Matanzima.⁶⁷ George Matanzima who was by then Prime Minister and had been present at many of the meetings with Mr Berkeley, certainly those concerning the Nigerian deal, accused him of putting out false information after the *Spectator* article had been published. 'Mr Berkeley is making colossal efforts to bluff the world, just as he attempted to bluff the government of Transkei by faking what he knew he was incapable of performing.' George Matanzima also disclosed that Mr Berkeley and Mr Dwyer had parted company and alleged that Mr Berkeley was in the habit of bringing people of no standing or consequence to Transkei, and assigning false credentials to them.⁶⁸

Shortly afterwards, Mr Koyana revealed that Mr Ntshongwana, at the time in exile with Mr Berkeley, had told the Transkei cabinet that Nigeria wanted to use Transkei as a military base from which to fight South Africa. Mr Ntshongwana had also told the cabinet that Nigeria wanted R1,5 million before it would recognize Transkei. And Mr Berkeley had promised to convene an Umtata meeting with President Banda of Malawi, President Kaunda of Zambia, Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho, President Khama of Botswana and Kaiser Matanzima. Mr Berkeley was to have arranged for the Prime Ministers of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Jamaica to invite Kaiser Matanzima to their countries. Following this, recognition from the OAU and the Commonwealth would be on the cards, to be followed by the UN. Mr Koyana said: 'This was the grand recognition plan which we agreed to go in for after Mr Berkeley had come and projected himself as a personal adviser to several African heads of state and personal friend of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers.' The

R1,5 million was to be paid to the Nigerian contact, Mr Alhaji Ahmed, who was likely to become the Foreign Minister in the new Federal Nigerian Government. In fact, Mr Ahmed became a senator in the ruling party, but was reported to be close to President Alhaji Shagari.⁶⁸ Two cabinet ministers were to meet Mr Ahmed in London by February 9 and pay the first instalment. The next move was for Mr Berkeley and Mr Ntshongwana to splash the news that they were meeting Arab financiers in London, 'and fabulous sums of money would soon pour into Transkei.' Mr Koyana said Mr Berkeley had stopped Mr Masimini going to the OAU conference in Khartoum, to protect 'delicate negotiations he was just on the point of completing with Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Algeria, for the final recognition of Transkei by these countries.' He quoted a letter from Mr Berkeley dated February 16, 1978, in which he proposed 'a plan for recognition of Transkei which we believe, if followed, would bring success within 12 months.'⁶⁹

There are two somewhat shattering implications in this statement. The first is that Mr Berkeley could actually propose a programme for the recognition of Transkei in 12 months. In one and a half years, not a single country other than South Africa and Bophutatswana had recognized Transkei, yet he could seriously propose to reverse the situation in a shorter period of time. It was too good to be true, but someone believed him; that is the second implication. Mr Berkeley was believed by at least some sections of the Transkei Government, including Kaiser Matanzima.

Later in 1979, Mr Berkeley was accused of a 'monstrous swindle' and a letter to *The Spectator* by two officials in Transkei's Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Tennyson Makiwane, a former ANC official, and Mr Amos Sondaka, later Transkei's European representative, disputed other issues. They identified the Nigerian emissary as Mr Dennis Ikpa — who, it appears, was acting on behalf of Mr Ahmed Ikpa. He was responsible for liaison between Mr Berkeley and the Nigerian High Commission in London — but they denied any knowledge of him. Mr Makiwane and Mr Sondaka had also conducted their own on-the-spot investigation in Lagos — where, they reported, no senior Nigerian government official had ever heard of Mr Ntshongwana, who was supposed to have met all the members of the military council.⁷⁰

Clearly there are two versions of the whole affair, but the

Berkeley interpretation is undoubtedly the most improbable. Its major assumption is that South Africa would have objected to the supposed Nigerian deal so strongly that it was prepared to 'bribe' Kaiser Matanzima because the Nigerian military presence would have been too serious a challenge. This is patent nonsense. South Africa has the most powerful military machine in sub-Saharan Africa and, logistically, it would have been able to counter any conventional military action. Not only that, but for all the oil money that Nigeria might have been willing to pour into Transkei, there was absolutely no way in which Transkei could have afforded to break its economic links with South Africa. Transkei's massive 'surplus' labour would still have been forced to find work in South Africa, and South Africa would have remained the source of all Transkei's essential goods. If Transkei had become a base for insurgency operations in South Africa this may have posed a threat. However, the presence of a guerilla force would have created internal dangers for the Matanzimas. Led by either the ANC or the PAC it would have rejected the TNIP. In any case, such a development would have led to hostile counter-action by South Africa.

The Berkeley version just does not hold water. The Transkeian version seems far more likely, though it reveals some notable misjudgements in Umtata.

The belated scepticism with which Berkeley's employers viewed his schemes appears to be justified. This issue, however, should not cloud one's judgement of the treatment he then received in Transkei.

REMOVING BERKELEY

On February 16, 1979, Mr Berkeley was having dinner at the most prominent restaurant in Transkei, the Umtata Holiday Inn, when two men came to his table and one said he was a security policeman. He was asked to go outside where he was shown a warrant for his arrest, signed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police and containing a charge of fraud. When the two men said they wanted him to go to the police station with them, Mr Berkeley said he was unwilling to go with them and they would have to force him to do so. Which they then did. At this stage, the entrance to the Holiday Inn was crowded with onlookers, as is frequently the case when

there are incidents at the hotel, and when he was grabbed by the police, Mr Berkeley turned to the crowd and said: 'I am being seized by the security police and if I am killed you will know who has done it.'

There were several eye-witnesses to this incident and it was never disputed. He had been arrested by the security police. Publicly, at least, there was some mystery about who ordered the arrest. The day after the incident, George Matanzima said the first he had heard about it was that morning. He had summoned the Police Commissioner, Brigadier Cwele, and the head of the Security Police, Colonel Ngceba, but they both reported that they knew nothing of the incident. He had instructed them to look into the matter and ordered an inquiry. He added: 'Those policemen, if found, will be seriously treated. If a person is non grata in our country, we deport him, we don't beat him up.' And Kaiser Matanzima sent a top government official to Mr Berkeley, who was now in hospital in Komgha in South Africa, to find out what happened.

In view of the fact that he was indeed arrested at the Holiday Inn and that he was indeed found inside South Africa later the same night, it is probable that the rest of his bizarre story is reasonably correct. Except for the lack of any disciplinary action by either South Africa or Transkei, there has been no attempt whatsoever to dispute Mr Berkeley's account of his kidnapping. The absence of judicial/disciplinary action in either territory could mean that the authorities do not believe his story is true — and that is possible — or that they are unwilling to take any steps because they do not wish to reveal the true story in all its detail. In September 1979, it was announced that the South African authorities would not prosecute Mr Berkeley's alleged assailants even though Mr Berkeley gave them the names of five of the six Transkei security policemen involved. The Attorney-General of the Eastern Cape, Mr E.C. Heller, declined to prosecute after he had received a police dossier on the case. The head of the CID on the border, Col J H Fourie, said: 'All the facts from our investigation were sent to the Attorney-General who declined to prosecute.' He added that anything that took place inside Transkei was under the jurisdiction of the Transkei authorities.⁷¹

In view of the legal action since taken by Mr Berkeley and the wide publicity which has attended the incident, this decision not to prosecute is mystifying, unless it was taken on the grounds that

there could be no case owing to lack of evidence.

In any event, Mr Berkeley's account — the only one we have — is chilling stuff.

He said that as they left the hotel, another car began to follow closely behind them. The two cars stopped at a secluded spot about ten kilometres from Umtata. 'Six men proceeded to beat me up, whipping me on my back and arms, and beat me on the head with a metal-buckled belt. I said to them: "If you are going to kill me, why not do it now?" They said they were going to kill me, but not just then. "We will do it in our time." They then tied his wrists with wire and stuffed him into the boot of their car and drove off. Some hours later, he was taken from the boot. There were then three men and one was brandishing a revolver. He said: "We are now going to shoot you." Mr Berkeley said: 'I asked if I could pray. They said I could. To my surprise, when I knelt down, they knelt down with me by the side of the road. I said I was praying to God to forgive them for their action. I made the sign of the cross. When I got up, the threatening attitude of my captors suddenly seemed to have disappeared. They appeared frightened and got into their car.'

About two minutes after they had driven away, Mr Berkeley flagged down a car with two South Africans from Butterworth inside. They drove him 15 kms to Komgha. He asked to be taken to the police station where he told the police that he was a prohibited immigrant. The 'extremely nice white police sergeant' said 'he would deal with that later and said I must receive medical treatment first.' At Komgha, he was treated for severe cuts and bruises and a suspected skull fracture. He had five stitches in his head. One of the people who took Mr Berkeley to the police station — he declined to identify himself to the press — said Mr Berkeley was covered in blood when found, and had been disorientated. The Komgha police said Mr Berkeley looked as if he had been badly assaulted but it appeared robbery was not the motive. Mr Berkeley said he had no intention of resigning as Transkei's diplomatic representative and hoped to return to Transkei.⁷²

If Mr Berkeley's account of the events was true, the question of the motive is important. It appears to be the case that the Transkeian authorities, or at least a section of the security police, wanted to teach him a lesson and that they had powerful backing somewhere in the government.

Mr Berkeley offered several possible reasons. At first he thought it must have been overzealousness on the part of the policemen. They might have been reacting, he surmised, to some things said by the British head of the Transkei Development Corporation, Mr James Skinner, who had been deported that week. He could not understand why the arrest warrant mentioned fraud because 'it is impossible for me to commit fraud. I have a fixed quarterly fee paid to me for my services.'⁷³ Later he said he was convinced that the Transkeian Security Police intended killing him and dumping his body in South Africa so that the South African Security Police would be blamed.⁷⁴ He also said that he did 'not think this was politically motivated. I regard it as a serious breach of discipline.' But Mr Skinner, now out of Transkei, thought differently: 'They were trying to get rid of the only people who really believed in making Transkei independent of South Africa.'⁷⁵

Whatever the motive, the story was widely accepted. Even the South African Security Police seemed to go along with it. Its head on the border, Col A P van der Merwe, said that because Mr Berkeley had been dumped in South Africa against his will, no police action would be taken against him, even though technically he had entered the country without a visa.⁷⁶ On the same day that Col van der Merwe's statement appeared, some significant variations in the kidnap account emerged.

Mr Ntshongwana, Mr Berkeley's close associate, said that the men who dragged him from the Holiday Inn were security police, and he disclosed that he could identify four of the six abductors.⁷⁷ Quite how he could do this was not explained. According to Mr Berkeley's initial account he was arrested by two security policemen and noticed afterwards that they were being followed by another car. When Mr Ntshongwana said he could identify four of the men, Mr Berkeley was still in Komgha Hospital. There was thus no doubt that Mr Ntshongwana meant that he himself could identify them. Although no one else had claimed to have seen more than two policemen at the hotel, he could say: 'I can identify four of the six men as Transkei security police.' Now Mr Ntshongwana had not been at the hotel when the incident took place, although in one interview Mr Berkeley claimed he had been.⁷⁸ Mr Berkeley said in another interview: 'A hotel official telephoned him when he saw the police approach me and Mr Ntshongwana rushed over immediately. He saw me being taken away.'⁷⁹ Why a hotel official would have felt it

necessary to phone Mr Ntshongwana immediately was not explained. Mr Ntshongwana's house was about a mile away from the hotel: he had moved quickly if he got there in time to witness the alleged abduction. In the circumstances, it is surprising that Mr Ntshongwana did not follow the police to arrange bail and lawyers. He might also have contacted the Prime Minister or the head of the police to find out what was happening to an important diplomatic representative. But there was no indication that he did anything more that night than witness the arrest. His initial inaction, or apparent inaction, can only be viewed as surprising.

Mr Ntshongwana also said that the vehicles used in the abduction were security police vehicles, and that one of them had been identified by an eye-witness.⁸⁰ How the other was identified was not explained. He added that the same people who had been involved in the deportation of Mr Skinner had been involved in the arrest of Mr Berkeley and he found this 'quite curious'. Mr Berkeley had identified one of the men at the hotel as a policeman involved in Mr Skinner's deportation. Mr Ntshongwana said he had been astonished to see the same man in a parked car near Komgha on the day he had gone to visit Mr Berkeley at the request of Kaiser Matanzima. Earlier, he had seen a Pretoria-registered car parked at the border post. Two men had been waiting at the car and a Transkeian policeman had told him they were 'waiting for something from Umtata.' When he arrived at the hospital, Mr Berkeley had told him that his briefcase, stolen on the night of the assault, had been returned to him that morning by a South African police constable. The briefcase had been brought to the police station by young boys who said they had found it at a dam.⁸¹

After Mr Ntshongwana had identified four of the six abductors, he asked for police protection from the head of the CID, Colonel D. Nkalitshana, rather than from Colonel Ngceba, which in the circumstances was understandable. Mr Berkeley said Kaiser Matanzima was 'absolutely furious about what happened' and Mr Ntshongwana said he was 'shocked',⁸² but besides ordering an inquiry, the Matanzimas were noticeably silent in public. When Mr Mda tried to raise the matter in the no-confidence debate six days later, the new Prime Minister successfully prevented any discussion on the grounds that the matter was *sub judice*, although no action had at that stage been formally instituted. George Matanzima did not even choose to make a public statement to the assembly which might have been expected in the circumstances.⁸³ Strangely, the

only statements were made by Mr Berkeley and Mr Ntshongwana.

Four days after the abduction, Mr Berkeley returned to Umtata. The following day, he attended a banquet in honour of Kaiser Matanzima's investiture as State President. Subsequently, he saw both Kaiser and George Matanzima, as well as six members of the cabinet. Before leaving for London, he attended an identification parade and made a full statement to the police. Before his departure, he said: 'If the investigation into this matter is really thorough, Transkei's position in the eyes of the world could be enhanced.'⁸⁴

It was clearly the beginning of the end of Mr Berkeley's relationship with the Transkei Government. The incident has never been satisfactorily explained. In spite of the talk of immediate action by the Transkei police, no one has been charged with the abduction and the assault. At this stage, only two conclusion seem possible: either the Transkei Government is involved in a cover-up, or Mr Berkeley was involved in a hoax to save his skin. The affair may be cleared up if Mr Berkeley's case against the Transkei Government ever comes to court. However it turns out, it contains a mixture of the bizarre and the brutal all too typical of small-time despotic states.

Just over a month later, Mr Berkeley returned to Transkei claiming that it 'is the most peaceful country that I know.'⁸⁵ He left soon afterwards after receiving a death threat at the same hotel from which he was abducted. He was apparently told that if he did not leave Transkei he would be assassinated. Mr Berkeley immediately phoned the British Prime Minister, Mr James Callaghan, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr David Owen, to inform them of the threat.⁸⁶

It was then reported from London that the government had not sent any money to run its London office for three months. Mr Berkeley and Mr Loblack 'were known to be "extremely worried" about the situation, but yesterday declined to comment.' Mr Berkeley was also reported to be 'extremely upset' over leaks about an alleged deal with Nigeria.⁸⁷ The Transkei Government described these allegations as 'a lot of lies.'⁸⁸ It did not surprise anyone when, at the end of the month, Mr Berkeley was given three months' notice. George Matanzima accused him of having failed to 'deliver the goods as promised.'⁸⁹

In July, Mr Berkeley issued writs against the Transkei Government and three (named) Transkeian Security policemen for

assault, wrongful arrest and attempted murder. He said he had also issued writs against the government for unlawful termination of his contract. In addition, he was suing the Matanzimas and Mr Qaba, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for defamation.⁹⁰ George Matanzima confirmed a few days later that some summonses had been received. He said that the matter would be heard at a date to be finalised when deposits had been paid as necessary security for an action.⁹¹ These cases had not come to court a year later, and in May 1980 an amendment to the Transkei Constitution made it impossible for cabinet ministers to be sued in their personal capacities for official activities. The amendment was made retrospective to 1976. This move has been interpreted as an attempt to prevent Mr Berkeley from suing the Matanzima brothers in their personal capacities. It was also reported that Mr Berkeley's lawyers had been told that he would not be allowed to re-enter Transkei, and that his lawyers — two advocates and two attorneys — would have to make applications to visit Transkei.⁹² The Transkei government thus appears to be placing obstacles in the way of the Berkeley law suits, which can only lead to speculation that it has something to hide.

There was another twist to the Berkeley affair in August 1979, when Mr Ntshongwana fled Transkei and was given emergency travel documents to go to Britain. He claimed that the Transkei Security Police wanted to kill him, and that he had fled after 'heavily armed' security police arrived at his home. Although Col. Ngceba told one newspaper⁹³ that this allegation was 'absurd', he confirmed to another that although there was no warrant for Mr Ntshongwana's arrest, his men 'had been following him home and he drove to the back of the house. They knocked at the front door, then went round to the back where the car was, and saw somebody jumping over the fence.' He also said the police had no intention of taking action against Mr Ntshongwana.⁹⁴ He never explained why the security police were following him but unless he has a special definition of 'action' the fact that the security police were following him home at 1 a.m. would seem to justify Mr Ntshongwana's fears.

Mr Berkeley believed that Liston Ntshongwana had fled because he feared for his life. 'He is the only one who can corroborate the evidence I have against the Transkei security police when they beat me up and chucked me out of the country.' The day Mr Ntshongwana's departure was reported, some sources in Umtata

pointed out that he still owed the government for his travels with Dr Blom.⁹⁵ The Auditor-General's report of that debate appeared in Umtata that week.⁹⁶

It was in the reports of Mr Ntshongwana's flight that the security policemen allegedly involved in the abduction of Mr Berkeley were first named publicly: they were Major Jalele, Lieutenant Lavis and Lieutenant Ndengana. If they were found to have kidnapped Mr Berkeley, the entire leadership of the Security Police, other than Col. Ngceba, would have been involved. It is virtually impossible for them to have acted without his go-ahead.

As soon as Mr Ntshongwana arrived in London, he made contact with Mr Berkeley, who said: 'Liston is safe. He has arrived safely and is relieved to be out of reach of the Transkei Security Branch.'⁹⁷ He refused a South African newspaper permission to take a picture of him with Mr Ntshongwana on the grounds that the latter's application for political asylum was 'conditional that he has no contact with the press,' an interpretation which a Whitehall spokesman described as 'nonsense'.⁹⁸ Within 36 days of his 'exile', Liston Ntshongwana was back in Umtata. Clearly, he returned after reaching an arrangement with Kaiser Matanzima. This was both reported in the Press and confirmed directly to one of us by Mr Ntshongwana himself. The agreement with Kaiser Matanzima was made after he had spent five days in a Johannesburg hotel and phoned the President on numerous occasions. Within hours of his return, he had met Kaiser Matanzima. From George Matanzima downwards, everyone initially denied knowledge of his return, but it was clear that Kaiser Matanzima had given him sufficient guarantees of protection to remove the initial fears that had caused his departure.⁹⁹ It reflected the continuing power of the President, but it made the whole Berkeley affair, in Alice's word, curiuser.

Mr Ntshongwana said that he felt the threat to his life to be over, and took up a job as a sports co-ordinator in the Department of Education. Both in the press and privately, he explained that he was going to study further in England, but he was still in Umtata long after the academic year started.

THE SKINNER AFFAIR

In a country that publicly proclaims adherence to the principles of

free enterprise — a commitment reinforced, theoretically, at the constellation talks in July 1980 — the Transkei Development Corporation, the state-controlled body that controls commercial activities in the territory, is a totally incongruous body. Not only is it the body which took over white-owned commercial operations when they were sold to the South African Development Trust, but it has also seeded new activities, lent money to industrialists and created infrastructure. It dominates commercial and industrial activities in Transkei. Formed out of the Xhosa Development Corporation in 1976, the TDC, and the XDC before it, was run until October 1978 by Mr Franko Maritz, a man dedicated to the fulfilment of the philosophy of separate development. Much-criticised, the TDC has always been a controversial body, both because of its commercial dominance and because it is state-controlled. The Maritz style — his brother, J.P. Maritz, was also a senior executive — was another source of criticism and gave rise to rumours of allegedly dubious operations.

Criticism of the TDC came to a head in February 1978 when an Israeli, Prof J.D. Ben-Dak, censured the way it was conducting its affairs. He had been appointed (at 75 000 US Dollars a year, payable anywhere in the world) as National Planning Adviser and as head of the Transkei National Planning Agency. In a report to Kaiser Matanzima, Prof Ben-Dak claimed that several top TDC officials performed in a manner which, given normal corporation practices, was delinquent if not illegal; that these practices included conflict of interest, extravagant expenditure and most serious financial misconduct; and that some of the TDC leadership was professionally incompetent, unaware of world markets and without an objective standard of excellence; further that some of the TDC leadership did not have the interests of Transkeians at heart.

In the memorandum, he suggested that the two Maritzes be 'quietly' dispensed with and that the TDC be closely linked to the political leadership and cabinet-determined priorities. He also criticized some of the TDC operations, such as hotels and garages.¹⁰⁰

The publication of the report infuriated Kaiser Matanzima and this was one of the reasons why Peter Kenny of the *Daily Dispatch* was deported from the territory three months later.¹⁰¹ It also infuriated Franko Maritz who fought back hard. He fired a senior development officer, Mr Fred Fehrsen, for talking to Prof Ben-Dak and accused the professor of 'not doing his job properly' and of 'dabbling in affairs outside the Corporation.' Prof Ben-Dak was

dismissed after just under a month's employment and the development agency plan was cancelled. He left, contemptuously rejecting a consultancy job at the same pay.¹⁰² The Maritzes won that battle, but the appointment of James Skinner in October that year to succeed Franko Maritz as Managing Director of the TDC seemed to vindicate the Ben-Dak criticisms.

James Skinner was a former director of the National Development Corporation of Tanzania, and his appointment seemed to herald a new approach. Some observers concluded that the South African control of the TDC, at least at a managerial level, had been broken. Mr Skinner was also a friend of Humphrey Berkeley, and his appointment was announced in London by Mr Loblack. It was clear that the Maritzes had not been consulted about the appointment, nor had any of the other senior management people.¹⁰³ Soon after his arrival, the new head of the TDC said he had agreed to take the job because he was convinced of the genuine independence of Transkei.¹⁰⁴

His attempts at reform soon ran into resistance. He axed J.P. Maritz and cancelled a large public relations contract with Hans Lombard Associates, a firm headed by a former journalist on a government-supporting newspaper. In December, a Sunday newspaper claimed that he was purging South Africans from the TDC. These claims were denied in Umtata and sources said that a shake-up in the TDC was long overdue. 'Since 440 (over 90 per cent) of the corporation's 466 white employees are South African citizens, it is only to be expected that some South Africans would be included,' Mr Skinner said. He also said that senior management officials of the TDC, who were all South Africans, had agreed that certain employees should be relieved of their duties. It had been alleged that he had refused to admit a group of South African MPs to Transkei, but he said they were welcome as long as they paid for themselves. The MPs concerned had been on a Hans Lombard-arranged tour of the Ciskei, at the expense of that homeland's development corporation, and Mr Skinner decided that it was not in the financial interests of the TDC to pay for an extension of their tour to Transkei.¹⁰⁵

Mr Skinner won that fight but lost the next one. It started with a Sunday newspaper report that he had been spending vast sums of money, without authority, to repair a house on the outskirts of Umtata. Mr Skinner described the report as 'untrue', although he had admitted ordering renovations to the residence after discovering

that Franko Maritz's old residence, purchased by the TDC for R100 000, had been leased to an individual without authority in September 1978.¹⁰⁶ That individual was the minister of Commerce, Mr Ramsay Madikizela, who then re-let it to the local manager of the off-course tote, Mr Jack Weiner, for about R600 a month.¹⁰⁷ Whichever way Mr Skinner tried to explain it, the affair of the new residence provided a rationalisation for his ousting. Nor did the publication of his 34-page, 15-section report on the future of the TDC save him — though amongst other things it recommended that the President chair the TDC board. Mr Franko Maritz strongly attacked Mr Skinner at a board meeting that week and claimed that he had spent R60 000 on the repairs to the new house.

Mr Skinner felt, justifiably, that his opponents had a vested interest in shutting him up and driving him from Transkei. It was pointed out that Mr Maritz, on his retirement, had taken up full-time employment with Zakrzewski Associates, a firm of consulting engineers which did a considerable amount of work for the TDC. 'It is fair to question how he can work for them while he is chairman of the TDC board,' remarked one source. Another suggested that Mr Skinner was to investigate why industrial buildings were costing so much, and pointed out that Mr Maritz's new firm was able to afford a helicopter. Another example quoted was the way Mr Maritz's car was disposed of. Through a quick resale to a Mr Goboda, he made R5 728 profit, by buying it at book value from the TDC and reselling it at its going price, including R500 commission to a garage.¹⁰⁸ There were many other unpublished stories about the activities of the TDC, and it was little wonder that five of the directors submitted a memorandum to the Transkei government demanding Mr Maritz's resignation. But their demand was rejected. It was rumoured that Franko Maritz and Kaiser Matanzima were close associates and friends, and that in these circumstances it was not surprising that Franko Maritz was protected for so long, or that shortly after the board room row between him and Mr Skinner the latter was fired.

Ups and downs were the order of the day. The new managing director of the TDC, Mr Roy Gammie, resigned on a Friday, had his resignation accepted on the Monday by the TDC's executive committee, and on the Tuesday, February 13, 1979, was appointed acting managing director.¹⁰⁹ Just as summarily, the

Transkei Government then gave Mr Skinner 24 hours notice to leave the country and he was escorted out by the Security Police. He was refused admittance to South Africa and had to spend a night at Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg. Journalists were prohibited by the Security Police from talking to him at the K.D. Matanzima airport in Umtata.¹¹⁰ The episode exemplified Transkei's way with dissenters who fall from favour.

Few people in the country could seriously disagree with Mr Skinner's view, contained in a memorandum submitted to Mr Madikizela on January 26 that year, that Transkeians did not recognize the TDC as their own property for various historical reasons. Instead they identified it with foreign interests and treated it with hostility. He also proposed various schemes to develop closer links and some measure of identification between the TDC and the Transkeian people.¹¹¹

All to no avail: he had challenged the conglomerate of South African/TDC hierarchy/Transkei government interests, and he had to go. South African supervision of his departure was underlined by his having to sign forms detailing his recent and intended movements. A Department of National Security (formerly BOSS) official had accompanied him on his flight from Umtata, and his briefcase was tampered with.¹¹²

No reasons for his dismissal were given until he had left Transkei, but, Mr Madikizela, in a plainly ludicrous statement, accused him of being a socialist. Mr Skinner himself denied the charge, said he voted Liberal in England and claimed that he had left Tanzania when he felt that the socialist path had been taken too far. Indeed, in all his utterances on the future of the TDC, there was very little that could be described as remotely 'socialist'. He certainly felt there should be a closer identification between the TDC and the political leadership, and that there should be greater participation by Transkeians in the economy and the corporation. His framework, however, was essentially capitalist and aimed at the promotion of free enterprise.

Mr Madikizela's view was that Mr Skinner tried to cause revolution and chaos. He had tried to set up his house at Viedgesville 'where he could be accessible for night secret meetings.' He was also a 'hardened racist who hated white South Africans.' By calling on Franko Maritz to resign he had emphasized 'his hatred for the Afrikaners.' 'Skinner's move,' concluded Madikizela, 'was to introduce socialism into Transkei.'¹¹³

It was a quite remarkable statement and it was no wonder that Mr Skinner immediately instituted legal proceedings,¹¹⁴ although Mr Madikizela has now been protected in his personal capacity by the 1980 amendment to the constitution. It was reported that Kaiser Matanzima had forced through his dismissal although the majority of the cabinet was 'solidly' behind Mr Skinner,¹¹⁵ and that Mr Maritz was grateful he had gone.¹¹⁶ That said far more about why he was forced out than his apparent inclinations towards socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Daily Dispatch*, 20 January 1976.
2. Evidence and Exhibits of the Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged Irregularities in the former Department of Information (Erasmus Commission), Vol 22, 1980, page 7435.
3. *Argus*, 5 May 1976.
4. *Sunday Times*, 24 October 1976.
5. *Daily Dispatch*, 6 August 1976.
6. *Daily Dispatch*, 18 October 1976.
7. For example, *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 March 1976.
8. *Daily Dispatch*, 25 March 1976.
9. For example, *Daily Dispatch*, 7 October 1976.
10. *Daily Dispatch*, 15 November 1976.
11. *Ibid*, 14 January 1977.
12. *Daily Dispatch* and *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 April 1977.
13. *Daily Dispatch*, 24 March 1977.
14. *Ibid*, 13 April 1977.
15. *Ibid*, 9 February 1977.
16. *Imvo*, 16 July 1977, and *Daily Dispatch*, 18 August 1977.
17. *Daily Dispatch*, 9 and 23 July 1977.
18. *Ibid*, 18 August 1977.
19. *Ibid*.
20. *Argus*, 9 November 1977.
21. *Citizen*, 13 January 1978.
22. *Sunday Times*, 19 March 1978.
23. *Post*, 23 December 1979.
24. *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1978.

25. Ibid, 20 September 1977.
26. Ibid, 7 August 1978.
27. Ibid, 18 July 1978.
28. Minutes of Select Committee on Public Accounts, page 536 of Debates of the National Assembly, 1978.
29. Ibid, page 460.
30. *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 May 1978.
31. Debates of the National Assembly, 1977, pages 143, 144 and 173.
32. *Die Burger*, 30 April 1977.
33. *Vaderland*, 5 April 1977.
34. *Daily Dispatch*, 8 April 1977.
35. Ibid, 11 May 1977.
36. Minutes of Select Committee on Public Accounts, ibid, page 459.
37. *Daily Dispatch*, 20 September 1977.
38. Ibid, 21 September 1977.
39. *Sunday Express*, 25 September 1977.
40. *Sunday Tribune*, 25 September 1977.
41. *Cape Times* and *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 February 1978.
42. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 February 1978.
43. Ibid, 17 February 1978.
44. Ibid, 26 August 1977.
45. Ibid, 5 April 1978.
46. *Argus*, 19 April 1978.
47. *Daily Dispatch*, 18 April 1977.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid, 22 June 1978.
50. Ibid, 20 May 1978.
51. Ibid, 5 May 1978.
52. Ibid, 18 July 1978, and *Daily News*, 20 July 1978.
53. *Argus*, 31 August 1978.
54. *Sunday Express*, 17 September 1979.
55. *Argus*, 30 September 1978.
56. *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 September 1978.
57. *Daily Dispatch*, 28 October 1978.
58. Ibid, 27 and 28 October 1978.
59. Ibid, 3 November 1978.
60. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, page 291.
61. Ibid, page 297.
62. *Imvo*, 12 May 1979.
63. As printed in *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 August 1979.
64. *Sunday Express*, 12 August 1979.

65. *Argus*, 31 August 1979.
66. *Financial Mail*, 31 August 1979.
67. *Daily Dispatch*, 20 April 1979.
68. Ibid, 8 August 1979.
- 68a. *Sunday Express*, 7 October 1979.
69. Ibid, 5 September 1979.
70. *Sunday Times*, 23 September 1977.
71. *Daily Dispatch*, 15 September 1979.
72. Ibid, 17 February 1979, and *Daily News*, 17 February 1979.
73. *Daily Dispatch*, 17 February 1979.
74. *Daily News*, 17 February 1979.
75. *Sunday Tribune*, 18 February 1979.
76. *Daily Dispatch*, 19 February 1979.
77. *Daily Dispatch* and *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 February 1979.
78. *Citizen*, 19 February 1979.
79. *Sunday Tribune*, 18 February 1979.
80. *Daily Dispatch*, 19 February 1979.
81. Ibid.
82. *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 February 1979.
83. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, page 8/9.
84. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 February 1979.
85. *Post*, 25 March 1979.
86. *Daily Dispatch*, 31 March 1979, *Sunday Tribune*, 1 April 1979, *Daily News*, 3 April 1979, and *Imvo*, 7 April 1979.
87. *Sunday Times*, 15 April 1979.
88. *Citizen*, 21 April 1979.
89. *Daily Dispatch* 3 May 1979 and *Argus* 8 May 1979.
90. *Daily Dispatch*, 7 July 1979.
91. Ibid, 10 July 1979.
92. *Sunday Express*, 4 May 1980.
93. *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 August 1979.
94. *Daily Dispatch*, 28 August 1979.
95. Ibid.
96. *Sunday Times*, 23 September 1979.
97. *Daily Dispatch*, 29 August 1979.
98. *Sunday Times*, 23 September 1979.
99. *Daily Dispatch*, 4 October 1979, *Post*, 7 October 1979, and *Sunday Express*, 7 October 1979.
100. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 February 1978, and *Sunday Tribune*, 12 February 1978.
101. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 April 1978.

102. Ibid, 11 February and 28 February 1978.
103. Ibid, 30 September 1978.
104. *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 October 1978.
105. *Argus*, 5 December 1978, and *Cape Times*, 12 December 1978.
106. *Sunday Tribune*, 11 February 1979.
107. *Daily Dispatch*, 5 February 1978.
108. *Sunday Tribune*, 11 February 1978.
109. *Daily Dispatch*, 14 February 1979.
110. Ibid, 16 February 1979.
111. Ibid, 14 February 1979.
112. Ibid, 17 February 1979.
113. Ibid, 20 February 1979.
114. Ibid, 1 March 1979.
115. *Daily News*, 15 February 1979.
116. *Citizen*, 17 February 1979.

Chapter Seven

THE WAGES OF INDEPENDENCE

Corruption

This enrichment cannot be condoned by any means.

— Hector Ncokazi, then leader of the Democratic Party, speaking on the use by Kaiser and George Matanzima and their political allies of rent-free farms supplied by the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development. August 1, 1977.

The farms were robbed from the people by British rooineks, who have no shame in their blackmail of people whose land they robbed so callously.

— George Matanzima, speaking on the same issue. July 31, 1977.

One of the points made in this book is that Transkeian 'independence' has benefited only a tiny élite in one of the most underdeveloped regions of the world. The main benefit reaped by this élite — which is formed by the governing party, its relatively wealthy supporters, the civil service, and the armed forces — must be measured in salaries far beyond the comprehension of the mass of unemployed, underemployed and migrant workers of the territory.

However it appears that the new Transkeian élite is not content with this advantage. Many of its members have turned to dubious and illegal methods of further enriching their personal lives. This trend started in the 1950s and continues to this day.

The South African government cannot be absolved of the charge of participating in corrupt and illegal practices in the region. We would argue that by rewarding the supporters of apartheid with extra perks it has sought to make collaboration in unfolding apartheid policy a materially rewarding proposition.

The practice began in the mid-fifties when South Africa ceded land traditionally administered by Chief Sabata Dalindyebo — King of the Thembus and a staunch opponent of apartheid — to Kaiser Matanzima. This provided Matanzima with the power base he needed in Transkei, and established a pattern of support for him as apartheid's expedient champion. For Matanzima, his brother, and many of his political colleagues, the material rewards of collaboration have been great.

His involvement in corrupt and suspect practices set an example to civil servants and other government employees, and it is not surprising that they have done well out of independence. They have followed in their master's footsteps, and have turned government departments into nests of corruption and maladministration. This section seeks to establish the nature and extent of this corruption.

Senior South African government officials set the tone of corruption in the months leading up to October 1976, the time of the Port St Johns land deal saga. The South African government paid R1,2 million compensation to a Pretoria businessman, Mr P Henning, for his holiday plots in Port St Johns after the town had been incorporated into Transkei. 'Desperate residents' of Port St Johns had been told by the government to wait patiently for compensation. Moreover, the government had paid Mr Henning just when they were withdrawing offers for farms in the Ciskei that were scheduled to be handed over to black investors. The farmers were told that the offers had been withdrawn because there was no government money available.

It was alleged in a newspaper report at the time that the Port St Johns deal had gone through because a South African government official had been paid a R150 000 bribe to expedite Mr Henning's compensation claim.² Professor Chris Jansen, then Director of Life Sciences at the Atomic Energy Board, made the claim about the bribe and admitted to being the 'Pretoria connection' in the deal. Two Pretoria companies had made a R1 784 000 profit on the deal when the properties were sold to the Bantu Trust.³ A police investigation followed, but the Attorney General of the Transvaal said in 1978 that there was insufficient evidence for him to prosecute.⁴ There were several other reports of corruption of this nature, involving senior government officials, at the time. Millions of rands changed hands in these deals, and several individuals made huge profits by buying land in areas of Transkei

zoned for incorporation into the territory. The profiteers bought properties — armed with the knowledge, not made public at the time, that the South African government would later buy them out — and resold them to the government at a massive profit.

These land deals did not involve the Matanzimas or any Transkei government officials, so they will not be examined in detail here. What should be borne in mind is the precedent they set for members of the Transkei government and civil service, many of whom have since been implicated in equally shady deals.

For the Transkei élite the pay-off came with independence — when, for example, the territory's first Prime Minister, Kaiser Matanzima, was given a R315 000 palace by the South African government, as well as a R16 000 American limousine.⁵

What follows is a history of dubious activities, many of which have come to light after investigations by courageous journalists in the territory, some of whom have suffered deportation, detention and harassment by the Matanzima regime. It is impossible to gauge the full extent of corruption as it is practised in Transkei today, but it is known to involve people ranging from international speculators to senior government officials and civil servants, and to include shady deals by many South African businessmen.

Umtata is constantly rife with rumours, often well-grounded as it later turns out, of a rampant and ubiquitous corruption. Less and less of this information is getting into print, and details of government corruption are especially difficult to source. Informants are not willing to go on record as repression worsens in the region and is increasingly used not only to squash political dissent but also to silence those who 'know too much'.

Corruption in the region is not confined only to business deals, but appears to have permeated every facet of government operations, including the judiciary, civil service and the police force.

One of the earliest instances of corruption involving South African government participation in Kaiser Matanzima's rise to power was reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* in 1963.

Five months before the vital election of the Chief Minister of Transkei in December 1963 the South African government gave a 2 630 morgen farm to Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau — in exchange, it seems, for his vital support of Kaiser Matanzima for

the position.

The *Rand Daily Mail* reported that 'at the time of the donation of the farm, Chief Sigcau held the balance of power between the two aspirants for the Chief Ministership, Kaiser Matanzima and Chief Victor Poto, Paramount Chief of Western Pondoland.

'In the election, Chief Sigcau and his supporters backed Matanzima, who won. Only one Eastern Pondoland chief voted for Chief Poto.' This gave Matanzima a 54-49 majority over Chief Poto. The entire Eastern Pondoland bloc of 15 votes was expected to go to Chief Poto, as Sigcau and his camp were all supporters of the opposition Democratic Party. The conclusion reached by observers at the time was that Sigcau's bloc had voted for Matanzima, against their political interests, in exchange for the farm — which was made the 'Great Place' of the Sigcau royal family. When questioned by the press about the gift and whether it had influenced him and the Eastern Pondoland MPs to vote for Matanzima, Sigcau replied in the negative.

The then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr de Wet Nel, refused to comment.

The alliance between Matanzima and Chief Sigcau was finally consolidated when Sigcau was made State President of Transkei after independence in 1976.

KAISER'S FARMS

Before independence in 1976, a government-sponsored motion was introduced in the Umtata House of Assembly. It proposed that white farms to be given to Transkei by the South African government as part of the homeland consolidation plan should be allocated to paramount chiefs and to farmers who had rendered 'faithful service to the development of the Transkei.'⁶

TNIP secretary-general Ludidi, who proposed the motion, said: 'The question whether the paramount chief would farm productively is beside the point. I am concerned that the government should recognize the role the paramount chiefs have played in our long and non-violent progress to independence.'⁷

Replying to him, Mr Knowledge Guzana (then leader of the opposition) said he was now 'convinced that those in power seek to entrench themselves forever. They seek to reward their political supporters from paramount chiefs down to their political canvassers.'⁸

A few days later the *Sunday Tribune* reported that Kaiser and George Matanzima had 'acquired' two farms near Queenstown which were bought from a white farmer by the Bantu Trust for more than R400 000 as part of the homeland consolidation process. It seems certain that the motion introduced by Ludidi, as outlined above, was inspired by the Matanzimas, who began moving into the farmhouses some weeks before the motion was passed. Ludidi, when confronted by the *Sunday Tribune* over the issue said of George Matanzima's new farm: 'It's a little bit awkward. I don't know how he got it. We'll just have to wink at it.'

Replying to a question as to whether his motion would lead to abuses by people in influential positions, Ludidi said: 'I am very sure this will happen. You'll find a lot of it...'⁹

After this interview with Ludidi had been published, the *Daily Dispatch* revealed that the two farms taken over by Kaiser and George Matanzima were to have formed the basis of a big TDC cattle-ranching project.¹⁰ The TDC had gone as far as appointing a manager for the proposed cattle ranch when it was learned that the Matanzimas had taken the farms over.

The press was unable, at the time, to establish how the Matanzimas had acquired the farms. Guzana promised to press for further information in the House of Assembly. It was speculated that the bill, passed shortly before the press uncovered the Matanzima mystery, had actually been introduced to make provision for their occupancy at the farms.

On April 20 the MP for King Williamstown, Mr S A van den Heever, said he would raise the issue with the government in Parliament in Cape Town. He said South Africa was in a difficult financial position and could not afford the luxury of spending R400 000 to buy farms for Transkeians.¹¹ The farms occupied some of the best farmland in South Africa, and the issue was getting more coverage than the Matanzimas might have anticipated. The farms had not yet been officially incorporated into the Transkei and the issue thus involved both the South African and Transkeian governments.

An executive member of the Transkei Democratic Party, Mr J Z Kobo, said on April 23 that a meeting of the party's executive would be held the following day to discuss the cession of the farms to the Matanzimas. He said the meeting would tell the people of the Transkei that the Matanzimas' motive in pushing for independence was self-enrichment.¹²

'The acute shortage of land in the Transkei and the poverty, hunger and suffering that goes with it should make the Matanzima brothers ashamed of grabbing everything for themselves. When they clamour for more land (for the Transkei) they want that land for themselves and their friends. The people must be aware that what is involved is self-glory for the brothers,' he said.

When the DP put their question about the farms to the government in the Assembly later that week, the question was neatly sidestepped by the then Minister of the Interior, Ms Stella Sigcau. She said that because the farms were still officially outside the Transkei, they were outside her department's jurisdiction, and she could therefore not answer the question.¹³ But the press speculated that because the farms were never handed over to the Transkei by the Bantu Trust, they must have been given or sold to the Matanzimas by the South African government.¹⁴ It was now up to the South African government to give a full explanation of the matter, according to Knowledge Guzana.

On April 30 the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M C Botha, gave a veiled reply to questions on the issue put to him by Mr van den Heever. He said the government had approved the allocation to Kaiser Matanzima of one of the houses on nine farms acquired near Queenstown. He did not mention George Matanzima.¹⁵ The issue remained dormant until July 1977 when the *Sunday Times* reported that Kaiser was 'dishing out farmlands worth millions of rands to himself, Cabinet Ministers and other political allies.'¹⁶ The report said Kaiser had been given rent-free use of the farm by the Department of Bantu Administration and was using it for his own profit. He was not simply occupying the house, as the Department had maintained the previous year. Brother George was doing likewise with the farm he had obtained.

It was also revealed that Kaiser had notified the TDC that he required a neighbouring farm for the use of his Minister of Finance Tsepo Letlaka. Letlaka, too, was to use the whole farm, rent free, for his own profit. Other political allies of the Matanzimas were being allowed to use neighbouring farms — all of which belonged to the Bantu Trust — for their own profit on the personal orders of Kaiser Matanzima. It appeared, too, that Mr. M C Botha had knowledge of and was implicated in these deals with Matanzima. The report said that when approached for comment on the issue, Botha replied: 'Transkei is now independent and we have made

completely new arrangements with the Transkei government and the corporations managing these farms. I cannot give you the details.'

Then, after having remained silent on the issue for over a year, the Matanzimas lashed back. On July 27, 1977¹⁷ George Matanzima accused the *Sunday Times* of being a 'notoriously biased and racialistic newspaper.' He conceded that he and Kaiser were using the farms, but said the land on which the farms stood had been 'grabbed by British robbers' from Kaiser's great-grandparents and allocated to British settlers free of charge.¹⁸ 'Now the descendants of these robbers, those murderers who killed Mapasa's followers and grabbed his land, have a vendetta against the good name of Transkei's prime minister.' He said the descendants of the British colonialists, the *Sunday Times*, should remember that their forefathers 'grabbed the mining area of the Reef and helped themselves to land belonging to the Northern Sotho.' While there was some — albeit twisted — justification for this statement, George went on to say that 'these press attacks are making our people very bitter' and were strengthening their determination to recover every inch of ground that was 'robbed' by the white colonialists.

This was absurd, as 'his people' were angry only that the Matanzimas had used their positions to enrich themselves while selling out on their brothers and sisters. He said, finally, that 'of course, the Prime Minister who worked so hard to acquire the land, will be among the beneficiaries and so will his brother George.'

Predictably, the Matanzimas ignored renewed calls by the opposition for their resignation, and could not be contacted by the press for further comment on the issue. But they had succeeded in one thing, if in nothing else — they had set the example for their minions to follow . . .

In October 1977 South Africa's Foreign Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, handed over a R2 million palace for the state president to the Transkei government. The palace, which a press report said was 'the best of its kind in the whole of Southern Africa,'¹⁹ was clearly designed as a prestigious symbol. Unfortunately, it stood in the middle of one of the poorest regions in the world.

In 1978 government corruption was again highlighted in the news media. In August it was reported that the Transkei government was selling houses formerly owned by whites in

Umtata to government officials at incredibly low prices.²⁰ The government official in charge of allocating the houses, Secretary for Local Government Mgudla, bought a house for R2 300. The South African government had paid R44 000 for it. These houses had been given by the South African government to their Transkeian protégés in 1976. They had been bought from whites who wished to leave Umtata before independence by the South African Bantu Trust, but of the subsequent sales, only one had been registered in the Umtata deeds office. A reporter wishing to peruse files in the deeds office was told by an official that Kaiser Matanzima 'gets very angry when journalists look at these deeds.'²¹

Other shady dealings involving the houses included the sale of a house valued at R30 000 to Justice Secretary J D Zeka for R2 100; the sale of a house to the Secretary for Education, T M Mbambisa, for R5 050 (the house was valued at R10 160); and negotiations to buy a house occupying the best position in Umtata by Kaiser Matanzima.

After these suspicious dealings had been reported in the press, the Minister of Local Government, George Ndabankulu, said, somewhat predictably given the response by George Matanzima to the publicity surrounding the disputed farms, that the houses were situated on land that had been 'generously donated' by Transkeian chiefs to white settlers.²² He also said the houses had been shown, on close inspection, to be made of mud covered with plaster. This was an apparent justification for the low prices government officials had paid for the dwellings. Ndabankulu added that since the land on which the houses stood had been 'generously' donated to white settlers by Transkeian chiefs in the last century, the Transkeian government 'could not therefore be bound by arbitrary land valuations.'

The same day journalists in Umtata discovered that Kaiser had ordered the Umtata deeds office – which by law should have been open to the public – out of bounds, 'especially to journalists.'²³ It was also revealed that Kaiser had bought the R44 000 house that had been occupied by the former Transkeian Attorney General, but the amount he paid was unknown. The journalist inquiring about it had not been allowed to peruse records in the deeds office.

A newspaper report estimated²⁴ that the Bantu Trust had handed about 500 houses to the Transkei government at the time

of independence and that 'few, if any of these houses have been registered with the deeds office.'

In February 1979 the new Prime Minister, George Matanzima, took a new step toward preventing the public airing of scandals involving his government when he banned all parliamentary debate on three major scandals that were rocking his government's already non-existent credibility.²⁵ The scandals involved the assault on Mr Humphrey Berkeley, the firing of TDC manager James Skinner and the shock cabinet decision to fail hundreds of matric pupils. Matanzima banned debate on these issues as he said they were being investigated by the police and were therefore sub judice.

Three months later three TNIP MP's, addressing a 500-strong TNIP rally in Umtata, accused the government of serious irregularities in selling and allocating houses, granting disability pensions and employment practices.²⁶

The Rev A Mabovula accused the government of allocating and selling houses to relatives, friends and those in its good books. He further alleged that applications for pensions and disability grants were shelved unless applicants were personally known to the officials.

Examples of corruption in the judiciary and police are widespread and cases involving employees of these two departments make regular headlines in the Umtata press. It is impossible to mention all these incidents here, but two are used below as examples.

In the first case, involving a police attempt to bribe a motorist, it was alleged that Mr Alfred O'Driscoll of Johannesburg was threatened with imprisonment by a Transkeian policeman for refusing to pay a bribe to a policeman who accused him of having smooth tyres.²⁷ After the policeman had inspected Mr O'Driscoll's car, he ordered the motorist to take him for a drive. Mr O'Driscoll takes up the story:

'After we had driven for a while, during which time we passed the police station, he asked me how business was, and I replied it was not so good. We drove past the police station again and he asked me again how business was. I told him it was bloody lousy. It was obvious what he was getting at – he wanted money. The policeman then told me to drive to the police station because he was going to charge me. At the police station I told him I wanted to take the matter to court, but . . . he said the court was closed

and since I did not want to pay an admission of guilt fine he would have to lock me up until Friday. I just decided to pay the fine and get out.'

Petty corruption of this nature is widespread in today's Transkei — and there is little hope that the region's bureaucracy will ever rid itself of these practices because of the example set by people in the top echelons of government.

In June 1979,²⁸ a magistrate and a prosecutor were each sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment on charges of bribery and corruption. They were found to have accepted a total of R330 and a quantity of liquor from a Willowvale trader for considering his request to have an assault charge withdrawn. One of the men was already serving a 6-month sentence for corruption. Sentencing the two men, the magistrate, Mr T A Moll, said: 'The people of Transkei have to respect the police force and their judicial officers. If this malpractice is allowed to continue it will mean the whole society is being struck at . . .'

A revealing case involving civil servants came before the courts in September 1979 when a clerk in the office of the Receiver of Revenue was charged with the misappropriation of government funds. Sentencing Mr H Mzwandile to a fine of R100 or four months' imprisonment, the magistrate, Mr D B Muir, said the courts had been 'dealing with such cases for the last five years.'²⁹

In November 1979 South Africa's first black magistrate was sacked as chairman of the Transkei Public Service Commission a few months after he reversed a judicial finding and cleared a former trainee diplomat.³⁰

In March 1980 the opposition DPP called on the Transkei government to resign and hand over to white South African officials because of maladministration of the affairs of state.³¹ DPP member, W Dweba, and fellow party member, Chief D Mlindawze, said there had been distrust, inefficiency, thefts and the squandering of public funds ever since independence.

Chief Mlindawze said the Transkei civil service was a disgrace, staffed by incompetent, unqualified and unreliable people. Some of these people were ordered, against regulations by senior officials, to sign cheques for large amounts of money.

'The government must, therefore, resign as it has failed to administer the affairs of the country, and should let white South African officials run the country. In fact, we never understood why you broke away from them in the first place,' Chief Mlindawze

said.

Two months later the report of a select committee on public accounts in Transkei for the period 1978/79 was released in Umtata.

It released details of unauthorized spending totalling R2,9 million in 10 government departments. The report attributed this massive sum to extra printing costs . . .

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show in this chapter the extent of the corruption practised in post-1976 Transkei, permeating the civil service and government from top to bottom.

We have also tried to show that this corruption — including the 'gifts' transferred from one section of the Transkeian élite to another — indicates clearly who the real beneficiaries of Transkeian independence have been.

So much has been covered up and sanctioned by the very highest authority in the region that it is impossible to gauge the full extent of this corruption or to put a figure to it. It is probable that the press has succeeded only in exposing the tip of the iceberg but what has emerged is a pattern of self-enrichment by the beneficiaries of Transkei independence at the expense of the masses, who languish under conditions of abject poverty in a region designed to serve the interests of those who proclaimed it independent.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Cape Times* 26/4/77.
2. *Ibid* 26/4/77.
3. *Sunday Times* 8/1/78.
4. *Daily Dispatch* 27/1/78.
5. *Rand Daily Mail* 22/10/76.
6. *DD* 13/4/76.
7. *Ibid*.
8. *Ibid*.
9. *Sunday Tribune* 18/4/76.

10. *DD* 19/4/76.
11. *Ibid* 21/4/76.
12. *Ibid* 24/4/76.
13. *DD* 28/4/76.
14. *DD* 28/4/76.
15. *DD* 30/4/76.
16. *Sunday Times* 24/7/77.
17. *DD* 28/7/77.
18. *DD* 28/7/77.
19. *Imvo* 29/10/77.
20. *Sunday Tribune* 6/8/78.
21. *Ibid* 6/8/78.
22. *DD* 11/8/78.
23. *Daily News* 11/8/78.
24. *Ibid* 11/8/78.
25. *Ibid* 27/2/79.
26. *DD* 7/5/79.
27. *DD* 8/2/79.
28. *DD* 1/6/79.
29. *Indaba* 7/9/79.
30. *Post* 4/11/79.
31. *Natal Mercury* 25/3/80.

Chapter Eight

GRASS ROOTS FARMING

Transkei's Dagga Industry

For as long as people have been living in South Africa, dagga has been smoked. In Transkei especially it grows in wild profusion, and until fairly recently its consumption by black people (and, quite probably, not a few white people) was disregarded. But with the advent of the youth/cultural revolution in the West in the late 1960s, and government concern about the misuse of drugs, including dagga (marijuana/grass), it was inevitable that the worldwide clamp-down would be strongly supported in South Africa. Tough anti-drug legislation was pushed through Parliament in 1971 by the then Minister of the Interior, Dr Connie Mulder, though it was too late to do more than push up prices and penalties: the use of dagga by black communities in both rural and urban areas had spread to white areas, and was particularly prevalent among the youth at all class levels.

In spite of imaginative counter-action by the South African Police drug squad, especially by its current head, Col Basic Smit, the use of dagga in the urban areas has not decreased and has probably increased, although, for obvious reasons, statistics are difficult to come by. In 1978, the then Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions, Mr F W de Klerk, dismissed this view, pointing out that prosecutions had dropped from 40 935 in 1971 to 21 909 in 1976. (The figure for possession of dagga in 1976/7 among whites was 600 while in 1977/8 it was 608 according to the Minister of Statistics, Dr Andries Treurnicht in February 1980;¹ while the prosecutions in 1977/8 totalled 24 033 for all races² — indicating that Mr de Klerk's views were somewhat optimistic.) In his 1978 speech, Mr de Klerk said he knew that there would be people

who contended that 'this drop does not prove anything because the problem has merely been driven underground by the measures which we adopted. But I want to argue that the matter is not quite as simple as that . . . there is really no concrete evidence for the underground theory.' Nevertheless, he proposed amendments to the Abuse of Dependence-Producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act which reduced the sentences for people found in possession of dagga.³

The number of people sent to jail for possession of dagga is staggering. The Progressive Federal Party MP, Mrs Helen Suzman, estimated that 80 000 people were sent to jail for dagga offences in the five years following the implementation of the drug law, while 10 000 were jailed for dealing.⁴ In 1977/8 a total of 15 870 people, mostly black, were convicted of possession (43,5 people every day of the year) while 3 757 were convicted of dealing (10,3 people every day of the year).⁵ And whatever the politicians may say, this is merely scratching the surface. Dagga is still available in all the urban areas of South Africa and it is still used as much as ever. For example in 1977 the divisional CID officer for the South Western Police Division, Colonel A P van den Heever, estimated that only one out of every ten dealers was arrested and he said dagga usage was increasing.⁶ The New Republic Party MP for Berea, Mr Nigel Wood, described it as a 'booming' export for Transkei at the end of the same year.⁷

In the meantime, dagga smuggling has become a major operation for crime gangs. There is police evidence, reflected in court cases, that the profitable South African traffic is linked to international drug gangs where the profits are even higher.⁸ Dagga bought in South Africa for R1 000 can fetch as much as R20 000 overseas, delivered. Early in 1979, for example, dagga worth R1 million destined for Britain resulted in the arrest of three men in Durban. It was being exported as 'African curios'. In much the same way that Prohibition in the United States laid the foundations of the Mafia, a whole underground network of gangs is emerging in South Africa, with thousands of users, runners and dealers linking into the system.

Prohibition in the US was a disastrous experiment. Pushed by such bodies as the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Anti-Saloon League, with the strong backing of the Protestant Churches, the US Congress banned the manufacture or sale of alcoholic liquor during World War 1, then wrote it into the

constitution. It was called 'a noble experiment' and it was a failure. The Prohibition constitutional amendment was repealed in 1933, never to be revived, and intoxicating liquor is as much a part of the American way of life as Coca-Cola. A former US Attorney-General, Ramsey Clark, wrote that the anti-marijuana moves in his country were 'reminiscent of the frantic enforcement activity in the dying days of the Prohibition, when raids indiscriminately and unjustly rounded up thousands of persons who had done nothing different from hundreds of thousands of others.'⁹ South Africa's prohibition may not be in its dying stages, but it is heading that way, simply because the vast majority of people simply do not see any greater offence in dagga than in, say, alcohol.

If South Africa's frantic enforcement of the unenforceable is keeping a large number of police and court officials busy, it is also making the Transkeian dagga plant the territory's most profitable agricultural product, earning millions of rand, tax-free, for a significant number of people.

THE PROFITS

In spite of the potential dangers, the dagga business is a highly profitable one. The plant grows easily in many parts of Transkei, often as a weed. The only real problem at the stage of cultivation is to keep it undetected (accordingly, it must be grown in a relatively inaccessible place) and to ensure that it is reaped at the right time. Then, there is the problem of selling it to the middle man, normally the runner. Inside Transkei, this does not seem to be much of a hurdle. Colonel L F Funani of the Transkei Police even talked about an informal dagga 'market' in the Libode area in October 1979, where buyers competed with each other.¹⁰

It seems that although there is some competition, a buying cartel exists, because the prices paid to the primary producer — that is, the Transkeian farmer or speculator — are extremely low, given the ultimate price paid for the product. However, the delivery is expensive, with high risk — which means that runners require adequate compensation for the danger. In any event it is clearly a profitable crop despite the low price.

Col Smit said in an interview that dagga was divided into three grades depending on its content of THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) which determined its potency. Dagga 'brands' like Durban Poison,

perhaps South Africa's most renowned specimen, Acapulco Gold, Zanzibar Green and Malawi Red, are the most popular and most potent. Dagga grown in Eastern Pondoland is also popular for the same reason, including a brand called St Johns No 1. The top of the plant where the THC concentrates is first grade. Second grade is also popular but less expensive, while third grade is the cheapest.

The product is normally sold in bags initially and then dispensed in smaller quantities. A bag of first grade could be bought in March 1979 for between R300 and R400 a bag. In return a dealer could make up to R8 000, or even more, in profit. Third grade, on the other hand, could be bought for between R15 and R30 and could bring in about R3 000 in profit for the dealer. Usually the dagga is rolled into zols and about 3 000 zols can be made from one bag. Prices for a zol at that time varied from 50 cents to R1 for the lower grades and went up to R3 a zol for first grade.¹¹ Dagga, like most commodities, is more expensive in Johannesburg than elsewhere.

An indication of the income generated by the sale of dagga was given in the Transkei National Assembly in 1979 when an amendment was moved to the Abuse of Dependency-Producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act, which, as its name implies, is modelled on the South African legislation. An MP for Bizana, Mr W M Madikizela, said in his speech that there was 'a great demand for dagga' and that 'it is a money-making commodity and in my area there are many youngsters who own cars because they have found the sale of dagga very lucrative. I do not invite you to go and investigate such matters, but there is that unhappy situation in our part of the country.' An Umtata MP, Mr W Z Lufefeni, confirmed this: 'They come and cart the dagga plants away and sell them, becoming rich thereby. Some people who live in Pondoland have never been to work because they derive their income from dagga . . . In Transkei, dagga will always be grown because it is a source of income. It is just in general use and used for the same purpose as liquor.' Chief G L Sigcau from Sipaqeni (Flagstaff) claimed 'dagga is a Pondo tobacco which has made us rich . . . A lot of businessmen have been made rich by dealing in dagga and, in fact, it will be easy to pay our taxes now because we will be selling dagga. I think the Hon Minister should be thanked for this bill and I thank him on behalf of my people that now we shall be able to pay our taxes with this commodity in free use.' Chief G M Mabandla of Tsolo said that there was

no gold or silver or diamond mines in Transkei but 'we do have a prevalent natural article in the form of dagga plants. Our people derive great benefit financially from the sale of this plant and it will benefit our own people instead of people in far-off places like Port Elizabeth . . . During the regime of the South African Government the white people saw that we had no mines from which we could derive revenue and because of the fact that we tried to improve our financial situation by growing dagga our former masters discouraged the growing of this plant.'¹² The point is clear: dagga cultivation is profitable, probably the highest single internal income earner in Transkei, other than labour.

THE POLICY

Officially, the Transkei government is opposed to dagga, but in practice, as the speeches of the MPs quoted above indicate, this opposition is not very determined. Between 1977 and 1978, the number of dagga cases decreased from 555 to 326¹³ and it seems that many of those were 'foreign' runners caught by the police. Certainly both the amendment to the drug law, and the reasons offered for it, indicate that it is not regarded as a serious crime. Mr Koyana then Minister of Justice, reflected this when he referred to 'simple dagga cases' where people who had smoked it all their lives had been sent to jail for possessing dagga. He did stress, however, that the government did not condone 'trafficking in dagga by unscrupulous persons for personal gain.' He added: 'We are of the opinion that many of the persons convicted of dealing in dagga are merely runners for the main dealers in the main cities of South Africa.' He also felt that if fines were imposed on runners, they would merely be paid by the dealers.¹⁴

The implication is apparent: as far as the government is concerned the main problem is the dealer in the big city, and that is South Africa's responsibility. If the central problem were removed, the market would not be so good. But the MPs took it much further: they welcomed the financial benefits of dagga trading and implicitly accepted that the traditional use of dagga would continue in Transkei. Indeed, the MP for Mqanduli, Mr P N Nkosiyan, took it much further: 'I want this trafficking in dagga to be a money-making proposition . . . I think the government itself should have large plantations. The use of dagga can then be

controlled as in the case of liquor. You will remember we used to be fined and imprisoned for drinking liquor but that did not stop us drinking . . . I think there should be general planting of dagga and everybody will realize the importance of having large plantations.¹⁵ There was apparently laughter during his speech, but, in the end, it may well be that the only solution will be for alcohol and dagga to be placed under the same controls. And, in any event, it seems clear that the export of dagga from Transkei is now a fact of life that is accepted in the territory.

THE MARKETING

Because dagga is illegal in South Africa and because the borders are watched closely by the South African Police, the marketing of dagga in the big cities is, undoubtedly, the most precarious aspect of the whole operation. The runners, it seems, can make big and quick money, but the stakes are high.

A Cape Town trial in 1978 gave one indication of how the substance is transported. In evidence, it was disclosed that seven men left in a truck in July 1977 to fetch pineapples in Port Alfred. They travelled to Port Alfred, fetched the pineapples and then went to Sterkspruit inside Transkei. They were approached by the two accused and eventually, after negotiation, went into the mountains where their truck was loaded (by torchlight) with what the driver told the court he thought were sacks of potatoes. He eventually drove the truck back to Cape Town with the 'potatoes' and was arrested the day after he got back. In evidence, one of the transporters (all of whom had charges against them dropped) said he was paid R800 for the trip and that there were 53 bags on the truck.¹⁶ At going prices that load was worth at least R75 000, and the two dealers were eventually sentenced to ten and eight years.

Runners have used every conceivable method to carry their valuable cargo. In February 1979, for example, the driver and conductor of a pantechnicon were arrested at Queenstown. They were transporting 45 bags valued by the police at R114 000.¹⁷

Many of the smugglers are caught at roadblocks. Thus, in January 1978, four cars and 24 people were arrested in one weekend in which 39 000 zols, and cargoes worth R400 000 were netted.¹⁸ In August 1979, R55 000 worth was picked up in road-

blocks near Harding.¹⁹ In June 1980, two men from Windhoek were caught with 39 kgs of dagga which they had bought in Engcobo.²⁰

There have been variations on the theme. A 17-year-old Cape Town youth who was given a five-year suspended sentence in Queenstown told the court he had been stopped by two men in Umtata who asked him if he could take some clothes back with him to Cape Town for them. He became suspicious and asked them if there was any dagga in the bundle of clothing. They admitted there was but paid him R50.²¹

Frequently, the roadblocks are broken and dangerous car chases ensue — like the one involving a Transkei-registered van which was carrying R1 million worth of dagga. After a highspeed chase, which included a wrong-way burst down a freeway, the driver was caught when he jumped out of the moving vehicle.²² In a Queens-town car chase, a man crashed through a roadblock, turned onto a dirt road and drove at 160 kms per hour until the police drew up next to him and pointed an R1 automatic weapon.²³ A Uitenhage man, who got a 12-year sentence with five years suspended, was shot in the buttock when he tried to run away after attempting to force a police vehicle off a dirt road.²⁴

Dagga has been found in vehicles equipped with false bottoms.²⁵ A police dog, aptly named Soek-Soek, sniffed out a suitcase on a bus which had stopped in the centre of Queens-town.²⁶ Soek-Soek's exploit has been emulated on trains and on platforms,²⁷ and at East London airport where a man in a wheel chair was arrested with dagga on him.²⁸ Others have been arrested at the end of the journey — like the Cape Town women who had buried R50 000 worth under a chicken run. It was believed that the consignment had come in from Transkei under layers of Natal fruit.²⁹ On another occasion, dagga was found concealed in a large drum used in Zionist Church gatherings. It had a church flag on top of it.³⁰

Most of these casualties are runners rather than dealers. Often people in desperate need of money, they are used by the dealers to transport the weed. After the chicken-run haul Lieutenant Colonel C N Coetzee, head of the murder and robbery squad, said: 'This dagga is just part of the work of a large dagga syndicate operating in the Cape Town area.'³¹ Mr Koyana also referred to the dealers and Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Nkalitshana, head of the Transkei CID, told a *Cape Times* investigation in 1977 of a thriving racket with the syndicates from the western and southern

Cape. With more than 50 exit points from Transkei, and only two of them permanently-guarded border posts, control is extremely difficult.³² A *Sunday Tribune* investigation found that South African syndicates were linked with international drug operations.³³

While the Transkei side of the operations seems to be mainly concerned with production, the running and dealing is clearly the province of sophisticated gangs and syndicates. Despite frequent police successes it seems that most of the product still gets through to its main markets in the cities and abroad. It is very risky and very profitable. It is doubtful that it can be controlled unless it is legalized. While it remains illegal, it must encourage large-scale criminal operations with the ordinary user driven underground. One has to ask whether it is worth maintaining South Africa's prohibition of a drug which the majority do not recognize as harmful. It can only promote disrespect for laws, tie down large numbers of policemen and turn many ordinary people into lawbreakers. Certainly Transkei's *de facto* approach, as opposed to the official view, seems to be the only way out.

SIZE OF MARKET

It is impossible to estimate how much dagga is exported from Transkei every year and what income it produces for people living in the territory, but some of the news reports give an indication. If a bag of grade one dagga is worth between R300 and R400 to the producer (possibly as much as R500 by mid-1980) and it is sold for about R10 000 in the cities, then approximately five per cent of the marketable value accrues to the original producer.

So when a truck with a cargo worth R1 million is tracked down in Durban, that may have meant an income of some R50 000 to producers in Transkei. In December 1979, it was revealed that R20 million worth had been picked up in two months.³⁴ On this scale that would mean some R1 million for the producers. Another newspaper estimated that R11 million had been picked up on the Transkei-Transvaal route during two weeks in the same period.³⁵ That would be worth R550 000 inside Transkei. It was reported that a consignment worth R1 million had been seized by East

London and Grahamstown police during 1978.³⁶ That haul did not include the takings on the main route to Cape Town (through Middelburg) which the local commandant described as being on the 'dagga run' in the same story. In the south western Cape over 12 months in 1976/7, 2 426 kg of dagga had been seized and 469 people arrested. That may have been worth R2,5 million. In 1975, a man was arrested in Beaufort West with dagga worth R500 000.³⁷ If the estimate that one in every ten dealers is caught is correct, the dagga trade is astronomical.

Even if one based the calculation on one out of every two runners being caught (which seems too low because the risk would be far too high) a very crude estimate suggests that dagga with a value in South Africa of between R10 million and R20 million is being marketed every month. That would net producers in Transkei somewhere between R500 000 to R1 million a month in cash for dagga — that is, between R6 million and R12 million a year. Whether those guestimates are way out or not, and our feeling is that they are too low, that is big business for Transkeian producers, particularly in the main growing areas such as eastern Pondoland. With marketable agriculture worth some R100 million a year when the products are sold — i.e. many times their value to the actual producer — it is clear that dagga is an important element of the Transkeian economy, one might even say an indispensable element. Indeed, for a peasant farmer, without security of tenure and little opportunity to live off the land, dagga growing is more than a means of making a living. It is a survival technique.

FOOTNOTES

1. 1980 House of Assembly debates, Questions and Replies, Col 98.
2. Ibid, Col 22.
3. 1978 House of Assembly debates, col 5476/5480.
4. Ibid, Col 6328.
5. 1980 House of Assembly debates, Questions and Replies, Col 22.
6. *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 September 1977.
7. *Daily Dispatch*, 15 December 1977.
8. *Sunday Tribune*, 21 October 1979.
9. Ramsey Clark, *Crime in America*, Pocket Books, New York, 1974.

10. *Indaba, Daily Dispatch*, 5 October 1979.
11. Details from an interview with Colonel Smit in analysis of dagga trade in *Queenstown Representative*, 30 March 1979.
12. Debates of National Assembly, 1979, page 173/5.
13. *Ibid*, page 372.
14. *Ibid*, page 172.
15. *Ibid*, page 174.
16. *Cape Times*, 16-18 January 1979.
17. *Representative*, 30 March 1979.
18. *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 January 1978.
19. *Daily Dispatch*, 17 August 1979.
20. *Representative*, 20 June 1980.
21. *Ibid*, 20 February 1980.
22. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 March 1980.
23. *Representative*, 30 March 1979.
24. *Ibid*, 9 October 1979.
25. *Ibid*, 21 March 1980.
26. *Ibid*, 5 February 1980.
27. *Ibid*, 23 and 30 November 1979.
28. *Daily Dispatch*, 16 November 1979 and 5 March 1980.
29. *Indaba, Daily Dispatch*, 2 November 1977.
30. *Representative*, 30 March 1980.
31. *Indaba, Daily Dispatch*, 2 December 1977.
32. *Cape Times*, 26 July 1977.
33. *Sunday Tribune*, 21 October 1979.
34. *Natal Mercury*, 12 December 1979.
35. *Star*, 8 December 1979.
36. *Sunday Tribune*, 21 October 1979.
37. *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 September 1977.

Chapter Nine

HARBOURS IN THE SKY

The Port and Airport Speculators

It is perhaps inevitable, if wasteful, that newly-independent states should aspire to create symbols of the new nationhood: parliament buildings, presidential palaces, prestige office blocks, new and modern hospitals, universities and the like. International hotels and airports are a 'must'. And, if the country has a coastline, why not a harbour? If anything symbolizes 'independence' it is independent access to the rest of the world. The use of another country's transport system to export or import goods would emphasize the very dependence from which the country has just been liberated.

In the pursuit of these prestige, largely symbolic, projects, the Transkeian leadership has, since 1976, been pretty typical. Where there was once a grass runway before independence, the K.D. Matanzima Airport has a full-time control tower and a tarred runway which can take large aircraft, if not full-sized jet passenger liners. The airport is well used, considering how little Umtata was used before, with regular flights on Transkei Airways between Umtata and Johannesburg, charter flights to East London and Durban, and a number of private flights. It is predictable, though, that as in neighbouring Lesotho, the leadership would like an airport capable of taking any plane in the world.

Similarly, it is predictable that the idea of a Transkei harbour would be appealing, in abstract terms. It would symbolize how 'independent' Transkei is and would even reduce actual dependence on South Africa.

Indeed, there are stronger arguments for a port and an international airport in Transkei than their prestige value. Humphrey Berkeley highlighted two aspects. The first was (and

is) that Transkei might obtain some form of recognition if it could establish an understanding (based on mutual interests) with its neighbour, Lesotho. Following the 'independence' of Transkei Chief Leabua Jonathan, the Lesotho Prime Minister, was able to create much international sympathy for his country by alleging that the borders with Transkei had been closed. As the banned editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, Donald Woods, illustrated in his escape into exile, and as anyone in that part of the country knows, the borders have not been closed, except possibly when either Transkei or Lesotho wishes to make a political point. In reality, they are as open as they have ever been. It is in the interests of both governments to keep it that way. Not only that: the Lesotho and Transkei police have, over the last four years, been meeting fairly regularly to counter cattle-thieving and other crimes. For example, in 1979, George Matanzima could say that 'as a result of our discussions with Lesotho there have developed areas of co-operation about which I need not shout.'¹ In Lesotho one frequently sees Transkei-registered cars — and in Transkei, Lesotho-registered cars.

If this *de facto* collaboration were to be sanctioned *de jure*, Transkei would obviously benefit. A member of the OAU would have recognized the Transkei government.

A harbour enabling Lesotho to export and import goods without traversing South African territory would help. It is believed, both in Transkei and elsewhere, that Lesotho might prefer to use Transkei to break its geographic isolation. Only its Transkei border alleviates a complete encirclement by South Africa. If Transkei could build a harbour, it might be easier to persuade Lesotho that closer and more open links were in its interest.

Secondly, a Transkei harbour would allow the West to defend the Cape sea route without having a base in South Africa — a technical distinction which they might nevertheless wish to utilize. Mr Berkeley, as we have seen, developed this theme — and it seems likely that he would not have done so unless he believed there was some merit, some potentially persuasive benefit, in the proposal. Indeed, there is little doubt that in some Western military circles the idea of a developed harbour in Transkei had appeal. Thus, in August 1976, Major Wesley Groesbeck, an 'intelligence officer', revealed that Kaiser Matanzima had asked the United States for a plan that included the development of Port St Johns into a modern

seaport. In a paper published by the journal of a leading US military research college, Major Groesbeck argued that Port St Johns could be developed into a suitable harbour 'which would adequately serve the purposes of the US Navy in the Indian Ocean,' adding that while an alleviation of the US arms embargo against South Africa seemed unlikely, a deftly-handled Transkeian operation could enhance the US image with the Republic 'without overtly doing so, or creating any agreements which could hinder the US image with the rest of black Africa.' Even if the US did not set up a permanent base at Port St Johns, 'but uses it primarily as a bunkering station with an agreement to military rights in the event of war or world crisis, America's economic, strategic and political position would be greatly enhanced.'

Major Groesbeck, formerly based in Ethiopia, is a two-tour veteran of Vietnam. At the time it was reported that 'his study is seen as of particular significance because of its timing and detailed reasoning.'² Clearly, Mr Berkeley was not alone in trying to push the potential of Transkei as a security base for the West.

It was also frequently argued by Transkeian politicians that the development of a harbour and a full-length airport would not only reduce its dependence on South Africa, but also provide an alternative entry into Southern Africa. Thus scheduled airlines need not land in South Africa but in Transkei.

Then, too, there were arguments about the stimulus to growth in Transkei. A free port could provide an incentive to industrial growth, amongst other development benefits. It would also necessitate the construction of new infrastructure in the territory — which has no railway line other than the one which links Umtata with East London, the nearest South African port.

On paper, therefore, a harbour for Transkei seemed to be a good idea. It was also an idea which appealed to developers who saw the possibility of making money out of its construction. The realities of harbour construction, as opposed to the dreams, were something else.

THE PROBLEMS

While the idea of a new harbour had theoretical appeal, the practical difficulties were formidable. It is necessary to examine

these problems because one then understands just how ludicrous the projected schemes were. The first and most obvious problem was that there was no natural harbour on the Transkei coastline. Although in the early days Port St Johns, as its name implies, was used as a harbour, only small coasters or lighters from larger vessels could put in there. The silting of the Umzimvubu mouth resulted in major navigational problems and shifting sandbanks. Indeed, this site was soon ruled out by both the government and developers because large ships could not use it. If a new harbour is ever constructed along the Transkei coast, it will have to be at a totally new site where there has been no infrastructure before. There isn't much at Port St Johns but at least there is a regularly-used road between it and Umtata, and there are some hotels and houses.

Even if an adequate site for a new harbour were found, other substantial difficulties would remain. Some of these were raised by East London harbour specialists when the Transkeian idea was first mooted. They pointed out that it would have to be a long-term project and that it would require much capital.

The former chief engineer at East London harbour, Mr E. Merrifield, said that if the harbour was to be a free port, this would mean overseas trade and provision would have to be made for containers. 'Containerization is big, so a harbour would have to have a depth of at least 12 metres and a large land space of at least four hectares for every berth.' He disclosed that several scientific and engineering bodies had been looking into a possible harbour for Transkei for some time. 'What they are looking for is flattish swampy ground that can be dredged out, but before there are any decisions, soundings and borings will have to be taken, because it is what's underneath that is all important — if they strike rock too close to the surface, then they will have to look for another site because going out to sea is really expensive and this coast is really wild coast.' In addition, there had to be suitable land space that could be developed behind the quay-side activities. 'Another thing is that a port needs rail and road facilities to make it viable so a railway line will have to be built from any possible port to the main rail system — and in the Richard's Bay development, this was one of the biggest costs.' The development of a harbour was an enormous project and it required in-depth study. 'One must ask who is going to use this harbour and what sort of trade will be attracted, and whether this trade will be for Transkei only or will

it also be used across the borders. My own view is that the harbour will not supply Transkei alone, because they will want to make money out of transit traffic.' He did, however, think the idea was a good one because, given the length of the South African coastline and the size of the country, there were too few ports for the country's long-term future.

The representative of the Border Chamber of Industries on the East London Harbour Advisory Board, Mr Max Philips, asked if there would be sufficient volume at the harbour in relation to cost and whether this volume could be matched with an inland transport service. 'If trade is not confined to Transkei, such a harbour will have to compete with Durban and East London, both of which have the necessary infrastructure already and these would not want to hand over traffic to anyone else.'³

These public views and many other opinions expressed privately should have made it quite clear to the Transkeian leadership that a harbour would be very costly, that it could not afford to develop a port out of its own resources, that an expensive infrastructure including railroads across difficult terrain would have to be constructed, and that a high level of managerial expertise would be necessary. In spite of this, two separate agreements were entered into with two speculators, and Transkei lost considerable amounts of money on both. Why, in the face of these realities, the government went ahead with these projects was as inexplicable as any of the decisions made in Transkei after 1976.

The development of a port, or any large capital-intensive project remains a political decision — there will always be 'experts' who can give advice, sincerely or otherwise, one way or the other. If the decision taken is incorrect — whether it is based on inadequate information or bad judgement — those holding power must be accountable. When all is said and done on the subject of Transkei's ventures into harbour development, that responsibility remains the central issue.

DR PANIGEL

At the end of July 1978, Kaiser Matanzima announced that the cabinet had formally approved the establishment of a free harbour situated in what would become an extensive commercial and industrial zone (also free of tariffs) on the Transkei Wild Coast.

An intensive feasibility study into its establishment would begin the following month. He said an agreement had been signed with a French company, the Societe Des Grands Travaux de Marseilles, to initiate the project. Three experts would arrive from France to begin the study, one of whom would concentrate on the engineering aspects while another would work on the economic aspects. The proposed harbour would be duty-free and would have all the advantages of a free port. The co-ordinators of the project were a Durban firm of architects, Franklin, Garland and Gibson, although one of the partners, Mr. D E Franklin, refused to say anything because statements had to come from the Prime Minister's office. It was also reported that the project was being undertaken in conjunction with a 'financier', Dr Edmond Panigel.⁴

It sounded good, particularly when it was revealed that a major French consortium, Compagnie de Construction Internationale (CCI), was involved. CCI, which represented five construction organisations, had helped build the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique and the trans-Gabon railway line. It had contracts in Zambia, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. But, even then, there were warnings signs. CCI's secretary-general, Claude Bernard, who had never visited Transkei, said: 'It is only a small contract. The outcome will depend on the financial backing for a new Transkei port.' Although it involved 'only a small expenditure' from Transkei, he refused to disclose how much. He also said reports from Transkei indicating the project would be on a large scale were wrong, saying that the question of size would depend on the outcome of the feasibility study.⁵ The question of finance was never resolved.

Fuelling speculation about the harbour later that month, the Secretary of Commerce, Mr Dunjwa, disclosed that industrialists from Italy and France were to do feasibility studies on fishing off the Transkei coast. They were due to arrive shortly.⁶

By October Kaiser Matanzima was able to announce that the proposed free harbour would be situated at Umngazana River, about 20 kilometres south of Port St Johns, killing the rumours that the port would be at Coffee Bay. He said: 'The second stage in establishing a free harbour for Transkei has now been completed.' Umngazana had been recommended by a team of harbour construction experts, including a geologist, an economist and a technician. A free commercial and industrial town would be developed around the site, covering some 130 square kilometres.

At that stage, no one would say where the money was coming from. It was pointed out that communications with the selected area would have to be constructed and that they would be costly. 'The mouth of the river is usually approached by boat at present.' There were no rail links and if these were to be constructed, providing a line to Umtata, the costs would be exorbitant.⁷

Besides the fact that false expectations may have been raised by the press stories, there was no major problem with the scheme at this stage. A feasibility study had been conducted and had found a potential site. If the money could be raised, a harbour could be constructed.

Things started to go wrong from then on. Dr Panigel and his ever-present partner, Mrs S E Strydom, had begun to ingratiate themselves with the government in a number of ways. Numerous schemes were developed or proposed, including the construction of hospitals, the development of which would be supervised – at a fee. Dr Panigel won the contract to sell advertising for Radio Transkei and Mrs Strydom did the bookkeeping. One of these schemes was the *Voice of Transkei*. The Matanzimas had long wanted their own newspaper to counter reports in other newspapers such as the *Daily Dispatch*, the only daily paper circulating in the area. The simple economic facts of life were that Transkei could not afford a newspaper either in terms of advertising or in terms of circulation. Mr Vuyani Mwretyana also edited a paper inside the territory but that was critical of the government. Mr Koyana voiced the feelings of the government on the issue when in his policy speech in 1978 he said: 'The ideal is to produce a periodical which will reflect the national character of Transkei.'⁸

In March that year, it seemed as if that ideal was about to be realized when George Matanzima announced the launching of the *Voice of Transkei*. It was to be a bi-monthly magazine with a print-run of 25 000 copies. It was to be 'the medium of publicising Transkei's political views to its citizens, neighbours and the world at large.' It was to be a minimum of 36 pages, written in Xhosa and English. He said the paper would be run by a private company, not the government. His statement was made in the presence of Mr Perrie Kruger and Mr Dennis Head, who were introduced to local reporters and who were, it was believed, going to run the magazine.⁹ It is not known what happened to that scheme, but two months later a Cape Town advertising agency confirmed that

it had been appointed to sell space in the *Voice of Transkei*, now to be run by a company whose directors included George Matanzima, Tsepo Letlaka and Digby Koyana. (In fact, when the periodical appeared in September, it was disclosed that the only other directors of the 'Transkei National Press' were Mrs Strydom and Dr Panigel.) It was expected that it would sell 15 000 copies, with a further 5 000 to be issued free to embassies and corporations throughout the world. 'It is understood that backing will come from a French consortium,' the *Sunday Times* wrote.¹⁰

Quite how the short-lived magazine was financed was never clear, but Mrs Strydom claimed it had been financed by money she had received for doing bookkeeping services for Radio Transkei. 'The magazine was subsidized by a contract to do administrative work for the radio service, but this was cancelled in mid-July and I cannot keep a R5 000 magazine going without finance,' she said a year later when she announced that editorial and advertising staff had been laid off and the magazine folded.¹¹ But in the Select Committee on Public Accounts, the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr B B Pukwana, revealed that R49 654 had been spent on publications during the previous financial year and out of this amount, 'we had to print *Voice of Transkei*.'¹² That implied that some government money, at least, was involved. The magazine, when it finally appeared, was straight, unequivocal government propaganda and was printed by Craft Press, which had been set up in Bophutatswana by Mr John McGoff, the American publisher who was used by the South African Department of Information as a front man.

Voice of Transkei was used to promote the Umngazana harbour project. It gave an indication of the line taken by Dr Panigel and Mrs Strydom with the Transkeian leadership: 'With the stroke of his pen, Prime Minister Matanzima has set the wheels in motion to open the door to the world of Transkei . . . The harbour project, and its associated industries and other schemes, will involve millions of rands, so the fact that it is going ahead is a tribute to the vision of the Government and its advisers . . . In the harbour area, a cement factory, off-shore petrol points, textile industries and mining projects are being negotiated, while the company is also investigating forestry and fishery developments nearby. The harbour contract frees the area from restricting ownership to Transkeians, and already foreigners are enquiring about buying property in this area of the magnificent Wild Coast. Phase One

of the construction is expected to be completed by 1982 and will give Transkei an open door for trade and tourism with the rest of the world.'

It was public relations, and little else. Without the money, which Transkei could not and South Africa would not supply, it was all hot air. *Voice of Transkei*, however, did not give up, reflecting the hopes of the Panigel/Strydom partnership which stood to make a fortune if it came off. In its very first issue, on page 7, the magazine replied to an article by John Marsh in the pro-government and Perskor-owned *Financial Gazette*, headed 'Matanzima Taken for a Ride?' In the article it had been alleged that during the 1978 floods Umngazana was under almost seven metres of water and that at normal high tide it was under one metre of water. Marsh asked: 'Was this sector selected to boost the contract price in that reclaiming the area from high tides and floods would require huge earthworks?' *Voice of Transkei*: 'It is impossible that a large flat area like Umngazana could be under seven metres of water, and the engineers who measured the tides recorded high water at less than a third of the *Financial Gazette's* figure.' The first issue also had a two-page colour spread of an 'artist's impression of the new harbour.' It still looks very impressive . . .

In the second issue, *Voice of Transkei* published another double-page spread, this time of Umngazana as it looks today, again emphasizing what it would do for tourism and economic development.

Nothing could happen until the money was forthcoming. Could private investors — the magical French? — be persuaded to invest in it? The lure for the Panigel/Strydom partnership was the six per cent consulting fee which on the initial estimate of R125 million would have netted them a cool R7,5 million.

Indeed, when contracts were drawn up for signing to launch the harbour development company, Kaiser Matanzima balked at the six per cent fee and the documents were only signed on the bonnet of his car at his farm at Ncora after he had delayed for a week.¹³ Nevertheless, the contract to set up a limited liability company called 'Port of the Republic of Transkei' was signed on February 24, 1978 with a subscribed capital of R10 million — of which Transkei would pay R2,5 million in cash in quarterly instalments of R250 000, and R2,5 million would be liquidated by the cession of 128 kms of coastal land. The government would

also nominate half the directors. As Mr Letlaka sweetly put it in his budget speech that year: 'International finance for the balance of the funds will be attracted by establishing Umngazana as a free port where import and export are liberated from customs fees and charges. This constitutes a very strong attraction to industrialists, businessmen and financiers. Enquiries from American, French, Italian and Spanish sources have already been received.'¹⁴

In terms of the agreement, the Transkei government was to hold 5 million R1 shares, and the others were to be held by Systems and Management Boards (Pty) Ltd (SAMB), who at the company's registered offices in Umtata at 12 noon on 23 February 1978 appointed Dr E Panigel to represent it, according to an extract from a resolution by directors, certified to be true by Mrs S E Strydom; Transkei National Engineering (TNEC), a company in the process of registration, who at a meeting of trustees at precisely the same time as the directors' meeting at SAMB — that is 12 noon on February 23, 1978 — appointed Shirley Eileen Strydom to represent it, according to a true extract signed by Mr F. Germain, the secretary, and Dr Panigel; and the Societe D'Etudes et D'Equipements D'Enterprises (SEEE), who on June 29, 1973, apparently appointed Mr Germain to act for it. Why SEEE would have appointed Mr Germain in 1973 to act for it in this enterprise is not clear, but apparently — in a resolution written in French and taken in Paris on that date — it did.

The agreement said SAMB, TNEC and SEEE 'and such other persons nominated by them' would pay the other R5 million either in cash or in instalments at 8 per cent interest and the first payment was to have been made not later than March 1, 1980. SAMB as 'project promoter and co-ordinator of the entire project' was to receive a fee of six per cent 'of all total costs and fees', while TNEC would act as engineering consultants with the responsibility to appoint architects, engineers, land surveyors, town planners and other specialists 'at a fee equal to the aggregate of the minimum fees of their respective institutes.' The SEEE consortium, as the contractors, would carry out and complete the project 'for a sum equal to the total costs plus 8½ percent.' Although the contract stated that it had been signed in Umtata on February 24, 1978, it was publicly reported that it had been signed on the bonnet of Kaiser Matanzima's car at Ncora. This report was carried both in the press and indeed in the first edition

of *Voice of Transkei*.¹⁵

No wonder Kaiser Matanzima hesitated before he signed it — his signature was eventually certified by George Matanzima and Mr Letlaka. Apart from the practical details of the other parties raising the R5 million for the remaining shares, and the loan necessary for the construction of the harbour, the contract was a straight rip-off. Through SAMB, TNEC and SEEE the Panigel-Strydom partnership was to net 6 per cent as project coordinators, another 8½ per cent as coordinating contractors and a fee equal to the minimum paid to the various specialists. This would have meant that on the extremely conservative estimate of R125 million, they would have earned R7,5 million, plus R10,6 million, plus anything between R7,5 million and R12,5 million for TNEC — a minimum of R25,6 million. For them, it was a good deal. And Kaiser Matanzima signed the contract — after taking a week to reflect on these incredible fees.

In his February statement, Kaiser Matanzima said Grand Travaux de Marseilles and its associates had surveyed the site and had submitted a well-documented report to the cabinet. There was no indication that any consideration had been given to linking the proposed harbour with Umtata by rail, but it was obvious to anyone that this would be prohibitive.¹⁶

There were signs that all was not well in a statement issued by Grand Travaux the day after the contracts were actually signed at Ncora. It denied that any agreement for the construction of the harbour had been signed. Another two months were required to complete its investigations.¹⁷ Indeed, the introduction of SEEE as the consortium, and the disappearance of both Grand Travaux and the Companie de Construction Internationale (CCI) from the contract does not seem to have been noticed at the time. Most early press reports had referred to a 'French consortium' or 'French money' without naming specific companies. This may have confused other reporters later on — as well as their readers and the Transkei government. On the surface all was well.

In March 1978, George Matanzima announced that the French consortium would start work on the site that week, four months ahead of schedule, and that Mr Moonsieum Lanson, one of the senior managers of the consortium, had already arrived in Transkei to organize operations. 'The speed at which the operations are proceeding confirms the priority the government attributes to the

Umngazana project,' he said. A month later it was reported and confirmed that Transkei had secured a R168 million loan from Arab sources for industrial development and developing infrastructure. Mr Letlaka said the loan was being handled by an American brokerage house. There was no indication that it was for the harbour but that seemed likely.¹⁹

In his budget speech later that week, Mr Letlaka was still talking about long-term loans and scorned people who referred to the harbour as a 'pipedream'. He said 'We have been able to devise a financial plan well within our possibilities.' He also praised the scheme in a manner that suggested everything was well.²⁰

A month later, Chief Makaziwe Ndamase, the son of the Paramount Chief of Western Pondoland, urged the government to get on with the scheme because the people in the area were anxious to find work on the site. The Minister of Commerce, Mr Ramsay Madikizela, said engineers had been drilling on the site and would report to him that week.²¹ Later the same month, Kaiser Matanzima said soil-test drilling would start five months ahead of schedule.²²

At the end of the year, a spokesman for the company reported that the soil tests had been completed and the results were 'particularly satisfactory'. Rock had not been encountered within 12 metres of the surface. A quarry for filling stone had been found but not one for other uses such as concrete and building. The road to Umngazana had been widened and strengthened, and formal applications had been received from industrialists in France, Italy and the US who wanted to establish industries in the free zone. In order to provide loading and unloading facilities before the harbour was built, the board had instructed a French consortium to study the possibility of 'a temporary port'.²³

Finally, in July 1979, George Matanzima disclosed that the feasibility study had been completed and that the government was awaiting the report before calling for tenders. He also disclosed that Dr Panigel was no longer associated with the project. Dr Panigel had been engaged 'up to a certain time which is confidential' (although no such time scale was inserted in the contract) and when he was asked if that time was past 'he nodded'. Dr Panigel was, however, apparently still a director of the company, but when the Prime Minister was asked who was handling the harbour development, he replied, 'You are treading on a very delicate issue.'²⁴ By October that year it was confirmed

that Dr Panigel was *persona non grata* in Transkei.²⁵ That strange association with the Transkei government had apparently ended, after the first R250 000 paid towards the 'Port of the Republic of Transkei' had been used up without too much to show for it.

The government was clearly embarrassed by the whole affair. Twice in 1979, Mr Mda raised the issue in the Assembly, as did Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo. He pointed out when he replied to the budget speech that in 1978 Mr Letlaka had spelt out the government's plans for a harbour, but in 1979 he had said nothing. Mr Letlaka asked sheepishly: 'What do you want me to say about it?' To which, Mr Mda made the obvious rejoinder: 'To say that the plans have advanced to this or that stage. Naturally we expect that.'²⁶ Mr Letlaka had no more to say. Mr Mda then raised the matter during the Prime Minister's vote and asked what had happened to the salaries paid to George Matanzima, Mr Koyana, and Mr Madikizela, who were directors of the company. 'It has been stated that the government of Transkei has paid not less than a quarter of a million for the project at Umngazana — that is R250 000. At the moment there is nothing doing at Umngazana and that money must have been paid and, to all intents and purposes, in my humble observation, not to the benefit of the taxpayer of Transkei.' He wanted the Prime Minister to tell him what the purpose of that money was and what it had succeeded in achieving,²⁷ but all George Matanzima ventured in reply was that 'a salary is a different thing from what a person is paid for attending a meeting . . . there is no question of salaried directors.'²⁸ No explanation of the standstill at Umngazana was offered.

The government's reticence was understandable. It was a highly embarrassing affair, and there was now every indication that it had been taken for a ride. In any event, its Middle East representative had come up with an even better deal — or was it an even bigger ride?

EL-HAJJ

At a time when Arab oil money was the main theme of leader-writers the world over, Transkei's highly-paid Middle East representative, Salim el-Hajj, suddenly announced spectacular plans to build an R800 million harbour complex in Transkei

which would include tourist facilities, casinos, an international airport, an oil refinery, hotels, housing and roads. Finance for the projects would come from his companies and Arab and European concerns. Mr el-Hajj was not worried about a possible oil embargo against South Africa — he said the Arab consortium was only willing to build the refinery if it had the right to sell its products to surrounding countries, including South Africa — because 'we would not build a refinery if we were not sure we could sell our products.'

With this announcement in April 1978²⁹, Mr el-Hajj directly challenged the Panigel scheme, which had been signed in February that year and which was formally approved by the cabinet in July. He said, referring to the Panigel plan, 'The Transkeian people should reap the benefits of a harbour, and not a private company.' The additional advantage of his scheme, which he did not spell out, was that he would benefit, and not Dr Panigel, if it ever came off. Indeed, by talking bigger he eventually took over the idea.

After this announcement, el-Hajj was appointed Transkei's Middle East representative in July and an information office was opened in Beirut by Mr Koyana. The following month an agreement of intention was signed with the government to finance the budget deficit and other undefined projects to the tune of R400 million.³¹ The agreement was signed in Umtata by Mr el-Hajj, representing the Medi Dupius consortium, and he was accompanied by four French-speaking Arabs and a Canadian from Montreal. Earlier, he had said the Transkei government had not responded to his offers but it seems that a new mood had prevailed.

Kaiser Matanzima refused to comment on the reports and referred inquiries to Mr Letlaka who said he was not in a position to comment. But el-Hajj was confidently extending his scheme to include hospitals, a technical college, an agricultural scheme as well as the harbour and an international airport.³² A few days later it was reported that a 'top' Middle East military expert was assisting with the training of the Transkei army.³³

Even while el-Hajj seemed to be delivering the goods, there was good reason for the government to have been cautious. In the South African press it was reported from Beirut that 'informed sources say he collected a lot of money for the Phalangist Party (the biggest right-wing militia in Lebanon) in the form of donations and contributions. However, large sums of this money did not

reach the party, some people allege.' He was also training pilots at one of the two technical training academies he owned in Beirut but Middle East Airlines would not accept his graduates' certificates and he lost a court case over the issue. Another training academy had folded in London. He had tried his hand at third world development once when he tried to finance a 30 million dollar project in Cameroun but that failed as well. 'His Transkei deal first appeared unplanned according to the sources. Three men from Transkei walked into his office one morning with proposals which Hajj was quick to accept . . . Hajj's efforts to get businessmen here interested in the development of Transkei failed, so he embarked on a lone journey there . . . While in Transkei he was given rights to import timber, from which he now earns a great deal.'³⁴

Still, the government persevered — eventually paying him a vast sum, reported to be R8 million³⁵ but privately said by one minister to be nearer R9 million, as was later confirmed by Finance Minister Madikizela.^{35a} As the Panigel scheme collapsed, the el-Hajj scheme began. The Institute of Oceanology — a part of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research — was commissioned by el-Hajj's Middle East Commercial and Investment Services (Mecis) to undertake a survey 'to see whether it is at all possible to build a harbour.' One of us was told by a minister that the site was selected after el-Hajj and Mr Letlaka flew over the Transkei coast. They chose Mazeppa Bay — no explanation was offered as to why Umngazana was no longer suitable. It was, however, reported that an agreement had been reached in March by which Mecis was to take over the Umngazana project originally entered into with the Port of Republic of Transkei (Pty) Ltd. Apparently, the tests at Umngazana had shown that R1 million a year would have to be spent to remove silt from the harbour mouth whereas Mazeppa Bay's deep water and natural reef made it a more attractive prospect.³⁶

The next month, George Matanzima announced that a group of Transkeians were to receive training in harbour administration in West Germany. This followed talks between him and the West German government in Bonn the previous week during which he had spoken to government and opposition MPs and had met the Labour Minister, Dr Herbert Ehrenberg. The training of the Transkeians was linked to the Mazeppa Bay development which he said was still being investigated, but he said it was particularly

important in view of the joint harbour plan at East London. 'If we are going to be involved in the East London plan, we will have to send our own people down there,' he said.³⁷

The statement hinted that all was not well with the el-Hajj scheme, which el-Hajj himself underlined when he said in December that the R185 million plans for a new international airport near Elliotdale and a harbour with an oil refinery at Mazeppa Bay were being held up because the Transkei government had not made a down payment of R16 million. For a scheme that allegedly involved Arab finance, Transkei was certainly being expected to pay an awful lot before anything happened. Mr el-Hajj explained that the airport had to be sited at Elliotdale because the K.D. Matanzima airport at Umtata could not be extended up to international standards. The Middle East oil would be shipped to an oil refinery to be built near the harbour as soon as Transkei obtained a bank guarantee for the project. Work on the harbour and airport would begin simultaneously 'very early next year' assuming all the conditions of the agreement were met, he said.³⁸

But although George Matanzima confirmed the agreement publicly early in 1980³⁹ it was effectively over. In March, Mr Madikizela announced that the plans had been cancelled and he applied for another R9 million in the budget to cover Transkei's losses in the el-Hajj affair. 'It has been our fear that el-Hajj is one of the international crooks who have been swindling our state from time to time by making unfulfilled promises to assist the country in return for huge sums of money,' Mr Madikizela told the assembly. Amazingly, it was reported that the agreement with el-Hajj had been signed just four months previously in Beirut. In terms of the contract, the Transkei government was to make a down payment of 16 million dollars (R12,8 million) on a R185 million loan. It was reported that the Transkei government could only afford to pay R9 million, but our information is that this sum was paid to el-Hajj earlier in the year. It was also reported that R8 million of the money was still in Mecis's bank account in Johannesburg in December 1979 and that it could not be established what had happened to the other R1 million. Our information was, however, that the entire R9 million was paid out in Lebanon.⁴⁰

In any event, it should have been clear to the Transkei government long before then that all was not well with el-Hajj, who

apparently travelled extensively on a Transkei diplomatic passport and drove around in Beirut in a white diplomatic Buick with Transkei registration plates and a Transkei pennant. His companies, Medi and Mecis, went into liquidation although he retained the registration. In February, his South African representative and former senior Iscor official, Gert Botha, resigned.

Within a week, el-Hajj announced that he was suing the *Sunday Times* for R327 million for its disclosures which he claimed represented the alleged loss suffered through the cancellation of agreements with Transkei as well as Venda,⁴¹ but by August, this claim had been reduced to R30 000, the amount originally claimed as general damages.⁴²

It was also revealed that a R100 million Venda deal was cancelled after the South African government advised the Venda government to have nothing to do with el-Hajj and to distance itself from him.⁴³ If this is the case, it seems likely that the Transkei Government would have been similarly 'advised' particularly as the South African Government had made it known that it was opposed to international pie-in-the-sky projects and had introduced new conditions for payments of money to the independent homelands. In April 1980, el-Hajj also lost his agency with Iscor for Middle East contracts.⁴⁴

With that, Transkei's involvement in the development of its own harbour seems to have faded. The lure of that project and of big international money resulted in some classic bad judgements. One of those who suffered was Mr Letlaka, who was demoted in September 1979 to the Justice and Prisons portfolio. It was believed that he lost the prestigious finance portfolio because of the report of the Select Committee of Public Accounts into the extensive financial irregularities in the civil service.⁴⁵ But it was also known that Kaiser Matanzima was furious over the payment to el-Hajj and that Mr Letlaka was held responsible for it.

It is not known at the time of writing if any money was ever recovered from el-Hajj, but it was an expensive debacle. It is ironic, in the circumstances, that both Matanzimas seemed to have escaped without tarnish over the Panigel and el-Hajj affairs. That merely reflects the power situation inside Transkei.

FOOTNOTES

1. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, page 284.
2. *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 August 1976.
3. *Daily Dispatch*, 29 and 30 July 1977.
4. *Daily Dispatch*, 29 and 30 July 1977.
5. *Rand Daily Mail* and *Daily Dispatch*, 2 August 1977, and *Argus*, 4 August 1977.
6. *Daily Dispatch*, 16 August 1977.
7. Ibid, 15 October 1977.
8. Debates of the National Assembly, 1978, page 242.
9. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 March 1978.
10. *Sunday Times*, 4 June 1978.
11. *Daily Dispatch*, 19 October 1979.
12. Minutes of Select Committee on Public Accounts in Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, page 459.
13. *Daily Dispatch*, 25 February 1978.
14. Debates of the National Assembly, 1978, page 117.
15. Details from copy of contract, certified true by Steven Julius Saul Klagsbrun, A Pretoria notary, on May 17, 1978.
16. *Daily Dispatch*, 18 February 1978.
17. *Argus*, 25 February 1978.
18. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 March 1978.
19. *Sunday Tribune*, 16 April and *Daily Dispatch*, 17 April 1978.
20. Debates of the National Assembly, 1978, page 117.
21. *Daily Dispatch*, 17 May 1978.
22. Ibid, 30 May 1978.
23. Ibid, 14 November 1978.
24. Ibid, 27 July 1979.
25. Ibid, 19 October 1979.
26. Debates of the National Assembly, 1979, page 149.
27. Ibid, page 178.
28. Ibid, page 192.
29. *Sunday Tribune*, 23 April 1978.
30. *Daily Dispatch*, 1 July 1978.
31. *Argus*, 21 August 1978.
32. *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 August 1978.
33. *Citizen*, 25 August 1978.
34. *Daily News*, 29 August 1978.
35. *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 December 1979.
- 35a. *Sunday Times*, 30 March 1980.

36. *Daily Dispatch*, 2 October 1979.
37. *Daily Dispatch*, 20 November 1979.
38. *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 December 1979.
39. *Star*, 3 January 1980.
40. Details from *Sunday Times*, 30 March 1980.
41. *Sunday Times*, 7 April 1980.
42. Ibid, 3 August 1980.
43. Ibid, 30 December 1979.
44. Ibid, 15 June 1980.
45. *Daily Dispatch*, 26 September 1979.

Chapter Ten

MATANZIMA:

A NEW HENRY VIII?

The Banning of the Methodist Ch

Finding a 'fascinating parallel' between King Henry VIII's takeover of the Church in England in 1534 and Kaiser Matanzima's takeover of the Methodist Church in Transkei in 1978, a Cape Town newspaper, the *Argus*,¹ used our chapter heading over an article comparing the two incidents. The parallels were indeed close, and the Matanzimas used the full resources of the state, and some shrewd politics, to take over the operations of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa in the territory. Initially called the Transkei Methodist Church, the breakaway was later named the 'United Methodist Church of Southern Africa.'

Whatever the title, the effect was the same: religious institutions in Transkei would only be allowed to operate if they did not question Transkei's 'independence' and recognized the government of the territory.

The first hint of the approach the Transkeian government would take towards religious institutions came before October 1976. It followed the South African government's expropriation of the Federal Theological Seminary at Alice for the extension of the University of Fort Hare, and the transfer in 1975 of the seminary to the grounds of St Bede's Mission, just outside Umtata where it was housed in mobile homes, tents and other temporary structures. The Seminary was the training centre for black Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregational priests. If tolerated, the seminary might have been a wonderful advertisement for Transkei – it was widely respected for its non-racialism, its religious tolerance and its general standing.

That was not to be. The students had run foul of the Fort Hare

authorities over their political activities and their support of black consciousness. Kaiser Matanzima was even less tolerant. When the first signs of black consciousness emerged from the seminary, his response was immediate and angry. He accused the students of coming to Umtata to stir up revolution and racial hostility between black and white. He warned St Bede's to get rid of the seminary students or 'my government will use all its power to dispose of them.' He said he had Black People's Convention and South African Students' Organisation documents which had been issued at 'a so-called memorial service' at Ngangelizwe township near Umtata. 'I am satisfied that the theological seminary is composed of people who are members of leftist organizations . . . I cannot let this type of thing go on.'²

In the face of that threat the seminary moved on, eventually establishing itself in Natal where Kwazulu's Chief Gatsha Buthelezi was somewhat more tolerant. Not only was Kaiser Matanzima trying to reduce the possible influence of the black consciousness movement – indeed, it almost passed Transkei by – but he was giving notice to other religious leaders that he would brook no opposition from them. Most church bodies preferred survival to a direct confrontation with the Transkeian leadership over their attitudes to 'independence'.

However the Methodist Church, in which Kaiser Matanzima was a lay preacher and which accounted for about a quarter of Transkei's Christians, stepped out of line. It took a decision at its annual conference in October 1977 to discontinue sending messages of goodwill and loyalty to the President of South Africa because this would involve sending a similar message to the President of Transkei. This decision was reported in the Methodist newspaper, *Dimension*. According to their report, the decision had been taken because many Methodists were opposed to, and did not recognize, Transkei's independence. Kaiser Matanzima read the article. Angered that his own church had taken such a stand, he took it to the cabinet which decided to ban the Methodist Church of Southern Africa in Transkei and form the Methodist Church of Transkei in its place.³

Undoubtedly the majority of Methodists both in South Africa and Transkei did not recognize Transkei's independence. If the church had done so it would have polarized its adherents and destroyed itself in the eyes of most black people. Matanzima's reaction was understandable, perhaps; his solution was extra-

ordinary.

As was so often the case, nothing would change his mind. A former Methodist President, Dr Alec Boraine, Progressive Federal Party MP, said the ban was 'tragic' and 'negative';⁴ Dr Colin Morris, general secretary of the overseas division of the British Methodist Church, said: 'It is entirely appropriate that a phoney state like the Transkei should try to establish a phoney church';⁵ the South African Council of Churches was shocked and 'totally' rejected the reasons given by Transkei;⁶ the *Argus* described the dispute as 'unnecessary and unedifying';⁷ *Post* called it 'childish';⁸ and the *Rand Daily Mail* described the move as 'Transkei's blunder'.⁹

While the Methodist leadership desperately tried to patch things up, Kaiser Matanzima became more defiant. He claimed that he was backed by the mass of Methodists in Transkei¹⁰ and alleged that the Methodist Church was taking instructions from the World Council of Churches.¹¹ He eventually agreed to talks with the head of the Methodist Church and local Methodists stressed that the decision was not final. It was clear from the start, however, that the Matanzimas were not to be dissuaded from their intention to 'nationalize' the church. The meetings and discussions were no more than a token. Some Methodists, such as Rev Arthur Attwell, claimed that Transkei had not been singled out at the conference and said the decision had been reached because it was an 'anachronism' to send messages to heads of state.¹²

Kaiser Matanzima stated his attitude to the talks, which took place on January 26 in Umtata, by failing to attend them.¹³ A few days later he announced that the government would proceed with the ban, in spite of the talks. He announced his decision at a meeting of Methodist clergy: 'We cannot pay our money to a conference where we will be insulted . . . We cannot have divided loyalties. The church is an autonomous body, but must not interfere with the State.'¹⁴

The Matanzimas now tried to shift the emphasis away from state interference and the nationalization of the church. Instead their action was to be seen as a move forced on them by the racism of the Methodist Church. Thus, when the Rev B Thomson said he was worried about the decision to legislate the establishment of the new church, Mr Tsepo Letlaka, then a senior minister in the cabinet, said his speech was 'typical missionary talk'. Transkeians,

he added, did not owe anything to the missionaries. He also made the curious claim that the government was not interfering with the church: it was the church that had shown itself to be politically motivated.¹⁵

Mr Letlaka's attack typified the Matanzima strategy: divert attention from the central issue of state control over religion by introducing emotive racial issues, and use government power to bolster the new church.

The Matanzimas stopped short, however, of pursuing another idea of the day: the establishing of a united Transkeian church consisting of all denominations with Kaiser Matanzima as the head. The idea was floated by an Anglican priest, Canon Michael Guma, who said Transkeians regarded Kaiser Matanzima as 'Defender of the Faith' and 'anti-communist'. Canon Guma claimed that: 'Dr Matanzima has defended the Christian faith in the eyes of the whole world.'¹⁶ It was a quaint view, but its appeal to Kaiser Matanzima must have been powerful. Not only would it have eliminated Methodist opposition to 'independence', but it would also have pre-empted any challenge by the other churches — though they were notably uncritical of the moves against the Methodist church.

The Matanzima explanation of the attack was pushed hard, unsurprisingly, by the Leader of the Opposition, Cromwell Diko. Never was the supportive role played by Mr Diko as the opposition leader more blatantly underscored. Here was a clear attempt by the Matanzimas to whip the churches into line — a course of action which displayed religious intolerance and severely damaged the credibility of the Transkei government both in South Africa and in the rest of the world. Yet the leader of the opposition openly backed the takeover, displaying just where his true loyalties lay.

Announcing his support for the move, Mr Diko accused the church of collecting money from Transkeians and putting it into the hands of whites in South Africa. He said black ministers were given meagre handouts, while white ministers were getting fat cheques, and he accused the Methodist Church of practising apartheid.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, the Methodist Church, like all white-dominated churches in Southern Africa, had its racial faults, but in the 1970s, particularly in the late 1970s, it was clear that Christian leaders were grappling with these issues. Neither the Matanzimas nor Mr Diko could have failed to notice this trend.

Mr Diko's theme was equality: 'Those Methodist leaders in South Africa should get out of politics and preach the word of God and the brotherhood of man which states that all men are equal in the eyes of God.'¹⁸ That Kaiser Matanzima might also be the equal of other men in the eyes of God did not seem to strike the opposition leader. The Prime Minister himself reminded the Methodist clergy that their church was on good terms with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and that together they wanted majority rule in South Africa. Mr H Pamla, Minister of the Interior, said the Methodists had a black church and a white church in Umtata, and Mr Letlaka found justification for the ban in Henry VIII's actions.¹⁹

George Matanzima went so far as to say that the Methodist Church of South Africa had been made rich by money from its Transkei members and 'that money will be ours, not theirs.' His view was disputed by church leaders.²⁰

While the politicians alleged racism to justify the takeover, the Methodists tried to resist. There were warnings that many Methodists would be forced to quit Transkei;²¹ a further meeting, this time involving Kaiser Matanzima;²² a statement that the ban had placed the Methodist Church in 'a terrible situation';²³ and a vote by Methodist ministers and lay preachers in Transkei (70 to 40) against the ban.²⁴ It was pointless to resist. The government had already decided on its course.

The Matanzimas started using state machinery to impose their will. At a meeting of Methodists in the Clarkebury district, the Security Police were present and a former priest, Mr M Lila, told the meeting that he had been sent by Kaiser Matanzima to tell them there was no turning back.²⁵ Then 'foreigners' were banned by the government from attending meetings of Methodist ministers and George Matanzima sent out telegrams declaring that 'foreigners attending will be dealt with.' Kaiser Matanzima told Methodist leaders that this decision had been taken because 'he had reason to fear that there might be violence.'²⁶ The intention was, however, quite clear: to prevent the Methodist President, Rev Abel Hendricks, from attending a meeting of Methodist preachers. George Matanzima, echoing his brother, said Mr Hendricks had been barred from the meeting for 'security reasons' but he refused to elaborate.²⁷

Finally, on May 26, 1978, the Methodist Church was banned in Transkei in terms of the recently adopted Unlawful Organizations

Act. The day before, George Matanzima had stressed that the state would not hesitate to enforce the ban: any Methodist who attempted 'to revive the Methodist Church of South Africa would be dealt with under the Public Security Act.' Asked how the church was 'prejudicial to the interests of the State,' he replied: 'Surely any organization which does not recognize the sovereignty of a State is a threat to it?'²⁸

The move was condemned by non-Methodist Christians, such as Archbishop Bill Burnett of the Anglican Church and Archbishop Denis Hurley of the Catholic Church, while Dr Boraine predicted resistance as well as 'unrest, unhappiness and heartache.'²⁹ All to no effect.

After the ban, prayers continued in the outlawed churches as usual.³⁰ Rev Hendricks said ministers of the proposed Methodist Church of Transkei would be deemed to have resigned if they joined it and he made a strong attack on Kaiser Matanzima: 'As a Methodist, the Transkei Prime Minister should know better than to dabble from a political platform in the affairs of the church in which he was nurtured. The ultimate authority of the church is God. As such I refuse to recognize attempts by man to arrogate to himself such all-encompassing authority over any church.'³¹ From then on, it was all-out war between the new church and the Methodist Church, as subsequent events showed.

The Methodist Church of Transkei was established in Umtata on June 2, 1978, amidst what the *Daily Dispatch* described as 'exuberance' — but priests like Rev Paul Shone, deputy chairman of the Clarkebury district of the church, were ordered out for refusing to sign up with the new body. On the same day, a government notice ordered the Methodist Church of South Africa to stop all its 'activities' in Transkei and to hand over all its property in Transkei to the new church within six months. At the inaugural conference, only seven priests refused to have anything to do with the new church.³²

Within days, the Security Police were denying that loyalist ministers had been detained, but the former superintendent of the Rode circuit, Rev Amos Fadani, who was to be detained without trial for two months in 1979, fled to Kokstad in South Africa, and the Rev Shone and Rev Osborne Ngcatshe, who was rumoured to have been detained, made plans to leave Transkei.³³ Five other ministers went 'missing' after the rumours of Rev Ngcatshe's

detention — *Die Burger* stated it as a fact³⁴ — but reappeared after Rev Ngcatshe was reported to have arrived in Durban.³⁵ A few days later Rev Shone and his family were deported from Transkei and at least seven other Methodist ministers were reported to have left the territory. The Shone family had hoped to remain in Transkei for six months so that their children could finish the year at school, but clearly the government felt that such subversive foreigners could not remain.³⁶ Police accompanied them across the border.

There were also reports of ministers in the Methodist Church of Transkei being accompanied by policemen to demand keys for church property.³⁷ Two days later, Rev Shone said 17 ministers, 16 black and one white, had been forced to leave Transkei.³⁸ The Methodist Church of South Africa estimated it had lost property insured for R3,6 million in the takeover and *Dimension* revealed that Rev Ngcatshe had been summoned, before his departure, by Kaiser Matanzima who tried to persuade him to stay.³⁹

Meanwhile, the government was jubilant. Kaiser Matanzima congratulated the church on receiving the backing of 95 per cent of Methodist ministers and lashed out at the South African church's 'sinister plans to humiliate and insult our President and Government.'⁴⁰ The government also lent the new church R300 000 from a pension fund.⁴¹ In the Assembly, there was an uproar when the new leader of the opposition, Mr Mda, claimed that certain ministers who had failed to abide by the regulations of their church and refused to be disciplined had 'dragged the Transkei Prime Minister by the ear' and persuaded him to ban the Methodist Church. He was ordered to withdraw the remark, but stuck to his view that dissident members of the church had influenced the Prime Minister.⁴²

The new church then embarked on the legitimization of its moves. It accused the South African Methodist Church of toeing the South African government's line, claimed that the statement that 17 ministers had been deported from Transkei was 'a lie', and said both furniture and money had been taken by the departing ministers. It also claimed that it had received 'numerous' applications from ministers in South Africa to join it.⁴³ The strategy was simple: the establishment of the Transkei church had to be seen as part of the black man's drive to stand on his own and liberate himself. It was a neat adaptation of the Black Consciousness philosophy. Thus the 'racist' stipends paid to ministers by the South African church were

criticized.⁴⁴ And there were numerous speeches attacking the racialism in the South African church. As it started extending its activities beyond the borders of Transkei — it opened a church in Port Elizabeth in July, 1978⁴⁵ — the concept of an extended black church began to find support. It was promoted after a leading black theologian, Rev Ernest Baartman, travelled to Umtata to discuss the formation of a black United Methodist Church of South Africa and, after discussions, was given a mandate to convene a meeting to discuss the issue. In case the Transkei Methodist Church got too carried away, Radio Transkei broadcast an 'invitation' on the same day to ministers of the Transkei church to attend a meeting in Kaiser Matanzima's office the following week.⁴⁶ What became evident was that a Transkei-led black Methodist Church was approved by the government, but not a black breakaway in which the Transkei section could be influenced or even controlled by black people in the urban areas.

This later trend, which never got off the ground in practice, did lead to the official renaming of the new church in 1979. The National Assembly accepted an amendment changing its name to the United Methodist Church of Southern Africa in April 1979, ostensibly to extend its jurisdiction beyond the borders of Transkei. In fact the new name was a tacit admission that a separate Transkei church under government control had little credibility.

In 1978, the former DP leader, Knowledge Guzana, a lay preacher, joined the Anglican Church rather than the Transkei Methodist Church: 'but I will retain my membership of the Methodist Church of South Africa.'⁴⁷ It was a clear act of defiance, contrary to the law, but he was never prosecuted. One of the black ministers who refused to join the breakaway, Rev Tom Mbabane, became the first black Methodist minister in South Africa to be appointed to a white congregation in Boksburg, Transvaal.⁴⁸ His personal belongings had been impounded by Transkei police — they included his pets — when he tried to leave. A van carrying Rev Ngcatshe's goods was also stopped by the police.⁴⁹

Not surprisingly, the Methodist Church of Southern Africa decided in October 1978 not to recognize the new church at the annual conference in East London.

The Transkei-based church received a boost when the deputy circuit-superintendent in the Port Elizabeth area, Rev Ben Tunyiswa,

joined it in February 1979. At that time it claimed some 12 000 members outside Transkei, including 70 ministers who had crossed over to it.⁵⁰ In June that year, about 6 000 people were reported to have attended a conference of the church in the Transvaal region.⁵¹ In August a prominent exile, Dr Mxolisi Ntlabati, returned to South Africa after 15 years to join it.⁵² That may have been the peak in the church's short existence.

Dr Ntlabati naively thought that Transkei was a perfect base for nationalist leaders and believed he would be an agent for 'black solidarity and black reconciliation.' He immediately launched a number of self-help projects and became an assistant superintendent in the Umtata Methodist Church. He lashed out at the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, accusing it of racism and bigotry, and said he believed the Transkei church was an expression of black self-determination.⁵³ But within a month, he was rudely awakened — he was detained and deported back to South Africa.⁵⁴

Then, too, the Transkei-based church was involved in a messy dispute with a leading minister, Rev Morgenthal Mdolo, who was in charge of the historic Buntingville Mission. After a simmering dispute, which involved allegations that he had excommunicated a headman, Mr D Ngcai, and one other member without consultation with the church hierarchy, he was summarily transferred — to Namaqualand, of all places, where not even the church's president had claimed membership some months previously. Rev Mdolo refused the transfer, and then the state machinery was used to enforce the decision. When a church investigatory committee was hearing allegations against Rev Mdolo, a mob of people arrived, led by none other than the director of the Transkei Intelligence Service, Mr Fuzile Ngcai, possibly a relation of the excommunicated headman. Then, Rev Mdolo took the transfer issue to the Supreme Court where he applied for an interdict. The government replied by detaining him under the Public Security Act for 82 days. Nevertheless, he won his case. Chief Justice Munnik ruled that the church had acted illegally and restrained it from appointing his successor, Rev G Z Ketj. Rev Mdolo's delight — the church was ordered to pay costs as well — was soon soured when the State intervened again and banished him to Tsomo.⁵⁵

The dispute indicated that all was not well in the United Methodist Church of Southern Africa. While it retains the support of

the Matanzima government the Transkei church will survive, but the initial enthusiasm is wearing off. In June 1977, the president, Rev de Waal Mahlasela, was denying that it was anti-white or the personal property of the Transkei government.⁵⁶ In October the same year, its missionary secretary, Rev Don Dabula, was saying it 'would not be opposed' to better relationships with the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, although it was reported that the prospects of a reconciliation 'seemed slim after a discussion with Prime Minister, George Matanzima.'⁵⁷ Finally, in July 1980, the government eased its ban on the South African church by giving ministers of the Black Methodist Consultation conditional approval to conduct funerals in Transkei — provided the service was opened by a minister of the Transkeian church!⁵⁸

Since so much prestige and effort has been invested in the nationalized church by the Matanzimas, it is unlikely that the breakaway will collapse in the near future. However it is clear that a step-by-step reconciliation is being encouraged, from both sides. A state church, with or without a new Henry VIII, has minimal chances of survival — particularly if it is linked to a government like the one in Transkei. It was a typically impetuous move by Kaiser Matanzima, on petty grounds. The Transkei church survives because the South African church remains banned in Transkei, and because it retains the assets of the South African church. It is always possible that the South African church will divide on racial lines, but such a breakaway would be inspired by Black Consciousness — and would therefore be unacceptable to Matanzima. It is thus unlikely that the Transkei church will broaden its base in that direction.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Argus*, 4 February 1978.
2. *Argus*, 30 July 1977.
3. *Cape Times*, 13 January 1978.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 January 1978.
7. *Argus*, 13 January 1978.

8. *Post*, 15 January 1978.
9. *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 January 1978.
10. *Argus*, 13 January 1978.
11. *Cape Times*, 13 January 1978.
12. *Daily Dispatch*, 16 January 1978.
13. *Daily Dispatch* and *Citizen*, 27 January 1978.
14. *Daily Dispatch*, 1 February 1978.
15. *Ibid*.
16. *Voice*, 21 January 1978 and *Imvo*, 28 January 1978.
17. *Daily Dispatch*, 24 January 1978.
18. *Imvo*, 28 January 1978.
19. *Imvo*, 11 February 1978.
20. *Daily Dispatch*, 25 May 1978.
21. *Ibid*, 16 February 1978.
22. *Ibid*, 18 February 1978.
23. *Ibid*.
24. *Ibid*, 22 February 1978.
25. *Ibid*, 16 February 1978.
26. *Rand Daily Mail*, and *Daily Dispatch*, 18 February 1978.
27. *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 February 1978.
28. *Daily Dispatch*, 25 May 1978.
29. *Ibid*, 25/6 May 1978.
30. *Ibid*, 29 May 1978.
31. *Ibid*, 30 May 1978.
32. *Ibid*, 3 June 1978.
33. *Ibid*, 7 June 1978.
34. *Burger*, 7 June 1978.
35. *Daily Dispatch*, 13 June 1978.
36. *Ibid*, 17 June 1978.
37. *Ibid*.
38. *Ibid*, 19 June 1978.
39. *Argus*, 22 June 1978.
40. *Daily Dispatch*, 7 June 1978.
41. *Ibid*, 10 June 1978.
42. *Daily Dispatch* and *Daily News*, 16 June 1978.
43. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 June 1978.
44. *Indaba*, 14 July 1978.
45. *Daily Dispatch*, 29 September 1978.
46. *Ibid*, 19 August 1978.
47. *Post*, 22 June 1978.
48. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 June 1978.

49. *Argus*, 25 October 1978.
50. *Voice*, 17 February 1979 and *Post*, 16 February 1979.
51. *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 June 1979.
52. *Post*, 12 August 1979.
53. *Voice*, 18 August 1979.
54. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 September 1979.
55. *Post*, 9 April and 17 September 1979; *Imvo*, 28 September 1979 and 2 November 1979.
56. *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 June 1979.
57. *Daily Dispatch*, 25 October 1979.
58. *Ibid*, 11 July 1980.

Chapter Eleven

TELL IT NOT IN UMTATA

Information Control

All authoritarian regimes survive by controlling the flow of information about their activities and events in their countries. The Matanzimas are no exception. Since October 1976, they have deported, interrogated, detained (sometimes unlawfully) and attempted to restrain journalists. They have banned newspapers and publications. And they have tried to control what newspapers print about Transkei.

The prime targets have been newspapers circulating in their area, like the *Daily Dispatch*, *Imvo*, *Isaziso*, *Isizwe* and *Intsimbi*. All have had action taken against them. *Isaziso* and *Isizwe* have been banned outright and their editor has been detained twice (charged only once, and then acquitted.) The *Daily Dispatch* was banned for three weeks in 1980. In comparison with other newspapers in South Africa, these publications have been cautious and restrained in their reporting and editorial criticism — a natural development, since their very survival depends on selling their product inside Transkei. When other newspapers have published critical articles about Transkei, the usual response has been verbal disclaimers by one or other of the Matanzimas.

The intentions of the leadership are obvious: to control the flow of information out of the territory. However since all but three of the publications have been produced outside Transkei, the power of the Matanzimas to limit that flow has been reduced. The newspapers, though cautious, have continued to publish news, as opposed to the government's versions of events. Meanwhile, the ten-person press corps in Umtata maintains a precarious existence, exposed to the whims of the leadership.

WARNINGS

Kaiser Matanzima's attitude to the press was reflected in an extraordinary statement made shortly before 'independence' in response to a report in the *Sunday Times* which stated that he and his brother owned a large number of shares in a group of hotel and bottle store companies based in Umtata.¹ He did not dispute the facts. Indeed, he implicitly confirmed them by saying: 'What is wrong in ministers taking shares in private companies?' But he objected to 'the vicious insults and diabolical political propaganda levelled against us by the journalists in the English press.' He said the story about the shareholding depicted 'the deep-seated hatred these English jingoes have developed since we took over their Transkei — their new England — in 1964. This hatred for the Matanzimas by the English people — the so-called liberals — who cynically raped our forefathers' country is now escalating in alarming degrees because all propaganda to influence the voters against us has failed dismally. These robbers of our land are now adopting dirty tactics — nosing all over the Transkei to find faults against our personality.' He described the English press as 'racialistic', said he had taken note of their 'sinister attitude' and threatened to react by banning the English press. He also said that discriminatory laws in South Africa were the 'results of the anti-black policies of these jingoes' and that for 14 years 'the English press have done dirty work in their propaganda against us.'² It earned him the title of 'Idi Kaiser' in the *Rand Daily Mail*³ and characterized his approach to the press afterwards.

Over the years, there have been various attacks on the press by the Matanzimas, usually after the publication of home truths about them. When various newspapers published stories about the unmarked Dakota which had flown in from Europe with weapons, George Matanzima accused the press of inventing stories which were 'nothing but loads of rubbish, meant for public consumption.' He then warned newspapers not to meddle in Transkei's military affairs.⁴

In March 1979, George Matanzima warned the *Daily Dispatch* that it would be banned if it continued its 'unbalanced' reporting. 'This paper has since 1963, when we gained self-government, shown its malicious hatred of the system we have followed in this country . . . I want to warn this paper that its days are numbered. They shall be completely banned from circulating in the Transkei

if they continue reporting in this manner.⁵ A few months later he declined to say why *Isizwe* had been banned but added that some newspapers were 'naughty' and explained that 'it is naughtiness on the part of a newspaper if you are seen committing adultery and the newspaper thinks it is for public consumption. People must have a measure of privacy.'⁶

The only occasion on which the government has tested its case against a newspaper in a court of law was in May 1980 when George Matanzima announced that Transkei would institute legal proceedings against the *Sunday Post* over an article on Transkei's 23-man navy. He did not indicate what form of legal action was envisaged and the matter has not, at the time of writing, been brought to the courts.⁷ For the rest, it has used arbitrary actions and threats to control the media.

Only Mr Letlaka has expressed public support for a free press. In a message congratulating *Isaziso*, before it was banned, when it was printed instead of being cyclostiled, he said: 'One hopes that in Transkei there will be room for a free press catering for the untrammelled expression of various points of view on the pressing questions of the day.'⁸ But when *Isaziso* was trammelled by his own government, Mr Letlaka was notably silent.

VUYANI MWRETYANA

The first journalist to be victimized by the Matanzimas was a remarkable man, Vuyani Mwretyana, who managed to produce a lively newspaper despite limited resources. When he was first detained on June 1976 under Proclamation R400, his newspaper, *Isaziso*, was appearing weekly. In his first spell of detention he was held in solitary confinement for 17 days and then released without charge. He explained after his release that he had kept his wits about him by planning the next edition of his paper, by singing and by practising karate.¹⁰ He later explained in an article in his own newspaper that he had started it because 'after practising for eight years as a journalist, it dawned on me that writing for a white-owned newspaper, even if it is in an African language, means writing to please the masters.'

His newspaper survived for almost two years after independence, although in March 1978 he complained that the Security Police were intercepting copies on their way to South Africa and

lodged a complaint with the Transkei Postmaster-General. A copy of *Isaziso* containing reports on the funeral of Steve Biko was banned in South Africa, and he also published statements by Donald Woods, the banned editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, on the grounds that he was not banned in Transkei.¹¹ Predictably, his luck did not last. While he was on a visit to South Africa, the Security Police arrived in nine cars at his home looking for him. They also visited his office several times. When he arrived back in Umtata, he telephoned Colonel Ngceba to tell him he was back. Immediately afterwards, three security policemen came to his office and took him away.¹² A week later, *Isaziso* was banned in a special Government Gazette while Mr Mwretyana was still in detention. Sergeant Boo of the Security Police came to the paper's offices and the deputy editor, Zola Dunywa, closed the paper down.¹³ As usual, no reasons were given. While he was in detention, he was given honorary membership of the Writers' Association of South Africa and nominated for an award for his contribution toward the establishment of a truly black-controlled press in South Africa. He was also admitted to hospital for a kidney complaint.¹⁴ A *Post* reporter even managed to see him and wrote: 'Looking cheerful, he described his condition as better than it was in jail.'¹⁵ When he was released more than three months later, it was revealed that the main reason for his detention was the publication of a letter which alleged that a cabinet minister was using his official car to transport his mistress. Mr Mda rightly complained during the no-confidence debate in 1979: 'Why have we, after attaining freedom, hastened so much to become intolerant of the most elementary basic qualities which are the necessary constituent ingredients of freedom? A journalist reports about a government car seen conveying some minister's mistress through the bush somewhere in the backveld and that immediately becomes sufficient reason to ban the newspaper and to detain the reporter . . . There is no doubt that a black ministerial car attracts attention wherever it is seen and the peculiar circumstances of the environment, passengers being conveyed and the hour of the day, all these combine to make a very worthy news item.'¹⁶ But, as in the vast majority of cases on which the Transkeian government has acted, the fact that it was published was sufficient provocation.

During this detention, Mr Mwretyana was charged with smuggling articles out of jail. When the matter came to trial, it was

revealed that what he had allegedly tried to smuggle out was a letter to his attorney maintaining that his captors were 'sadists' and that they were holding him for 'sweet nothing'. In the letter to the attorney, who was Knowledge Guzana, he had written: 'I was just dumped in prison and nothing was said to me. On September 6, 1978 (that is, after nearly three weeks' detention) I was interrogated by Lieut Gladile. He produced a cutting from *Isaziso* about a government car that fetches a girlfriend to and from work every day. Gladile alleged the letter was damaging to the government and scandalising people. I told him the contents were true and found to be true. I told him the letter had nothing to do with a threat to state security for it was based on proven facts.' He was acquitted after the magistrate had ruled that there was no evidence against him.¹⁷

During the trial, his second newspaper *Isizwe* ran into problems. The Perskor-owned Thanda Press in King William's Town refused to print the newspaper and cancelled its agreement with him. 'Unforeseen' problems had arisen. Mr Mwretyana thought these problems had much to do with new moves by the Transkei government to ban the paper and believed Thanda Press had come 'under government pressure from Pretoria not to nurture a lion cub like me who has no sympathies with pro-apartheid institutions.' He disclosed that he had honoured his part of the contract and had been paying cash for the printing. He also claimed that the printers had mentioned that they received most of their business from the Transkei government and were not prepared to risk losing lucrative contracts. The Thanda Press manager, Izak de Meyer, said the decision was due 'mostly to pressures of work' and claimed that Mr Mwretyana did not keep to deadlines.¹⁸

Then, shortly before he left for the United States, a Transkei businessman and the Transkei Development Corporation attached his van and two typewriters to recover a R3 000 debt which he acknowledged.¹⁹ Apparently that did not break him either, because it was still necessary to ban *Isizwe*. Then, finally, he read the writing on the wall and fled into exile in Lesotho.²⁰

For all the actions taken against him, no reason was offered or pretended — other than his publication of a story on the misuse of government property to transport the mistress of a cabinet minister.

DEPORTATION

The Matanzimas levelled their repressive artillery against the South African press in April 1978 when Peter Kenny of the *Daily Dispatch* was served with a deportation order by Major Ngceba, and given ten minutes to leave Umtata. He was then escorted across the Kei River border by two security policemen. The ostensible cause of the deportation was the story he had written about the memorandum on the Transkei Development Corporation submitted by Professor J Ben-Dak, the Israeli adviser appointed by the government. This story had angered Kaiser Matanzima and when Mr Kenny was served with the deportation order, Major Ngceba said to him: 'I warned you about the stories you wrote about Ben-Dak.'²¹

However, the final decision appears to have been sparked off by a story he wrote under the title 'Behind Transkei's Political Split', a feature article on the decision of a number of Eastern Pondoland MPs to resign from the TNIP. He had been called in the previous week by Kaiser Matanzima who expressed his dissatisfaction with the article. Earlier, another Kenny story had embarrassed George Matanzima. In it he had predicted the split in the TNIP. George Matanzima launched a scathing attack on the story, only to hear the Speaker announce in the Assembly that six MPs were resigning from the TNIP.²² All of which suggested that Peter Kenny both knew, and was writing, too much.

When the man who signed the deportation order, the Acting Minister of the Interior, Mr Ramsay Madikizela, was asked about it, he declined to elaborate or give reasons. The Deputy Prime Minister, George Matanzima, also declined to comment. A spokesman for Transkeian journalists was however, prepared to comment: 'The freedom of the press is now in danger. We expect Mr Madikizela to give an explanation of the deportation of our colleague.' And the Umtata office of the newspaper 'was inundated with telephone calls from people throughout Transkei and South Africa expressing shock at the deportation.'²³

In an interview with a rival newspaper, Mr Kenny made a revealing comment on the nature of journalism in Transkei: 'At first I thought Major Ngceba was just going to make another attempt to reveal my sources of information.' He also said that the government had complained about a number of stories he had

written and that Kaiser Matanzima had warned him not to participate in Transkei politics.²⁴

The *Daily Dispatch* editor wrote a letter to the Minister of the Interior asking for reasons for Mr Kenny's deportation, whether he would be allowed to return to his post and what arrangements had been made for him to return to Umtata to pack up his personal belongings. Mr Madikizela replied: 'I wish to advise that it will not be in the interests of my government to give reasons for the deportation of Mr Kenny. With regard to his personal belongings these may be collected by anybody on the staff of the *Daily Dispatch* upon instructions from him.'²⁵ And that was the end of that. No one ever attempted to justify his deportation or to give official reasons. When the president of the South African Society of Journalists, Mr John Patten, said the Transkei government had left 'question marks about its motives'²⁶ he understated the issue. There were no question marks: the action against Mr Kenny was a clear warning to others of what would happen to them if they wrote stories unacceptable to the Matanzimas.

Just as mysteriously as the deportation order had been served, the restriction was lifted at the end of 1979.²⁷ It was as if he had served his sentence and the cabinet, graciously, had decided that he wasn't so bad after all.

DETENTIONS

Until 1980, only one journalist, Vuyani Mwretyana, had been detained by the security police, but within the first four months of 1980, Sydney Moses of the *Daily Dispatch* was detained twice and Peter Honey of the *Daily News* once. In all three cases, it was clear that the detention had nothing to do with state security, although that was the legal provision used to hold them. The detentions had something to do with the sources of stories and much to do with straight victimization. The first time Mr Moses was held, it was a short stay of one day. The second detention was somewhat longer, nearly a month. He was released, without charge and without being questioned, when his lawyers were preparing to apply for an interdict against the police for unlawful detention. The Transkei government settled all legal costs — which was as close as they could get to admitting publicly that the detention was unlawful. In Mr Honey's case the Transkei govern-

ment tried to contest an interdict application in court, but the Supreme Court ruled that his detention had been unlawful and he was released. The Honey and Moses detentions, and the subsequent legal developments, clearly showed that state powers were being used to pressurize journalists into either disclosing their sources or simply recognizing who the boss was.

In the Peter Honey case, he had written a story contending that the Attorney-General, Mr George Muller, was expected to resign by the end of January 'following behind-the-scenes manoeuvring in top echelons of Transkei government. The dispute is said to be connected with Mr Muller's attitudes towards some cases involving political detainees in which legal sources say there are differences of opinion between him and Transkei's Security Police chief, Colonel Martin Ngceba, over the strength of certain evidence.' He wrote that these differences were highlighted in the trial of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo and pointed out that when the case first came to court it was the former Transvaal Attorney-General, Dr Percy Yutar, who appeared for the state and not Mr Muller. 'The official reason given for Mr Muller not being appointed prosecutor for the trial was that he was to be kept out of local politics. But this explanation was regarded with scepticism in some legal circles.'²⁸ Within a week he was detained under the Public Security Act and Ngceba (now Brigadier) said he would be released as soon as he divulged his sources of information for the story.²⁹ It may have been his own way of getting back at Mr Muller, whom he may have suspected of being a source of the information, and at Mr Honey, who had initially worked for the *Daily Dispatch* in Umtata and had written a number of stories which Brigadier Ngceba did not like. There was never any suggestion that the Honey story was incorrect — indeed Brigadier Ngceba himself confirmed it. The police simply wanted his sources of information.

Brigadier Ngceba played it hard: 'Mr Honey will be held incommunicado under Transkei's security laws for as long as he refuses to talk.'³⁰ The government had the right to 'squeeze' Mr Honey until he revealed his source of information.³¹ After ten days' detention: 'He has not yet talked, so he will not be released until he does.'³² 'We have the right under the law to squeeze Mr Honey until he gives that name,' he told a *Daily News* journalist who then disclosed this in an affidavit during the court application.³³ After his court-ordered release, Mr Honey revealed

that Brigadier Ngceba had told him that he would make him 'dance'.³⁴ In spite of the police chief's curious interpretation of the law and his powers, the Supreme Court held that the detention was unlawful and he was released.

Even Brigadier Ngceba conceded that the information in the Honey story was 'authentic' and he said publicly: 'I want to make it perfectly clear that he was not detained because of the press article he wrote, but the information he got was from somebody who must have been under oath not to disclose information of that nature. It was authentic and it should not have gone out.'³⁵ It was a remarkable performance by Brigadier Ngceba who apparently suffered no penalty for his misjudgement and lack of understanding of the law. It was an action which earned Transkei much bad publicity as evidenced in a *Cape Times* editorial which said: 'The brothers Matanzima are fast earning reputations which would be politically grubby in a banana republic. It is distasteful that Pretoria bankrolls Transkei, seeks world recognition for it and contemplates it as part of a Southern African constellation of states. It is time Umtata was told where to get off.'³⁶

The first Moses detention was no better. He was detained at his home on a Friday night after he had been 'invited' by the Security Police to accompany them to their offices. Lieutenant Lavis, who headed the raid, actually spoke to the editor of the *Daily Dispatch* from Mr Moses's home and told him it was a 'routine investigation'. He phoned the editor a second time to seek permission to visit the newspaper's Umtata offices. Once again he stated that it was 'a routine investigation': Mr Moses was not under arrest, nor was he being detained. However, he *was* detained until the following night. Meanwhile the police searched the newspaper offices for three hours with a search warrant which specified that they were looking for 'subversive literature'. They confiscated seven documents for 'further investigation'. These included two statements, some years old, by Hector Ncokazi, an old booklet produced by the Methodist Church of South Africa, an old news bulletin of the Methodist Church, a shorthand notebook, four copies of the constitution of the defunct Union of Black Journalists which was banned in Transkei the previous year, and his 1977 diary which contained the telephone numbers of many of his contacts. Whether the contact book was the 'subversive literature' they were looking for was never clear, but that seemed to be the only document of any significance.

On his release, Mr Moses criticized the conditions in the cell in which he was detained and then said: 'I am still mystified as to why I was detained. Lieutenant Lavis said the police were looking for passport applications with photographs, but according to the search warrant, they were looking for "subversive literature".'³⁷

His second detention was even more weird and ominous. George Matanzima said, announcing the banning of the *Daily Dispatch*, that he had received a telephone call the previous morning: barely 30 minutes later, Mr Moses had phoned to ask him about what was discussed during his conversation with the overseas caller. 'This reporter even quoted word for word what we had been discussing, even though the call had been routed through my private line. When I asked him where he got all that information, he said he got it from his sources. I am sure he had a contact at the international exchange in Umtata and I call upon the Postmaster-General to investigate the matter immediately.' The telephone call had been about Transkei's alleged offer to the ex-Shah of Iran of political sanctuary in the territory, and a tip-off that the Shah had accepted the offer. Shortly after this call Mr Moses was picked up for questioning, along with the two other *Dispatch* reporters, released and then detained.³⁸ He was held for a month without questioning and without charge. Meanwhile George Matanzima announced that he was troubled by the fact that Mr Moses had quoted the telephone call verbatim: 'Who knows that our phones and ministers' phones are not tapped by the agents of this paper?'³⁹ In a statement Brigadier Ngceba said that Mr Moses would be charged with 'some subversive matter' and confirmed that he was being detained under section 47 of the Public Security Act which permitted detention of a person suspected of being in possession of information relating to a crime or matters of state security.⁴⁰

Mr Moses was released a month later on the eve of a court action asking for his release. He did not know why he had been held and had been neither questioned nor harassed during his detention.⁴⁰ Yet it is obvious why he was released and why the Transkei government paid all his legal costs: the only reason for his detention had been George Matanzima's anger when the reporter questioned him over a telephone call he had received. A journalist on the trail of a 'scoop' had not wished to publish anything without checking with the Prime Minister first. In Transkei that was regarded as prying, and the offender had to be taught a lesson.

BANNING

One of the few arbitrary actions for which the Transkei government offered a justification was the three-week ban in 1980 on the *Daily Dispatch*, the only daily paper circulating in the territory. It might have been better for the regime if no justification had been attempted because the statement made by George Matanzima when the paper was banned can only be described as absurd.

The relationship between the Matanzimas and the *Dispatch* had had its ups and downs. Way back in 1963, the *Dispatch* had backed Victor Poto in his quest for the Chief Ministership against Kaiser Matanzima. At the time, Paramount Chief Poto was a moderate who advocated sharing between the races, while the Matanzimas were solidly behind the Nationalist Party policy of separate development. It was inevitable, then, that an opposition, progressive-leaning newspaper would support the grouping that became the original Democratic Party. The Matanzimas never forgave the newspaper — and seventeen years later George Matanzima cited this act of disloyalty in his statement on the ban.

Shortly after the TNIP had entrenched itself in power, there were moves to have the *Dispatch* banned from Transkei, but these were resisted by some senior seconded officials, particularly Mr Johan Mills (then Secretary to the Chief Minister, later Secretary of Coloured Relations and finally Director-General of Cooperation and Development.) Mr Mills argued that it would damage Transkei's position severely if the *Dispatch* were banned because as an anti-government newspaper its reports gave Transkei considerable credibility. It was also argued that its reports were 'independent' and not dismissed as easily as those appearing in government publications or pro-apartheid newspapers. That argument won out and it was sufficient to restrain the Matanzimas until April 1980. Indeed, its own government publications have frequently reproduced *Dispatch* reports to bolster its case.

For its part, the *Dispatch* has been cautious in its coverage of Transkeian affairs, frequently giving substantial coverage to the Matanzimas and highlighting major events in Transkei. It has published supplements on the Transkei Development Corporation and on Transkei's independence. Indeed, it has frequently been criticized by journalists for being 'soft' on Transkei: but since some 20 per cent of its circulation derives from Transkei there are

obvious commercial reasons for being soft. When the editor of the newspaper, Donald Woods, was banned by the South African government in October 1977, Kaiser Matanzima offered him asylum in Transkei.

However, as some of the statements quoted earlier in this chapter have reflected, the *Dispatch's* persistence in publishing the facts, as opposed to what the Matanzimas want it to print, has frequently lead to conflict and tension. That tenuous path of survival ran into the sand in April 1980. Two stories apparently provoked the banning. The first was Sydney Moses's attempt to find out whether the Shah had accepted an offer of sanctuary in Transkei. The second was a story about the arrest of several people near the Qamata Great Place of Kaiser Matanzima. It was reported that police and army units had been involved in an action against cattle thieves, but it was also strongly rumoured inside Transkei that the people had been arrested because of alleged complicity in a plot to assassinate Kaiser Matanzima. The report said the matter had been put to Brigadier Ngceba who responded with the statement that 'this is a false rumour.' Both the rumour and Brigadier Ngceba's response were published in the original story. The following day two security policemen asked the reporter for the names of his informants but he said it had come from an anonymous caller and this was why he had approached Brigadier Ngceba. Brigadier Ngceba told him the arrests were made in an attempt to round up people who were allowing 'destructive cattle' to damage fences. This had all been incorporated in the original report.⁴¹

George Matanzima felt that the '*Daily Dispatch*, for no rhyme or reason, puts in a paragraph which has absolutely no bearing on the report — the so-called plot to assassinate His Excellency the State President. This could only have existed in their imagination or, perhaps, their constant desires, and they nefariously plant it in the people of Transkei. This is the highest form of incitement.'⁴² Covered by parliamentary privilege, George Matanzima could not be sued for defamation, though clearly his statement amounted to that. In any case we have good reason to believe that the original 'rumour' was in fact true. And even if it wasn't, it seems that George Matanzima, and undoubtedly his brother, expected journalists to ignore a 'rumour' of this nature or suppress it.

George Matanzima's lengthy statement in the assembly largely dealt with stories and editorials published in the 1960s. It seemed

as if the original dossier on the *Dispatch* had been dredged up to justify action in the 1980s. He then cited a report published in 1980 in which the newspaper said Kaiser Matanzima's wife had been arrested at the Lesotho border, when, in fact, it was his ex-wife who had been held. The fact that the newspaper had published the present wife's picture was 'an irrefutable proof of the evil intentions of this paper.'

He concluded that 'having considered the long record of persistent false reporting and the malicious attitude against Transkei as displayed by its tactics in trying to incite the people of Transkei to revolt against the orderly government and establishment, as shown in this statement and others, and having regard to the numerous occasions this newspaper has been warned,' the government had decided to ban the newspaper. In his statement he had accused the newspaper of inciting people to revolt, encouraging people to assassinate the President, of being unprofessional and racist ('the usual stunt of the *Daily Dispatch* to belittle the intelligence of the black man.') As a smear it may have succeeded. As a justification, it failed hopelessly.

Indeed, George Matanzima himself implied that the statement had been an exaggeration when some three weeks after he had accused the *Dispatch* of these criminal motivations the ban was lifted and it was allowed to continue circulating as before. Besides the patent over-reaction, the intention of the Matanzimas was clear: to show the newspaper's management who was boss in Transkei and to try to ensure that it reported Transkeian affairs in a manner acceptable to those in power. In the process, they managed to engender much critical comment on the ban in the South African media, both English- and Afrikaans-speaking (even South African television was hostile when it questioned George Matanzima on the issue.) An interesting sidelight was that the *Citizen* newspaper was the first to hear of the ban: its news editor phoned the *Dispatch*'s news editor about the ban before it had been made public.⁴³

OTHER MEASURES

While the foregoing episodes illustrate the more blatant steps taken by the state to control the coverage of events in Transkei, other, perhaps more subtle measures have also been used against

journalists.

They have been subpoenaed to give evidence for the state in political trials. Sydney Moses was subpoenaed to give evidence against Hector Ncokazi concerning a speech allegedly delivered. Mr Moses had not even been present when the speech was made. *Intsimbi*'s Velile Tonjeni was subpoenaed to testify for the state against a DPP organizer, Mr B M Pikashe, on a letter which was published under Mr Pikashe's name. Mr Moses and *Imvo*'s Victor Tonjeni were subpoenaed to give evidence against Paramount Chief Dalindyebo. Mr Victor Tonjeni was held for questioning (on two different days) about the Qumbu meeting at which Paramount Chief Dalindyebo was alleged to have made his statement and, after interrogation, made a written statement.⁴⁴

Journalists have been questioned about their stories. Besides the examples given earlier, the Security Police questioned two *Daily Dispatch* reporters and another from the *Sunday Post* about stories they had written on Transkei's financial crisis in 1979. All three were escorted by security policemen to their headquarters. The aim was to find out who had got hold of an apparently secret memorandum compiled by the Secretary for Finance, Mr J Maquabela. During their investigations the Security Police seized a copy of a South African Press Association report which had been telexed to the *Dispatch* offices in Umtata.⁴⁵ By the time the police acted the SAPA story had been telexed around Africa and, probably, around the world. The Security Police, it seemed, were not familiar with the mechanics of agency filing.

In October 1979, members of the Security Police raided the *Imvo* offices and took specimens from the typewriters in the office. Warrant Officer B Moni demanded that two lines from each typewriter be typed. Two years previously, an *Imvo* reporter, Eric Gqabaza, had been recalled from Transkei after incurring Kaiser Matanzima's displeasure over the way he had reported the leader's views on Black Consciousness.⁴⁶

In March 1980, the editor of *Intsimbi* paid an admission of guilt fine for a story about the use of the army in the Lady Frere district.⁴⁷ A few days later, Brigadier Ngceba warned journalists that it was 'dangerous' to report on the hospitalization of detainees, and that journalists should write with a 'patriotic pen'.⁴⁸ After a TNIP MP complained about a picture of Nelson Mandela hanging in the *Imvo* offices, the Security Police raided them and confiscated it.⁴⁹

There have undoubtedly been other incidents which have remained unpublicized. The journalists have, however, withstood the constant pressure from the state, and have not been cowed.

JOURNALISTS' STAND

If we disregard the government-owned and largely propagandistic Radio Transkei, the press corps in Umtata is small — about ten people. Yet every time action has been taken against them, they have fought back with tough statements. Thus, in July 1979, they issued a statement strongly condemning the tendency of the Security Police to interrogate them or make them state witnesses in political trials. Their statement underlined the precarious position they are placed in: 'We attend public meetings — political or otherwise — for the benefit of our papers, our readership and the general public — and definitely not for the Security Police who are free either to attend the meetings or make use of their informers. Frequent Security Police visits expose us to suspicion by the public that we work hand-in-hand with the police. This is a serious reflection on our integrity and it tends to dent our image in the eyes of the public . . . We refuse to be intimidated. We have built a reputation among our readership under difficult and trying conditions. It has taken us years to do so and we do not want this reputation tarnished overnight.'

When Sydney Moses was detained for the first time, the journalists again protested, calling the Transkei government 'inhuman and unjust'. They added: 'If the detention has anything to do with his professional duties, we do not hesitate to question the Security Police action against Mr Moses. As we have stated before, no amount of police intimidation — be it detentions without trial or other forms of harassment — will deter us from reporting current events without any favour or bias, and reporting the truth as we see it.'⁵¹

Reporting the truth in Transkei really is taxing, as this book has illustrated. Under these circumstances the Transkei press corps stood up to be counted.

FOOTNOTES

1. See section on Matanzimas.
2. *Daily Dispatch* and *Cape Times*, 13 October 1976.
3. *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 October 1976.
4. *Daily Dispatch*, 27 September 1978.
5. *Post*, 22 March 1979.
6. *Daily Dispatch*, 27 July 1979.
7. *Post*, 21 May 1980.
8. *Daily Dispatch*, 13 May 1978.
9. *Ibid*, 21 June 1976.
10. *Ibid*, 29 June 1977.
11. *Post*, 1 March 1978.
12. *Daily Dispatch*, 19 August 1978.
13. *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 August 1978.
14. *Daily Dispatch*, 14 September 1978.
15. *Post*, 14 September 1978.
16. Debates of National Assembly, 1979, page 7.
17. *Post*, 15 February, *Daily Dispatch*, 22 February 1979.
18. *Post*, 22 February 1979, *Daily Dispatch*, 23 February 1979.
19. *Voice*, 8 April 1979.
20. *Voice*, 22 July 1979, *Daily News*, 18 July 1979.
21. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 April 1978.
22. See section on the Eastern Pondo split.
23. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 April 1978.
24. *Sunday Tribune*, 24 April 1978.
25. *Daily Dispatch*, 28 April 1978.
26. *Ibid*, 25 April 1978.
27. *Ibid*, 1 December 1979.
28. *Argus*, 4 January 1980.
29. *Ibid*, 15 January 1980.
30. *Ibid*, 16 January 1980.
31. *Star*, 18 January 1980.
32. *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 January 1980.
33. *Argus*, 30 January 1980.
34. *Star*, 5 February 1980.
35. *Ibid*, 18 January 1980.
36. *Cape Times*, 18 January 1980.
37. *Daily Dispatch*, 16 February, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 February 1980.
38. *Daily Dispatch*, 18 April, *Post*, 18 April, and *Argus*, 18 April 1980.
39. *Cape Times*, 22 April 1980.

40. *Daily Dispatch*, 17 May 1980.
41. *Ibid*, 7 April 1980.
42. *Ibid*, 18 April 1980, which contains the full statement.
43. *Ibid*.
44. *Sunday Post*, 29 July 1979.
45. *Daily Dispatch*, 6 December 1979.
46. *Ibid*, 21 October 1977.
47. *Ibid*, 4 March 1980.
48. *Ibid*, 8 March 1980.
49. *Ibid*, 27/28 March 1980.
50. *Sunday Post*, 29 July, and *Daily Dispatch*, 25 July 1979.
51. *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 February 1980.

Chapter Twelve

BRIGADIER NGCEBA SAYS

The Role of the Security Police

One of the most powerful men in Transkei is Brigadier Martin Ngceba, Commissioner of Police and head of the Security Police. An unquestioning Matanzima loyalist, since 1976 Brigadier Ngceba has coordinated police action to limit dissent and minimize opposition to his master. He is the only security policeman who speaks, publicly, to the press.

Nothing escapes the range of Security Police activities. When the agitation to ban the Methodist Church of Southern Africa in Transkei was taking place, the Security Police were there. When the eastern Pondos were meeting to choose a successor to Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau, the Security Police were there. All the prosecutions under the Public Security Act have been handled by the Security Police. The Sotho secessionists soon ran into conflict with the security machine built up by Brigadier Ngceba. Academic researchers need permission from the Security Police and are often followed. Even the ruling Transkei National Independence Party has not escaped the scrutiny of the Security Police.

In March 1980, seven local executive members of the TNIP in Butterworth and five party members were questioned by security policemen for four hours. They had been attending a meeting at the home of the TNIP district secretary, Mr A M Bam. Others questioned were the district chairman, Mr M Matutu, the district organizer, Mr W K Tamsanqa and other prominent officials. Both Mr Bam and Mr Tamsanqa had already announced that they were to seek TNIP nomination in the general election scheduled for 1981. Afterwards they announced that they were taking the

matter up at the highest level and were to seek 'blanket permits' to prevent further Security Police intervention in their party affairs. Their detentions followed complaints by another TNIP member, Mr P L Msweli, that unlawful meetings were taking place at Mr Bam's home. The Security Police remained at Mr Bam's home until the meeting was over and then asked the people present to accompany them to their offices. It was only a TNIP committee meeting and they were discussing party organization, Mr Tamsanqa said afterwards.¹ Significantly, neither of the two sitting MPs for Gcuwa, Mr Silas Mbanga (then Minister of Education) or Mr H M Ketane were present at the meeting.

The next day Mr Msweli, a former Butterworth mayor, said the branch to which the detained men claimed to belong had been dissolved in February that year, and that even if it had been reinstated, the terms of office of the executive members had elapsed. Mr Msweli also said it had been suggested that he worked as an informer for the Security Police and that this was a 'despicable' suggestion.² Two years previously, Mr Msweli and Mr Bam were both detained by the Security Police along with four other people after another meeting at Mr Bam's house. It was believed that the swoop was the culmination of a long-standing feud and bickering within the Town Council.³ They were released two weeks later, although three women detained with them were released after three days. The detentions came after Mr Msweli lost his mayoral chair.⁴

Whatever the causes of the dispute, the penetration of Security Police action into local affairs underlines the fact that there is virtually no limit to the scope of their activities. This suits both Brigadier Ngceba and the Matanzimas, but has disturbing implications for political life in Transkei.

Chief Mlindazwe, the opposition Chief Whip, stressed the dangers of this situation in 1979. He warned that the network of spies and informers would be the downfall of the nation. Transkei would be a nation that feared its own shadow.⁵ A chauffeur to a former Ciskeian cabinet minister, Mr T Stemele, disclosed that he had been stopped near Lady Frere in 1977 and that the police had produced a list of Ciskeians not welcome in Transkei. Major Ngceba (as he was then) denied the existence of such a list but Mr Stemele insisted that he had been shown one — and detained, apparently because his employer, Mr J N Mkrola, was on the list.⁶

The powers of the Security Police to detain and to banish, as well as their ability to charge virtually anyone who attacks either Kaiser Matanzima or Transkei's 'independence' have already been outlined. They have been able to limit dissent and to disrupt and restrict all potential opponents of the Matanzimas. During 1980, for example, several key members of the opposition party, including its parliamentary leader, were detained for six weeks and then released without charge. After this, the opposition had to get permission from the Security Police before it could even meet. Meanwhile the party leader, Paramount Chief Dalindyebo, had been found guilty under the Public Security Act. In the rural areas where most Transkeians live, the chiefs continue to control the right to hold meetings. It is extremely difficult for the DPP to function — in that sense, the forces of 'law and order' have been effective.

That does not mean that the Security Police under Brigadier Ngceba could be described as efficient or professional. In two cases, described earlier, security policemen gave evidence which was rejected by the courts. In the Public Security Act trial of Hector Ncokazi, a security policeman, Constable Mncedisi Ludidi, testified that he attended a DP congress in his official capacity. Shortly before it started, he was given copies of Mr Ncokazi's speech, and of the party's constitution and programme. These were distributed to members and delegates. He left the congress after Mr Ncokazi had completed his address. His evidence was disputed by the defence, and Chief Justice Munnik said in his judgement that Constable Ludidi was a poor witness and made a poor impression. The court was satisfied that he did not attend the congress and that he had got the documents from someone else.⁷ It does not seem possible that he had managed to persuade his bosses, the investigating officer and the prosecuting lawyers that he had actually been at the congress. In any case, responsibility for these glaring inadequacies in the evidence of Constable Ludidi lay at least partly with his senior officers in the Security Police, and ultimately with Brigadier Ngceba.

This was not the only case. When a former detainee, Welamazwe Bango was charged with insulting Kaiser Matanzima in 1979, a security policeman, Luvuyo Nqamqele, testified that he had been present in a cafe when Mr Bango allegedly said Kaiser Matanzima was 'a dog'. But Mr Bango was acquitted after he had told the court that he had never seen Mr Nqamqele. Clearly the security

policeman's evidence was rejected.⁸

It is obvious both from his own statements and those of George Matanzima that Brigadier Ngceba was consulted over the banning of 32 organizations in 1979. The roll-call of 'subversive' organizations contained some ludicrous entries, as has been remarked earlier — and this points to careless and inept advice from the Security Police. In 1980, Peter Honey was detained and, according to Brigadier Ngceba, was to be held until he revealed his sources. Yet the Supreme Court ruled that the detention was unlawful. It is apparent that Sydney Moses would also have been released if the matter of his detention had ever been brought to court.

Then there was the detention of the DPP Executive members in 1980. They were released after six weeks when the Attorney-General declined to prosecute them on the basis of the Security Police dossier. This slap in the face did not dampen the spirits of Brigadier Ngceba: although he said he was compelled to be satisfied with the Attorney-General's decision, this did not mean that those released could not be detained again tomorrow.⁹

Despite the abundant evidence of Brigadier Ngceba's poor judgement, it seems as if the Matanzimas are happy with his performance — presumably because despite his mistakes he is serving their interests well. While he continues to enjoy Matanzima protection and retains control of all the security forces except the army, he will remain all-powerful. The Minister of Justice, Mr Tsepo Letlaka, could blandly claim in 1980 that Transkei was not a police state because everyone had the right of recourse to the law.¹⁰ It looked good in print, but while the Public Security Act is on the lawbooks and while Brigadier Ngceba is on the loose, those claims have little relation to reality in Transkei, particularly for those in opposition.

Brigadier Ngceba joined the South African Police in 1959 at Paarl and was first stationed at Philippi in Cape Town. His political inclinations began to emerge when after the 1960/61 disturbances, he joined the Security Police in 1962 and two years later, applied for transfer to Transkei. He was first stationed in Umtata but in 1966 he was transferred to Bizana for almost six years. His services were rewarded by a transfer back to Umtata and an appointment to the Transkei branch of BOSS. In 1974, he received an interesting and significant appointment: he was attached to the Transkei government, concentrating on local politics. It was possibly

at this time that he endeared himself to the Matanzimas. Two years later he was transferred back to the Security Police, and by 'independence' he had become a major and was head of the Security Police. Two years later he was made a colonel. When the Commissioner of Police, Brigadier Elliot Cwele, refused to have anything to do with the arrest of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo in 1979 and was prematurely retired, Colonel Ngceba was made Acting Commissioner of Police while remaining at the head of the Security Police. Early in 1980, he was promoted again, this time to the rank of Brigadier, and appointed both Commissioner of Police and head of the Security Police.

It seems inevitable that Martin Ngceba will become a general soon,* possibly pipping Brigadier Keswa of the army as the first to hold that rank in Transkei. Yet if his mentors fade from the scene he will be in trouble. He has created many foes in the pursuit of his duties, as might be expected. At the end of 1979, for example, an organization called the 'Black Eye' distributed a pamphlet threatening to kill not only Brigadier Ngceba but also his family. It stated that they did not only want to kill him, but to torture him so that his family would suffer. The pamphlets were distributed in Mdantsane and Zwelitsha as well.¹¹ It may have been an empty threat.

* Indeed, he was appointed major-general late in 1980.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Daily Dispatch*, 26 March 1980.
2. *Ibid*, 27 March 1980.
3. *Imvo*, 7 October 1978.
4. *Ibid*, 21 October 1978.
5. *Voice*, 15 April 1979.
6. *Daily Dispatch*, 17 November 1977.
7. *Daily Dispatch*, 26 October 1978, 8 February 1979 and 12 May 1979.
8. *Ibid*, 23 and 28 May 1979.
9. *Ibid*, 18 March 1980.
10. *Ibid*, 26 March 1980.
11. *Imvo*, 16 November 1969.

Chapter Thirteen

THE TRIAL OF THE KING OF THE THEMBUS

The Ousting of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo

For many years one of the sharpest thorns in Kaiser Matanzima's flesh has been Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo — the King of the Thembu tribes. Kaiser was a minor chief of the Emigrant Thembus and a member of the right-hand (or 'lesser') house of the Thembu royal family.¹ As such, Paramount Chief Sabata was, and still is, Kaiser's superior in terms of Thembu tradition and culture.

Matanzima and Sabata are both cousins of the banned African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela, who is serving a life sentence on Robben Island. Both know and have worked with Mandela, but it is undoubtedly Sabata who has the closer political and friendship ties with the ANC leader.

Kaiser Matanzima still likes to point out his kinship to Mandela — 'a member of the Great House of the royal Thembu line.' Both are descended from the Thembu chief Ngubengcuka.² But Sabata is more closely related to Mandela — Kaiser is only a distant cousin.^{2a}

This triangular relationship between the three men, and the fact that Sabata is closer to the ideals Nelson Mandela espoused before he was jailed, have been for Kaiser a source of political and personal frustration, humiliation and anger.

The roots of the political differences between Matanzima and Sabata Dalindyebo can be traced to 1957, when a private secretary to Sabata accompanied a Thembu delegation to Pretoria to protest against the Bantu Authorities legislation of that time.³ The Thembus were angered at this legislation because it undermined the rights of their Paramount Chief and enabled an 'upstart chief', Kaiser Matanzima, to achieve his own ends at the expense of Chief

Sabata.⁴ Originally, Kaiser, as a lesser chief, administered only the district of St Marks, but a Sabata district (Calanga) was appropriated to him by the South African government. His ascendancy to power, with the help of the South Africans, in a number of other districts eventually led to his being proclaimed Paramount Chief of the Emigrant Thembus. Sabata had had his first taste of Kaiser's ambition.

In those early days (1957), Sabata also had his first taste of harassment by a legal authority, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories, who wrote the following note to Sabata after the latter's complaints at the way Matanzima was treating a Thembu headman:

'You would do better to interview me if you have anything to say, rather than sign impertinent letters composed and written by your secretary. If I receive any further letters from you criticizing my actions, I shall have to cancel your appointment as regent.'⁵

The rift between the Thembus and Matanzima — which still exists today — was brought about in 1958 when the Thembus opposed the division of their territory into Thembuland and Emigrant Thembuland. The South Africans were well aware at that early stage which horse they were backing. Kaiser was, even then, recognized by them as the person they could rely on to do their bidding. By creating an Emigrant Thembuland for Kaiser, they were giving him the power base he needed to break into the Transkei political scene with some chance of making it to the top. In 1958 the under-secretary of Native Affairs 'decided to recognize Sabata as Paramount Chief of the Thembu but simultaneously to recognize Chief Matanzima as Chief of Emigrant Thembuland under the suzerainty of the Paramount Chief.'⁶ Matanzima's subsequent rise to power as Paramount Chief of Emigrant Thembuland and Chief Minister of the Transkei is described elsewhere in this book.

Sabata and the numerically strong Thembu tribe remain to this day a major threat to Kaiser's power. Realizing this, Matanzima has long sought to win Thembu chiefs and headmen into his camp, and to wipe out the threat posed by those who refuse to come willingly to his side.

By the time of Pretoria-style independence in October 1976, Sabata and his supporters in the opposition grouping were openly challenging the legitimacy of the Transkei's independence and were espousing a common South Africa not balkanized into

homelands but governed by a body elected by the will of all the people.

After independence in 1976, Sabata's parliamentary allowance was removed by Kaiser because the former had not attended sittings of the Umtata National Assembly during that session of the body.⁷ Sabata had informed the Assembly at the beginning of the session that he could not attend sittings because he was ill, and presented a doctor's certificate to this effect.

The Minister of Justice, George Matanzima, in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister, gave Sabata leave of absence. But Kaiser later rescinded and overruled his brother's decision, saying that Chief Sabata's non-attendance in the house 'could have serious repercussions on his chieftainship.'⁸ Kaiser said that as Sabata had not been sworn in he could not 'reap the benefits' of a member of the House of Assembly. He would therefore not be paid his allowance until such time as he was sworn in by the house.

It was the first sign that Kaiser intended punishing his brother and his King for his opposition to Transkei independence and to Kaiser's leadership. Far worse was to come.

In October 1978 Sabata's Great Place (or 'palace') at Bumbane was raided by the Transkei Security Police. They told Sabata they were searching for his uncle, Chief Anderson Joyi, who had been banished to Qumbu from his palace at Mputi.⁹ Sabata said after the raid: 'I confronted the police and asked them whether such behaviour would be tolerated at Matanzima's Great Place. They did not reply. I want to tell the people of Transkei and South Africa that for years now I have been the target of provocative government actions.

'Since the early 60's my close associates have been subjected to arbitrary action by the government to make me a lone voice in Transkei politics. I want the world to know that I have been persecuted for my political convictions since 1963 and have been ridiculed and humiliated even by junior chiefs who were government supporters. When I was installed as Paramount Chief, I became King of the Thembus from Lady Frere to Elliotdale — seven districts. But because of my uncompromising stand against apartheid, I have ended up with only three districts and all of my faithful councillors have been in and out of prison. All along I have kept quiet but now I cannot take any more.'¹⁰

This statement by Sabata raises several important points. As King of one of Transkei's two largest tribes (the other is the

Mpondo tribe) he enjoys massive and, sometimes, fanatical support. This has made the South Africans and the Matanzimas wary of trying to remove him from power by direct repressive acts — the fate of many other lesser chiefs and commoners — because of the certainty that this would provoke immediate, widespread and violent mass retaliation. Matanzima, especially, could not afford to challenge Sabata on this basis, as it would illustrate the weakness of his own grassroots support. He and the South Africans have had to resort to more indirect tactics. The first tactic has been described above: to try and strip him of his tribal authority by removing from his jurisdiction most of the districts traditionally under his control.

The second tactic was to harass and victimize Sabata's closest and most powerful supporters through the use of detention without trial (this is what happened to Florence Mancotywa and Caledon Mda, amongst others) and other repressive measures such as banishments and the demotion of those traditional leaders who supported him.

Neither of these tactics helped Matanzima in the end, although the ceding of Sabata land did give Matanzima the territory he needed to become a Paramount Chief. They certainly did not destroy Sabata's power — if anything they alienated and antagonized his supporters still further, removing them forever from Kaiser's grasp.

After 1976, there remained one other channel open to Matanzima. On July 19, 1979, the head of the Transkei's Security Police, Col Martin Ngceba, announced to the press that Sabata had been charged under the Transkei Constitution Act and the Transkei Public Security Act.¹¹ The Constitution Act provides for the protection of the dignity of the State President (who, by this time, was Kaiser Matanzima), and the Public Security Act makes it an offence to issue statements and disseminate views subverting the sovereignty of parliament or the constitutional independence of Transkei. Sabata was, by this time, also the leader of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.

Highly-placed sources in Umtata have, at various times, told the authors that Sabata was charged on the express instructions of Kaiser Matanzima, and the indictment against Sabata is illuminating in this regard.

The indictment stated that, between June 30 and July 14 in the districts of Qumbu and Umtata, Sabata unlawfully committed acts

calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the State President in that he claimed:¹²

- 'that he was "Paramount Chief of Matanzima", having been born his senior, and will remain forever so;
- that the President visited Pretoria at the instance of the White Boers and accepted independence on terms dictated by them;
- that his house was taken from him and given to a concubine (of Matanzima's);
- that the President is free, but not his people;
- that the President has an abundance of the necessities of life while his people have to live on excreta;
- that the President maltreats his people; and
- that the President is untruthful and causes his people to assimilate what he says as the truth.'

On the second count, the Attorney General alleged that in roughly the same period Sabata propagated the following views which defied, were repugnant to and aimed at the subversion of the sovereignty of the Umtata parliament and the constitutional independence of Transkei:

- 'that the President visited Pretoria at the instance of the White Boers and accepted independence on terms dictated by them;
- that only the President and his Ministers are free and independent — but not the people in the land of their birth;
- that the authorities repossessed the residence "of the King" (Sabata) and allocated it to a concubine (of Matanzima's);
- that the Republic of Transkei is a "pigsty";
- that as a result of the foregoing the adolescents of Transkei are idle, ruin their parents' homes, have no means of livelihood, pounce upon and throttle innocent victims;
- "they should not be blamed: they are correct";
- that the people of Transkei are not free: they do not have either freedom or independence;
- that Transkeian passports are valueless documents;
- that the citizens of Transkei are maltreated;
- that the citizens of Transkei are told untruths and caused to assimilate same as the truth; and,
- that the educational system of Transkei is corrupt and inferior;
- and by the general tenor of his words and speech in the context of the general addresses at a meeting at Qumbu (Sabata) gave out that there was no constitutional independence of Transkei and he made utterances which defied, or were repugnant to or were

aimed at the subversion of the sovereignty . . . (etc);

and furthermore he did make a statement for publication in the *Daily Dispatch* in keeping with his utterances at Qumbu.'

At the same time that Sabata was charged, a political colleague, Hector Ncokazi, who had been in detention for three months, appeared in court charged under the same act.

On July 28, 1979 it was reported that the Security Police had detained Sabata following a raid on his Great Place, but the report was denied by Col Ngceba. Col Ngceba was, by this time, a close confidante of Kaiser Matanzima's, and his star in the unofficial Transkei power structure was on the ascendant. The head of the Transkei army, Brigadier Roy Keswa, denied that army members had participated in the raid on Sabata's Great Place.¹³

The reports of the raid and detention emanated from Mr William Nelani, one of Sabata's councillors, who told the press that Sabata was taken away in a car after about 38 police and soldiers had raided the Great Place in nine motor vehicles. All the soldiers and security policemen were armed and used army trucks and cars. They told Sabata they had been sent by Ngceba to fetch him.¹⁴

On the same day, Transkei Police Commissioner, Brigadier Elliot Cwele, was sacked by George Matanzima, and Col Ngceba was appointed acting Commissioner in his place.¹⁵ Brigadier Cwele was sacked, according to government sources in Umtata,¹⁶ because he refused to have anything to do with the detention of King Sabata against the explicit orders of Kaiser Matanzima 'who has consistently refused to relinquish real political power to his younger brother.'¹⁷

Kaiser's unprecedented action in detaining the King of the Thembus provoked almost immediate and widespread anger amongst Sabata supporters — as might have been expected. On July 30 thousands of Thembus congregated outside the Umtata magistrate's courts to demand his release. An indication of how apprehensive the authorities were had come a few days earlier, when Ngceba denied knowledge of Sabata's detention and both he and Keswa hotly denied that the army had been involved in the detention.¹⁸

Events over the next few days were to make them even more apprehensive. The Thembus massed outside the Umtata courts watched angrily as Sabata's senior wife grappled with George Matanzima in the street, demanding to know where her husband

was and why he had been detained.¹⁹ Matanzima, who had just finished a meeting in the courts with District Magistrates, became flustered and said he could not answer such questions in the street. He escaped quickly to his car and drove away with the then Justice Minister Koyana.

The police did not act immediately against the crowd, but as more and more Thembus, attracted by Sabata's mbongi (praise singer), Mncedisi Qangule — who was singing about Sabata's arrest and detention — interrupted court proceedings, they came up and told him to stop praise-singing and leave the area. Meanwhile, members of Sabata's family were singing and waving clenched fists in the air and the crowd was swelling as Thembu workers, now on their lunch-hour, began to join the angry crowd. The police eventually dispersed the crowd peacefully.²⁰

That afternoon, Transkei's Attorney General, Mr G. Muller, said he was arranging for Sabata's appearance in court and for his release on bail.

Events were becoming more turbulent. The *Daily News* of July 31 reported that many senior government officials were 'dismayed at what they see as the biggest blunder ever made by the Matanzimas in arresting Sabata — an event which would have 'serious repercussions for the government.' Already, Cwele's head had rolled over the issue and more were expected to follow.

It was announced that one of the charges against Sabata was, effectively, high treason — which carries the death penalty in the Transkei. This had the effect of further angering Thembus. Sabata's detention also led to a clash between Ngceba and the Attorney General's office which insisted that Sabata be brought to court and given the opportunity to apply for bail.

Sabata would be charged at a secret court hearing, it was decided²¹ — the first of many attempts to keep his court appearances as far away from potential demonstrators as possible.

One of the reasons for the timing of Sabata's arrest and detention may have been that, as leader of the new united opposition Democratic Progressive Party, he had managed to unite his own tribe with the other largest tribe in the Transkei — the Pondos. There were indications at the time that at least two other tribes were considering throwing their support behind him.²²

After a day-long wait by a small group of Sabata's family and supporters outside the Umtata courts on August 1, Mr Muller announced that the King would be released on bail later that day.

Post reported that this announcement was made after Muller had been summoned to George Matanzima's office, where presumably the Prime Minister conveyed his brother's wishes on the matter to the Attorney General.²³ Outside the courthouse, meanwhile, praise singer Qangule 'ran a commentary of the circumstances of the King's arrest, saying the incident marked the beginning of the end for peace in Transkei.'²⁴

Meanwhile, it was learned that King Sabata's parliamentary representative and publicity secretary of the DPP, Ms Florence Mancotywa, had been detained during the demonstration the previous day and had not yet been released.²⁵

Newspapers continued to report mounting anger at Sabata's detention, and Umtata journalists suddenly found it extremely difficult to contact 'certain key members of the cabinet' who were 'unavailable' or 'on leave' — a favourite trick used by these men when they want to avoid speaking to the press.²⁶

On August 7, nine days after his detention, Sabata was released on bail of R1 000. He pledged from the witness box in the Sterkspruit Court in which he appeared that he would not 'run away and leave his nation behind.'²⁷ Stringent bail conditions — including provisions that he should not attend political gatherings until after his trial, that he should surrender his passport, not leave the Umtata district and report to the police daily — were imposed, provoking strong protest from his attorneys.

They said the conditions were 'scandalous, oppressive and not fit for a king.'²⁸ *Post* revealed, at the same time, the intricacies of the conflict between the Attorney General and Col Ngceba that took place after the detention.²⁹ Muller had said Sabata would be freed on R500 bail pending a summary Supreme Court trial in September — a statement Ngceba objected to on the grounds that Sabata's release did not depend on the Attorney General's office but on the orders of the Justice Ministry. Sabata was, however, released on bail on August 6 on the insistence of Muller after he had consulted top government officials.

Post also reported that Sabata's half-brother — chief Bambilanga Dalindyabo, a member of Kaiser's ruling Transkei National Independence Party — was appointed acting Paramount Chief of the Thembus in Sabata's place after Sabata had been suspended from the chieftaincy pending the outcome of the charges against him.³⁰ This appointment was made by the Dalindyabo Regional Authority on the instructions of the Transkei cabinet and was

clearly a part of Matanzima's strategy.

Before Sabata's release, a defence fund for his trial was started, and the inaugural crusade raised R50 000 in a matter of hours during a political rally in the massive Mdantsane township outside East London — a clear indication of the widespread Xhosa support for Sabata around South Africa.³¹

On August 16, 1979 it was announced in Umtata that the former Attorney General of the Transvaal, Dr Percy Yutar, had been appointed as prosecutor in the Sabata trial, scheduled for the Port St Johns courts on September 19. Normally, it would have been the Transkei Attorney General's job to lead the prosecution in a case of this nature but for some reason it had been decided to drop Muller in favour of Yutar. The Transkeian secretary of Justice, Mr J D Zeka, said when questioned about the appointment that it was Mr Muller's prerogative to delegate authority for the prosecution. Mr Muller declined to comment, but a press report said the Transkei government was unwilling to involve Mr Muller in the trial for political reasons.³²

Dr Yutar, who prosecuted for the state in the trial of Breyten Breytenbach, among other famous security trials, also refused to comment on his appointment. Neither did the then Minister of Justice, Mr Digby Koyana, who said he was on leave when the appointment was made and that George Matanzima had acted as Minister while he was away. George said he, too, knew nothing about the matter. 'It is possible that the news might not have reached the Minister's ears yet,' he said.³³ That was not the end of the Yutar/Muller mystery. Even more mysterious were certain events during the 1980 session of the Sabata trial.

Meanwhile, Sabata's defence team was announced. It consisted of Mr Ismail Mahomed, a Johannesburg advocate who led the appeal of Marthinus Choegoe in the Cape Town 'scissors' trial and was the first black person to take silk in South Africa, and Professor Leonard Gering of Durban.

The trial was to be heard by Transkei's Chief Justice, George Munnik. Munnik too, was soon to be at the centre of controversy over his role in the detention of *Daily Dispatch* journalist Mr Peter Honey, who had reported on Munnik's animosity toward Muller. Known for his stringent adherence to court procedure and asinine comments directed at participants in court proceedings, Munnik was a highly controversial person at the best of times.

The press was billing the Sabata trial as 'one of the most sen-

sational trials in Transkei history,^{34/35} and mention was made of the thousands of Thembu people expected to hire fleets of buses and travel to Port St Johns for the trial.

The magnitude of the trial was accentuated in September when the defence announced that it had subpoenaed Nelson Mandela and his wife, Winnie, to give evidence. Mandela was born in the Qumbu District where Sabata was alleged to have made his treasonable speeches and his wife had been a regular visitor to King Sabata's Great Place before she was banished by Pretoria to a small town in the Orange Free State.³⁶

At the same time (September 1979), at least three members of the DPP were still in detention without trial. They were: Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, a former TNIP cabinet minister who defected to the DPP after 13 years with the TNIP, Chief Ntsika Sicgau, son of the former Transkeian State President, and Florence Mancotywa. These continued detentions were indicative of how seriously the government was taking the threat of unrest over the Sabata issue. Following a request from Sabata's defence, Muller postponed the trial to November 9, 1979. In the meantime, Nelson Mandela was subpoenaed and agreed to give evidence in Sabata's defence — a blow for the Matanzimas — but the South African Department of Prisons refused to allow him to travel to Port St Johns as he would then be outside their jurisdiction and they were afraid he might escape.³⁷ This despite the fact that under the 1976 agreements between South Africa and Transkei Mandela had become a Transkeian citizen.

The South Africans said a compromise solution was possible — the court could hear Mandela's evidence in commission on Robben Island. Sabata's attorney, Mr Griffiths Mxenge — himself a former Robben Island prisoner — disagreed with this, saying: 'He is a Transkeian and that makes all the difference. It is a matter of coming to his own country as he is not an ordinary prisoner involved with another country. It is his own country and he is personally involved here. They (the South African Department of Prisons) can always have their warders accompany Mandela to Transkei.'³⁸

And in another development concerning political prisoners, this time inside a Transkeian gaol, Sabata's defence attempted to send a brief to advocate Fikile Bam, who had been in detention for some time.³⁹ Ngceba took offence at this move and refused to say whether he had passed on the brief to Bam, calling the whole

affair 'an insult to the Transkeian government.'

'How on earth can you expect us to allow a man who is being held incommunicado to go and defend another man who is being held by the same government? I would have understood it if they had briefed him earlier, but they cannot expect one man to defend another when they are both in the same soup.'

Late in September the homes of several leading members of the DPP in Eastern Pondoland were raided by units of the Transkei police. The DPP people were all leaders of the Eastern Pondos and had antagonized Kaiser Matanzima by placing themselves under the political leadership of Chief Sabata — thus breaking the monopoly previously enjoyed by Matanzima of intertribal support.

The plain-clothes police and security police, travelling in 17 vans, arrested the eldest son of the late state president, Botha Sigcau. Mpondombini Sigcau was later charged with the illegal possession of firearms. Police also raided the homes of Ms Stella Sigcau, Chief Ntsikayezwe Sigcau, Chief Zisamele Sigcau and Chief Daliwonga Mlindazwe — all members of the Eastern Pondo royal family — as well as Mr D Dweba and Mr Caledon Mda. All these people were active members of the leadership of the DPP.⁴⁰

On September 24 a Sabata councillor, Mr William Nelane, was held for questioning by the Security Police and later released.⁴¹ The same week thousands of anonymous pamphlets dubbing the Matanzimas 'stooges who take instructions from Pretoria' were distributed in Umtata. The pamphlets called on Matanzima to release political prisoners from detention and to stop harassing Sabata. They also called on workers to form trade unions to fight for wages and against apartheid, homelands and 'all other dummy institutions' created by the Pretoria regime.

'The Matanzima puppet government is carrying on the persecution of those who are fighting for the destruction of the homelands. Matanzima knows that pseudo-independence has been rejected by the majority of the people.'

It was the first of several pamphlets to appear during the Sabata trial.

The next event in the unfolding drama was the detention of Sabata's former parliamentary representative, Mr Anderson Joyi, who had previously been banished to Qumbu.⁴³ He was banished to Cofimvaba several days later.

A further pamphlet blitz attacking Ngceba for detaining Sabata took place in Mdantsane on October 19. The pamphlet said Ngceba was the man who had the 'dirty job' of persecuting patriots.⁴⁴

Four days later Sabata's praise-singer, Mncedisi Qangule, was detained at St Johns College, Umtata where he was singing praises to mark the college's centenary celebrations, and released after two days.⁴⁵ This seemed the most ludicrous detention so far, for Qangule had been invited to the school only to praise its educational achievements. He said of the matter:

'At the offices of the Security Police I was warned not to sing praises anymore. When I was locked in my prison cell, I continued singing praises about my detention. This precious talent is bestowed on me by God. Nobody can arrogate to himself the dubious authority of telling me not to use it.'

Some six days before Sabata's trial was scheduled to begin, another pamphlet concerning the trial was distributed in Umtata, and it was followed by a series of others too numerous to mention here.⁴⁶

The weekend before the trial was due to begin in the Port St Johns Courts, police wearing battledress set up roadblocks on all roads leading to and from Port St Johns, and searched each car, bus and person travelling toward the coastal town — possibly because they suspected a plan by Sabata supporters to organise major demonstrations at the trial.⁴⁷ A police spokesman told the press the roadblocks were 'routine', although it was later learned by one of the authors that the police had commandeered most of the vehicles belonging to the Department of Agriculture and Forestry for the exercise, and had still not returned them by April 1980.

All hotels, camping sites, and holiday cottages in Port St Johns were fully booked for the duration of the trial. In another development that week that had much to do with the Sabata trial,⁴⁸ the Transkei government banned 34 organizations — some of which did not even exist — because they believed they posed a threat to the 'maintenance of law and order.'⁴⁹

Events in the next few days took place with bewildering rapidity. On November 5 more pamphlets, published by the 'Black Eye' were distributed in Umtata in support of King Sabata. Two days later police detained Sabata's two sons, Patrick and Sonto. A reporter who called to ask for comment on the 'Black

Eye' pamphlets was told he would be arrested by Brigadier Ngceba.⁵⁰ The Brigadier added that there was 'nothing sinister' about the roadblocks and searches that formed part of the Transkei's biggest security clampdown since 1976. The magistrate of Port St Johns banned all public meetings in the town and the *Daily Dispatch* reported that a number of people had been called to give state's evidence against Sabata, among them Nathan Jafta, Mr S A Xobololo, Sydney Moses of the *Daily Dispatch*, Victor Tonjeni of *Imvo* and several DPP members.

This was not the first time that journalists had been called as state witnesses in political trials — a development that later prompted Umtata journalists to issue a statement condemning the police for trying to use them as informers.

Meanwhile police were manning roadblocks and had also been posted on all the hills surrounding Port St Johns. All were armed.

But, on the eve of the trial, Chief Sabata was admitted to St Mary's hospital in Umtata with a 'potentially serious illness'⁵¹ related to his diabetic condition. This led to the postponement of the trial until March 14, 1980.⁵² Doctors reported that the sugar count in Sabata's blood was so high that he could go into a coma.

Shortly before postponing the trial, Justice Munnik launched a scathing attack on the newspapers for the way they had covered the trial to date.⁵³ Their reports, he said, amounted to nothing less than incitement. 'To talk about busloads of people coming to the trial is incitement.' He said some reports had suggested government involvement in the trial, which he dismissed.

Sabata was saddled with stringent restrictions by the Judge for the period leading up to the new trial date in March 1980. He was ordered to report to the police every day, although the Attorney General was empowered to alter this restriction should Sabata be admitted to hospital at any stage.⁵⁴

Next day the two journalists who had been subpoenaed by the state to give evidence against Sabata, Sydney Moses and Victor Tonjeni, said they had received threats that should they continue with their participation in the trial they would be killed.⁵⁵

On November 26 Brigadier Ngceba announced that Chief Sabata's son, Patrick Mimi Dalindybo, was still in detention. Sabata's other two sons had been released. Brigadier Ngceba said Patrick Dalindybo and nine others were being held in connection with the distribution of the pamphlets attacking him and Kaiser Matanzima.⁵⁶ The pamphlets had also called on students and

workers to stage boycotts during the trial of Chief Sabata. They warned those who might choose to defy the boycott that 'when our army dethrones Matanzima, you will also be dethroned.'

'Let us involve ourselves totally in the liberation struggle. We have been quiet for so long that K D (Matanzima) thinks all Transkeian students are afraid of him. Let us correct this mistake.'⁵⁷

Several days later Koyana — who was now Foreign Affairs Minister — returned from overseas and told the press that the Sabata trial was being used there as 'the greatest weapon' to attack the Umtata regime. The reports in foreign newspapers, he said, suggested that Sabata was hereditary king of all Transkeian tribes, that he had been arbitrarily arrested because Kaiser wanted to kill him and that the 34 organizations had been banned because they preferred Sabata to Matanzima. This was 'clear fabrication', Koyana said, as he and all his cabinet colleagues 'will be very happy if Sabata is found not guilty and discharged at the end of the trial.'⁵⁸

No doubt they would have been — at that stage. For by now all the indications were that the cabinet was deeply worried: could the emotions aroused by the Sabata trial be contained? Thousands of people had gathered in Port St Johns for the trial, despite the massive police surveillance, and newspapers had reported that thousands of Pondos had massed in the hills around Port St Johns in anticipation of Sabata's conviction. They would probably have taken action against the police had Sabata been convicted at the time.

In January 1980 Sabata was unanimously re-elected leader of the DPP, despite the fact that he was unable to attend the party congress in terms of his bail restrictions.⁵⁹ Florence Mancotywa was re-elected publicity secretary, although she was subject to the same restriction — released from detention, she had been charged under the security legislation.

In the same month almost the entire leadership of the DPP and the DPP youth league were detained by the Security Police. All were held until after the Sabata trial was over. There was an angry response in Transkei, in South Africa and world-wide. The detentions were viewed by his critics as Kaiser's paranoid attempt to prevent an outbreak of unrest during the trial. Behind-the-scenes leaks indicated even more curious occurrences.

People close to Sabata said (anonymously, as they had no wish

to be detained) that Kaiser was angered because his most daring political manoeuvre to date had not come off.

In 1976, Kaiser had offered Sabata the State Presidency in an effort to neutralize his power by placing him in an apolitical office that was easy to monitor. A senior source in the civil service told one of the authors that Kaiser had also given Sabata a gift of a number of very expensive breeding cattle in an attempt to entice him into the Presidency.

Sabata seemed to regard the offer as little more than a bribe and refused to accept the Presidency.

This was humiliating for Kaiser, as his offer had been made public knowledge and was seen as a deliberate attempt to remove Sabata from active party politics. Some time later Kaiser himself was elected State President, but in his hands the office has been everything but apolitical. He has continued to make public statements on issues ranging from party politics through the use of security legislation to foreign affairs. It is known that he calls the tune in Transkei and that his brother, Prime Minister George Matanzima, dances to it.⁶⁰

Sources close to the cabinet have given an account of what really happened behind the scenes between the time Sabata rejected the Presidency and the end of his trial.

After Sabata turned the Presidency down and Kaiser took over the office, Sabata was charged with violations of security legislation. He knew full well that a conviction under this legislation would enable the cabinet to kick him out of the National Assembly on the grounds that he had a criminal conviction (this was later to happen to Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, and had already happened to a Sotho Chief, Neo Sibi). Sabata knew too that such a conviction could also mean that the State President, in his capacity as titular leader could, on the recommendation of the cabinet, suspend or depose him as Paramount Chief of the Thembus.

This, sources argue, was calculated to make Sabata apprehensive about losing office and thus enable Kaiser finally to entice him into the fold and nullify his political opposition. It seems a plausible hypothesis.

According to a source close to Sabata, this was not the limit of Kaiser's plans. He had a further vision, entailing a manoeuvre that would, all at once, bring Sabata into Kaiser's fold, form the basis of expedient ties with the African National Congress and increase

Transkei's chances of international recognition a hundredfold.

The plan allegedly involved Kaiser, Nelson Mandela, Winnie Mandela, the South African government and Chief Sabata. Kaiser planned to approach Chief Sabata as a relative of royal Thembu blood and suggest to him that he use his influence, along with that of Winnie Mandela, to persuade Nelson Mandela to agree to being released from Robben Island — on condition that he come to Transkei and occupy a senior post in the Transkei government. Matanzima felt that, for his part of the bargain, he would be able to persuade the South African government to release Mandela under these conditions. Once Mandela had been released, Kaiser, Sabata, and Nelson Mandela would rule the region together in a powerful triumvirate that would easily attain international recognition for the Transkei . . .

That, according to the source, is what Kaiser would have liked. Certain events during that time back this argument up. Firstly, Winnie Mandela was known to have visited both Kaiser and Sabata on several occasions during 1979/1980, and to have held discussions with them. She had been allowed to travel to the region from her place of banishment by the South African authorities because she had been subpoenaed to give evidence in Sabata's defence. It is not clear what took place during these talks, although official sources revealed that they involved attempts to heal the 'family feud' between Sabata, Mandela and Matanzima.

What views Winnie Mandela expressed about the plan — if indeed it was put to her — are not known, but the source close to Sabata told one of the authors that three successive requests made by Kaiser to meet Nelson Mandela were indeed passed on to Mandela on Robben Island.

In what must have been a series of devastating blows for Kaiser, Mandela refused to see him each time. And it seems that Sabata refused to co-operate in the plan too, for his trial was eventually resumed in March 1980. If the deal had gone through, the state would have dropped charges against Sabata. It must have been a bitter pill for Kaiser to swallow — his attempts to unite the Thembu royal family into the rulers of Transkei had failed.

Surely Kaiser Matanzima must have known that his ambitious scheme was doomed to failure from the start? There was a fair chance that the South African government would have agreed to release Mandela to Transkei if he agreed to occupy a post in the government. For the South Africans such a gesture would have

meant a magnificent public relations exercise, for both South Africa and Transkei. If Mandela had agreed to the plan, he would have alienated himself immediately from the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe, which is committed to a unified South Africa under people's rule and has completely and repeatedly condemned the bantustans and their 'puppet leaders'. This split would have been advantageous to the South Africans — it was likely to provoke a major division in the ANC and thus ameliorate the threat the organization poses to South Africa.

On the other hand South Africa would not have welcomed a Transkei united under the strong and popular leadership of Mandela and Sabata, who would undoubtedly have been able to pressure Kaiser into taking a giant leap to the left. Also for all South Africa knew, Mandela might have agreed to the plan simply in order to get off Robben Island and, once in Transkei, broken the agreement and left for the ANC headquarters to resume active participation in the liberation struggle.

It is not known whether the plan was even put to South Africa by Matanzima, and if so what the South Africans said.

Clearly, however, the plan failed and Kaiser had no option but to press on with Sabata's trial.

On March 13, three days before the trial was due to resume in Port St Johns, the *Daily Dispatch* reported that Dr Yutar and advocate N M MacArthur had withdrawn from the prosecution in the Sabata trial. They were to be replaced by the Transkei Attorney General, Mr B G Muller.⁶¹ Legal sources speculated at the time that the move was an attempt by Muller to reassert his authority as Attorney General after his omission from the cast of the trial earlier. Muller had, in addition, unwittingly become involved in a dispute concerning Chief Justice Munnik. Umtata journalist Peter Honey had been detained by Brigadier Ngceba who wished to 'squeeze' him until he revealed the source of his information for a story he had written alleging that Munnik was trying to push Muller out of the Transkeian judiciary. It was also reported⁶² that 'top echelons of government' were trying to force Muller to resign because of differences between him, Brigadier Ngceba and the cabinet over certain political cases — the most important of which was the trial of the Thembu King. Muller and Ngceba had disagreed over the issue of bringing Sabata to court at the start of the drama in 1979, and Honey had inferred in his report that this was one of the reasons why he was being pressured

to resign. The story obviously touched on a sensitive nerve, for Munnik called Honey into his offices, demanded to know his source of information and 'virtually threatened him with deportation through the offices of President Kaiser Matanzima.'⁶³

In this light, Muller's decision to drop Yutar and take on the prosecution of Sabata himself could be seen as a deliberate attempt by him to assert his position as Attorney General and to refuse to bow to political pressure. It was to have an unfortunate sequel some days later.

On March 14 *Imvo* reported that tension was again building up inside Transkei and South Africa over the Sabata trial, which was scheduled to restart the following day. The trial was, however, postponed for a few days following an application by Sabata's defence.

Security measures were as strict as before, with police manning dozens of roadblocks after (according to a source in Umtata) they had been given orders to open fire on any demonstrations. At the same time, the ferry on the road from Pondoland to Umtata — which crosses the Umzimvubu River at Port St Johns — broke down under mysterious circumstances. Ferry operators said it required parts that had to be procured in Queenstown, but there was speculation that it had been closed down on police orders.

When the trial resumed on March 18, it went ahead as planned for the first time. Giving evidence in his defence on the charge that he had said Transkeian passports were useless documents, Chief Sabata said Malawi authorities had told him when he was trying to get a visa to enter that country that Transkei passports were not recognized and he would have to obtain a South African passport.

He also said that while in detention after being taken from his Great Place by the Security Police the previous year, his ancestors had come to him in a dream and told him that they were angry he was in jail — it was not a fit place for the King of the Thembus. He wrote to Matanzima from detention, telling him this and demanding a meeting with him. In defence of his statement that he was Kaiser's Paramount Chief, Sabata said he was descended from the Great House of the Thembus and was higher in seniority than Kaiser Matanzima.⁶⁴

Transkeians were afraid to comment on the region's independence as they feared being arrested under the security legislation,⁶⁵ Chief Sabata said. Transkei was a 'pigsty' not because it was dirty but because its people had only restricted

independence within its borders.⁶⁶ Matanzima had accepted independence from Pretoria after repeated discussions with the white government, but he did not consult his black fellow-men in Transkei about the issue. Transkei's present status was harmful to the interests of urban blacks in South Africa. He would have been happy if the decision to opt for independence had been taken in consultation with the people of Transkei. If his party, the DPP, was elected to power, it would abolish restrictions on freedom of movement and speech as well as the indiscriminate detention of people because of their political convictions.

Transkei independence was incomplete because it was not recognized internationally, he said. He confirmed that he had been offered the position of first President of Transkei in 1976 by Kaiser Matanzima, but 'I would not accept the position and enjoy the luxury of the office while the rest of the people were living on excreta.'⁶⁷ By saying this at the rally at Qumbu, Chief Sabata said he had not intended to insult the office of State President but had merely tried to emphasize that underprivileged people in Transkei were poor and starving.

Closing the case for the state, Muller said the views expressed by Sabata were similar to those expressed by former opposition leader, Hector Ncokazi, who had said: 'These Transkei leaders live in luxury while thousands are smothering in poverty.'⁶⁸ Ncokazi had been charged under the Transkei security laws for this statement. Muller said it was clear that Sabata had contravened the acts under which he was charged.⁶⁹

Closing the case for the defence, Advocate Mahomed denied this and said the views propagated in Sabata's speech could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the state to be repugnant to the sovereignty of government or the constitutional independence of Transkei. Sabata was part of the constitutional structure in his capacity as leader of the opposition, and it was in this capacity that he had said that independence was not accepted from Pretoria on the correct terms — he did not say it was wrong to accept independence *per se* and could therefore not be found guilty of challenging Transkei's independence.⁷⁰

The latest event in the unfolding Muller saga had, meanwhile, taken place in Umtata. On the night of March 22 — while Mr Muller was in Port St Johns at the trial — his house was broken into and ransacked. On the surface the incident appeared to have been a normal burglary. It appeared that thieves, having broken a

window with a brick, had entered and searched the house, and left shortly afterwards. Further investigations by *Daily Dispatch* reporters⁷¹ revealed, however, that there was far more to the break-in than first met the eye.

Firstly, nothing had been stolen, although the intruders had carefully filed open the locks on a strongbox that contained thousands of rands' worth of silverware. They had ignored all items of value and, according to Mr Muller, had concentrated on his files letters, documents and notes — none of which had been removed.⁷²

It also transpired that the intruders had gained access to the house not through the window they smashed, but through the kitchen door by picking the lock. The obvious inference was that the smashed window was a ruse calculated to throw either the police or the press — or both — off the scent.

Muller said he could not rule out a political motive for the break-in. As the crime has not yet been solved, this leads to two possible motives for the break-in. Firstly, the intruders may have been Sabata supporters intent on warning Muller not to continue with the prosecution — in which case, though, they would surely have caused serious damage to the house instead of just searching it and removing nothing.

The second possible theory — and the most sinister — to be voiced on the Umtata grapevine at the time, was that members of the Transkeian Security Police had perpetrated the crime in order to scare Muller and/or find documents which could have in some way been used against him. The role of the police and government appeared to be somewhat questionable during investigations.

On the one hand, officials of the Transkei Development Corporation hastily replaced the shattered plate glass window the morning afterwards as soon as it became known that the house had been broken into. They were not acting on Muller's instructions, as he was in Port St Johns and had not even heard of the break-in. The TDC is controlled by officials in close liaison with the government, especially with Kaiser Matanzima, and had been implicated in other covert activities before. They could, therefore, have been acting on government orders — for it is difficult to see who else would have notified them of the break-in.

On the other hand, the police, in a patently absurd attempt to explain the motive for the crime⁷³ told Muller afterwards that 'they saw people watching the house while it was under police

guard the night of the break-in, and supposed they were the original intruders returning to take away valuables.' This statement was absurd because no burglars would have come back to the house the following night knowing that there was a police guard posted outside — especially after that fact had been reported in the press the same morning.⁷⁴

The truth of the matter will probably never be known. Everyone, from Muller to Brigadier Ngceba, claimed to be 'baffled' by the break-in, and thus far no culprits have been arrested. The argument that some government agents were involved seemed to be the most plausible to observers at the time, and there was much speculation in Umtata to this effect.

In any event, Sabata was found guilty by Justice Munnik and sentenced to a fine of R700 or 18 months imprisonment. This put him in line for action by the Regional Authority in his area, which was entitled to suspend him for a period, fine him, or strip him from his tribal office because he now had a conviction. It also paved the way for the State President to do the same and, at the same time, to strip him of his right to sit in the Umtata House of Assembly.

Sabata knew this, and knew too that certain key people would like to see this happen because they preferred having his conservative, TNIP-supporting half-brother in the position that was rightly, in terms of Thembu law, Sabata's.

He accordingly obtained an urgent application restraining the Dalindyebo Regional Authority from further discussing his punishment the night before they were due to meet on April 15.⁷⁵ Backing his urgent application, which was heard at midnight before Mr Justice van Coller, Sabata said he had information that the Regional Authority planned to introduce a motion deposing him as King of the Thembus because of his conviction.⁷⁶

Sabata was chairman of the Regional Authority until July 1979 when George Matanzima suspended him. *Sunday Post*⁷⁷ reported that the plan to depose him was a plot hatched by 'junior chiefs'.

On May 9 Sabata was refused leave to appeal his conviction of having violated and injured the dignity of the State President. (He had been acquitted on the charge of subverting the sovereignty of parliament and the independence of Transkei.)⁷⁸

Meanwhile, George Matanzima had informed the District Commissioner of Dalindyebo that he deemed the offence commit-

ted by Sabata, i.e., his conviction, tantamount to misconduct and had directed the Regional Authority to deal with this misconduct within 8 weeks. The Authority, which consists of headmen (most of whom are TNIP supporters) and chiefs, voted the following day that Sabata should be fined. Fifteen voted that he should be fined, three voted that he be merely reprimanded and only two that he be deposed.⁷⁹

The decision was subject to the approval of the State President, but by the time of writing no further developments had taken place in this regard.

The Dalindyebo Authority's vote to fine Chief Sabata for misconduct was ironic — it brought the King of the Thembus full circle back to where, in the 1950s, he had fought bitterly with the South Africans over the implementation of the Bantu Authorities legislation, which favoured Kaiser while removing much of Sabata's authority.

Kaiser Matanzima had started to use the Bantu Authorities legislation to Sabata's detriment as early as 1957/58, and by 1980 the offspring of that same legislation was being wielded in a final attempt to destroy him.

The Sabata saga did not end there, however. On August 6, 1980 the Transkei cabinet rejected the recommendation of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority that Sabata be suspended from his Chieftainship for two years. The Cabinet had rejected the Dalindyebo Authority's earlier recommendation that Sabata be fined R100 for misconduct, thus forcing them to recommend a heavier penalty.

After rejecting the suggestion that Sabata be suspended for two years, the Prime Minister, George Matanzima, announced that the Cabinet had recommended to State President Kaiser Matanzima that Sabata be deposed as King of the Thembus for all time. Thus the Matanzimas finally rid themselves of the last Transkeian Paramount Chief who refused to kowtow to their wishes, although George Matanzima denied that Sabata's removal had anything to do with the fact that 'a Matanzima is President.'⁸⁰

After announcing the move to depose Sabata, George Matanzima said the Dalindyebo authority would have to consult the Thembus before a new chief was elected, but, he said, 'the government must approve.'⁸¹ It is illuminating here to quote substantially from his statement on the issue, as it provides

considerable insight into the feelings of the Matanzimas about their most vocal and longstanding tribal opponent:

'Chief Sabata was born of Paramount Chief Jongilizwe Sampu Dalindyabo on November 25, 1928 . . . He was born exactly five months after the death of his father in June 1928 and was the fifth son. After the death of Chief Sabata's father, his father's brother, Chief Jongintaba Dalindyabo summoned a meeting of the Thembu tribe to determine the heir to the Paramountcy. At the meeting there was a clear division for, while some chiefs and headmen proposed that Chief Nxego should be heir, others proposed that Chief Sabata should be heir.

'The matter was referred to Paramount Chief Mhlobo for his decision as senior chief of the Thembu tribe as a whole. Chief Mhlobo gave his ruling in favour of Chief Sabata . . . and his ruling was accepted unchallenged.'

Matanzima then named the people appointed as Sabata's guardians and outlined his educational history, alleging that he had been expelled several times from educational institutions for misconduct.

He continued: 'In 1948, very much contrary to customary practice, Chief Sabata got himself circumcized without consulting his guardian, acting Chief Dabulamanzi and the Thembus, an act which infuriated Chief Dabulamanzi and the Thembus, but Chief Dabulamanzi was prevailed upon to take no punitive steps against Chief Sabata.

'In 1954 Chief Sabata was installed Paramount Chief . . . Kaiser Matanzima attended the installation, and he presented Chief Sabata to the magistrate. No sooner had Chief Sabata been installed than he showed a special aversion towards both Chief Dabulamanzi and K D Matanzima. He attempted to have Paramount Chief K D Matanzima deposed from Chieftainship by building a case against him, but failed.

'In 1960, when the Pondo revolts moved to Thembuland, Chief Sabata accused (K D Matanzima) of being a spy and a good boy for the Republic of South African government [sic] when the Exco decided to call upon the Republic of South Africa to put an end to the revolts.

'In 1961 Chief Sabata supported a motion on self-rule but soon turned round and supported the ANC in its opposition to self-rule. From that time Chief Sabata adopted a hostile attitude towards K D Matanzima and started a campaign of insulting him at all

the meetings he (Chief Sabata) addressed.

'In three such meetings held in 1976 by Chief Sabata . . . he abused and insulted K D Matanzima. Paramount Chief K D Matanzima's reaction to such acts of abuse and insults was to summon a family meeting at which he complained about the conduct of Chief Sabata towards him and Chief Sabata was reprimanded.

'Ever since K D Matanzima was elected as President in 1979, Chief Sabata has never shown any respect for him as head of state. This attitude has resulted in the insults Chief Sabata has directed against the State President which have amounted to a treasonable act [sic].

'As a normal consequence to this misconduct it has been decided that Chief Sabata cannot hold a seat of leadership to people under the head of state and thus has had to be deposed from Paramountcy.

'(His) conduct would have deserved the same consequence if the State President were a different person from K D Matanzima.

'It is significant to note that even apart from the bleak past of Chief Sabata, he has never made a positive contribution towards the development of the Thembus . . . As a fellow-traveller of the ANC or PAC, Chief Sabata appears to be carrying out all the objectives of these organizations as is even evinced by the fact that his son is in a refugee camp at a training terrorist centre [sic] in Botswana.'⁸³

Sabata responded to the statement the same day, denying that he had been expelled from the educational institutions mentioned by George Matanzima for misconduct. He claimed that Matanzima's allegations were a 'pack of lies'.

He said: 'I have no hatred for State President Kaiser Matanzima — we differ only in politics.'

He denied that he ever supported self-rule, and maintained that Chief Mhlobo Matanzima, father of both Matanzimas and mentioned in George Matanzima's statement, was never a Paramount Chief. He said he was refused admission to Lovedale because they never received an application — and it was Kaiser Matanzima who was supposed to make the application.

Many Thembus celebrated his circumcision, Sabata said. 'Three other chiefs agreed to it when Chief Dabulamanzi ignored my request to be circumcized. When Chief Dabulamanzi took the matter to court, he lost the case.'

Four days later it was reported that King Sabata was on his way to exile in Swaziland, on August 10.

FOOTNOTES

1. Laurence, op cit, p. 9.
2. Ibid, p. 9.
- 2a. Carter, Karis and Stultz, op cit, p. 133.
3. 'The Thembu Reject Bantu Authorities.' Undated Documents.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Laurence, op cit, p. 35.
7. *Daily Dispatch* 13/11/76.
8. Ibid.
9. *DD* 27/9/78.
10. Ibid.
11. *DD* 20/7/79.
12. Attorney General's Indictment of Jonguhlanga Sabata Dalindyabo, p. 1.
13. *Rand Daily Mail* 28/7/79.
14. *Cape Times* 27/7/79.
15. *RDM* 28/7/79.
16. *Daily News* 31/7/79.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. *Post* 31/7/79.
20. Ibid.
21. *Daily News* 31/7/79.
22. Ibid.
23. *Post* 1/8/79.
24. Ibid.
25. *DD* 1/8/79.
26. *Argus* 31/7/79.
27. *DD* 7/8/79.
28. *DD* 7/8/79.
29. *Post* 6/8/79.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. *DD* 16/8/79.

33. Ibid.
34. *Imvo* 25/8/79.
35. *Post* 31/8/79.
36. *Cape Times* 8/10/79.
37. *DD* 14/9/79.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. *Post* 23/9/79.
41. *DD* 25/9/79.
42. *Voice* 29/9/79.
43. *DD* 9/10/79.
44. *Voice* 20/10/79.
45. *DD* 24/10/79.
46. *Sunday Post* 4/11/79.
47. *DD* 5/11/79.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. *DD* 8/11/79.
51. *DD* 9/11/79.
52. *DD* 10/11/79.
53. Ibid.
54. *RDM* 10/11/79.
55. *Voice* 11/11/79.
56. *Post* 27/11/79.
57. *Post* 7/11/79.
58. *Post* 2/12/79.
59. *Imvo* 11/1/80.
60. *Sunday Post*.
61. *DD* 13/3/80.
62. *Argus* 4/1/80.
63. *DD* 30/1/80.
64. *Argus* 20/3/80.
65. *DD* 20/3/80.
66. *Post* 21/3/80.
67. *Post* 21/3/80.
68. *DD* 27/3/80.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Syd Moses and one of the authors.
72. *DD* 24/3/80.
73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.
75. DD 15/4/80.
76. *Sunday Post* 20/4/80.
77. Ibid.
78. DD 10/5/80.
79. DD 2/7/80.
80. *Daily Dispatch* 7/8/80.
81. Ibid 7/8/80.
82. Ibid 7/8/80.
83. Ibid 11/8/80.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of Transkei's future cannot be based on the possibility of Transkei gaining international recognition. Neither can it be based on the possibility that Transkei's development strategies will enable it to become economically independent of Pretoria and the mining houses. For, to put it simply if strongly, these are very improbable possibilities.

In order to suggest the probable future of Transkei, one must therefore consider the future of South Africa's ongoing apartheid strategy, to which the future of the region is inextricably chained. South Africa controls Transkei's future, whatever leeway it may allow Kaiser Matanzima and his functionaries in deciding on matters of superficial importance. Indeed, it is pragmatic for Pretoria to allow the Umtata National Assembly this leeway, for the removal of petty apartheid paves the way for its removal in greater South Africa: an inevitability that seems to have been recognized by P W Botha. In preparing white South Africa for the repeal of such legislation the South African government can point out that the race riots predicted by hard-right Nationalists when Vorster allowed the desegregation of Transkei have not taken place.

Umtata has not been able, however, to repeal fundamental apartheid legislation such as the influx control laws, the restrictions on the rights of migrant and contract workers from its territory to organize themselves at their places of labour, and the urban areas laws. Neither, of course, has it been able to repeal the Bantu Authorities Acts — the legislation which made provision for the homelands and their independence in the first place.

Legally speaking Transkei could disavow these laws — but that would not be in Umtata's interest. It would mean the undermining of the tiny bantustan élite whose very existence and power depend on such legislation — and on the control of Transkei labour by means of these laws.

The real future of Transkei is being mapped out by government strategists in conjunction with military men and with the aid of monopoly capital. The planning has been termed 'total strategy' by Premier P W Botha. One of the most important facets of this strategy is the constellation of states — already well on the road to becoming a reality on the subcontinent.

Total Strategy evolved as a response to 'general developments and specific crises which form South African society.'¹ It involves an attempt by the dominant South African groups and interests to monitor and restructure 'certain fundamental relationships — between and within classes, between classes and the state, between the state and the economy and within the state itself.'²

The current change in the nature of the South African economy is evidenced in the trend towards the dominance of monopoly capital in all sectors of production in the urban, industrialized centres. Moss³ points out the degree of 'centralization and concentration of capital (and hence productive units)' which has led to the growth of certain industrial and commercial interests both within their own areas of operation and through diversification into other areas. As this process continues, alongside the interpenetration of 'local' and 'foreign', 'English' and 'Afrikaans' capital, monopoly capital's interests and power becomes more predominant.⁴

This change in the economic structure has had two effects which are of considerable importance to the lives of the people of Transkei.

First, the productive process is becoming less reliant on a massive, unskilled, migrant labour force because of the move towards the use of capital-intensive, high-technology production processes. These processes require a smaller, more settled skilled and semi-skilled labour force to operate them. Only the mining and agricultural sectors continue to rely on a cheap, migrant labour force, and even these sectors show signs of change.⁵ The altered composition of the work force required by the production process has 'placed certain demands on the state, which is partially responsible for the training, creation and management of the

labour force.'⁶

The second effect is that the tendency of monopoly capital to replace unskilled workers with machinery has caused the rate of unemployment and underemployment in the urban and rural areas to rise sharply. Wolfgang Thomas, Professor in the University of Transkei's Economics Department, outlined the effects of this change in the South African central economy on the Transkei region in an interview with the *Daily Dispatch* in June 1980.

'Migrant labour, hitherto a major contributor to the Transkei economy, could well decline in significance in the future. With the mines taking a larger component of settled labour (Transkei's main source of revenue and largest export), they would be inclined to turn toward their own local instead of Transkeian sources.

'Such a development would be entirely in keeping with the Riekert recommendations and could have the effect of making the mines less of a growth sector for Transkeian employment.'

Pointing to the 25 000 Transkeian workseekers estimated to enter the work market as migrants each year, Thomas described the situation as 'a bomb ticking away.'

It is even more of a 'bomb' with the potential of disrupting the South African economy when one considers the total numbers of unemployed and underemployed people in South Africa. Most are African, and when one considers the increasing frequency of incidents of revolt (Soweto, 1976; East Cape, 1979/80; West Cape 1980), and the growing realization by black school children that their education is preparing them only for unemployment or poorly-paid, demeaning work, their 'disruptive' potential within the South African economy takes on new significance.

Estimates (for there have been no reliable statistics) show that unemployment is reaching massive proportions, having grown rapidly during the past few years as monopoly capital has become more dominant, and is in the region of 2½ million people in the urban and rural centres of South Africa.⁷

In order to defuse this situation, the state has used the homeland strategy to pump the unemployed into the rural, underdeveloped areas — one of which is Transkei — through the use of influx control and a myriad other regulations.

This has not been completely effective — witness the incidents of revolt cited earlier — but a function of Total Strategy is to examine ways in which potential dangers of this nature can be controlled.

The state cannot hope to counter the prospect of crises in the economic structure simply by transporting the unemployment problem to the bantustans. A mass of impoverished unemployed, underemployed and unemployable people in the homelands will inevitably lead to fundamental conflict there that will, indirectly, challenge the very basis of the bantustan system — and thereby the South African economy.

South Africa must therefore look to new methods of dealing with this facet of crisis in the economy. The state cannot rely on the use of repression as a final solution to the problem, although both the South African armed forces and their Transkeian counterparts have frequently been called into action during the years since 1976. With unemployment estimated at around 2½ million,⁸ it has become imperative for state strategists, working with groups such as Anglo American, to devise a solution that will batten down the revolutionary potential of the Transkei situation. The new inventiveness of the 'constellation of states' idea, and the broad-based consultation on which it rests, marks a departure from the policy followed by the Nationalist Party under Vorster, which tended to rely exclusively on existing legislative and repressive power. Under P W Botha, the National Party has moved away from its nationalist roots and become a 'bourgeois' party, discarding the white Afrikaans working class that brought it to power in 1948.

The fundamental tenet of total strategy has been to 'win the hearts and minds' of a section of South Africa's black people by giving them certain economic privileges unknown to their black compatriots. This has manifested itself in the attempt to create a black middle class with vested interests in the existing economic structure. It is hoped that this new class will divide the nationalist unity of blacks as a wholly-exploited group dedicated to waging a national struggle for power, and thus decrease the chances of such a group ever taking control.

The first black élites created by the state existed in the homelands many years before those in the urban areas. The National Party had had to abandon a former crucial aspect of their bantustan strategy, 'namely the suppression of the emergence of an African bourgeoisie', because revolts such as the Pondo Rebellion at the beginning of the 1960s and 'a series of worker/peasant revolts in the cities had shown that the people were not learning the narrow tribal nationalism of the bantustans, they were

learning from their struggle the broad united nationalism of the South African black oppressed.'⁹

There were thus two fundamental reasons why the state found it necessary to create a homeland bourgeoisie — the first a political reason, and the second an economic one.

Molteno¹⁰ suggests that the need for the creation of a 'comprador' capitalist class in the bantustans became fundamental to the bantustan strategy, but needed capital investment. This investment has previously been channelled into Transkei through grants from South Africa and special concessions designed to attract industries to the area granted by both the South African and Transkeian governments.

But these concessions have not succeeded in attracting enough investment to Transkei to alleviate the symptoms of massive unemployment and the potential conflict embodied in the situation. The Transkeian élite created under the bantustan strategy was originally made up of an inflated state bureaucracy, centred mainly in Umtata. With 'independence' this élite grew to include an entrepreneurial class whose existence depended on structures such as the TDC and the government and whose interests therefore lay in maintaining existing relations in the region and South Africa.

It was only with Vorster's fall from power, and the Botha administration's acknowledgement that the pace of growth of this new class was not rapid enough to cope both politically and economically with the restructuring of the central South African economy, that the South African government began to make renewed efforts to establish a peripheral economy in the Transkei.

This renewed vigour, as manifested in the constellation of states plan, has recently won the active support of the monopoly capitalist institutions. The most illuminating evidence of this trend was the announcement by Harry Oppenheimer in 1979 that he supported the concept of a constellation. He even put several serious suggestions about the structure of such a constellation to the Prime Minister, and met him in November 1979, along with many other leading South African businessmen, to formulate a clearer business strategy towards the plan.

P W Botha has thus involved, for the first time since the National Party came to power, big monopoly concerns in the planning of a new South Africa. These businessmen have tentatively committed themselves to the constellation of states

— seeing that it is in their economic interest to do so. The TDC and the Transkei and South African governments alone cannot create the conditions for a peripheral economy in Transkei — they have to have the co-operation of South African business.

The stated object is to create a class of black entrepreneurs in Transkei that will eventually become the dominant group in the region, paving the way for the amelioration of the unemployment crisis.

Molteno¹¹ says the class of black entrepreneurs is heavily parasitic on the South African state — 'its allegiance to the status quo is ensured by its dependent existence being entirely predicated upon the perpetuation of the bantustan system.' This class, in relation to the South African capitalist class, is weak and dependent, and need be so in order not to challenge the hegemony of this class in South Africa. Because it is weak, its economic function is 'negative', but its 'socio-political function has become the pivot of the whole bantustan strategy.'

Molteno adds that along with the political representatives of this class — who would include Matanzima and his cabinet — the aspirant middle classes of the Transkei and other homelands together constitute the 'broadening of the base of the South African state.'¹²

At the same time, the labour force in the urban areas is undergoing a transformation. Migrant labour is increasingly contract labour. Contract labourers will spend a longer period in South Africa, often with their families, but remain tied to the homelands by the citizenship and other legislation, so that, should the need arise (as in the 1980 Johannesburg municipal strike) they can be sent back to the homelands.

The main functions of the homelands have to date been the political control of the black labour force, and the reproduction of this labour force as super-exploitable workers for the South African economy.

But as the economy shows increasing monopolistic trends, relying less and less on the unskilled labour that is in ever more abundant supply, the homelands have begun to take on the new function — which still requires drastic stimulation — of mopping up the vast surplus of labour.

The constellation of states has as one of its main tenets the object of stimulating industrialization and 'efficient' agricultural production in the homelands, whether they be

'independent' or otherwise.

The South African business sector is entering on a new path of co-operation with the state in establishing the infrastructures necessary to the success of this economic plan. It is as yet unclear exactly what measures will be taken, but the first moves have been made and the Transkei government has already lent its almost unqualified support to the planners.

What does all this mean to Transkei and the peoples who inhabit the region? As industrialization there gathers momentum, guided and artificially stimulated by South Africa, the state bureaucracy and the new middle class are likely to grow in size and strength. This new group will have significant political clout within Transkei, and is likely to supersede the rule of the paramount chiefs, chiefs and headmen — giving the government a wider and stronger support base than it has had to date. As the ruling party in the House of Assembly, the Transkei National Independence Party is likely to become the party representing the interest of this class, and to remain in power. The support of the non-elected chiefs will no longer be so crucial, and the government may indeed decide at some stage to dispense with the clause in the Transkei constitution which stipulates that half the members of the Assembly should be chiefs. This new class, the creation of South African business interests and the state, will remain subservient to those interests.

The proposal, within the 'constellation of states' framework, to increase industrialization in Transkei will make a larger quota of unemployed and under-employed worker/peasants employable, without doing enough to alleviate this crisis to the desired point. It is also likely that there will be intensified efforts to make Transkei agriculture more viable. As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter it has to date been impossible for the ruling élite to restructure the agricultural system because this would undermine the power echelons upon which internal political control is based. But it is becoming increasingly likely that the Transkei government, in collaboration with South African interests, will attempt to change the land tenure system and establish it on a more capitalist footing. If the TNIP has the increased political power industrialization is likely to give it, it will be easier to make this change. This has, like industrialization, been unlikely in the past because of the active suppression of the development of wholly capitalist relations in the territory. But, given the injection

of capital the constellation of states is likely to herald, the possibility becomes ever more real.

In July 1980 the formation of a Southern African Development Bank was announced, on whose resources the homeland élites are expected to draw. Professor Thomas said he saw 'no reason why the South African government and private sector funds should not be combined in the financing of programmes' inside Transkei.¹³ He saw hope for such funding in Pretoria's plans to institute the Development Bank, which would be a 'key instrument' in getting the various independent and self-governing homelands 'interested in closer co-operation.' He said that one of the factors to be contended with in the Transkei's new economic approach under the constellation of states is the disparity between the rate at which blacks are acquiring new skills in the urban centres and the rate at which the same skills are obtainable in Transkei. Other factors include the lack of skilled labour and technical and planning expertise. This would mean a 'steadily diminishing interest by South Africa in investment, training and development projects.' The solution to this problem, as he saw it, was that Transkei had to be drawn back into the wider South African economy and polity. He felt sure that 'long-term economic forces would make it necessary for Transkei to participate in a South African federation.'

WHEN KAISER GOES

It has been South Africa's gain that Kaiser Matanzima is a man who follows largely the dictates of his own self-interest. It has been easy to persuade him to follow Transkei's direction, in return for certain material and prestigious rewards. As long as he remains in power, this pattern is likely to hold.

He has, with the help of South Africa, built up and maintained at the expense of many other Transkeians, a position of power that is almost impregnable as long as he retains Pretoria's backing. As he gets older, though, the question asked with increasing frequency is: what will happen when Kaiser goes? Who will succeed him?

There is no obvious protégé or pretender. During the long years of his rise to power in Transkei, he systematically removed all those whose power even remotely challenged his. This makes prediction

difficult.

It is, however, unlikely that anyone in direct political opposition to Matanzima will be able to assume the mantle of power, for a number of reasons. The first of these is that it is unlikely that the TNIP which is well-versed in the politics of repressing opposition, would allow this to happen. Therefore the new leader or ruling group would have to take control by force, and the Transkei police and defence forces are probably effective enough to suppress any revolt that may arise. Even if they find such a task impossible, the TNIP would be likely to invoke the so-called mutual defence pact with South Africa, and call in fire-power from that quarter to quell any attempted coup by opposition groupings.

In any case there would be little point in such a coup. Transkei is not recognized as an independent state and the main aim of political opposition in the territory has been to resist the balkanization of South Africa. Before it was made illegal to do so, all the opposition talked in terms of the re-integration of the territory into South Africa should they take power.

It is likely then that Kaiser's successor will be drawn from within the ranks of the present ruling élite. Here, three men seem to be his most likely successors: the head of the Transkei Army, Brigadier Rodney Keswa; the Commissioner of Police, Brigadier Martin Ngceba, and the Prime Minister, George Matanzima. All three have Kaiser's ear at present, although none share his power.

George Matanzima, as Kaiser's brother and the Prime Minister, seems the most likely choice. An experienced, shrewd politician and businessman, he has the knowledge and parliamentary experience — more so than either Keswa or Ngceba — to assume direct power. But he is known to have displeased Kaiser and many within the élite because of certain allegedly unscrupulous business deals, and seems to regard political power more as a means to furthering his own material interests than anything else. Kaiser Matanzima is known to have been extremely unhappy, on occasions, with his brother's performance as Prime Minister, and there have been strong suggestions that Kaiser has considered assuming the position of Executive President in order to control his brother's activities and the affairs of state more directly.¹⁴

George Matanzima has many business and political enemies, and does not seem to inspire the fear and respect commanded by Kaiser. It is distinctly possible, therefore, that he will be ignored

in the selection of a new leader on Kaiser's death. It is unlikely that the ruling TNIP will choose a new leader in such an event — what is more plausible is that the party will merely ratify a decision taken elsewhere in the corridors of power.

Brigadier Martin Ngceba is a close confidant of the President, and it is often said that he takes orders from no-one else in Transkei. He is well-versed in the art of suppressing viewpoints and people that do not agree with the dominant élite in the region, and he may well have the armed force and experience necessary to seize power on Kaiser's death. His chances of succeeding must be rated as high.

The third person, **Brigadier Keswa** is something of a dark horse. Not much is known about him except that he is shrewd and also has Kaiser's ear and backing. He has a small but loyal army to back him in any bid he might make for power, and he is one of the few people in the Transkeian power élite who has managed to remain untainted by allegations of corruption and inefficiency. It is difficult to assess his power, however, as so little is known about him, and it is even more difficult to assess his political standpoint because of his low-profile approach to Transkeian political issues. One thing in his favour though, assuming that South Africa has some influence over the choice of Kaiser's successor, is the rise in power of the South African generals and the assumption of Premiership by Defence Minister Botha. Keswa was trained by the South African army to take control of the Transkei army and it is likely that he has made personal acquaintance with General Magnus Malan — who is known to be one of the most powerful men in South Africa. If South Africa does have any say in the selection of Kaiser's successor, it is likely then that Keswa would be backed.

Keswa is the only one of the three men who has not been the target of accusations of incompetence and inadequacy — another factor that would influence South Africa in his favour should the occasion arise. If South Africa's political influence over Transkeian politics increases under the constellation of states (perhaps as a precondition of aid and development assistance) Keswa's chances will be very good indeed.

A South African option which cannot be discounted would be to encourage an opposition take-over. This would legitimize the electoral process, make it look as though it was a popular move and enable the new government to escape the taint of the Matanzima

regime. Although sections of the DPP have strongly criticized the 'independence' of Transkei, particularly the old DPP members, the essential causes of the splits in the TNIP have not been ideological. It is conceivable that a Stella Sigcau/Jeremiah Moshesh alliance would countenance a 'reunification' with South Africa inside the constellation of states, which they could call a federation. Although there would be risks for the South African government in such an outcome, the advantages would be considerable. Given the nature of the DPP it would probably be able to satisfy the broad aspirations of the rising middle class. A Ngceba/Keswa assumption of power would assume some form of coup, while an opposition take-over, possibly with the backing of the army and the police, would enable a new start to be made. It would certainly look very much more democratic, and that would probably suit the South African government better.

THE FUTURE OF TRANSKEI

In October 1979, when the constellation plan was being bandied about ever more publicly by the Botha administration, Kaiser Matanzima said that the idea would resolve, among other things, the economic recession, unemployment, labour difficulties resulting from influx control, racial discrimination and the colour bar.¹⁵

Can the proposed constellation succeed in ameliorating the problems which Matanzima mentioned, and can it succeed in its own stated objective of creating a middle-class agricultural and industrial élite in Transkei — and the other homelands — in order to contain the antagonisms that are building up in South African society?

The answer seems to be negative, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the plan will require a massive injection of capital into the Transkei and the other bantustans to have any chance of viability. This capital would have to be supplied not only by the South African state, but also by the business sector. In an area as underdeveloped, as far from export and industrial centres, and as financially mismanaged as Transkei there would seem to be little or no incentive to potential investors and industrialists. There is therefore little likelihood, despite P W Botha's call to selected business leaders in November 1979, that much

investment will take place. If it is to come about, infrastructural conditions attractive to industrialists will have to be created.

South Africa's R1 025 million grants to Transkei over the past five years have not managed to create these conditions. Roads and railway lines need to be built, electricity has to be supplied more cheaply and many other infrastructural developments will have to take place before Botha can expect any significant degree of co-operation from business.

Apart from the creation of infrastructure, investors will have to be satisfied on the score of the political stability of the region. At present there is no such thing. There is a growing degree of political dissatisfaction and resistance, rooted mainly in the working and unemployed groups, that could quite conceivably lead to escalating conflict within the territory.

Moreover, the Transkei government has a sorry history when it comes to labour relations. Trade unions are banned, and wildcat industrial unrest in a future Transkei can be looked upon as a probability.

Opposition to independence, despite the fact that it is now a capital offence, is growing all the time. It is inevitable that this conflict will take on a more overt character, as the people of the region find less and less migrant work available to them in order to supplement the meagre living — or lingering death — they are able to eke out of the overcrowded earth. The migrant workers and ex-migrant workers have a relatively high degree of political consciousness, and the Quail Commission into the possibilities of Ciskeian Independence found that the majority of migrants were amongst the most vehement opponents of Transkei-style independence.

This class of people is being shunted in ever-increasing numbers back into the Transkei and other reserves, and as they become more alienated and disillusioned, so their resistance to the bantustan strategy and its functionaries in the homelands is likely to grow — and eventually explode.

The future for investors, then, looks bleak from the overriding point of view of the profit-motive.

As the 'pacesetter' for the rest of the homelands, Transkei is of the first importance to the Nationalist ideologues in their attempts to prove that the bantustans can work.

The territory is moving into the 1980s as one part of the total strategy designed by the South African state to maintain its

hegemony of power on the subcontinent, and as one facet of the ongoing solution to the periodic crises to which the South African economy is subjected. If Transkei is part of the solution, the prospects of the strategy as a whole are not bright.

This book has attempted to contribute toward a better understanding of the 'homeland' policies of South Africa by considering the historical development of the crucial Transkei region. Perhaps the most important insight that we have gained is the effect of the bantustan strategy and Transkeian independence on the lives of the migrants and peasants of the region. The impact has been brutal: high infant mortality rates; the absence of men from the rural areas and the consequent — and immeasurable — hardships that women have had to bear as child-raisers, farmers, and labourers; the malnutrition, disease and starvation; the rape of the soil because of inadequate farming methods and the outmoded system of land tenure; and the ever-longer queues of desperate men at the labour bureaux . . .

What of the future of these people? All the above symptoms of the exploitative economic system to which they are subject are likely to continue for a while yet. If there is change and work does start to become available in the region it will be the work of a semi-industrial proletariat: a workforce that will be even more exploited, in a peripheral economy, than the one at present working in the South African industrial centres.

FOOTNOTES

1. Glenn Moss, 'Total Strategy'. Paper, 1980, p.5.
2. Ibid, p.2.
3. Ibid, p.3.
4. Ibid, p.4.
5. Ibid, p.4.
6. Ibid, p.4.
7. *Institute of Race Relations Survey*, 1976, p.283.
8. Ibid, p. 283.
9. Frank Molteno, 'The Historical Significance of the Bantustan Strategy', in *Social Dynamics* 3, 1977, p.24.
10. Ibid, p.24.

11. Ibid, p.25.
12. Ibid, p.25.
13. In a Wolfgang Thomas interview with the *Daily Dispatch*, 13/6/80.
14. *Sunday Post*, April 1980.
15. *Daily Dispatch* 11/10/79.

POSTSCRIPT

'South Africa is our greatest friend and benefactor, just as other under-developed states have their own friends and benefactors.'

— K D Matanzima, speaking on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of Transkei independence in October 1980.

Since we finished writing this book, little has changed in Transkei. Many things, though, have intensified — resistance to the Matanzima regime, and the inevitable security crackdowns afterwards; the poverty of vast areas of the countryside, now emphasised by a severe drought; corruption in the civil service, highlighted by new disclosures. There has been an attempted coup against the Matanzimas, and several important opposition leaders have gone into self-exile and aligned themselves with the African National Congress.

The material conditions of the territory's populace have undoubtedly worsened. This is partly due to the drought, which left thousands of families without food or water.¹ Once again, South Africa had to be called in to relieve a desperate situation, and donated, at the request of the Transkei government, food and money. The South African army established a base in Umtata and supplied water in tankers to drought-stricken areas. But after the drought was broken the army stayed. Even the government-supportive newspaper *Inkwenkwezi*, whose shareholders include cabinet ministers, said people were becoming sceptical about their continued presence. The breakdown in the infrastructure of the territory, and the worsening plight of the populace was attributed by the Matanzima brothers to the fact that there were no longer

any white police to instil fear into the people.

Criticising the 'dirtiness' of many towns, Prime Minister George Matanzima said: 'All this is done because there is no longer a white policeman to look after them. In the rural areas people no longer care to cultivate lands even after heavy rainy days, because there is no white man who will come and say he is taking the land away because it is not being cultivated.'²

The schools boycott, which spread from South African towns to Transkei and led to the state of emergency there, was blamed on the African National Congress by President Matanzima. He said that the attack on the educational system was aimed at recruiting pupils for 'terrorist service against South Africa'.³ By March 1981, the emergency was still in force — although its ostensible causes were over.

It is not known how many school children were detained under the state of emergency, but the number is believed to run into the hundreds. In addition at least 20 people were held by the Security Police between September 1980 and February 1981, and the irregularity of many of these detentions was highlighted by several applications to the Supreme Court. Because of the all-embracing nature of the emergency powers none succeeded.

In November, the Society of Advocates of Transkei issued a statement expressing concern at the number of detentions under the Public Security Act and emergency regulations and called for all detainees to be charged or released without delay.⁴ The Matanzimas justified repressive measures by alleging that money was being poured into Transkei 'to assist revolutionary elements to rise against the established government.'⁵ The main 'subversive' force behind the rebels was, President Matanzima said, the African National Congress.

This increasingly open acknowledgement of the ANC as the paramount opposition force seemed prompted by the fact that senior opposition leaders in the territory, who were hounded into self-exile by the Matanzimas, had joined the ANC. These people included Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, who commanded massive support amongst the Thembus as their hereditary king and amongst the people of the territory as a whole in his capacity as leader of the DPP, and his publicity secretary, Ms Florence Mancotywa.

Thus, in attempting to crush the DPP internally by bringing its leaders to trial under security legislation and harassing and

victimising its prominent supporters, the Matanzimas unleashed a far more potent force against them — that of the ANC, with its reportedly large following and the close proximity of some of its leaders in neighbouring Lesotho.

On the night of December 11, 1980, a grenade attack was made on the home of the chief of police, the newly-promoted Major-General Martin Ngceba.⁶ Neighbours said they heard two 'thunderous' blasts and two shots a minute later. The attack came as Ngceba was driving into his Umtata home's driveway. Ngceba fled from his car shortly after the grenade blasts and sprinted to his house, from where he fired two shots. The assailant(s) escaped, and at this stage it is not yet known who was responsible.

In September 1980 six out of 11 alleged PAC activists who had been held in detention for almost two years were released on the recommendation of the attorney-general, Mr G B Muller, who declined to prosecute them. The released six were Mr Synod Madlebe, Mr Mackay Magoza, Mr Sigqibo Mpendulo, Mr Zizamele Gushu, Mrs Valencia Mketi and her husband, Mr Vuyisile Mketi. Their release followed an unprecedented appeal to the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity to intervene on their behalf. Security police had alleged that they had brought arms into Transkei, harboured guerillas and planned the violent overthrow of the Transkei government. In their letter to the United Nations, smuggled out of Umtata prison, the detainees alleged that although they had been detained by Transkei security police, they had been interrogated by South African security police.⁷ Although the six were released, the other five people held with them remain in detention.

Opposition to the Matanzimas and Transkei itself does not come only from the left-wing, as was proved by a bomb blast at the home of the Transkei consul in Port Elizabeth on October 30, 1980. A powerful bomb was planted at the front door of the Summerstrand home of Mr M A Dumalisile, causing extensive damage to the house. No-one was hurt, but South African police later disclosed that a number of alleged members of the extreme right-wing Wit Kommando organisation were being held in connection with the blast, among other attacks inside South Africa.

During the period under review, a number of Sabata's supporters and relatives were imprisoned, banished or harassed by the security police — an apparent victimisation of his followers

in the wake of his alignment with the ANC. Sabata's chief counselor, Mr William Nelani, and Mr Handsom Mgingxa were each sentenced to 7½ years imprisonment under the Constitution and Public Security Acts for distributing 'inflammatory' pamphlets in Umtata during Sabata's trial in November 1979.⁸ In November another of Sabata's sons, Mr Sonto Dalindyebo and five other youths were detained by security police.⁹ The reason for the detention is not known.

In a bizarre, and brutal display of the use of security police power when legal means have failed, the homes of eight Thembu families in the Mputi area of the Umtata district were burnt to the ground by security police and their occupants banished to remote areas of Transkei.¹⁰ The homes destroyed in November 1980 belonged to Mr Anderson Joyi, Sabata's former parliamentary representative, and other supporters of the Paramount Chief. Major-General Ngceba explained the action by saying the occupants of the houses 'had displayed signs of rebellion against the government.' Ngceba claimed they had assaulted chiefs in the area, although they had appeared in court and been found not guilty. All the homes belonged to people who were among 18 Mputi residents detained in 1977 and released in 1978. Transkei security police supervised the operation, in which thatched roofs were set alight and the homes bulldozed. Government trucks stood by to remove each family's belongings to the areas of banishment.

Another prominent Sabata supporter, Mr Ezra Mtshontshi, fled Transkei and went into self-imposed exile in the Ciskei after a tip-off that he was to be banished to a remote area. Mr Mtshontshi, who was expelled during the emergency from the University of Transkei where he was the SRC president, was shocked to hear in August 1980 that security policemen had arrived at his Umtata home and removed all his furniture — and his four children. Also removed by the security men were Mr Jabulani Conjwa, his wife, and their four children, who were staying in Mr Mtshontshi's house.¹¹ It is believed that the people taken away were deported from Transkei.

Two other detentions unleashed widespread criticism of the Matanzima government. In the first, the editor of the popular *Drum* magazine, Mr Stan Motjuwadi, was detained for 27 days after arriving in Umtata in September to cover the funeral of Mr Saul Ndzumo, the cabinet minister who died in detention. Mr Motjuwadi was released after a statement he allegedly made to

the Security Police was released by Major-General Ngceba. In the statement, Mr Motjuwadi apologised for a report he had written on Transkei.

On October 29 another journalist, Mr Marcus Ngani of *Post* newspaper, was detained in Umtata.¹² After being held for over a week, Mr Ngani was taken to the Kei River border post in an attempt to 'deport' him to South Africa. When South African officials refused to accept him, Transkei security police drove him to an unmanned border post and dumped him near Queenstown. Professor John Dugard of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies said the 'deportation' highlighted the 'absurdity' of Pretoria's homeland citizenship policy.¹³ Mr Ngani was a citizen of Transkei by virtue of the citizenship laws for blacks. 'In law a state may deport aliens from its territory, but it may not deport its own nationals. The deportation of Mr Ngani to South Africa constitutes an acknowledgement of the farce behind the policy of separate citizenship for independent homelands. The situation seems to be that Transkei can deport one of its own citizens to South Africa when it is politically convenient, and that South Africa can deport people permanently resident in South Africa but connected to a homeland to that homeland when it finds it politically expedient.'

COUP ATTEMPT

Late in September 1980, the Transkei Minister of the Interior, Mr Saul Ndzumo, leaked the news of an alleged plot to topple the Matanzima regime. Speaking at the funeral of a policeman who died in a car accident, Mr Ndzumo said he had opposed the plot and praised the dead policeman, a Detective Hophula, who he said had told him of the plot.¹⁴

Reports several days later suggested that the plot failed because of the refusal by members of the Transkei army to participate. Brigadier Ngceba, when asked about the plot, said: 'This is a very delicate matter which is still being investigated.'¹⁵ A day later he denied the plot's existence.¹⁶

On September 31 the *Sunday Times* released details of the plot which it said emanated from a source close to President Matanzima. The report said the plotters — a group of dissident Thembus in the civil service known as the 'Group of Eight' —

planned to depose the Matanzimas and instal Chief Sabata as president of Transkei. The plotters were all allegedly ex-members of the ANC and PAC. One member of the Group of Eight was Mr Tennyson Makiwane, a former senior ANC member who had defected and was working for Transkei's Foreign Affairs department. Mr Makiwane was gunned down by a masked attacker at his Umtata home in July 1980. The report further stated that most of the plotters worked in one government department, presumably Foreign Affairs, and were well-supplied with arms. The coup attempt has been one of Transkei's most closely guarded secrets.

On September 27 Mr Ndzumo was sacked by the cabinet from his position as Minister of the Interior and replaced by Ms Stella Sigcau.¹⁷ Five days later Ndzumo and the former Commissioner of Police, Brigadier Elliot Cwele, were detained by security police. Brigadier Cwele had been sacked because of his refusal to detain Chief Sabata (see Chapter 13). Brigadier Ngceba said the two men had been detained so that they could 'put the record straight' about the coup plot.

On September 9 an urgent application by Brigadier Cwele for his release was turned down in the Umtata Supreme Court. The reason for the dismissal was given as the evidence by Colonel L S Kawe of the Transkei Security Police that he had reason to believe that the plot still existed and that Cwele 'might still be involved.' The same day as the application was dismissed, Ndzumo died in the Idutywa police cell where he was being detained.¹⁸ The Idutywa district surgeon, Dr J S Knutzen, said he had visited Ndzumo, a diabetic with a heart ailment, two days previously and he had been in good health and had the necessary medication for his condition. Dr Knutzen said Mr Ndzumo appeared to have died of natural causes. Chief George Matanzima said Ndzumo had been in 'poor health' on the day of his detention.

On September 11 the Minister of Health, Mr T Vika and the Deputy-Minister of Agriculture, Mr Cromwell Diko, were asked to make statements on the plot by the security police.¹⁹ Chief George announced that Mr Ndzumo's widow was to receive an MP's pension and said in a press statement: 'It was unfortunate that at the peak of his career (Mr Ndzumo) fell into a trap which led to his dismissal.' On September 15 it was announced that a post-mortem had shown that the former minister had died of natural causes, and Brigadier Ngceba said there would be no

inquest into his death. Another post-mortem was conducted on the insistence of the family. The results of the post-mortems were not made public, despite a pledge to this effect by Chief George.

After 32 days in solitary confinement, Brig Cwele was released on bail of R200 after being charged with the theft of government documents. A condition of his bail was that he was not allowed to speak to the Press. By mid-November, the results of the post-mortem on Mr Ndzumo's body had still not been released. On February 3, 1981 the charges against Brigadier Cwele were withdrawn. That, to date, is all that has emerged concerning the mysterious coup.

Although nothing more has been made public, the whole affair is indicative of the increasingly loose grip the Matanzima regime has on internal dissent, for no-one has been brought to court and no known 'culprits' are in detention awaiting trial. Further cause for concern for the Matanzimas are persistent reports of clashes between the Transkei police and army and armed dissidents in various parts of the territory. Where these dissidents obtain their arms is a matter for speculation, but the source could be the army itself, for there have also been reports of gun-running by members of the Transkei defence force.²⁰

Another indication of the insecurity felt by those in control is provided by persistent reports of the victimisation, banishment, detention and harassment of former Robben Island prisoners released into Transkei.²¹ On September 12, 1980 hundreds of Transkei police and soldiers surrounded the Ilinge township near Queenstown and ordered every male to report to the police charge offices instead of going to work. Those without stamps showing them to be Transkei citizens were held for further questioning. The police claimed that the raid was to stamp out crime in the area, but five former Robben Island prisoners, Mr Sunshine Philipson, Mr Pmemelelo Ndudula, Mr John Hashe and Mr Harry Pembaze were held for further questioning.²² Altogether 140 men were charged with being in Ilinge illegally. Mr Richard Tokwe, a former Robben Island prisoner, was detained in August by security police. Brigadier Ngceba said one month later that in the intervening period 'many former Robben Island prisoners had been detained.'²³

HUMPHREY BERKELEY

On October 18, 1980 Mr Humphrey Berkeley defied Prime Minister George Matanzima to arrest him when he visited Umtata the following week.²⁴ Berkeley had been granted a special 28-day visa by the South African government to travel to South Africa in order to institute claims against the three Transkei security policemen who he said assaulted him in 1979. Berkeley said he wanted the policemen charged and extradited to face proceedings in a South African court. He said he would seek compensation for breach of contract, wrongful arrest, assault, abduction and attempted murder. However, Mr Berkeley's case was not put on the roll for the Umtata Supreme Court, and the court registrar said: 'I don't know why Mr Berkeley is coming to Umtata.'²⁵ An application by counsel for Mr Berkeley to have a security cost order of R120 000 changed was upheld in the Umtata Supreme Court on October 24.²⁶ Security costs were then fixed at R20 000 by the court.

In February 1981 Mr Berkeley obtained another 28-day visa to attend an identity parade in Umtata so that he could identify the three policemen he alleged were responsible for the assault on him, but the Transkei attorney general asked him to delay his trip for unspecified reasons. In March 1981, Mr Berkeley was again in Umtata, but the identity parade he had expected was not held and the Attorney-General, Mr George Muller, was too busy to see him. His claim of R100 000 has still not been settled, nor has a date for the case been set.

Meanwhile Liston Ntshongwana, Mr Berkeley's close friend, has returned to Umtata, apparently without any difficulty — not even over the R10 000 the Select Committee of Public Accounts had been so concerned about when he went to South America with Dr Richard Blom, then a diplomatic representative for Transkei. The DDP's Mr D W Dweba, moving the no-confidence motion in the absence of Mr Mda, said in March 1980: 'We were astounded about this matter and we wondered how we would get the money back that this man absconded with. He left this country hurriedly and we do not know the reason why he left. To our surprise, however, we heard this man had come back again and he seems to be enjoying the confidence of the government without anyone knowing where the money was that he had taken. It was an amount of R10 000 and yet this man seems to enjoy immunity

from prosecution. Although he is so unreliable yet he seems to enjoy the confidence of the government.'²⁷

TRANSKEI RECOGNITION

Early in the new year, Transkei's registered lobbyist in the United States, Mr Ncqondi Masimini, claimed he had been officially invited to attend the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan. Mr Masimini said the alleged invitation was a great step for Transkei in its fight for international recognition. But the US State Department denied that any representative of Transkei's government had been invited to attend the inauguration.²⁸ Their statement read: 'Foreign agents, including the agent of the so-called Republic of Transkei, have no diplomatic status in the US. No invitation was or will be issued to Transkei. The US does not recognise the Transkei but considers it to be an integral part of the Republic of South Africa. We do not believe that the homelands offer a viable solution to South Africa's racial problems, and we are not willing to recognise any solution which is imposed on the black majority without their consent.'

It was the latest setback in a long history of snubs for Transkei. But in the US, some friends of the Transkei government found employment in the Reagan administration. Jay Parker, their first lobbyist, was in the transition team and even made a public plea for recognition. Donald de Kieffer, the South African Information Department lobbyist, was appointed to a senior position. Along with President Reagan's public plea for the Transkei in 1976, that provided the only faint hope of recognition in the outside world.

ATTEMPTS AT DEVELOPMENT

Late in 1980, three Transkei businessmen visited Taiwan and came back with the announcement that three joint ventures between Transkei and Taiwan were in the pipeline. The ventures included an engineering project and two chemical projects. Little else was made known, but the announcement coincided with the strengthening of economic, military and diplomatic ties between South Africa and Taiwan.

A somewhat more complex plan was revealed in February 1981. According to Chief George Matanzima, a R300-million ethanol plant which would employ more than 11 000 Transkeians was being planned for Eastern Pondoland.²⁹ Chief George said Transkei was negotiating with Pretoria for funds to finance the project. He declined to give to journalists any indication of the exact site of the plant or which companies were involved. At first sight, it had the look of another pie-in-the-sky project in the Panigel-el Hajj mould, the planning stages of which might make someone a fortune. But our sources say that Trek Beleggings, the South African-controlled petrol company, is involved. Trek is owned by Federale Mynbou, Federale Volksbeleggings and Industrial Selections, an Industrial Development Corporation subsidiary. The main shareholder of the two Federale companies is Sanlam. With such backing, the chances of funds being found somewhere seem good. Not only that but Zakrzewski Associates, whose principal consultant is Franko Maritz, the former TDC chairman, are the planning consultants. (Umtata-based architects and surveyors are very upset about Zakrzewski Associates cornering what might turn out to be a very profitable deal, and argue that the firm maintains only a token presence in Umtata. They feel they should have had a better share.)

We understand that a Swiss concern is involved in the paper and pulp project while a Dutch firm is involved in the cattle fodder scheme. All Chief George would say was that the project would be executed by overseas concerns in co-operation with 'local concerns', and could be seen 'as an important step towards realisation of the proposed constellation of states.' It was envisaged that the plant, scheduled to process ethanol from sugar cane, would yield 653 000 litres of ethanol daily once in full production, Chief George said. He added that the bulk of the product would be exported, but declined to name the markets.

Presumably, though, the market would be South Africa, where ethanol is seen as a strategic fuel in the face of possible oil sanctions.

It is because of this that the project seems to stand more chance of getting off the ground than any of Transkei's previous abortive attempts at prestigious schemes such as the proposed harbour and the Qamata irrigation schemes. Pretoria would no doubt be keenly interested in backing such a project, particularly given Trek's involvement. Further evidence of this is that officials seconded to

Umtata's Department of Agriculture by Pretoria are known to have been working for a considerable time on feasibility studies of large-scale sugar cane farming in Pondoland.

Chief George said the decision to proceed with the project, which is likely to be situated in the Bizana area of Pondoland, had been taken by a unanimous cabinet after receiving a feasibility report drawn up by a group of South African advisers. It is not known whether the advisers were members of South African government departments.

The concept of the proposed ethanol plant and the massive sugar cane cultivation and hydro electric plant that go with it is in line with the constellation strategy. The main thrust of the project is to provide large-scale employment, according to Chief George. One of the Transkei's most pressing problems is massive unemployment, and Pretoria is as keen as the Matanzimas to contain the threat of rural rebellion in the bantustan showpiece.

Development projects like this one might stand a better chance of stemming the tide of discontent if the Transkei's crisis was not compounded by a massive corruption in the corridors of government departments and in the fiefdoms of government-appointed chiefs. Chief Kaiser Matanzima revealed a growing, if belated, concern for corruption in government in September 1980 when he said that government departments were 'bedevilled by the presence of thieves, drunkards and subversive employees.'³⁰

'Ever since Transkei acquired independence it has become a haven for terrorists, murderers, thieves and other unruly elements who escape from South Africa,' he said. What prompted his alarm was suggested by another remark he made in the same speech. He said Transkei was looking forward to the proposed establishment of a constellation of states. The South African government, as mentioned earlier, had embarked on a campaign of reclaiming 'a large measure of economic control' in an attempt to halt corruption and mismanagement in Transkei.³¹ Pretoria had stopped its annual R113,5-million bulk-aid package to Transkei and replaced it with tight control over how and when Transkei received and used aid.

The *Star*³² said the Matanzimas had been 'forced by growing unrest and opposition in its ranks to accept the new arrangement.' The newspaper reported that Pretoria's grants would be concentrated on funding, under strict supervision, educational, agricultural and 'sound' industrial projects. A number of cabinet

statements condemning corruption and abuse of privilege were made over the following six months, and several cases of corruption amongst civil servants, including one cabinet minister, were brought before the courts. Among issues raised in the press were allegations of police drunkenness, cases of soldiers raping rural women, massive theft of government property and high-level government corruption.³³

In October 1980, the Minister of Works, Mr H D Mloyeni and his departmental secretary, Mr S S Ngudlwa, were charged with the theft of building materials, the use of governmental employees for private work during office hours and the private use of government vehicles. Mr Mloyeni was forced to tender his resignation from the cabinet. In March 1981, he was found guilty in the Supreme Court.

CISKEI, VENDA AND SOUTH AFRICA

The proposed independence of Ciskei in December 1981 provoked an angry reaction from Umtata. In a special statement, released to the editor of the *Daily Dispatch*, Chief George said Transkei would refuse to sit with the Ciskei at any meeting of the envisaged constellation of states. Quite correctly, he pointed out the contradiction in Nationalist policy revealed by the move, which would destroy the Xhosa national unit and contravene the Self-Government Act of 1971. He also accused the South African government of implementing a divide-and-rule policy. Transkei had the 'rightful claim' to be the sole representative of the Xhosa and he said it would be interesting to know which national unit Ciskei would represent at constellation meetings. 'I wish to urge South Africa . . . not to create problems for itself by granting independence to Ciskei separately from Transkei.'³⁴

The Ciskei's Chief Minister, Chief Lennox Sebe, was not impressed. He said the Ciskei would have its own brand of 'independence' different from that of Transkei's and it would enter a confederation with South Africa.³⁵ He said later that Chief George had 'insulted' the Ciskei. 'Our people voiced their feelings about independence in a referendum. We believe their wishes are sacred. The nation says it wants independence. Where does Chief Matanzima come into it? Who is he?'³⁶ As the crossfire between the two homeland governments continued heatedly, the statements

merely underlined just how successful the policy of divide-and-rule had been. There was also validity in the reaction of a nominated Progressive Federal Party MP, Mr Nic Olivier, when he said Chief George was 'trying to be a bit of an imperialist.'³⁷

Still, the Matanzimas are quite capable of changing their minds, as the visit to Umtata in January 1981 by the President of Venda, Chief Patrick Mphahlele showed. Shortly before Venda got its independence at the end of 1979, Kaiser Matanzima contemptuously dismissed the move, saying Venda had no historical claim to independence, unlike Transkei and Bophuthatswana. Transkei would refuse to recognise Venda, he said then.

Yet just over a year later Chief Mphahlele was saying that he would mould his homeland on the pattern of Transkei, and telling his delegation to learn and note down everything they came across during their visit.³⁸ Welcoming Chief Mphahlele, President Matanzima said the Venda visit took place at a time when there was an 'ardent desire in the air for international co-operation and co-existence.'³⁹

The 'international' exchange said more about Pretoria's power over the policies of its satellites than anything else. It did not suit the South African government that two of its three independent states should fail to recognise each other. If Transkei and Ciskei refuse to sit at the same table that will be more disagreeable still.

Pretoria's power was also illustrated when the Vice-Dean of Arts at the University of Transkei, Professor Piet Verhoef, was dismissed after three years at the university. The South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs terminated his secondment. The principal of the university, Professor B van der Merwe, actually said that the South African Foreign Affairs Department had 'ordered' the termination. His apparent crime was to support, as a member of the Examination Board, the dropping of Afrikaans from the Transkeian school syllabus. Professor Verhoef claimed that Professor van der Merwe had accused him of meddling in Transkeian politics and called him a political agitator. 'Prof van der Merwe told me it was my duty to implement the principles of Bantu education. He said because the South African government was paying for education in Transkei, they decided what should be taught,' he said. Professor van der Merwe denied this but did say that the authorities in South Africa 'could' have been upset over Professor Verhoef's recommendations to have Afrikaans dropped from the school syllabus.⁴⁰

Pretoria has little power to change the daily lives of people in

Transkei. Like the people of Venda, Transkeians are still suffering the effects of the bantustan policy, as well as the aftermath of the drought.

In spite of 'peaceful co-existence' and international co-operation between Transkei, Venda and South Africa, the number of unemployed people in Transkei appears to have reached new heights. Starvation and grinding poverty are at a maximum, thousands more unemployed workers continue to stream into the Transkei on Administration Board orders, and the most lucrative cash crop, dagga, has suffered a bad decline in production owing to the drought.

Transkei's director of social services, Mr I D Sawula said of the drought and of the general situation in the region: 'If you drive through the countryside, you will find a lot of young men and women roaming around, unable to work on the dry land or finding no jobs to earn a living. This unemployment crisis has now spread to suburban areas like Umtata and Butterworth, resulting in a fast-increasing crime rate and an unprecedented high population of street beggars.'⁴¹

That summed up the reality of life for the average Transkeian after nearly five years of 'independence' rather more accurately than the optimistic projections which continue to flow from government sources.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Daily Dispatch*, 10 October 1980.
2. *Ibid*, 29 September 1980.
3. *Argus*, 29 October 1980.
4. *Daily Dispatch*, 5 November 1980.
5. *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 October 1980.
6. *Argus*, 16 December 1980.
7. *Post*, 23 September 1980.
8. *Daily Dispatch*, 7 November 1980.
9. *Ibid*, 6 November 1980.
10. *Ibid*, 18 November 1980.
11. *Ibid*, 23 August 1980.
12. *Post*, 30 October 1980.

13. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 November 1980.
14. *Post*, 24 August 1980.
15. *Daily Dispatch*, 27 August 1980.
16. *Argus*, 27 August 1980.
17. *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 August 1980.
18. *Daily Dispatch*, 11 September 1980.
19. *Ibid*, 12 September 1980.
20. *Argus*, 27 August 1980.
21. *Cape Times*, 13 September 1980, among others. *Star*, 15 July 1980.
22. *Ibid*.
23. *Ibid*.
24. *Argus*, 18 October 1980.
25. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 October 1980.
26. *Ibid*, 24 October 1980.
27. 1980 Hansard, page 9.
28. *Cape Times*, 16 January 1981.
29. *Star*, 15 July 1980.
30. *Evening Post*, 29 September 1980.
31. *Star*, 15 July 1980.
32. *Ibid*.
33. *Ibid*.
34. *Daily Dispatch*, 4 February 1981.
35. *Ibid*.
36. *Sunday Times*, 15 February 1981.
37. *Cape Times*, 10 February 1981.
38. *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 January 1981.
39. *Ibid*.
40. *Daily Dispatch*, 21 August 1980, and *Sunday Tribune*, 24 August 1980.
41. *Daily Dispatch*, 23 November 1980.

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The best bibliography we have found appeared in Newell Stultz's Transkei's Half Loaf (David Philip, 1980). With all credit to him, we have used his sound bibliography as a base and then built on it. Some of the publications he has listed are not available inside South Africa at present because they have been banned or they have been published by banned organisations. We have kept these books on the list, however, because they are part of the literature on Transkei and South Africa, even though it has been impossible for us to refer to them.

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